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Electronic commerce has been described as unique, in the opportunities it creates 
for economic growth and its potential to revolutionise the way business is done. 
Although initial expectations and predictions have proven rather optimistic, it must 
nevertheless be accepted that electronic commerce has firmly established its place in the 
economies of the United Kingdom and European Union. 
Although considerable work and discussion has surrounded the creation of a 
regulatory framework for electronic commerce, insufficient attention has been given to 
the most fundamental element - the legal regime applicable to electronic contracts. 
Electronic contracts form the basis of electronic commerce. 
Parties have been contracting electronically for some time. However, electronic 
contracts have unique qualities and attributes making them sufficiently `different' to 
contracts entered by more `traditional' means to raise questions of the applicability and 
appropriateness of existing legal principles. This work is an examination of the legal 
environment within which electronic contracts are made. If electronic commerce is to 
reach its economic potential there must be a stable and predictable legal environment for 
electronic contracts. In this thesis the existing common law and regulatory principles are 
analysed, in the context of electronic contracts, to examine whether their application has 
the potential to create a stable legal environment. It is argued that a combination of, 
uncertainty in the common law; dated concepts in regulatory measures; and the 
introduction of new regulation without sufficient consideration of the nature of the 
electronic environment, has resulted in a lack of clarity in the law applicable to electronic 
contracts. 
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1.1 Electronic Contracts 
Contract az 1. An agreement between two or more parties creating obligations that are 
enforceable or otherwise recognisable at law <a binding contract> 1 
Electronic 4 adjective 1 (of a device) having or operating with the aid of many small 
components, especially microchips and transistors, that control and direct an electric current. 
3 relating to or carried out using a computer or other electronic device, especially over a network: 
electronic shopping. 2 
Two relatively well established and reasonably well understood definitions. Put 
simply, electronic contracts are contracts entered into via, or facilitated by, electronic 
forms of communication' Parties have been contracting electronically for some time. 
However, electronic contracts have unique qualities and attributes that are sufficiently 
d g&= to contracts entered by more `traditional' means to raise questions of the 
applicability and appropriateness of existing legal principles. This work is an examination 
of the legal environment within which electronic contracts are made. 
1.2 Electronic Commerce and Legal Certainty 
Electronic commerce has been described as "a unique opportunity to create 
economic growth, a competitive European industry and new jobs. "` It also has "the 
potential to revolutionise the way business is done and improve the competitiveness of 
i Blacks Law Dictionary 7th edition. West Group 1999. 
2 The New Oxford Dictionary of English, Oxford University press 1998. 
3 It is accepted that the phrase ̀electronic communications' can encompass many of the older and more 
basic forms of communication such as fax, conventional telephones and even telex. Here, the phrase is 
used to refer to the more 'modem' forms of communication, including e-mail, mobile-phones and the 
Internet, unless otherwise stated. 
4 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic 
commerce in the internal market. (COM(98) 586 final); (OJ C30, (05.02.99)) at p. 3. 
1 
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British industry. "' Although initial expectations and predictions have proven rather 
optimistic, it must nevertheless be accepted that electronic commerce. has firmly 
established its place in the economies of the United Kingdom and European Union. 
Trist and confidence in the electronic environment and in entering electronic 
contracts has a significant role to play in the development of electronic commerce. The 
legal regime applicable to electronic commerce must not only be consistent and 
predictable but must also foster an environment of trust and confidence, particularly for 
weaker parties such as consumers. 
Contracts created and often performed in the electronic environment form the 
basis of electronic commerce. A contract is required, to access the electronic 
environment (a contract with an Internet Service Provider (ISP) for example); to create a 
presence in that environment (contracts for domain names, hosting and e-mail services); 
and most obviously contracts to transact with customers and participate in the e- 
commerce economy, an economy worth 14,572 billion US dollars' and an estimated 172 
billion Euro7 in 2001. 
A stable and predictable legal environment for electronic contracts is therefore 
essential for the growth of electronic commerce. The European Commission has 
indicated that: 
"electronic commerce will not fully develop if concluding online contracts is 
hampered. "8 
The Commission also identified key elements required to provide an appropriate legal 
environment to promote electronic commerce and facilitate the use of electronic 
contracts. The essential elements are: 
1) the removal of legal barriers' to the use of electronic contracts; 
2) a non-discriminatory or medium neutral approach to contracts formed and 
performed by electronic means; and 
5 Department of Trade and Industry. Buddig CayUmx in Elwron c Comm -A Cons dution Daaonvrt. 5th 
March 1999 URN 99/642 at p. 1. 
6 U. S. Census Bureau. `E-Stats' 2001. Available at; www. census. gov/estats. 
7 Eurostat `E-Commerce in Europe' 2000/2001 Available at; 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/enterprise/ict/studies/lr-e-comm-in-eur-2001. pdf. 
8 Op cit fn. 4 at p. 4. 
2 
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3) the creation of legal certainty in the principles and legislation applicable to 
contractual relationships created in the electronic environment. ' 
It is often said that business parties prefer a `light touch' approach to the 
regulation of commercial activity, allowing for party autonomy wherever possible. 
However, it is equally important in many areas (particularly those considered in this 
thesis) for there to be a sufficient level of legal certainty to enable businessmen to order 
their affairs. As Professor Roy Goode states: 
"A recurrent theme in the development of English commercial law is the 
importance attached to predictability. As our judges have said again and again 
over the past 300 years, it is better that the law should be certain than that in every 
case it should be just. "" 
Legal certainty in this context is required to provide a predictable and stable legal 
environment within which a business party can ascertain the potential risks, liabilities and 
responsibilities which may arise from a particular venture. Whilst legal certainty is 
desirable for commercial activity in general it is particularly important for electronic 
commerce because the activity is new to those participating and a lack of legal certainty 
may undermine the confidence required to take steps into this `new' territory. There is a 
general consensus that if electronic commerce is to reach its potential then a consistent 
and predictable legal environment must be created. 
"The pace and the extent to which Europe will benefit from electronic 
commerce greatly depends on having up-to-date legislation that fully meets the 
needs of business and consumers"" 
The needs of the business community in relation to legal certainty and 
predictability can be seen in the report for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) chaired by Mr. John Sacher in 1997. In the report it is 
asserted that: 
9 Ibid at p. 7,8, and 11. 
10 Goode, R Tim Haanbn La-bam- Gwrnmal Law in the Next Millamiwn. (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1998) 
p. 14. Empbzis added. 
11 "A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce" COM(97)157 at p. 12. 
3 
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"Commerce depends on confidence. For the electronic market-place to flourish 
in both its customer and enterprise dimensions, buyers and sellers alike must 
have at least the level of confidence in the outcome of Electronic Commerce as 
they have in more traditional kinds of transactions. "" 
and 
"As a matter of urgency, governments need to clarify the legal definitions, 
practices and structures that pertain to commercial activities in an electronic 
environment" 
The report identifies a number of key issues. In particular the fact that an 
increased level of legal certainty, when compared to traditional commercial activity, is not 
necessarily required but rather that the nature of electronic commerce and associated 
technological developments challenge existing legal provisions, principles and definitions 
creating a potentially detrimental degree of uncertainty. This is illustrated by reference to 
the nature of the electronic environment and the prevalence of contracts for intangible 
products in electronic commerce. The report concludes that governments should 
"adjust existing laws and regulations so that they apply to "intangible" as well as 
"material" product environments. "" 
For consumers the need for legal certainty' relates to the protection they are 
afforded when entering transactions with parties via electronic commerce, particularly 
parties in other states. Consumers are becoming increasingly aware of their rights 
through the media and the availability and dissemination of information promoted by the 
European Union and implemented by the Office of Fair Trading. Electronic commerce 
is relatively new and an unknown quantity to consumers and the EU and other interested 
bodies" have recognised that uncertainty as to what legal protection consumers are 
afforded in cross border electronic contracts may lead to a lack of confidence. The 
Council of the European Union identified particular concerns including the legal regime 
12 OECD Report of the Group of High-Level Private Sector Experts on Electronic Commerce. 
Electronic Commerce: Opportunities and Challenges for Government (The Sacher Report), OECD, 
August 1997 p. 16 & 42. 
13 IM This issue is considered in below in chapter 3 and in detail in the context of implied terms in 
chapter 13. 
11 The European Consumer Law Group and the National Consumer Council for example. 
4 
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applicable to consumer contracts and contractual terms, liabilities and responsibilities. " 
The European Consumer Law Group (ECLG) focus on this crucial issue in their report 
on consumer transactions on the Internet in 2000: 
"The development of the Internet as a shopping channel can be of great benefit 
to consumers. It can lead to lower prices, a more varied range of choices of 
delivery and more flexible payment solutions. But still there is a long way to go 
before consumer protection is sufficient and business attitudes serious enough to 
develop a thriving market. Today many consumers lack confidence in this new 
technology. 
This report deals with four important issues related to the Internet: contract 
conclusion, payment, privacy, and jurisdiction/applicable law. These are the areas 
of major importance, and concern, for consumers. Without a good legal 
framework and a high level of consumer protection in these areas consumers will 
not use the Internet as a shopping channel and the Internet will not develop to its 
potential. "" 
One of the main benefits associated with the electronic environment is the ability 
to conveniently and quickly conclude contracts with parties in another State. This factor 
must also be introduced into any discussion of the legal environment applicable to 
electronic contracts. Although cross-border trade is not a new phenomenon, the extent 
to which it is now possible, and the accessibility of cross-border trade to the ordinary 
consumer, is a unique attribute of electronic commerce 
The law then has a dual role, to facilitate and promote the use of electronic 
contracts by providing legal certainty and to create an environment of trust and 
confidence for electronic commerce. 
So to the purpose of this research: Can the law applicable to contractual 
relationships in England and Wales, as influenced by legislation from the European 
Community, fulfil these requirements and adequately accommodate lectronic contracts? 
is See; "The Consumer Dimension of the Information Society". Council Resolution (3. XI. 1998. Adopted 
at the 2128th Council meeting on "Consumer Affairs", Brussels, 3 November 1998. Article 4 
(d, g& h). 
16 Report of the European Consumer Law Group (ECLG) "Consumer Transactions on the Internet" 
(ECLG/194/2000) at p. 2. 
5 
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The approach adopted in this thesis is to assess the existing common law and 
regulatory principles to establish, 
1) Whether they can be applied.. ) (Does the terminology used or basis of the 
approach adopted make it impossible to apply a particular principle to electronic 
contracts? ) 
2) What the likely consequences are of the application of the existing principles? 
a. Is the result absurd, unwelcome or contrary to the purpose or function of 
the principle or legislation? 
b. Could the result have a detrimental impact upon the use of electronic 
contracts and correspondingly electronic commerce? 
In addition, a number of regulatory provisions have been implemented because of 
concerns that existing principles and legislation may not be able to accommodate 
electronic contracts successfully. These developments will be examined and analysed 
against, 
a. the problems perceived with the existing law; 
b. the objectives of the new regulation; and 
c. whether the new regulation has or is likely to achieve those objectives. 
From this analysis it is possible to assess whether existing law permits, facilitates, or 
deters the use of electronic contracts. 
An important caixat to be remembered when considering the electronic 
environment and electronic contracts was highlighted by Professor Goode in his 1997 
Hamlyn Lectures: 
"In debates concerning the legal implications of an electronic business 
environment here is an unfortunate tendency to over-emphasise the technology 
and to assume that it automatically changes everything so far as legal relationships 
are concerned. This is a myth which I am anxious to dispel. "
He continued to pose a fundamental question: 
6 
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"... it is necessary to ask why, if the message is broadly the same, its legal 
significance should be affected by the medium through which it is sent. "" 
The Professor's comments emphasise the resistance that should meet any discriminatory 
treatment of contracts formed and performed by electronic means of communication. It 
follows that, a fortiori, the communication medium used to create a contract and the 
media employed to deliver the subject matter of that contract should not dictate a party's 
rights. The technology must not be allowed to conceal the fact that an electronic 
contract is after all just a contract. 
1.3 The ̀ Thesis' 
This thesis then is an argument that although considerable work and discussion 
has surrounded the creation of a regulatory framework for electronic commerce, 
insufficient attention has been given to the most fundamental element - the legal regime 
applicable to electronic contracts. It is submitted that although the common law in 
England and Wales is sufficiently flexible and adaptable to accommodate electronic 
contracts, regulatory guidance is needed to create a predictable, consistent and favourable 
environment with sufficient legal certainty to promote the use of electronic contracts and 
hence, electronic commerce. It is further submitted that where measures have been 
introduced with the objective of accommodating new methods of communication and 
electronic contracts, insufficient consideration has been given to the nature of the 
electronic environment to produce regulation which is sufficiently clear to provide the 
legal certainty and favourable legal environment desired. 
1.4 The Structure of this Work 
The research focuses on the law of England and Wales and applicable legislative 
instruments emanating from the European Community. Where relevant reference is also 
made to other sources helpful in the analysis of electronic contracting, including the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCTTRAL). The research 
was concluded on September 1A 2002. However, where possible developments after that 
date have been included in the text. In the text, words importing the masculine gender 
include the feminine and vice versa. 




This work is divided into five sections intended to be a progressive examination 
of the law and electronic contracts. In Section I this introduction is followed by a brief 
examination of Electronic Data Interchange (ED) which can be politely referred to as 
`the old man' of electronic commerce. Its relegation to a brief discussion is in no way a 
reflection of its significance to electronic commerce, responsible as it is for the majority 
of electronic contracting worldwide, but rather a reflection of the nature and 
environment within which that particular type of electronic commerce takes place. 
Chapter 3 contains a discussion of issues fundamental to the rest of this work, the nature 
of the electronic environment and of electronic contracts. This chapter illustrates the 
important elements of electronic commerce and in particular the significantly different 
nature of many electronic contracts and their subject matter, compared to their more 
traditional counterparts. 
In Section II the issues relevant to the cross-border potential of electronic 
commerce and specifically electronic contracts are examined. For the European 
Community the facilitation of cross-border trade is a fundamental principle of the Single 
Market. Electronic communications create an unprecedented opportunity for the 
development of cross border trade between businesses and with consumers throughout 
Europe. Chapter 4 contains a detailed examination of the rules relating to the 
adjudicative jurisdiction of the courts in a contractual dispute. The discussion includes 
an analysis of the Brussels Convention18 and its recent replacement, the `Brussels 
Regulation', " introduced to accommodate modem forms of communication and clarify 
the interpretation of certain provisions contained in the 1968 Convention. The 
provisions contained in these instruments are analysed in the context of electronic 
contracts to examine whether they provide the legal certainty and subsequent confidence 
required to promote the use of electronic contracts. In chapter 5 the same approach is 
adopted in the examination of the rules for determining the governing or applicable law 
of the contract. The provisions of the Rome Convention20 form the basis of this analysis 
and the significance of the lack of a modernising, at present, is considered. The section 
is concluded with an assessment of whether the specific rules relating to cross border 
contractual activity are sufficiently clear when applied to the electronic environment to 
promote the desired confidence in the use of electronic contracts. 
18 The Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 
signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968, (OJ L299/32). 
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, on `jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters' (OJ L 12/1 (16.1.2001)). 
20 The 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (OJ L 266). 
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Section III is concerned with the creation of electronic contracts. Chapter 6 
highlights the potential problems created by the `anonymity' of the electronic 
environment and the difficulty in identifying the party you are communicating with. This 
situation creates two potential problems for electronic contracts, a lack of confidence in 
entering a contract with a party with whom you are communicating electronically and the 
creation of a contract with a party other than the one with whom you were intending to 
contract. The practical solutions to the first problem and the common law response to 
the second are considered. The issues raised in this chapter also highlight the need for 
transparency in electronic commerce and the importance of the provision of information 
about business parties contracting in the electronic environment. Statutory information 
requirements have been introduced to address this issue and help promote trust and 
confidence in electronic commerce and these are also considered in the discussion. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the potential problems created for electronic contracts by formal 
legal requirements such as 'writing' and `signature'. Requirements of this nature, 
developed and adopted in a paper-based society, are often considered to be potential 
`barriers' to the development of electronic commerce. Their potential to act as ̀ barriers' 
to the use of electronic contracts and the regulatory solutions to this perceived problem 
are discussed. The chapter also contains an analysis of formal requirements specifically 
introduced for the electronic environment. The risks associated with the introduction of 
such requirements and the potential creation of additional barriers to the use of 
electronic contracts by the use of inappropriate terminology is highlighted. In chapter 8 
the formation of electronic contracts is analysed. The final chapter in this section is 
devoted to a discussion of the application of traditional contract formation principles to 
the electronic environment and the potential difficulties associated with this application. 
There is an inherent flexibility in the common law which allows for the accommodation 
of new technology and changes in society. Unfortunately the corollary of this flexibility 
can be legal uncertainty, which may have a detrimental effect on electronic contracting 
because of the difficulty predicting how existing principles will be applied to electronic 
contracts. Of particular importance in the electronic environment is the question of 
when and where a contract is actually formed. To address this issue the common law 
rules on contractual offer and acceptance must be considered, including the inevitable 




In Section IV the contents, or terms of electronic contracts are the focus. The 
analysis begins in chapter 9 with an examination of the traditional common law 
principles relevant to the incorporation of terms and the application of those principles 
to electronic contracts. Chapters 10,11 and 12 are concerned with the regulatory control 
of contractual terms, in particular the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. This legislation may be particularly 
important to the development of consumer confidence in participating in electronic 
commerce. The background and objectives of these pieces of legislation are considered 
with the substantive elements to examine whether the objectives can be achieved in the 
electronic environment. The section is concluded with a consideration of the implication 
of terms into contracts at common law and by statute in chapter 13. Here, a particular 
issue is raised by the increasing occurrence of `dematerialised' or intangible items as the 
subject matter of electronic contracts and the appropriate terms to be implied as to the 
standards of performance required. The issue has been raised briefly in the courts in 
relation to computer software and whether the implied terms as to quality in the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 should apply to contracts for its supply. As computer software and 
other intangible items are common subject matter in electronic contracts this issue is of 
particular importance and uncertainty in the matter may have detrimental effects on 
electronic commerce. 
Section V concludes the work with a re-examination of the initial proposition 
that the present legal environment applicable to electronic contracts does not provide the 
legal certainty, consistency and predictability required to promote confidence in the use 
of electronic contracts and the development of electronic commerce. 
The topics considered in this thesis were chosen on the basis of their significance 
to electronic contracting in the United Kingdom and cross border trade in general within 
the European Union. From the preliminary research it was clear that the areas identified 
would pose a significant challenge to existing legal rules. The subject matter chosen also 
broadly reflects the issues which have been prominent in regulatory developments and 
policy discussions concerning electronic commerce at an International, European and 
National level. 
A discussion of the nature of the electronic environment and electronic contracts 
is an essential starting point. However, before that discussion, brief consideration must 
be given to a particular form of electronic commerce and a well established form of 
electronic contracting, Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). 
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2 
Electronic Data Interchange 
At this point a brief discussion of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is required. 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDT) is one of the oldest and hence, most established 
forms of electronic commerce. In the banking and airline sectors EDI has been in use 
since the 1960's. 1 Its function is primarily the transfer of data between users, whether on 
a floppy disc delivered by a courier or via a direct computer link. The purpose of such 
data can range from simple information exchange to facilitating complex stock 
management and payment systems. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce defines EDI as, 
"the electronic transfer from computer to computer of information using an 
agreed standard to structure the information. "Z 
EDI and its associated technology were the focus of early discussions of the legal 
issues now commonly discussed under the broader mantle of `electronic commerce'. 
The shift in focus from EDI to Electronic Commerce can be attributed to two main 
factors' The first has been the rapid development of technology and the widespread 
availability of that technology, making EDI only one element in the electronic commerce 
phenomenon. This move is reflected in one of the earliest attempts to guide the 
regulation of electronic commerce, the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Model Law began 
life, and its key principles were developed, under the auspices of an investigation of the 
legal issues raised by EDI. Identifying the need to encompass a broader range of 
communications used in electronic commerce the UNCTIRAL sought to provide, 
I See, Lloyd, I. Legal Asports of te Inform Society (London: Butterworths, 2000) at, p. 233. 
2 Article 2(b) of the UNCTTRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996). General Assembly 
Resolution 51/162 of 16 December 1996. Available at; 
http: //www. undtral. org/enZlish/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm. htm. 
3 See op cit fn. 1 at p. 233. 
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"a general framework that would identify the issues and provide a set of legal 
principles and basic legal rules governing communication through electronic 
commerce. "4 
indicating that the issues under consideration had a much broader sphere of application. 
The second factor is the pre-formulated structure within which EDI takes place. 
EDI can produce considerable savings in human and paper resources and increase speed 
and efficiency. ' However, in order to obtain these benefits the system put in place must 
be highly structured with appropriate safeguards to reduce the risks associated with 
electronic systems. ' In order to achieve this, the transactions between the parties usually 
take place within a highly structured regime, agreed upon in advance. The potential for 
disputes arising due to legal uncertainties is considerably reduced. The parties will make 
provision for a variety of these issues before any transactions take place. These 
provisions are usually found in an Interchange Agreement. In the agreement he parties 
will generally prescribe technical specifications, formats and protocols; security, 
confidentiality and archiving procedures; dispute resolution and legal forum provisions; 
and importantly, detailed provisions relating to contract formation. 
In he with the approach adopted by other multinational bodies' in 1994 the 
European Community introduced a Model Interchange Agreement as guidance to parties 
seeking to take advantage of EDI. B Rather than prescribing the content of Interchange 
agreements it provides a structure highlighting the key issues, for parties to customise to 
their own particular needs. Its form and structure is indicative of many such agreements 
in use by commercial parties. The Model Agreement deals with contract formation as 
follows: 
3.1. The parties, intending to be legally bound by the Agreement, expressly waive 
any rights to contest the validity of a contract effected by the use of EDI in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement on the sole ground 
that it was effected by EDI. 
Guide to Enactment of the UNCTTRAL Model Law on electronic Commerce (1996) at para 131. 
SOpc*fn 1. 
6 Such as system failure and errors in transmission to unauthorised access, and resultant liabilities. 
7 In particular the UN/ECE, 1990-03, definition of UN/EDIFACT: United Nations rules for Electronic 
Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport. They comprise a set of internationally 
agreed standards, directories and guidelines for the electronic interchange of structured data, and in 
particular that related to trade in goods and services between independent, computerised information 
systems 
8EC Model Interchange Agreement - 94/820/EC OJ L338/98 (28.12.1994). 
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3.2. Each party shall ensure that the content of an EDI message sent or received 
is not inconsistent with the law of its own respective country, the application of 
which could restrict the content of an EDI message, and shall take all necessary 
measures to inform without delay the other party of such an inconsistency. 
3.3. A contract effected by the use of EDI shall be concluded at the time and 
place where the EDI message constituting acceptance of an offer reaches the 
computer system of the offeror. ' 
An agreement of this nature commits the parties to recognising the validity of contracts 
entered into via EDI and specifies the time and place of contract formation. "
By employing the regular, structured format of the interchange agreement, he 
parties will deal with many of the key legal issues themselves to ensure a smooth 
operation and the minimum risk of conflict due to legal uncertainty. The existence of 
such a structured and pre-meditated approach to EDI means that at present, e-mail, web- 
based and other forms of electronic commerce, where there is no pre-existing 
relationship between the parties, raise the more significant legal issues for electronic 
contracting and hence this thesis. However, the substantial economic significance of 
EDI and its impact on e-commerce as a whole must not be overlooked because, 
"Business-to-Business (B2B) activity, which depends critically on Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI), dominates e-commerce. "" 
Therefore where the issues discussed below have a bearing on EDI or EDI agreements 
they are incorporated into the discussion. 
9 Article 3. Validity and formation of contract. 
lo Although phrases uch as 'reaches the computer system of the offeror' have the potential to create 
difficulties. See the discussion of 'receipt' of electronic communications below chapter 8.4. 
11 U. S. Census Bureau. 'E-Stats' 2001. Available at; www. censu. mv/estats. (March 2003). 
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3 
The Nature of the Electronic Environment and 
Electronic Contracts 
As was indicated in the introduction, the electronic environment, within which 
electronic contracts are formed, demonstrates a number of unique characteristics. As a 
consequence many elements of the contractual process and contractual relationships 
formed in that environment are also unique. It is important to consider these 
characteristics independently before any detailed analysis is undertaken because the 
unique characteristics of the electronic environment and electronic contracts have 
potential implications for many of the legal issues discussed below. In this section the 
`nature' of the electronic environment, the contractual process, the contracting parties 
and the subject matter of electronic contracts will be considered. This analysis, focussing 
on some well known issues, is essential to the following discussion. 
3.1 The `Nature' of the Electronic Environment 
Electronic contracting takes place in the electronic environment, via electronic 
forms of communication and is an integral element of electronic commerce. 
3.1.2 Electronic Communications 
Electronic communications involve the exchanging of information by electronic 
means and can encompass awide variety of methods, techniques and technology, many 
of which have been in existence for some time. Section 15 of the Electronic 
Communications Act 2000 defines "electronic communication" as, 
"a communication transmitted (whether from one person to another, from one 
device to another or from a person to a device or vice versa)- 
(a) by means of a telecommunication system (within the meaning of the 
Telecommunications Act 1984); or 
(b) by other means but while in an electronic form 
14 
TheEla cEminnn 
On this broad interpretation electronic communications can encompass any 
communication transmitted by connecting a device to a telecommunication network. 
This could be a telephone, a fax machine, a personal computer, a laptop or a Personal 
Data Assistant (PDA). Electronic contracts are most commonly associated with 
computer-based forms of communication and Electronic Data Interchange (`EDI' - 
discussed above) can probably claim to be the oldest form of computer based electronic 
contracting. ' Here, the communication is automated, and contractual messages are sent 
and received directly between computers, often without any human intervention. 
However, it is the accessibility and expansion of the Internet and the World Wide Web 
which has been responsible for the establishment and growth of most electronic 
commerce based business and hence, electronic contracting. For the majority of 
electronic contracts on open networks, e-mail and interactive websites are the chosen 
form of communication. A personal computer or laptop is connected to the Internet or 
some other network and parties communicate using electronic mail protocols (e-mail) or 
web-based communications, such as websites. Websites can take a variety of forms and 
the form adopted not only dictates the function performed by that website but may also 
have an influence on a number of legal issues. 
3.1.2.1 Websites - `Passive' or `Interactive' 
Websites can be used in a number of ways and they can be broadly classed as 
`passive' or `interactive'. Here the phrase ̀ passive' is used to describe sites that merely 
provide information to the viewer, such as advertisements, product ranges and price lists, 
and contact names and addresses. The phrase ̀ interactive' describes those sites which 
allow greater user interaction such as the placing of orders. This may include the sending 
of automated responses to confirm the receipt of orders, the tracking of orders, and in 
many cases the automated provision of the service, information or data product ordered. 
The site may also provide a `personalised' shopping experience with the use of cookies' 
to store individual user information and allow the site software to target advertising to 
I "The most mature form of electronic contracting is electronic data exchange (EDI), which permits 
trading partners to exchange commercial documents electronically. ' Baum, M. S. & Perritt, H. Elarronic 
Q -aczircg Publishing and EDI Lary (Wiley Law Publications: New York, 1991) p. 2. 
2 According to 'Netscape', cookies are a "general mechanism which server side connections can use to 
both store and retrieve information on the client side of the connection. " Essentially, cookies are small 
data files written to your hard drive by web sites when you view them in your internet browser software. 
These data files contain information the site can use to remember such things as passwords, items in your 
'virtual shopping basket' and lists of pages you have visited, to save time on subsequent visits. 
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the user's profile, such as suggesting linked purchases. Some service providers have co- 
operated to create ̀ virtual shopping malls' with `virtual shop assistants' to guide you 
around the site with a human face, providing the user with a more familiar shopping 
experience' 
However, it is important to remember that while this may be one of the most 
popular methods of electronic contracting at present, the technology involved is 
constantly developing and there are likely to be significant changes in the future. ' 
3.1.2.2. The `nature' of electronic communications 
The ̀ nature' of electronic forms of communication also means that it is often 
difficult to assess ̀when' they are sent and `where' they are sent from. The law often 
requires, or searches for, some physical manifestation of the subject matter, the parties' 
presence or the contract itself. The physical concepts of time and place have little 
meaning in the electronic environment, but many legal concepts are predicated upon the 
location of a certain thing at a particular time. At the simplest level, it makes the 
ascertaining of the point at which a contractually significant communication is effective 
problematic. This characteristic also has the potential to create difficulties when 
ascertaining the appropriate legal forum, or jurisdiction, and the proper law of a 
contract .5 
Communications via the Internet, a mobile phone or a PDA are ephemeral in 
nature and their presence on a piece of equipment may be transient unless steps are taken 
to store or print the communication. Even if a message is stored, the electronic data can 
often be easily altered without leaving a trace of the interference. This raises evidential 
questions as to the existence and reliability of an electronic communication if, for 
example, a contractual dispute arises as to the existence of a contract or the terms and 
conditions of a contract. 
3 See Shop@AOL. CO. UK; http: //www. shopping. aol. co. uk- 
4 Even 'sci-fi' based gadgets, such as a pair of spectacles through which the wearer can gain access to the 
networks including the Internet, which are operated by voice command or even eye movement, are 
technologically on the horizon (Tomorrows World, BBC June 2001). Science of fiction? See 
<htcl2: //www. hackwriters. com/fatureofnetworks. htm>; <ht_pt : //www phys uni. torun. pl/--doch/ref/01- 
future/> If nothing more, this serves to illustrate that care must be taken when adopting legal approaches 
to regulate this area, not to base the concepts too heavily on current technology. 
5 Considered below in chapter 5. 
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3.1.3 Electronic Commerce (e-commerce) 
Rapid advancements in communications technology and its availability, 
combined with the expansion of communications networks, have been responsible for 
the phenomenon known as electronic commerce (e-commerce). A well known 
phenomenon it may be, but defining it can be more problematic. ' The definitions 
proposed tend to be unspecific and very broad 
"Electronic commerce is a broad concept hat covers any commercial transaction 
that is effected via electronic means and would include such means as facsimile, 
telex, EDI, internet and telephone. "' 
A broad and flexible definition is probably appropriate in light of the constant 
technological change associated with communications technology. However, an overly 
broad and flexible definition can result in uncertainty regarding its boundaries and the 
legal principles applicable to the activity! 
The `e-commerce revolution', although not quite yet reaching the heights 
predicted in the nineties, is nevertheless responsible for a significant sum, if not a 
significant percentage of retail sales and it is the potential for growth which drives 
Government and business interest. The statistics vary, in reliability and more importantly 
in what they actually measure, with the difficulty in defining e-commerce being a 
contributory factor to what often appear to be statistical anomalies. For example, the 
Office of National Statistics in the UK reported that £56.6 bn worth of goods and 
services had been sold over the internet in 2000, but on closer examination it became 
clear that this figure was closer to X11 bn once share trading and other financial trading 
had been taken out. Nevertheless, this is no small sum for an industry in its infancy, and 
sales of goods and services via the Internet are predicted to reach £300 bn in the UK by 
2005. ' It is the environment of electronic commerce within which electronic contracts 
play a leading role. 
6 See the comments in paras 7&8 of the Guide to Enactment of the UNCTTRAL Model Law on 
electronic Commerce (1996). General Assembly Resolution 51/162 of 16 December 1996, UNCTI'RAL 
Model Law On Electronic Commerce. Available at, http: //www. uncitral. org/enghsh/texts/electcom/ml- 
ecomm. htm. 
7 Report of the Electronic Expert Group to the Attorney General (Australia). Elahvmc Cam x-, = Budding 
dx Legal Franeuork, 1998. http: //wwwlaw. gov. au/aghome/advisory/eceg/ecegreport. html 
8 It can also mean that e-commerce activity is not measured consistently in the statistical reports. 
9 David Metcalf, analyst at Forrester research, quoted in McAuliffe, W. "Government e-Commerce figures 
`massaged'" (2001) ZDNet UKNeus 13/09/2001 at <httL: )-//news. zdnet. co. uk/stoiy/O., t269- 
s2095133,00. html> (Last accessed 24/03/2003). 
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3.1.4 Mobile Commerce (m-commerce) 
One predicted, but nevertheless still awaited development, is the 'boom' in `m- 
commerce'. The name represents a form of electronic commerce entered into via a 
mobile phone. 
"m-commerce is essentially e-commerce conducted via mobile phone or Personal 
Digital Assistant (PDA) and includes subscription based services such as news 
and information delivered to your mobile device"lo 
Not only does this form of communication have portable convenience, it has a 
potentially enormous market, with some figures suggesting that up to two thirds of 
Britons own a mobile phone with 80% of households having at least one mobile phone. " 
M-commerce also has the potential to open the commercial market to the under 18's, 
who do not have access to credit cards, but do constitute a large proportion of mobile 
phone ownership. The economic potential of m-commerce is highlighted by the fact 
that commercial communications and ̀ spam' to mobile phone technology is becoming 
common place. " 
3.2 The `Nature' of Electronic Contracts 
Although electronic contracts exhibit more similarities to their non-electronic 
counterparts than differences, the differences that do exist have been the focus of 
considerable debate. The distinguishing characteristics of electronic contracts are 
attributable to the technological developments associated with the `new' forms of 
communication discussed above. The new methods of communication in the electronic 
environment, the automated systems developed to send and receive those 
communications and the `new' products forming the subject matter of electronic 
contracts have all contributed to a level of legal uncertainty. 
10 Scroggs, C and Nugent, R. "M-commerce: Payments and Security". [2003] Feb/March Car x+ters and 
Lawatp 19. 
11 However, it has been suggested that the figure may be somewhat overstated due to `double counting'. 
See "Vodafone says figures overstate mobile ownership" Thursday 15th March 2001 Reuters. Available at 
http: //news. zdnet. co. uk/stow/O.. t269-s2085035.00. html>. The 80% figure includes both adult and child 
users see "Key trends in fixed and mobile telephony, and Internet: Residential consumers" OFTEL 17 
June 2002. Available at http: // www. oftel. gov. uk/pubhcations/research/2002/tr nnrO6O2 pdf. 
12 'Spam' is the common phrase used to describe unsolicited commercial communications, originally 
developed in reference to e-mail. 
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3.2.1 The Methods of Communication 
Communication, in the electronic environment, by whatever means, is fast, 
convenient and can be automated to a greater extent than most non-electronic forms of 
communication. Electronic communications, in particular the Internet, also have the 
advantage of `scale' providing a potentially massive, readily accessible global market for 
businesses for minimal expense. For marketing purposes electronic communications are 
a goldmine, a mass audience with minimal costs. For the individual, the business party 
and governments internationally, this has meant unsolicited commercial communications, 
or `spamming', the invasion of privacy and the `jamming' of networks. " 
Access to the electronic environment brings with it potential risks and liabilities 
whether entering contracts electronically or simply marketing goods and services. While 
the electronic environment itself is not a respecter of geographical or political boundaries 
the business or service provider must be, to avoid incurring civil or criminal liability 
imposed by national law to regulate ̀activity' within state borders or with citizens of that 
state. " 
For the consumer, electronic communications bring the promise of increased 
competition, better value and lower prices. However, once again there are inherent 
disadvantages created by the very factors responsible for the potential benefits. Cross- 
border contracts create the potential for confusion and uncertainty as to the level of 
consumer protection available, which in turn can reduce trust and confidence in entering 
cross-border electronic contracts. 
With the benefits associated with electronic forms of communications come the 
inevitable risks of a communication containing errors or being sent in error. The 
complete failure of a communication is also a realistic possibility. While the law has dealt 
with this type of occurrence previously, the issue will have to be considered again in the 
light of the numerous potential problems which may arise with electronic 
communications. For example electronic mail has a habit of being lost or delayed en- 
route, or becoming scrambled and nonsensical because of the packet switching 
is See Department of Trade and Industry 'Building Confidence in Electronic Commerce -A Consultation 
Document" (1999) URN 99/642. at p. 15 para. 28 et sec. 
14 For example defamatory comments 'published'in the US but accessible in Australia have attracted 
liability, see Dow jov c& Canpvry Irxv Gutnick [20021 HCA 56 (10 December 2002). Also see nua. com 
"Publish and be damned" December 16,2002 available at 
<Lnp: //www. nua. ie/smM/an*gs/weekly editor ial. htmb. 
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technology used. " Equally possible is an inadvertent click on a `send' button or icon 
instantaneously delivering an unintended, contractually significant message. Faulty 
software may result in the delivery of inaccurate communications to large numbers of 
customers, or the acceptance of an offer which would not have been contemplated by 
the supplier. In each situation the court will be left to decide where liability should fall 
and the issue may even be complicated further because the contracting ̀ parties' may not 
be quite what they seem. 
3.2.2 Contracting Parties 
In the electronic environment the contracting parties will generally be the same 
parties who enter non-electronic contracts. Individuals may enter contracts with one 
another, in much the same way as in regular private sales. However, the popularity of 
online `auction' sites, such as eBay, has increased the opportunities for this type of 
contract and electronic communications have introduced individuals to the possibility of 
entering private contracts with individuals in other states, previously a comparatively rare 
occurrence. 
Many businesses have been using electronic communications to enter contracts 
with their trading partners for some time. EDI has been particularly popular with 
business parties with an established relationship who enter contracts with one another on 
a regular basis. Business to business (B2B) electronic contracts account for the largest 
section of electronic commerce both in number of transactions and value with the latest 
figures suggesting that B2B contracts constitute 93% of all e-commerce transactions in 
the US. 16 In the European Union the total value of Internet e-commerce in 2001 was 
estimated at 172 billion Euros with B2B transactions constituting 87% of the total. " 
However, the status of B2B e-commerce may be challenged for `total value', by 
the growth in business to government (B2G) procurement contracts being tendered 
electronically. Governments in the EU and the UK government in particular, have been 
keen to embrace the new electronic media, emphasising the benefits to citizens of living 
in the information society and setting ambitious goals for access and use. In the UK, the 
goal championed by the ̀ Office of the eEnvoy', is to ensure that those who want it have 
Internet access by 2005, and to make all government services available electronically by 
15 For a more detailed discussion of 'packet-switching' see Reed, C. Internet Lev. - Text and Materials 
(Butterworths: London, 2000) at p. 10-14. 
16 U. S. Census Bureau. 'E-Stats' 2001. Available at; http: //ýwvw. census. gov/estats. 
17 European Information Technology Observatory (E1TO) 2002,10th edition http"//www. eito. com. 
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the same year. 18 Some of the services available will introduce a consumer to 
Government (C2G) category of electronic commerce. 
The consumer sector is accounting for increasing numbers of electronic contracts 
and business to consumer (B2C) contracts are seen as one of the major areas for growth 
in electronic commerce the future. The global nature of electronic communications has 
also led to the increased possibility of cross-border consumer activity. While this has 
occurred previously, the scale of this activity may increase due to easy access to wider 
markets, greater competition and hence better value. The consumer entry into cross- 
border trade has highlighted the need the need to ensure that consumer protection 
measures are in place, providing a 'base level' of protection for consumers to help 
promote trust and confidence. " 
3.2.2.1 ̀Electronic Parties' 
A development `unique' to the electronic environment and the Internet in 
particular, is the creation of automated systems controlled by complex computer 
software. Often called `electronic agents' they make the contracting process more 
convenient and less time consuming for consumers and suppliers. By using electronic 
systems, such as electronic agents, the need for human interaction can be minimised, 
creating greater transactional opportunities and reducing costs. This factor has been 
exploited by those using EDI for some time, drastically cutting the labour costs 
associated with stock level maintenance and improving cash-flow by facilitating `last 
minute ordering'. 
The point of legal significance here is the fact that at least one of the `human 
parties' to the contract will often have no conscious role in the entering, and sometimes 
performance of the contract particularly where so-called ̀ intelligent' electronic agents 
have been used. 
18 ̀Modernising Government' White Paper March 1999, 
http: //www. archive. official-documents. co. uk/document/cm43/4310/4310. htm. For example, registering 
and licensing vehicles. Services currently available can be found at, 
http: //www. e-envoy. gov. uk/oee/oee. nsf/sections/about-servicetransformation- 
dooline/$file/citizens. htm. 
19 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Recommendation of the OECD 
Council Concerning Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce. '
(1999)at 1. Available at < http: //webnetl. oecd org/pdf/M00000000/MO0000363 odf>. 
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3.2.2.2 Electronic Agents2° 
`Electronic agents' are software programs instructed to undertake particular tasks, 
for example finding particular goods or services, tracking down the best prices and even 
concluding transactions on behalf of the user. As a technology they are in their infancy 
but they are considered by many to be tools that will revolutionise electronic commerce 
by making shopping on the Internet less time consuming for the consumer and 
providing sellers with vital information about their customers! ' As with most recent 
advancements in information technology there has been initial resistance to their use, 
because of security fears and concerns about privacy and data protection, particularly in 
relation to `customer profiling. " 
There are also concerns, voiced by sellers and service providers, that the use of 
electronic agents will `strip away' their 'brand image' because they often remove the need 
to visit the vendor's website. For this reason some online businesses have blocked 
access to their websites by ̀ shopping agents' to avoid being ranked solely on price! ' The 
ability of suppliers to rely on the terms and conditions available on their website may also 
be compromised if electronic agents are used. If the supplier uses a ̀ click wrap' licence 
to ensure that purchasers review his terms, an electronic agent will automatically proceed 
through, or completely bypass the terms page with no consideration for its contents with 
the user having no opportunity to even be aware of its existence. " 
As the technology develops and the concerns are addressed, the use of electronic 
agents will become an integral and necessary part of electronic commerce ZS For the 
purpose of this discussion it is their role in the contractual process and the legal 
significance of that role which is of interest. 
20 Also referred to as ̀ intelligent agents', 'software agents', ̀software robots, or'softbots'. A 
comprehensive review of this technology is beyond the scope of this work, but for a very informative 
insight see Gonzalo, S. "A Business Outlook Regarding Electronic Agents" (2001)9 International journal of 
Law and IT 189. 
21 Weitzenboeck, E. M. "Electronic Agents And The Formation Of Contracts" (2001)9 International Jou»wl 
of Law andfT 204. 
22 Issues of privacy and data protection are beyond the scope of this work, but for a consideration of those 
issues in the context of electronic agents see, Bygrave, L A. "Electronic Agents And Privacy: A 
Cyberspace Odyssey 2001" (2001) 9 Interrwt ial journal of Law and IT 275. 
23 Levi, S. & Sporn, R. "Can Programs Bind Humans To Contracts? " (1997) 7he National Lary join al B09. 
Available at <http: //www liextra. com/internet/0113shrinkhtmb (last accessed 22/06/1999). 
24 Ibid However, this may not affect incorporation of the terms at common law, see the discussion below 
in chapter 9. 
25 It is suggested that they will become 'necessary' for e-commerce because as the networks and their use 
expands the vast number of users and amount of information available will make it more time consuming 
to find the product or service desired, at the best price. The increased size of the market and 
corresponding increase in competition is perceived as one of the main advantages of electronic commerce, 
but to fulfil its potential the market must be readily accessible and convenient to use. 
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The most recent electronic agents demonstrate artificial intelligence and can, 
arguably, be seen to behave autonomously, determining their behaviour by reference to 
their own experiences 26 To this extent it can be seen that the direct intervention of a 
human being is not necessary for its operation. In relation to electronic contracts, 
electronic agents raise questions of capacity, intent, participation and liability, because as 
Weitzenboeck indicates, 
"In such a situation, the question that naturally arises is whether a contract that 
has been generated and conducted by an intelligent agent without any direct 
human intervention, is legally binding and on whom. "17 
It must be noted at this point that, at common law, an `electronic agent' is 
unlikely to be treated as an `agent' for the purpose of the law of agency! ' Agency at 
common law necessarily requires the consent of two distinct parties, the `principal' and 
the `agent', to the extent that `one person, the agent, has the power to change the legal 
relations of the other, the principal. '29 It would require a very imaginative approach to 
apply the concept of `consent' to electronic agents, comprising of computers and 
computer software. It would be equally difficult to describe the user and the electronic 
agent as two `distinct parties'. 
It has been suggested that one way to deal with the activities of intelligent 
electronic agents would be to confer `legal personality' on them in the same way that 
limited companies are given legal personality once they are incorporated. " In this way 
they would have the legal capacity to enter contracts. However, such an approach has 
been questioned, because of the inherent uncertainty in the definition and identification 
of electronic agents and the need for some form of registration system, akin to the 
registration system for companies, for this approach to be workable. This is seen as an 
26 See Russell, S. & Norvig, P. Arlifuia1Intellige A Modem Approach. (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1995). 
27 Weitzenboeck, E. M. "Electronic Agents And The Formation Of Contracts" (2001)9 Intematixd joumal 
of Lazy and IT 204. 
28 Nevertheless, there have been suggestions that this approach should be adopted. See Fischer, J. P. 
"Computers as Agents: A Proposed Approach to Revised U. C. C. Article 2" (1997) 72 Ind U J. 545; and 
Kerr, I. "Providing for Autonomous Electronic Devices in the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act" 
(2000) Uni wm Law Corrfauxe of Gva d z, available at 
<http: //www. law. ualberta. ca/alri/ulc/current/ekerr. Pdf>. 
29 Guest, A. G. (General Editor) Cfiiny on Cc lraas, Vol 2- Specific Contracts, 28th ed. (1999) (Sweet & 
Maxwell: London), para 31. 
30 Allen, T. & Widdison, R. "Can Computers Make Contracts? " (1996) 9 Hanmd josanal of Law & Tedvdogy 
25. 
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unnecessary expense which would be unwelcome and superfluous to the requirements of 
those engaging in electronic commerce. " 
Allen & Widdison consider the implications of treating computers, and by 
analogy electronic agents, as `mere machines', or simply communication tools or 
conduits, through which certain acts are performed by the user. In this way the activities 
of the machine or software are treated as coming directly from the person controlling or 
instructing them (the user). This approach is often considered as something of a `legal 
fiction' because it ignores the involvement of the software altogether and in particular the 
fact that the software may make, what appear to be, autonomous decisions. This 
approach can be criticised because it has the potential to produce unfair results by being 
unnecessarily harsh on the party using the software. Allen & Widdison ask the question, 
"Is it fair, or even commercially reasonable, to hold the human trader bound by 
unexpected communications just because it was theoretically possible that the 
computer would produce them? "" 
And Weitzenboeck highlights the potential for 
"disastrous consequences that could ensue from an electronic bug, from an error 
of calculation or a programming fault"" 
However, it can be argued that the only party who has any level of control over the 
activities of an electronic agent is the party who chose to use it, and therefore the risks 
and liabilities associated with that use can only be borne by him. " 
At common law the refusal of the courts to allow parties to `snap up' offers 
clearly made in error would also serve to mitigate the harshness of this approachSS If an 
electronic agent makes an erroneous offer, which the other party knew or reasonably 
ought to have known, was incorrect the courts are unlikely to allow him to enforce 
31 Op cit fn. 22. 
32 Op cit fn. 31. 
33 Op cit fn. 22. 
34 He will usually have the opportunity to foresee such risks and adopt contingencies, such as insurance or 
passing liability onto the supplier of the service or software. However, as indicated by Allen & Widdison 
there are some occurrences which may be completely unforeseeable by the user. The risks for consumers 
in the European Union are reduced by virtue of the Electronic Commerce Directive to the extent that they 
cannot be bound to a contract unless they have had the opportunity to correct any errors. See below in 
chapter 8.4. 
35 See Ha v Colin & Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566; Sci* z Bros & Co vHindky & Co [1913] 3 KB 504; and 
Cer xialEstatesplcvMerrhvrtInt torsAssrr=vCoLtd[1983]ComLR158. 
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obligations entered into under that agreement. This approach would certainly 
accommodate some of the more ̀disastrous consequences' envisaged from an error such 
as the shifting of a decimal point a couple of places to the left in the price of a product. 36 
The use of automated machines to enter contractual relationships on behalf of 
their owner has long been accommodated by the courts of England and Wales because 
of the objective approach adopted to agreement. This issue was famously discussed in 
7bomtcn v Shoe Lane Parkin ' where Lord Denning was in no doubt that the offer is made 
by the proprietor of the machine when he holds it out as being ready to receive the 
customer's money? ' The activities of the machine are deemed to be those of the 
proprietor and he is bound by his apparent ̀intention to be bound' to the actions of that 
machine. When a user introduces an electronic agent into the electronic environment, 
usually the Internet, with instructions to enter a contract with a party or parties satisfying 
pre-programmed criterion, an analogy can clearly be drawn with the use of any 
automated machine and hence, Lord Denning's analysis of the contractual process. 
The attribution of communications generated by electronic agents, to the person 
instructing them would appear to be the approach adopted in the UNCPIRAL Model 
Law on Electronic Commerce39 In Article 13(2) it states that, 
"As between the originator and the addressee, a data message is deemed to be 
that of the originator if it was sent: 
(b) by an information system programmed by, or on behalf of, the 
originator to operate automatically. "" 
In the European Union the importance of electronic agents and related systems 
was recognised in the development of the Electronic Commerce Directive. However, 
their consideration was limited to the preliminary materials wherein it was stated that 
Member States should "not prevent the use of certain electronic systems such as 
36 Interesting discussions of this nature followed a pricing error on the Argos website. See Azim-Kahn, R. 
& MacQueen, H. L "The Argos Free TV Debacle: Two Legal Opinions" (1999)1(9) E1ein racBustness Lacy 
9-10. 
37 [1971] 2 Q. B. 163 
38 Ibid at p 169. 
39 General Assembly Resolution 51/162 Of 16 December 1996 available at; 
<frtp: //www. uncitral. orZ/english/texts/electcom/rnl-econim. htm> 
40 A number of States have introduced legislation based upon the UNCII'RAL Model Law. For example 
Singapore's Electronic Transactions Act 1998, section 13 but cfAustralia's Electronic Transactions Act 
1999 section 15 which focuses upon the concept of 'authority'to send messages. 
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intelligent electronic agents". " Electronic agents do not feature in the final directive and 
this complex issue will ultimately fall to be considered by the courts or legislators in each 
Member State. 
3.2.3 Subject Matter 
The subject matter of electronic ontracts is a combination of familiar goods and 
services and `new' subject matter capable of challenging the law and existing 
presumptions and definitions. Some of these definitions go to the root of contractual 
liability dictating the implied terms in a particular contract and hence the rights and 
liabilities of the parties 42 
3.2.3.1 Traditional Goods & Traditional Services 
Many of the contracts entered into electronically are for traditional goods and 
services. In the B2B market it may be components, outsourced services, and of course, 
traditional goods. In the B2C market, books, CD's, DVD's, chocolates, flowers, wine, 
computers and other technology, and clothes are all purchased online. Even the weekly 
grocery shop can be concluded online with the food delivered to your door. " The 
service industries involved with travel, finance and even dating have all made themselves 
at home in the electronic environment. 
3.2.3.2 Information Services 
Information of all kinds is available in the electronic environment and the 
Internet in particular is often called the `information superhighway'. A large amount of 
information is freely available but the majority of useful or valuable information is only 
available for a price. It is not surprising that a large number of electronic contracts relate 
to access to information, including access to national statistics, product reviews, 
television listings and other databases. It has already been noted that the online 
availability of information about Government services is targeted to be complete by 
2005. 
41 ̀Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic 
commerce in the internal market' COM(1998) 586 final, [1999] OJ C30/42. 
42 In particular the implied terms found in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982. See the discussion below chapter 13.2. 
43 As Tesco' has been keen to inform us, however, for obvious reasons the e-commerce grocery market is 
somewhat geographically restricted. 
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However, for businesses the most important information available is information 
about their customers, or potential customers. As in the `real world' the sale of data 
about consumers and their interests is an industry itself. In the electronic environment 
this information is readily and rapidly accumulated and distributed. This activity has 
raised serious issues in relation to privacy and data protection. " 
3.2.3.3 ̀New & Novel' Subject Matter 
With the evolution of electronic communications there has been a corresponding 
need created for contracts relating to associated subject matter. In particular there are 
contracts for services directly involved with the electronic communications industry such 
as service contracts with ISP's, contracts for domain name registration and web-hosting 
facilities. Developments in technology capable of `dematerialising' traditionally supplied 
goods and making it possible to transfer them via electronic forms of communication 
have made transactions for music, `books' and feature films particularly popular. The 
nature of this subject matter may genuinely be called ̀ new' and `novel', bringing new 
questions for the legislators and courts. 
Electra' is Envih7maaRelated Se vurs 
To use or access the electronic environment parties require an appropriate ̀ tool' 
for communication and a means by which to connect that tool to a network such as the 
Internet. The technology may come in many forms, for example, personal computers, 
laptops, mobile phones, "' Personal Data Assistants (PDA's), and digital television. A 
Service Provider is then required to enable connection to the relevant network, for 
example mobile network service providers such as Vodaphone and Orange, or Internet 
Service Providers like AOL or Freeserve. The latter may also provide additional services 
including domain name registration, web hosting and storage, and e-mail accounts, often 
referred to as Value Added Network Services (VANS). Many electronic contracts are for 
the provision of these essential services. 
44 This topic is beyond the scope of this research but see; Macdonald, E& Rowland, D. Infonniiion 
Tddmology Law. 2nd ed. (Cavendish: London, 2000) chapter 7. 
45 WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) phones were hailed as rlxzwy to access the Internet on the move 
but were something of a failure due to lack of speed, reliability and content. See, Banan, M. "The WAP 
Trap: An Expose of the Wireless Application Protocol" 2000 Free Protocols Foundation. Available at 
hrcn: //www. freeorotocols. ora/LEAP/Manifesto/arride/TheWAPTrao/sollt/main. htmL last accessed 21/ 
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E)07 rr'alised Goals'and Data P, tthts' 
It is unnecessary at this point to consider the often unhelpful debate surrounding 
the definition of `goods .46 It is sufficient to highlight at this point that the legal status 
ultimately given to this `type' of subject matter may have far reaching implications for the 
contracting parties. " The phrase ̀ data product' or `dematerialised goods' is used to 
identify material downloaded directly to an electronic device or `streamed' to that 
device. "' In isolation there would appear to be few problems with these items, with 
analogies being drawn to radio or television transmissions. However, `intangible' items, 
in particularly computer software, raise a number of significant questions as to their legal 
'nature'! ' 
Few, if any of the items downloaded are ̀ new'. Music, films, literature and 
computer software are all commonplace consumer items. In reality the key difference is 
the fact that the electronic environment provides customers, or `Information Society 
Service recipients', 5° with the opportunity to download the material directly without the 
need for a carrier medium of some kind to be provided as well. The questions raised by 
these ̀data products', however, far outweigh this simple difference. The question for the 
courts, and arguably the legislature, is whether this simple difference should dictate the 
rights and obligations of the parties or the statutory protection available to them. 
The difficulty arises when these ̀ new' products are considered in the light of 
existing definitions, such as ̀ goods' and ̀ services'. It is human nature to be comfortable 
with the familiar and to order `new' things by fitting them into an existing, familiar 
category and at times this can be equally said of the law. This has happened previously 
with computer software" and has been suggested of other `data products'. Existing 
categories may have legal rights or obligations attached to them and it is therefore 
important to be able to establish with some certainty which category the subject matter 
of an electronic contract may fit in. A common example relates to the different 
standards implied to contracts for goods or services. Distinguishing between these two 
46 A debate which can be found below in chapter 13.2. 
47 See the discussion of implied terms in chapter 13 below. 
48 Data streaming is the technique of sending large quantities of data, as often required when distributing 
video, across a network in a continuous stream avoiding the download process. The stream is then 
accessed by the users PC for display. The streaming media is usually broadcast live, and can be from 
anywhere in the world. 
49 pp cit fn. 48. 
50 The phrase employed in European Union legislation to describe services provided in the electronic 
environment. 
51 For example the treating of software as a ̀ literary work' for the purpose of copyright protection. 
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categories has been the cause of some debate for many years 52 However, deciding 
whether an intangible product should be classed as one of these categories or should be 
treated as something completely `new', or `sui gc e is, has already caused some discomfort 
in the courts and been the source of much academic debates' 
3.3 Conclusion 
Electronic communications have created a fast, readily accessible market for 
electronic contracting. In turn this environment has led to the creation of the 
phenomenon known as electronic commerce. The most popular methods of contracting 
in this environment are at present, e-mail and websites. However mobile phones and 
other mobile technology will increasingly play role in electronic contracting as technology 
develops. This factor creates the first challenge for the law, to accommodate the 
present technology without being driven by that technology, ensuring that principles 
applied are flexible enough to encompass future developments. 
The second challenge created by the electronic environment is the ephemeral and 
transient nature of electronic communications which may pose difficult questions for 
existing legal concepts which are based upon notions of physicality. 
The entry of the consumer into the environment of cross-border contracting has 
highlighted concerns about levels of consumer protection and the control of personal 
data. A crucial consideration for the development of consumer confidence in entering 
electronic contracts will be whether protections available in the traditional environment 
will transfer to electronic contracts and provide an adequate level of consumer 
protection. 
`Electronic agents', or computer programs capable of emulating human decision 
making, raise conceptual problems in relation to consent and intention in contract, and 
practical problems with the attribution of automated actions and liabilities flowing form 
those actions. 
In addition to creating the need for contracts relating to activity in the electronic 
environment electronic communications have changed the very nature of the subject 
matter contracted for. Films, music albums and even books no longer require a physical 
52 See the discussion below in chapter 13. 
53 See Sir Iain Gli dewell in St Alb, = City Emd District Qw il u Intemat ial Camp iters Ltd [ 1997] F. S. R. 251 at 
265; West, B. "Software -goods or services? " [2001] Sep, Legal Exaxie24-25; Bullock, P "The nature of 
software and standard terms' [1997] 3(1)Cap aer4nd Tel«wmoricatians LawReview 5-7; Adams, J. N. "The 
snark was a boojum, you see" [1997] 1(3) Edith gbLarwReti w386-392; Scott, A. P. "Software as 'goods': 
nullum simile est idem. " [1987] 3(4) CamputerLacv & Practice 133-136. 
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carrier medium to be transferred from a seller to the customer. This dematerialisation of 
traditional ̀goods' questions existing legal definitions and presumptions used to establish 
minimum standards required as to quality or performance. 
The issues raised by the nature of the electronic environment and contracting in 
that environment must now be considered against the background of existing legal 
principles in England and Wales applicable to contracts in general. In this way it should 
be possible to establish if there is a need for significant changes in the law or alternatively 
whether the existing legislative regimes and the flexibility of the common law can 
accommodate lectronic contracts. 
The first question to address however is whether the courts of England and 
Wales or the law of England and Wales will have a role to play in a dispute relating to any 
of the issues raised by electronic ontracts. The rules on jurisdiction and Applicable Law 
will be considered in the next section. 
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Which Court and Which Law? : Jurisdiction and 
Applicable Law Issues in Electronic Contracts 
Jur diaion and App&a1 e Lary Irate 
Introduction 
The chapters in this section examine two issues of vital importance in cross- 
border contracts; determining which court has jurisdiction to hear a contractual dispute 
and identifying the correct substantive law to apply in that dispute. For the parties 
involved these factors may have considerable impact on their rights and obligations 
under the contract. It is therefore surprising to find that these issues are often relegated 
to brief, and arguably ineffective, contractual clauses uch as, 
«In case both pxw ire tmahle to seile flair disputes out of cwz only the aas in Bmsels 
are ct Only Belg an jiaisý applies in case ofa dispute "1 
With this approach being common to many `well-established' and `new' electronic 
commerce based companies, the legal provisions relevant to these issues require 
consideration. 
The issues are by no means new and their significance to international trade has 
been reflected in the co-operative efforts made by many states since the 1960's. ' The 
`new' factor introduced by the development of electronic commerce and developments 
in communications technology, is that traditionally these issues have been the concern of 
large corporations and multinational businesses. In the past two decades small 
businesses, and perhaps more significantly consumers, have become increasingly 
involved in cross-border transactions. As Professor Ian Lloyd highlights: 
"Until the emergence of the Internet, international trade was largely the province 
of the commercial operator. Save for the few souvenirs and bottles of duty-free 
which a holidaymaker might bring back into the country, almost all of the average 
DVD Zone 2, the European DVD specialist at http: //www. dvdzone2. com/. 
2 However, as is highlighted below the key provisions which have been ratified tend to emanate from the 
EU, based upon its single market principles. 
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consumer's interactions with business would take place in the confines of a single 
country. "' 
As a consequence, concerns about whether principles originally developed to regulate 
international trade can, or are appropriate to, be applied to modem commercial 
transactions have been raised. In turn this has led to the review and amendment of some 
well-established and well-known Conventions. '
As highlighted in the introduction to this thesis, legal certainty is essential to 
promote confidence in entering contracts in the electronic environment. Knowing the 
extent of your rights and obligations is only part of the equation. Without the ability to 
enforce those rights and obligations effectively, the rights and obligations themselves 
become meaningless. 
Although in many cases jurisdiction and applicable law issues are intrinsically 
linked, the legal question of which court has jurisdiction and which substantive law 
should be applied are distinct. A court with jurisdiction to hear a dispute may be 
compelled to apply the laws of any country in the world if the parties so desire. ' The 
issues require separate consideration in relation to electronic contracting. 
The following discussion will consider the existing common law and regulatory 
frameworks associated with jurisdiction and choice of law issues and their application to 
electronic commerce and electronic contracts. Continuing the methodology of this 
thesis the traditional or existing provisions will be analysed to establish: 
1) the possible outcomes of their application to electronic contracts and desirability 
of those outcomes; 
2) the proposed or adopted amendments to those provisions; and 
3) the impact of those amendments in the light of the perceived problems with the 
existing provisions. 
Lloyd, I. Legal Aspaxs of tlr Infwmalion Society (London: Butterworths, 2000) at, p. 268. The advent and 
proliferation of `booze-cruising' must also be acknowledged as a significant development in cross-border 
trade, albeit somewhat restricted to UK citizens. (I am reliably informed that booze-cruising' is also 
popular in Finland! ) 
4 See 4.2 below. 
5 Discussed below at 5.2. The courts do not actually apply the law, as a foreign lawyer would but rather 
apply the principles on the basis of evidence as a matter of fact. See McClean, D. Moms ? tae Cor? ict of 





In general, parties will prefer to deal with disputes in a familiar forum adhering to 
the systems and procedures of their own national courts: 
"Litigation is never comfortable but it seems less alarming in one's home town, 
or at least one's home country, before local judges. There is perhaps the 
subconscious feeling that the court is more likely to be on your side if you are the 
local parry; the feeling may even be justified. "' 
For the consumer the prospect of pursuing an errant supplier in a foreign 
jurisdiction is both logistically and financially prohibitive. For the supplier the possibility 
of being the subject of litigation in numerous jurisdictions is equally prohibitive. In the 
context of electronic commerce these fears have the potential to negate many of the 
perceived benefits of modern communication technologies and stifle growth in an area 
of great economic potential. 
In this chapter the rules associated with the adjudicative jurisdiction of the courts 
are examined to consider the effects of their application in relation to electronic 
contracts. In this area the common law has been largely superseded by legislative 
measures and international Treaty. Therefore, the majority of the discussion will focus 
upon the interpretation and application of the relevant instruments and the recent 
amendment of the Brussels Convention by the introduction of an European Community 
Regulation, specifically intended to take account of modern electronic forms of 
communication. However, as a preliminary matter a brief mention must be made about 
the enforcement of judgments. 
i McClean, D. Mors; 71e Cor ct of Lars, 5th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2000) at p. 71. There are other 
implications of course, in particular the financial consideration of travelling to a foreign jurisdiction to 
resolve disputes and obtaining appropriate legal representation. As a minimum the parties will desire a 
level of certainty as to which courts may seize jurisdiction in the event of a dispute. 
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4.1 The Enforceability of judgments 
Before any discussion of the substantive law in a particular state or group of 
states, it is important to highlight the potential `void' between the obtaining of a 
judgment and its enforcement. Once judgment is obtained the enforcement of that 
judgment is dictated by the rules of the defendant's home-state. Whilst in the European 
Union and European Economic Area reciprocal arrangements exist for the recognition 
of judgments from other jurisdictions, ' enforcement in states not party to some 
reciprocal arrangement may be more problematic. Courts of that state will apply their 
constitutional and private international law principles in deciding whether a judgment can 
be enforced in that state. As was recently seen in the `Yahoo case' success in a local 
court is considerably devalued if you cannot enforce the judgment. In many cases a 
judgment will only be enforceable, in any real sense, if the defendant has assets in the 
jurisdiction where judgment is obtained. For parties attracted by the potential benefits of 
`global' electronic commerce this is yet another factor for consideration in their choice to 
enter electronic contracts with parties in other States. 
4.2 Regulatory Control of Jurisdiction in the European Union and the 
United Kinedom 
In 1968 the six original Member States of the European Community signed a 
convention on 'jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters', better known as the `Brussels Convention'. The Convention was introduced on 
the basis of Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome 
"Member States shall, so far as it is necessary, enter into negotiations with each 
other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals: 
- the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition of 
enforcement judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards. " 
2 Such as the Brussels Convention, discussed below. 
3 See LICRA & UEFJv Ya tt llncand Yalxv Framr (2000) Paris High Court. YaJw Iwv La Ligue Q=, e le 
Ratline et [ Antisee t ne (Unreported, November 7,2001) (ND Cal (US) The issue was a public law matter, 
but the principle remains true for private law matters although more reciprocity and recognition is evident 
in private law matters. 
4 Now Article 293 (4) of the Treaty of the European Union. 
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Clarification of the jurisdiction of Member State courts was considered a 
significant issue in achieving this objective. ' Due to the expansion of the European 
Community the original Convention was updated and amended by four Accession 
Conventions to incorporate new Member States and their legal traditions. ' Effect was 
given to the Treaty in the United Kingdom in 1982 by virtue of the Civil jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act (CJJA). ' To encompass states outside the European Union (EU) a 
further `parallel treaty' was signed in Lugano in 1988 by the EU Member States and the 
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). ' An adaptation of the 
Brussels Convention can also be found in Schedule 4 of the Civil jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act, for application in intra-United Kingdom jurisdiction disputes. ' 
The Brussels Convention was drafted at a time when international trade was 
generally the province of commercial parties, and modem forms of electronic 
communication could not be envisaged. The Convention suffers from ambiguity in 
several places in relation to contractual disputes, and these ambiguities particularly in 
relation to electronic contracts, have the potential to lead to uncertainty. In light of these 
uncertainties and the developing body of case-law from the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), the Council of Ministers recommended the review and revision of the Brussels 
and Lugano Conventions in 1997.1° Progress was halted temporarily by the introduction 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, but on March 1' 2002 the Brussels Convention was 
5 Preamble to the 1968 Convention, as amended. 
6 For present purposes the accession of the United Kingdom, The Republic of Ireland and Denmark, 
signed in Luxembourg on the 10th October 1978 is the most significant. The Convention included 
amendments to reflect the common law nature of the legal systems involved and significantly, made the 
European Court of justice the correct forum for questions relating to interpretation of the convention. 
7 1982 (c 27) (as amended). This Act did not come into force until all signatories had ratified the treaty in 
1987. Section 2 of the 1982 Act states, ̀The [Brussels Conventions] shall have the force of law in the 
United Kingdom, and judicial notice shall be taken of them. " Section 3A contains an equivalent provision 
for the Lugano Convention. 
8 Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The Lugano Treaty was closely based on the text of the Brussels 
Convention at the time and for the purpose of this discussion the text found in the Lugano Convention is 
identical to that found in the Brussels Convention. For this reason the term The Conventions' is used and 
should be treated as encompassing to the Brussels Convention (and the subsequent Accession Treaties) 
and the Lugano Convention unless stated otherwise One key difference however, is that the European 
Court of justice does not have authoritative rights of interpretation of the Lugano Convention, but 
signatories are requested to `pay due account to the principles laid down by any relevant decision delivered 
by courts of the other Contracting States concerning provisions of this Convention"; Article 1 of Protocol 
1. Section 3A of the 1982 Act gives the Lugano Convention the force of law in the UK. 
9 Essentially a person domiciled in a part of the United Kingdom is to be treated as a person domiciled in 
another contracting state. Schedule 4 of the Act has been amended by (Civil jurisdiction and judgments 
Order 2001 No. 3929) to bring the provisions in line with Regulation 44/2001(discussed below). 
lo See press release; "Commission adopts draft Regulation on jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement 
of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters", Brussels, 14 July 1999, IP/99/510, at p 1. 
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replaced in all EU Member States except Denmark, " by Council Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 of 22 December 2000, on 'jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters'. " The new Regulation is intended to 
introduce uniform modem standards for jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters 
"taking into account new forms of commerce which did not exist when the Brussels 
Convention was introduced". " There are clear references throughout the development 
of the Regulation to the concerns of companies engaging in electronic commerce, unsure 
of their position in jurisdictional disputes under the provisions of the Brussels 
Convention. " This is seen as a disincentive to the development of electronic commerce 
and it was hoped that clarification, in the form of the new Regulation, would remove 
uncertainty. " The key amendments to the Brussels Convention include: 
- the clarification of the special jurisdiction rules in contractual law, 
- new provisions to cover all consumer contracts, and 
- the introduction of a common concept of the domicile of legal persons. " 
The Commission was keen to ensure a smooth transition and to retain a level of legal 
harmony between states governed by the new Regulation and those remaining under the 
scope of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions: 
"Continuity between the Brussels Convention and this Regulation should be 
ensured, and transitional provisions should be laid down to that end. The same 
need for continuity applies as regards the interpretation of the Brussels 
Convention by the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the 1971 
Protocol [... ] should remain applicable also to cases already pending when this 
Regulation enters into force. "" 
II The United Kingdom and Ireland did not participate in the adoption of measures introduced under Title 
IV of the EC Treaty (See the Trotocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the 
EC Treaty. ) However, they have indicated their intention to participate fully with the implementation of 
this proposal. See recital 20 of the final Regulation. 
12 OJ L 12/1 (16.1.2001). (Hereafter, 'the Regulation). 
l"Op cit fn 10, at p. 2. 
14 I4 
15 Ibid See also the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Troposal for a Council 
Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters'. OJ C 117/6, (26.4.2000), para 2.12.1. 
16 If 
17 Op 6fn 12, recital 19. 
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Hence, to a significant extent the provisions relating to jurisdiction, found in the new 
Regulation, remain unchanged but for the areas perceived as creating uncertainty. In 
Denmark the Brussels Convention will remain in place, as will the Lugano Convention in 
EFTA countries. The reforms contained within the Regulation, relevant to contractual 
obligations, will now be considered with their Brussels and Lugano Convention 
counterparts and associated case-law. 
4.3 The Relevant Legislation 
4.3.1 The Scope of the Legislative Instruments 
The Conventions and the Regulation apply to civil and commercial matters, 
whatever the nature of the court or tribunal hearing the dispute. " Excluded from the 
scope of the Convention and Regulation are disputes relating to revenue and customs or 
administrative matters, all of which are considered to be within the sole competence of 
the Member State. " In addition, exclusive jurisdiction is given to the courts of a 
particular state in certain matters regardless of a party's domicile. These include, rights in 
rann in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property; proceedings which have 
as their object the validity of the constitution of a company or the nullity or dissolution 
of companies; validity of entries in public registers; and the registration or validity of 
patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights. " 
4.3.2 Interpretation 
In order to facilitate consensus between the Member States the Conventions 
were couched in very general terms. Due to the broad terminology adopted, the 
potential for disparate interpretation and application in Member State courts threatened 
to undermine the harmonising objective of the measures. As a consequence, when the 
Accession Treaty of 1978 was signed, the ECJ was given jurisdiction to interpret the 
provisions contained within the Brussels Convention. The ECJ is authoritative and 
questions of interpretation must be referred to it, or determined in accordance with the 
18 Article 1(1) 
19 Article 1(2) includes; the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a 
matrimonial relationship, wills and succession; banknzptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of 
insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous 
proceedings; social security; and arbitration. 
20 Article 22 of the Regulation (Article 16 of the Convention). 
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principles laid down by it. 21 In addition, Member State courts must give consideration to 
the explanatory reports published in the Official Journal of the European Communities! ' 
In relation to the Lugano convention the ECJ is not given authoritative status but 
nevertheless the case-law of the ECJ associated with the Brussels Convention plays an 
influential role in its application in Member State Courts! ' 
In respect of the new Regulation the ECJ has sole jurisdiction to interpret the 
content of the Regulation by virtue of its powers under Article 234 (ex 177) of the Treaty 
on European Union. 
4.3.3 Key Principles 
4.3.3.1 The "Home-State" Principle 
The core principle of the Convention and of the Brussels Regulation is that 
persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the 
courts of that State (his or her ̀ home-state? ` Persons who are not nationals of that 
state are governed by the private international aw rules on jurisdiction applicable to 
nationals of that State! ' The concept of `domicile' is central to the `home-state' 
principle. A distinction is made between the domicile of an individual and that of a 
corporation or other association. In both cases it is for the courts seized to apply the 
`internal aw' of that state to determine whether a party is domiciled in that State. " 
4.3.3.2 The Concept of `Domicile' 
4.3.3.2.1 Individuals 
Section 41 of the Civil jurisdiction and judgments Act 1982 (CJJA) is the 
domestic provision in England and Wales that will determine the domicile of individuals 
for the purposes of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. For the purposes of the 
zt Art 1 of the 1971 Protocol as amended by the Accession Treaty of 1978, and s. 3(1) of the 1982 Act. The 
Lugano Convention is not subject to the interpretation of the ECJ but a court must "take account of 
relevant decisions in the courts of another contracting state"; Article 1 of the second protocol. 
u Section 3(3) of the 1982 Act. The Jenard Report on the 1968 text [1979] O. J. C59/1; The Schlosser 
Report on the 1978 Accession Treaty [1979] O J. C59/71; Reports on the 1982 and 1989 Accession 
Conventions[1986] O . 
J. C298 and [1990] C189. And the Jenard and Moller report on the Lugano 
Convention [1990] O J. C189/57. 
23 See the House of Lords in Gv2ada Tn st Co and Orlin u StdzaAag and OA-rs (No 2) [2002] 1 A. C. 1. 
24 Article 2(1) of the Convention and the Regulation. A Contracting State' is a signatory of the 
Convention. 
25 Article 2(2) of the Convention and the Regulation. 
26 Article 59(1) of the Regulation, Article 52 of the Convention. 
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Regulation, Schedule 1(9) of the Civil jurisdiction and judgments Order 2001 contains a 
provision modelled on s. 4127 
The relevant provisions require that the individual is `resident' in the United 
Kingdom or part thereof and that the nature and circumstances of that residence indicate 
that he has a ̀ substantial connection' with the United Kingdom or relevant part! ' Three 
months residence raises a rebuttable presumption that there is a substantial connection 29 
An individual is only to be treated as domiciled in a non-Regulation/Convention State if 
he is resident in that state and his residence indicates a substantial connection with that 
state. 30 
4.3.3.2.2 Corporations or Associations 
Section 42 of the CJJA contains the definition of domicile for the purpose of 
corporations or other associations. The corporation or association will only be treated as 
domiciled in the United Kingdom (UK) if it has its `seat' here? ' A corporation or 
association has its `seat' here if it was incorporated or formed under the law of part of 
the UK and has its registered office or official address here. Alternatively, if the central 
management and control of the corporation or association is exercised in the UK, then it 
will also be treated as having its 'seat'here. 'Z 
During the review of the Brussels Convention it was recognised that a varied 
approach existed throughout the EU to the creation and seat of a legal entity and hence 
there had been divergence in the interpretation of `domicile' in Member State Courts" 
For this reason the `domiciles' of companies and other legal persons or associations are 
given a new, uniform definition by the Regulation in Article 60. This new provision is 
intended to introduce a `common concept of the domicile of legal persons" and 
facilitate a harmonisation of approach throughout the EU. 
Article 60 defines the domicile of these bodies as "the place where they have 
their statutory seat, central administration, or principal place of business".  There is 
additional guidance for the UK and Ireland in Article 60(2). ̀ Statutory seat' refers to the 
27 The provisions are identical, but for the insertion of the word ̀ Regulation' and will be discussed 
together. 
28 Civil jurisdiction and judgments Act 1982 (c 27), Section 41(2). Schedule 1, s. 9(2) of the Order. 
291big Section 41(6), Schl s. 9(6). 
30 IM Section 41(7), Schi s. 9(7). 
31 s. 42(1). 
32 Section 42(3). 
73 Particularly after the accession of the United Kingdom where the concept of a corporation's `seat' of 
business was practically unknown. 
34 Op cit fn 10, at p. 2. 
35 Article 60(1) (ab & c). 
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place where the business has its registered office or, where there is no such office, the 
place of incorporation. If there is no `incorporation' as such, as is the case with a 
common partnership, the domicile is the place where that body is legally formed. 
A corporation's `statutory seat' and `central administration' are relatively 
straightforward to define and locate. The statutory seat of the body will equate to its 
place of legal creation and a physical location such as the address registered at 
Companies House. The central administration of a body will usually equate to the place 
from which the activities of the body are managed or controlled and this will usually be 
the physical place where the directors or partners are located. However, it is the 
interpretation of the `new' and additional criteria of `principal place of business' which 
may have significance in the context of electronic commerce. Should it be interpreted as 
simply an extension of one or both of the preceding criteria? " Or alternatively should it 
be treated as a completely independent alternate criterion in the context of the 
Regulation? 
It may be significant that these criteria are listed as alternatives, rather than a 
progressive list. It would appear that a corporation or other association may be treated 
as domiciled in the place where it has any of the listed criteria. With a traditional business 
the three will often be found in the same place, for example Harrods' Registered office 
(hence statutory seat) is the same address as its central administration and principal place 
of business" However, with the advent of the Internet it is quite possible that all three 
will be in different jurisdictions. For example, a company may be created and registered 
in a particular state because of a favourable regulatory or taxation environment. The 
parties controlling and managing the business, the directors, owners or parent company, 
may reside in a variety of other states exercising their control by communicating 
electronically. The company's business transactions may be entered into via websites 
stored on servers situated in a number of other states dictated by their Internet Service 
Provider or matters of convenience. The core business of the company may be 
conducted with parties in one or a number of other unrelated states with no `physical' 
connection with the company's statutory seat, management or physical property. In such 
a case the statutory seat of the company and the location of its central administration, if 
it can be established at all, bear no relationship to the business activities of the company. 
This may be completely fortuitous or it may be a deliberate attempt to evade the 
36 Being intrinsically linked to the central administration of a body or annexed to the legally most important 
location such as the bodies' registered office. 
37 Harrods, 87-135 Brompton Road, Knightsbridge, London SW1X 7XL 
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jurisdiction of the courts of a particular state whilst exploiting the market in the same 
way that a company registered and physically located there would Arguably, the 
`principal place of business' criteria provides the court with an opportunity to consider 
the reality of the company's presence in the state. It could be contended that if a 
company conducts all or the majority of its business with customers in the UK via an 
interactive website its principal place of business is in the UK. 
There is a lack of direct authority on the meaning of Article 60 in the Regulation 
itself, in commentary, or in ECJ case law. It is clear that there are a number of possible 
interpretations of the ̀ principal place of business criteria'. It could be suggested that a 
corporation's principal place of business would be its primary, most important, main or 
predominant outlet or the place where it conducts the majority of its business. 
Alternatively it could be argued that the principal place of business criteria refers to the 
main physical place of the business and its activity, the place from where control is 
exercised and as such closely related to where the business has its ̀ central administration'. 
In K'igv Cvwj Enej TradvzgAG'$ Chambers J" had to consider the meaning of 
`central administration' and ̀ principal place of business' in the context of the Regulation. 
The case concerned proceedings brought by Kmg for breach of a service agreement and 
wrongful inducement of breach of contract. Cmz¢n Energy sought to set aside the 
proceedings on the ground that Kmg had not shown a good arguable case that when the 
action commenced Cn un Energy had its central administration and principal place of 
business within England and Wales within the meaning of Council Regulation 44/2001 
Art. 60(1)(b) and Art. 60(1)(c). 40 The defendants also argued that as their statutory seat, 
and hence ̀domicile' was in Zug, Switzerland they should be sued there. " 
In their defence C7riz n Energy relied heavily on an earlier Court of Appeal 
decision, Oren of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Rewia v Carib an L»zers (Caribtainer) 
Ltdi2 In this case the court was interpreting a jurisdiction and choice of law clause in the 
parties' contract which stated that the country where the carrier had its `principal place of 
business' had jurisdiction. The court concluded that in the context of the parties 
agreement `principal place of business' was intended to mean "chief" or "most 
important" place, "not necessarily the place where most of the business was carried out" 
39 [2003] EWHC 163; [2003] I. L. Pr. 28; Tunes, March 14,2003. 
39 Judge Chambers QC, sitting as a judge of the Queen's Bench division. 
'o This is perhaps the first point of note. The Regulation requires the `central administration' or `principal 
place of business'to be within England and Wales. Ooun Energy's argument treats the two criteria as linked 
and in the judgment Chambers J appears to adopt a similar approach. 
41 Under the Lugano Convention. 
42 [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 325. 
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but rather the "centre from which instructions were given.... and ultimate control 
exercised. "" The case was decided in line with earlier cases based upon the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1894 under which the interpretation of the phrase had a significant impact 
on the registration of vessels. " In that context the principal place of business was 
considered to be the place from which control and management was exercised. Cm to 
Energy argued that their business was entered into and controlled and managed at their 
offices in Zug and as such their central administration and principal place of business 
were located in Switzerland. 
In his analysis Chambers J began by considering the location of the central 
administration. In doing so he ascertained the location of the most important bodies and 
individuals involved in the management of the company. In particular the bodies and 
individuals responsible for making the key business and policy decisions. He concluded 
that the `heart' of the company was in London because the effective power and control 
of the organisation lay in the two management committees operating out of the London 
offices and hence the `central administration' of the company was located in London. 
He then continued to determine Cmun Energy's `principal place of business'. Having 
emphasised that the judgment in The Rerwia was delivered in the context of the 
interpretation of a contractual term and "upon the basis of cases that were themselves 
concerned with such a term", " apparently confining the scope of the decision to cases of 
that nature, he stated that The Rewia remained an essential tool in deciding what 
constituted the carrying on of the principal business of a company. His Honour then 
proceeded to base his adjudication of `principal place of business' under Article 60(1)(c) 
on the criteria derived from 71xRewi ' concluding that; 
"... the application of the criteria to be derived from 71 Rewia leads me to the 
conclusion that there is a good arguable case to the effect that its principal place 
of business is and was in London. "
It has already been stated that in 7Z Rewia, the Court of Appeal considered the 
location of the management and control of the company as decisive in interpreting the 
43 Ad at 334 & 335. 
44 The Pblzý [1916] P. 241. Forfeiture in wartime of a vessel that purported to be English rather than 
German. It must be remembered that these cases were decided during times of war and that this may have 
influenced the approach adopted. 
45 p. 493 para. 10 
46 p. 494. 
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phrase ̀principal place of business' as used in the parties' contract. However, in the 
context of the Regulation these factors are more akin to the ones employed by the court 
to decide the location of the `central administration' of a company. It would appear 
therefore that in JG g, Chambers J considered that the location of the central 
management and control of the company was the key factor upon which the criteria in 
Articles 60 (1)(b) & (c) were to be adjudicated. 
This approach would appear to support the conclusion that the two criteria are 
interchangeable and effectively one and the same, rather than being potentially distinct 
alternatives. Indeed, in his judgment Chambers J states that despite the "disjunctive 
appearance" of the criteria in Article 60 there 
"... could be considerable overlap between what constitutes the central 
administration of a company and the carrying on of its principal business, ". " 
Whilst this is undeniably true (see the Harrods example above) it is not napssarily the case 
in the modem business environment, particularly the environment of electronic 
commerce. If the approach adopted in Kmg is correct it renders Article 60(1)(c) 
somewhat redundant. Although it is probable that in many cases this considerable 
overlap between the `central administration' and ̀ principal place of business' criteria will 
exist, this should not necessarily influence or dictate the interpretation of criteria which, 
it is submitted, are intended to be viewed distinctly and individually. Although there may 
be connections and overlap, it is important in the context of the Regulation to treat them 
as distinct alternatives intended to fulfil the purpose of recognising the close link created 
and allowing the efficient administration of justice. 
Article 60 of the Regulation was intended to introduce ̀ a common concept of the 
domicile of legal persons' throughout the EU. However, the criteria included in the 
article, particularly the concept of a `principal place of business' are ambiguous and as 
such, may require some clarification from the ECJ if divergent application is to be 
avoided. The court may have to consider whether business activities entered into via the 
Internet in a particular state represent a `principal place of business' in that state in 
appropriate circumstances. 
It is submitted that the principal place of business criteria provides the courts 
with an opportunity to recognise the fact that business activity is no longer necessarily 
47 Ibrd p. 494 at para 14. 
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confined to a ̀ physical' place of business and that business activity with bodies or citizens 
in a particular state may create sufficiently close link to bring within jurisdiction of courts 
of that state, particularly with parties from third states, if websites and other 
communications technologies do not qualify as secondary establishments. 
If nothing more, the preceding examples would suggest that the application of 
the concept of `domicile' to the electronic environment may not be particularly helpful in 
resolving a dispute as to whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a case concerning an 
electronic contract. 
4.3.3.3 Derogations from the "Home-State" Principle 
The home-state principle can only be departed from in accordance with the 
provisions set out in the Regulation or Conventions. " The `exclusive jurisdiction', given 
to a particular State's courts in certain proceedings, is discussed above. 49 For the purpose 
of this discussion the provisions of interest relate to, the ability of the parties to 
determine which courts should hear any dispute, or `party autonomy'; the existence of a 
`branch, agency or other establishment'; the provisions concerning ̀ Special Jurisdiction'; 
and those dealing with consumers50, insurance matters51 and employment contracts", 
where the perceived weaker party is protected by "rules of jurisdiction more favourable 
to his interests". " 
4.3.3.3.1 Parry Autonomy 
The Conventions provide that the parties, one of whom is domiciled in a 
Contracting State, may agree that the courts of a particular Contracting State or States 
have exclusive jurisdiction in the event of a dispute. This option is subject to the 
provisions relating to Exclusive jurisdiction and contracts with 'weaker parties' discussed 
below. The agreement must be in writing or evidenced in writing, in accordance with the 
parties' own established practice, or customary to the form of international trade or 
commerce, with which the parties are involved. " Such freedom is expected within the 
business community and in the eyes of some commentators is required within the 
48 Article 3(1) in all cases. 
49 Article 22 of the Regulation, 16 of the Conventions. See 4.3.1 above. 
50 Regulation Articles 15 - 17 (Articles 13 - 15 of the Conventions) 
51 Regulation Articles 8- 14 (Articles 7-9 of the Conventions) 
52 Regulation Articles 18 - 21 (Article 5(1) of the Conventions) 
53 Recital 14 of the Regulations 
54 Article 17 
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electronic environment if electronic commerce is to thrive. " In the new Regulation the 
Commission were keen to recognise this, but equally keen to emphasise the protected 
nature of certain contracts and parties. 
"The autonomy of the parties to a contract, other than an insurance, consumer or 
employment contract, where only limited autonomy to determine the courts 
having jurisdiction is allowed, must be respected subject to the exclusive grounds 
of jurisdiction laid down in this Regulation. "" 
The new provision found in Article 23 is identical to its predecessor, but for the 
inclusion of a subsection clarifying the position of electronic communications with 
regard to the requirement of 'writing or evidenced in writing . 57 Article 23(2) states that: 
"Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the 
agreement shall be equivalent to `writing'. " 
While the clarification of requirements of form in the electronic environment is an 
important step in the removal of barriers to electronic commerce and the promotion of 
legal certainty, this measure retains an unfortunate ambiguity. The requirement of a 
`durable record' is not further defined, leaving uncertainty as to which forms of 
electronic communications will be considered a ̀ durable record'. For example, an e-mail 
message can be stored, reproduced and printed if necessary to provide evidence of the 
agreement. However, if the `agreement' is entered into via a website, by clicking on an 
icon for example, it may be argued that this does not produce a ̀ durable record. " 
4.3.3.3.2 The Existence of a ̀ Branch. Agency or Other Establishment' 
A significant derogation from the home-state principle comes into effect where a 
defendant, or parent company, has a "branch, agency or other establishment" in a 
Member State. The parent company may find that it has to defend an action in that 
55 See, Susman, A. M. "International Electronic Trading: Some Legal Issues" (2000] Society for Conprten & 
Law. Available at http: //wwwscl. org/Services/default. asp? p-156&c-- 
999&ctlD=12&cID=1140000216&prn=1. 
56 Recital 14 of the Regulation. 
57 Article 23 (2). Requirements of form in the electronic environment are discussed in detail below in 
chapter 7. 
5 The majority of electronic communications can be printed out of course, and arguably this would 
provide a durable record of the agreement. However, if this were necessary it would remove the 
'paperless' element of electronic contracting and an element of its appeal. 
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Member State rather than its home State. Although the phrase occurs in Articles 
discussed below, it warrants separate consideration because the interpretation adopted by 
the courts may have significant implications for those entering contracts electronically 
and for electronic commerce in general. 
For the trader, seeking to expand their business by entering contracts in other 
Member States, this is an important issue to take into account when establishing 
subsidiaries or locating a branch or agency there. As was indicated in the introduction to 
this chapter the differences in the judicial systems of other Member States can be 
daunting to an overseas party. A seller or service provider, resident in the UK, may not 
relish the prospect of appearing before a Greek court, for example, in the event of a 
dispute arising in relation to a contract entered into with a party in that state. For small 
and medium-sized businesses this may be a determining factor in any decision to expand 
into overseas markets by opening a new branch or subsidiary. (For the Single Market, 
this has been a significant issue in the desire for harmonisation in the field of access to 
justice in civil and commercial disputes). 
With the advent of modem communication technologies, in particular the 
Internet, in many cases there is no longer a need to set up a `physical' place of business 
or have an agent in a particular state to take advantage of the market and enter contracts 
with its citizens. Indeed this is one of the primary benefits to commerce of modem 
electronic communications. Any measure, which has the potential to curb this 
possibility, will be detrimental to the development of electronic commerce. However, it 
may be equally detrimental for measures intended to protect weaker parties and promote 
confidence in electronic contracting to be ineffective where electronic communications 
such as the Internet are used. In many circumstances interactive websites can perform 
exactly the same role as a branch or agency physically present in the state. The key 
question at this point is whether facilities intended to create or promote the creation of 
electronic contracts in a particular state, or group of states, can be classed as a `branch, 
agency or other establishment' bringing their proprietors within the jurisdiction of a 
particular court. 
Justification for this derogation 
The primary justification for allowing action in a State other than the defendant's 
domicile in this exception is the `special ink' or `close connection' created by the 
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existence of the branch, agency or establishment in that particular State. In Etablissamnts 
Somaf r SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG59 the ECJ explained that, 
"Although Article 5 makes provision in a number of cases for a special 
jurisdiction, which the plaintiff may choose, this is because of the existence, in 
certain clearly-defined situations, of a particularly close connecting factor 
between a dispute and the court which may be called upon to hear it, with a view 
to the efficacious conduct of the proceedings. "" 
The court added that in order to ensure legal certainty the phrase ̀branch, agency 
or establishment' must have an independent European interpretation common to all 
Member States. " Recital 12 of the new Regulation reaffirms the necessity of an 
alternative ground of jurisdiction based upon this close connection between the action 
and the courts of a particular State: 
"In addition to the defendant's domicile, there should be alternative grounds of 
jurisdiction based on a close link between the court and the action or in order to 
facilitate the sound administration of justice. " 
In the new Regulation it is also made clear that in relation to insurance matters, 
employment contracts and consumers the derogation from the `home-state' principle by 
reference to the existence of a branch, agency or other establishment is further justified 
by the desire to protect the weaker party to the dispute, as a matter of policy, in addition 
to the connecting factor created by the presence of the branch, agency or 
establishment. " Additionally, where a party to the contract falls within one of the 
categories of `weaker parties', the existence of a branch agency or other establishment in 
any EU Member State may have implications for parties based in non-EU States 63 
For the purpose of this discussion it is important to establish exactly what criteria 
will need to be satisfied in establishing whether a ̀ branch, agency or other establishment' 
exists and hence, whether the platforms and technologies employed in electronic 
commerce will fall within these criteria. 
59 Case 33/78, [1978] ECR 2183, [1979]1 C. M. L. R. 490. 
60 Ibid at 502 (para. 7). 
61 Ibid at 503 (para. 8). 
62 See Recital 13 
63 This issue is returned to below at 4.3.6. 
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An El iic Brande, Agency or OtI r EstablisJ nervt'? 
In the ̀ traditional' marketplace - the physical world - the courts have looked for 
a presence of a physical nature, the existence of a permanent establishment where 
business is conducted on behalf of the parent company by employees or by an agent. If 
the notion of `branch, agency or other establishment' requires some physical presence 
with a degree of permanency then a website, in itself, will not satisfy the requirement. If 
this is the approach adopted one must consider the effect that this will have on the ability 
of the regulatory measures to fulfil their objectives of providing ̀greater protection' for 
weaker parties - i. e. consumers" 
If, on the other hand, an interactive website can be brought within this definition 
then this prospect may deter a trader, particularly a small or medium-sized enterprise 
(SME), from taking advantage of electronic contracts and have a significant impact on 
the economic potential of electronic commerce. " 
Two questions need to be addressed. Firstly, can and should an electronic 
presence such as an interactive website be brought within the definition of branch, 
agency or other establishment'? And secondly, can such a presence be said to be actually 
situated in a Member State or group of States? Some consideration of the objectives and 
justifications of this exception to the home-State principle, in addition to relevant 
authority, is necessary. 
4.3.3.3.3 Relevant Articles 
The phrase occurs, albeit with a slight variation, in the rules on `Special 
jurisdiction' and the rules in relation to `insurance matters, "' and 'consurner" and 
employment contracts'. " With the Convention terminology being retained in the new 
Regulation it is reasonable to assume that the body of case law relating to the earlier 
provisions will retain its relevance in future disputes. The provision relating to `Special 
Jurisdiction' in Regulation 5 (5) reads: 
64 Clearly, this is only one base for claiming jurisdiction but, as the case-law illustrates, it is not an 
insignificant one. 
65 This issue is discussed further below in the section on 'directing activities' at 4.3.6. 
66 Articles 8- 14, specifically 9(2). 
67 Articles 15 - 17, specifically 15(2). 
68 Articles 18 - 21, specifically 18(2). 
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"A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be 
sued...... as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or 
other establishment, in the courts for the place in which the branch, agency or 
other establishment is situated. "" 
This provision can only be relied upon if the defendant is domiciled in a Member State 
of the EU. Where a defendant is domiciled in a non-Member State the national rules of 
private international law will apply. 
In disputes relating to insurance matters and employment or consumer contracts, 
more favourable rules than usual are provided to protect the interests of the weaker party 
to the dispute. " The provision relating to consumer contracts is perhaps the most 
significant in relation to electronic contracting at present" Regulationl5(2) reads: 
"Where a consumer enters into a contract with a party who is not domiciled in 
the Member State but has a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the 
Member States, that party shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the 
branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State. "
This provision is capable of having effect where the defendant is not domiciled in a 
Member State but has a branch agency or establishment in one of the Member States. 
The party is deemed to be domiciled in the Member State where his branch, agency or 
establishment exists. (This may have implications for parent bodies based in non- 
EU/EFTA States. ) 
The boundaries of phrase ̀branch, agency or other establishment' are unclear and 
even with guidance from the ECJ the phrase remains open to interpretation in the 
Member State courts. Clearly there is uncertainty and scope for speculation as to how 
this phrase will be interpreted and applied in the electronic environment. Before 
accepting jurisdiction on the basis of the activities of a branch agency or other 
establishment a court must be satisfied that there is a good arguable case that a 'branch, 
69 It is clear that this provision only applies to parties domiciled in a Member State. However, where a 
'weaker party' is involved in the dispute a party resident in a third State will be deemed domiciled in a 
Member State if he has a 'branch, agency or other establishment' there. See the discussion below at 4.6.2. 
70 Recital 13. 
71 The provision is identical to those found in relation to employment contracts and insurance matters. 
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agency or other establishment' exists in the Member State, and that the dispute has arisen 
`out of the operations of the branch, agency or other establishment. ' 
4.3.3.3.4 The Relevant Case-Law 
fl Existence of a Branch, Agency or Other Establish: 
In Etablissaneizts A. de Blas Sprl v. Estahii or is Bou)a SA" the ECJ responded to 
a request for a preliminary ruling on the phrase from the Belgian Appellate Court. " The 
European Court explained that: 
"One of the essential characteristics of the concepts of branch or agency is the 
fact of being subject o the direction and control of the parent body. "" 
The court added that the concept of `establishment' in the Article should be interpreted 
6zbngernr and based on the same essential characteristics as a branch or agency! ' In 
DeBloos the Court was not required to identify relevant factors for the determination of 
whether the parent body exercised direction and control over undertaking in question. " 
The issue was further addressed in EtaUissenents SomaferSA v. Saar-FeingasAG: 78 
"... the concept of branch, agency or other establishment implies a place of 
business which has the appearance of permanency, such as the extension of a 
parent body, has a management and is materially equipped to negotiate business 
with third parties so that the latter, although knowing that there will if necessary 
be a legal link with the parent body, the head office of which is abroad, do not 
have to deal directly with such parent body but may transact business at the place 
of business constituting the extension. "" 
72 C mda Traut Qmp ray md otlzr v Stolzm1vg vid ot/. v [ 1998] 1 VdA 547, [2000] 3 WLR 1376, supported on 
appeal; Gmada Tiust Co v Stdzenbvg (No. 2) [2002] 1 A. C. 1 [2000] 3 W. L. R. 1376 [2000] 4 All E. R. 481 
[2001] C. L. C. 118. 
73 Case 14/76, [1976] ECR 1497, [1977] 1 C. M. L. R. 60. 
74 The Gourd äp4td de Mons. 
75 [1977] 1 C. M. L. R. 60, at p. 82. 
76 IM 
77 Insofar as it is under the `direction and control' of a parent body a website would appear to satisfy this 
initial requirement, its actions being dictated by the website designer or proprietor. 
78 Case 33/78, [1978] ECR 2183, [1979]1 C. M. L. R. 490. 
79 Ibid at 503, para. 12. 
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From the two rulings it would appear that to satisfy the requirement that a `branch, 
agency or other establishment' exists, there has to be a good arguable case that: 
1. the defendant party is an extension of the parent body and that it is under the 
control and direction of the parent body, 
2. there is the appearance of permanency, 
3. there is a management, capable of negotiating business with third parties 
without the third party having to deal directly with the parent body. 
On this basis in B&zncckaert and Willens PVBA v. Luise Trod' a commercial agent 
or business negotiator based in Germany, who established a sales network there on 
behalf of a Belgian furniture manufacturer, did not constitute a `branch agency or other 
establishment' for the purpose of Article 5(5) of the Brussels Convention. The agent had 
the autonomy to work as and when and for whom he desired, including competitors, 
without being subject to the instructions of the parent body. In addition, the agent 
merely transmitted orders to the parent body without effectively participating in the 
completion and execution of transactions. An independent agency with these 
characteristics was not considered to have the `character of a branch, agency or other 
establishment within the meaning of the Article 5(5) of the Convention'. " 
There would also appear to be some tendency to expansion of the jurisdiction 
conferred by the phrase in the court's approach. In Sar Schotte GmbHv. Parfians Rothschild 
SartZ the court stated that even though the company in question was not technically a 
`branch, agency or other establishment' it could nevertheless be equated to one because 
the company based in France used it as an extension of itself to pursue its activities in 
Germany. 
However, in the case law to-date the courts have only had to consider the nature 
of a physical presence in a particular jurisdiction. Sanafer was decided at a time when 
`interactive websites' were not in existence and hence the terminology used by the court 
related to the commercial world as it existed then. With electronic commerce the 
presence in question will rarely be of a physical nature and the issue will depend upon the 
court's approach to a non-physical presence. 
80 Case 139/80 {1981] ECR 819; [1982] 2 C. M. L. R1. 
81 IM at 15 
82 Case 218/86 - [1987] ECR 4905; [1989] E. C. C. 431. 
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In the electronic environment online traders often utilise one or more of the 
following to facilitate entering contracts with parties in a particular jurisdiction: 
1) A website - this maybe passive or interactive, 
2) Hardware - such as servers and other technology, 
3) An ISP to host their site, 
4) A distribution centre or warehouse to organise the delivery of physical products. 
The question to be addressed is whether these methods, individually or in combination, 
will bring a trader within a court's jurisdiction on the basis of this provision. In isolation 
it is unlikely that any of these individual factors would fall within the definition of a 
`branch agency or other establishment' laid down in the case law of the ECJ. Clearly 
there are numerous permutations at present and there will undoubtedly be many more in 
the future. Each will have to be assessed on its own merit. What follows is a suggested 
analysis of the application of the three requirements indicated in the case law to the 
current climate. 
Websites 
Passive websites containing information or advertisements without the 
technology for entering contracts with customers would probably not fall within the 
provision because they do not `operate' or `act' in any way to negotiate business with 
third parties. " However, interactive websites may require closer examination. 
An extension of the parent body? 
A website is an extension of the owner's, or parent body's activity and it is 
obviously under its control and direction, being the result of actions taken by, or on 
behalf of, the parent body. However, an argument exists that electronic agents act 
independently of their users, and this argument may become more tenable as technology 
and artificial intelligence develop. 84 
83 In Wolfgang Bf rand Peter Nolleru Demo WzaerReynalds Inc. (Case C-318/93) [1994] ECR I-4275 the 
existence of an agency based in Germany which dealt with advertising for a US company (DWR) did not 
bring contracts entered into by consumers through an independent financial adviser in Germany within the 
scope of Artcles 13 and 14 of the Brussels Convention. 
84 See Allen, T. & Widdison, R. "Can Computers Make Contracts? " (1996) 9 Hanwdjou nal of Lary & 
Tahnology 25. Discussed above in chapter 3.2. 
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The äppoarance of p mumauy: 
It is important to note in relation to this factor that the requirement is for an 
appearance of permanency rather than an actual permanent presence. If an actual 
permanent presence were needed then websites, being transient and ephemeral in nature 
with no degree of permanence in a physical sense, would clearly be excluded. Equally 
many physical world businesses would also be excluded because their branch or agency 
premises are rarely ̀ permanent' in the true sense. In Dinkha Latcbric T/A Dinkha Latch 
Associates v. General Medite== Holdings SA & Anr 5 an occasional presence, in the form 
of a series of meetings, was sufficient to satisfy the court that a `branch, agency or other 
establishment' existed in London. The appearance of permanence will be satisfied if the 
body gives the impression that it is permanent. This will be a question of fact in each 
case but it can be speculated that where a website is well-known or well-established in a 
particular State or has entered transactions in that State for some time, then there may be 
scope for the argument that the website, as a commercial entity, has an element of 
`permanence' about it. The website would be no less permanent than its physical world 
counterparts. 
A nwugano t capable ofn tiatvig business »ulep7dent of the panv body 
In most cases an interactive website will be designed to enter into business 
transactions with third parties without the direct involvement of its owner (or parent 
body). Indeed this is the purpose of such sites. Whether there is a ̀ management' as such 
is debateable, but the site certainly has the ability to `manage' the business electronically! ' 
The court may accept the argument that the site is `managed' by the software and 
programming of the site as created and controlled by the parent body. 
W4aere is a zeebsite `citzr z 1:? 
However, even if a website can be considered a `branch agency or other 
establishment', adifficulty remains in establishing that the website is actually ̀situated' in 
a Member State or group of States. It could be argued that a website is situated on the 
Internet and therefore not in any State; " on a host computer, or server, " in the cache of 
85[2002] C. L. C. 330. 
86 Management -the process of dealing with or controlling things or people'. The New Oxford Dictionary 
of English. (1998) Oxford University Press. 
87 A popular argument for the proponents of an autonomous, self governing of Internet. See Lessig, L. 
"The Internet Under Siege" [2001] Nov/Dec Foreign Policy Magazbi(alrir) at; 
http"//www. foreignpgligy. com/issue novdec 2001/lessig html. 
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a user's computer or in the cache of numerous servers owned by Internet Service 
Providers. These propositions mayor may not be helpful in ascertaining the ̀ location' of 
a website, but even if they do provide an appropriate answer in a case before a court this 
will be purely fortuitous. The search for the location in which a website is situated is 
arguably an inappropriate basis for the purpose of conferring adjudicative jurisdiction. It 
is submitted that an interactive website should be considered situated in the State or 
States where its commercial activity is conducted. In this way the courts of that State will 
have a clear connection with any action resulting from the activities entered into via that 
website 89 This would not equate to mere accessibility but rather to the participation in 
commercial activity in that State. 
If a physical presence is required for there to be a `branch, agency or other 
establishment' situated in a Member State, then the only potential argument will relate to 
the situations where there is something physically located in the Member State, or, in the 
case of consumers, one of the Member States. If the seller uses an ISP, places its own 
technology or uses a warehouse in a particular State, then the physical presence would 
appear to exist and coupled with a website, would appear to provide a branch, agency or 
other establishment' for the purpose of the Regulation. However, it has been argued that 
the presence of technological means to host the website or similar technologies will not 
satisfy the requirements for the existence of a branch or secondary establishment under 
the Regulation. " This argument is based upon the terminology employed in the 
Directive on Electronic Commerce91 to define an ̀established service provider': 
"established service provider': a service provider who effectively pursues an 
economic activity using a fixed establishment for an indefinite period. The 
presence and use of the technical means and technologies required to provide the 
service do not, in themselves, constitute an establishment of the provider. "92 
88 Which could be situated in a state completely unrelated to the parties or their activities. 
89 It is conceded that in some circumstances even this approach will have inappropriate consequences. For 
example, where a website is visited and a contract concluded whilst travelling through a foreign 
jurisdiction. In such cases the court will have to revert to the 'domiciles' of the parties to the transaction. 
90 See; Stone, P. "The Treatment of Electronic Contracts and Torts in Private International Law Under 
European Community Legislation" [2002] 11(2) Infamurrrän & C. ammokaions Td nos gy Law (1 & CTL)121- 
139, at 122. 
91 Directive 2000/3 1/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive 
on electronic commerce) OJ L178/1. Implemented in the UK by The Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002 No. 2013. 
92 1bid Article 2(c). 
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In this context it is clear that websites, servers and related technologies will not satisfy 
the requirement. However, the Directive also clearly states that it `does not establish 
additional rules on private international law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction of 
Courts'. " On this basis it could be argued that the interpretation of provisions contained 
within instruments dealing with matters of jurisdiction should be independent and based 
on the purpose of the particular provision. 
The phrase `established service provider' is intended to define the service 
providers who are subject to the control of enforcement bodies within a particular State 
whose obligation it is to ensure compliance with national rules. The approach adopted 
to the presence of `technical means and technologies to provide the service' is intended 
to prevent restriction of the free movement of services within the internal market. The 
existence of a 'branch, agency or other establishment' is an indication of a business 
entity's connection with a particular State because of the activities he pursues with 
citizens of that State, thus providing a court in that State with jurisdiction. It is 
submitted that there is no justification for adopting the approach taken to the 
establishment of service providers in the Electronic Commerce Directive because the 
purpose behind the provisions, and the terminology itself, is completely different. 
If the trader is using an ISP to host the website, it may appear unlikely that this 
could amount to a `branch, agency or other establishment'. In many ways the activities 
of the ISP are akin to those of the independent agent in Blanckaerz being neither under 
the direction or control of the proprietors of the website. However, the content and 
activity pursued via a website is not usually under the control of the ISP, but rather under 
the control and direction of the trader. If the trader or `parent body' places its own 
technology in a Member State and operates an interactive website from that hardware 
then the physical presence exists, if indeed it is required to qualify as a ̀ branch agency or 
other establishment'. 
If nothing more, this `analysis' highlights the futility of looking for a physical 
presence with the appearance of permanency in the electronic environment. The two 
stated purposes of this exception to the home-state principle are the sound 
administration of justice because of the close link between the court and the action, and 
the protection of `weaker parties' such as consumers. It is submitted that these purposes 
should be the focus when considering the issue of whether jurisdiction should be 
93 Ibrd Article 1(4). 
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conferred rather than whether the means of conducting the activity which led to the 
dispute have a ̀ physical presence' in a State or not. 
As the new ̀ Brussels Regulation' is intended to take account of `new forms of 
commercial activity', 94 it could be expected that it should encompass new methods of 
having a branch agency or other establishment in a Member State. In the electronic 
environment bricks and mortar and a human presence are no longer necessary to obtain 
the benefits of having a physical place of business in that State. However, this issue is 
unresolved and will remain the subject of judicial interpretation. 
Disputes arising ̀out of the operations of the branch, agency or other establishment'. 
In addition to demonstrating the existence of a 'branch, agency or other 
establishment', it is also necessary to show that the dispute arose out of the operations of 
that body. In SanWs it was stated that the concept of `operations' comprises: 
- actions relating to rights and contractual or non-contractual obligations 
concerning the management properly so-called of the agency, branch or other 
establishment itself such as those concerning the situation of the building 
where such entity is established or the local engagement of staff to work 
there. 
- actions relating to undertakings which have been entered into at the above- 
mentioned place of business in the name of the parent body and which must 
be performed in the Contracting State where the place of business is 
established. 
" actions concerning non-contractual obligations arising from the activities in 
which the branch, agency or other establishment within the above defined 
meaning has engaged at the place in which it is established on behalf of the 
parent body. "96 
In the subsequent case of Lloyd's Rcnster of Shzping v Cvnp man Bemani' it was held that, 
despite the wording of the Scvnafar decision, it is not a pre-condition for jurisdiction 
under Article 5(5) that the obligations entered into by the branch in the name of the 
94ppCÜ fn 10. 
95 [1979]1 C. M. L. R. 490. 
961Miat p 504. 
97 [1995] ECR 1-961. 
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parent body were to be performed in the contracting state in which the branch is 
situated. If it were so, the court highlighted the fact that article 5(5) would be somewhat 
redundant in the light of Article 5(1) which deals with the performance of contractual 
obligations. "' 
The requirement that the contract be ̀ entered into at the place of business' could 
once again raise the difficult question of u &v in the electronic environment actions 
occur. If an interactive website is being relied upon as a `branch, agency or other 
establishment', then a dispute related to a contract entered via that website may be 
considered arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment. 
The interpretation of the phrase ̀ branch, agency or other establishment' may 
have a significant impact on parties using electronic agents and other technologies to 
enter electronic contracts with parties in other States. It is submitted that if these new 
methods of operating a secondary establishment in another state are not encompassed by 
the phrase ̀ branch, agency or other establishment' , there will 
be an undesirable lacuna 
created in the Regulations and their application. 
4.3.4 ̀ Special Jurisdiction' 
4.3.4.1 Contracts in General : Article 5(1) 
Before Article 5(1) is discussed the approach taken by the ECJ to the definition 
of a contract and a contractual relationship, within the context of the Brussels 
Convention should be considered. With the lack of a uniform approach to the notion of 
`contract' within the Member States the Court has stated that, for the purpose of the 
convention, the term has an independent meaning encompassing all matters having their 
basis in an agreement 99 In this way the Article encompasses ituations where there is a 
dispute as to the actual existence of a contract. However, where rights are conferred on 
a third party in an agreement, 10° they will not be treated as arising under a contract for the 
purpose of the Convention. "' 
Article 5 of the Convention contains a number of exceptions to the home-state 
principle where the subject matter of the dispute has a `close connection' with a state 
98 Ibid at 469 (para [17b. 
99 See Case 34/82 Petersu South Netlxniat CwuracronAssociation[1983] E. C. R. 987, Case 9/87Arrado Spit 
Hauhand SA. [1988] E. CR 1539 and case 38/81 Eifer SpA v. Yx7trner [1982] E. CR 825. 
'°° As may be the case in some legal systems including England and Wales, following the enactment of the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 
101 See Case C-26/91 Ste Hans eet Cie GmbHu Traiteii its Mumm-CJi'nques des Surfaces [1992] E. C. R. I-3967. 
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other than that in which the defendant is domiciled102 The Regulation retains this 
provision103 and introduces specific amendments intended to clarify uncertainty relating 
to the special jurisdiction rules in contractual law. 104 The source of the uncertainty and 
whether the Regulation has clarified the provision will now be considered. 
The basic exception found in Article 5(1) of both instruments, states that a party 
domiciled in a contracting state may be sued in the courts of another contracting state; 
"in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of 
the obligation in question. ""' 
4.3.4.1.1 "Place of performance" 
Whilst this phrase is, prim facie, a logical and justifiable criterion because of the 
close connection between the subject matter of the dispute and the court, "' it has 
produced a significant body of case law relating to its interpretation and application. "' If 
a single obligation is in question, then there are few difficulties. The place of 
performance of that obligation can usually be identified and if that contractual obligation 
is to be performed in a particular State the courts of that State have jurisdiction to hear a 
dispute relating to that obligation under Article 5(1). 
However, the position becomes more complicated if the dispute relates to a 
number of obligations under the contract, some of which are central to the contract and 
others which could be described as subsidiary. If these obligations are to be performed 
in different States there could be a number of courts involved in related disputes. The 
ECJ has made it clear that the word `obligation' in Article 5(1) refers to the contractual 
obligation forming the basis of the legal proceedings rather than the performance of any 
other obligation under the contract in another jurisdiction. "' This is the logical 
conclusion when the `close connection' justification for jurisdiction is considered. The 
uncertainty associated with this article arises when the particular obligation in dispute is 
102 Article 5(5), discussed above, being one of them. 
103 And it's numbering. 
104 Op cit fn 10 at p. 2. 
105 Article 5(1). 
106 Based upon the basic rule of "special jurisdiction" ornrrisdkt on rat nematerae rather than "general 
jurisdiction" or juridiczi ratiawpersawe 
'°7 See for example; Et blissoneiztsA. de Bkos Sprl u EstaMisson is Bowp SA Case 14/76[1976]ECR 1497, 
[ 1977] 1CM. L. R. 60; Boss Gn up Ltd u Boss Fran eSA [1996] 4 All E. R. 970 and Vukase Ltd v Paul Keifet 
GmbH[1999] 3 All E. R. 362. 
108 EtaUissaneits A. de B1cios Spd u EstaNüson its Bou r SA [1977]1CMLR. 60 at 81. 
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to be performed in a number of jurisdictions or, as occurs in many disputes, a number of 
obligations are involved, each of which may be performed in different jurisdictions. 
With an electronic contract the performance of the obligations may take place in 
numerous jurisdictions. For example, a contract with an ISP for storage, e-mail and web- 
hosting may be provided in a number of jurisdictions depending on the technology in 
use. If the basis of the dispute is the obligation to provide these services, then the 
question of `place of performance' becomes somewhat problematic. If the physical 
`place of performance' can be ascertained, such as the relevant server, this may have little 
or no connection with the parties themselves or the contract. 
Where a number of jurisdictions may be involved the first issue to consider is the 
risk of duplicate actions, or the inappropriate distribution of related actions. 
4.3.4.1.2 Duplicate or Related Actions - Lis Pendens. 
Where the courts in a number of States may have grounds to claim jurisdiction in 
a contractual dispute the potential exists for conflicting and irreconcilable judgments. 
This problem was envisaged at time of the drafting of the Brussels Convention and an 
Article was introduced to deal with the possibility of identical or related actions being 
brought in multiple jurisdictions. The provisions are now found, in identical form, in 
Articles 27 to 31 of the Regulation. Article 27 reads: 
1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same 
parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than 
the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time 
as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. 
2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court other 
than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court. 
Hence, providing jurisdiction of the court first seised can be established, courts in other 
jurisdictions must decline jurisdiction in those proceedings. Where an action is closely 
connected to an action before another court it may be expedient to hear the issues 
together. In this situation any court, other than the court first seised, may stay its 
proceedings and may also, on the application of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction. "' 
109 Aride 28 
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This is only a discretionary element and naturally where a court sees fit, it may still hear 
the dispute. 
When a claim relates to a number of obligations, to be performed in different 
jurisdictions the question before the court becomes even more complex. In such cases 
the courts have applied the Latin maxim aarssonhan sequitur princiAthk, requiring the 
identification of the principal obligation, to which all other obligations are deemed to be 
attached. "' However, where it is not possible to distinguish between the `principal' 
obligation and those which are seen as ̀ accessory', the ECJ has stated that a court may 
only seize jurisdiction under article 5(1) in respect of obligations which are performed 
within its territory. "' While this approach retains the close-connection principle as 
grounds for seising jurisdiction, it does have the potential to create considerable 
inconvenience and detract from the expressed objective of expediently dealing with 
disputes. 
However, the difficulty remains establishing the `place' of performance of the 
obligation in question. When questions of this nature arise it is for the national Courts to 
determine the `place of performance' according to the rules of national law'. 112 Here, the 
potential exists for divergent interpretation of the Article, because courts in different 
jurisdictions may interpret contractual performance differently. In English law, the `place 
of performance' will be primarily assessed on the express or implied intentions of the 
parties to a contract. Hence, if a contract for the sale of goods includes terms relating to 
delivery, then the `place of performance' will depend on the detail of that term. If the 
obligation in question is the delivery of a tangible item, then that the obligation is to be 
performed in the place where that item was to be delivered. If the obligation is to pay 
money, then the debtor is usually under a general duty to pay the creditor at the creditor's 
place of business"' rather than the place where the customer takes steps to make that 
payment. "` 
The phrase ̀place of performance of the obligation in question' has raised a 
number of questions of interpretation. When the phrase is considered in the context of 
the electronic environment existing uncertainties may be magnified by the problems 
110 Case 266/85 SM auzi u Kith r [1987] E. C. R. 239. However, identifying the `principal obligation' may 
still be difficult, see Chian Trmpn Gup plcu C. o tal Lines SA. [1992] 1 W. L. R. 15 and A. 1. G. Group 
(U. KOLtd V 7be Ethniki [1998] 4 All ER 301. 
1I Case C-420/97 Le mex Die Snate d SpA v. Bodetex B. V. B. A (E. C J., 1999). 
'12 Case 12/76 Industrie Tessili Italian Camu Dwv4AG [1976] E. C. R. 1473, and Case C-440/97 GIE 
Gra¢tte Coiznnie u 77 SuhiAeu ,v Par* (ECJ, 1999). 
113 Ihaxrl & Co Ltd v Gats [1904] 2 K. B. 685 
114 For example makes a bank deposit or posts a cheque. 
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associated with identifying a ̀ place of performance' leading to a lack of legal certainty. If 
the obligation forming the basis of the action is to be performed on the Internet, 
identifying the place of that performance may be difficult and even where it is possible it 
may be of little practical use. In the development of the Brussels Regulation the issue of 
clarifying this provision was addressed. The amended provision will now be considered. 
4.3.4.1.3 The Regulation - An Opportunity to Clarify the ̀ Place of Performance'. 
The Regulation seeks to clarify the ambiguity in relation to the phrase ̀ place of 
performance of the obligation in question' but nevertheless retains this terminology. "' 
The assistance provided by the Regulation is the introduction of a reference to contracts 
for the sale of goods or the provision of services. Article 5(1) of the Regulation reads: 
A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued: 
(a) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of 
performance of the obligation in question; 
(b) for the purpose of this provision and unless otherwise agreed, the 
place of performance of the obligation in question shall be: 
- in the case of the sale of goods, the place in a Member State 
where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should 
have been delivered, 
- in the case of the provision of services, the place in a Member 
State where, under the contract, the services were provided or 
should have been provided, 
(c) if subparagraph (b) does not apply then subparagraph (a) applies. 
The addition of Article 5(1)(b) clarifies the place of performance in contracts for 
the sale of goods or provision of services, adopting an approach already applied in the 
courts of England and Wales. "' This may explain why, when dealing with the provision 
in the area of their sole legislative competence (the provision relating to inter-UK 
disputes in the CJJA), the UK government chose to retain the original wording from the 
Brussels Convention, indicating that the amendment adds little to the application of the 
115 The significance of `a close link' as an alternative ground of jurisdiction can be seen from Recital 12 of 
the Regulation. 
116 See below at 4.4. 
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provision in the UK. "' However, the additions to the Article may do little to help clarify 
the situation with contracts not categorised as either involving a sale of goods or 
provision of services, in particular contracts for intangible items or `data products' which 
form a large proportion of the growing electronic ommerce market. "' 
The Article does envisage the situation where contracts do not fall within these 
categories (paragraph 1(c)) but simply refers back to the `place of performance of the 
obligation in question' qualification without further direction, retaining a status quo with 
the existing Convention provision. The new provision does add the phrase `unless 
otherwise agreed, ' re-enforcing the idea of party autonomy expressed in Recital 14, 
allowing business parties to expressly state in their contract terms that the obligations are 
deemed to be performed in a particular jurisdiction. "' 
With the stated objective of clarification it is unfortunate that the Commission 
adopted an approach which, in the context of electronic commerce, does very little to 
clarify the position in relation to the intangible items which form a common subject- 
matter of electronic contracts. The `place of performance of the obligation in question' 
remains and area of uncertainty which will ultimately require clarification by the ECJ. 
Article 5 contains derogations from the home state principle of a permissive 
nature. However, the derogations relating to consumers, insurance matters and 
employment contracts carry a far more obligatory tone. The provisions relating to 
jurisdiction over consumer contracts will be the focus here, but the provisions relating to 
insurance and employment contracts are identical in form. The new Regulation contains 
some significant developments in this area so the position under the Convention will be 
considered first followed by an analysis of the changes. 
4.3.5 Consumer Contracts : Articles 13-15 of the Brussels Convention 
4.3.5.1 Philosophy underlying the provisions 
In a consumer contract (one between a consumer and a business) the `consumer' 
is usually the economically weaker party. As such, within the UK and EU, the consumer 
is afforded greater protection in relation to substantive and procedural matters associated 
with the contracts he enters. The European Commission has, as a key objective, the 
development of a high common level of consumer protection within the EU. By 
117 CJJA Schedule 4 (3) (As amended by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001 (SI No. 3929). 
118 See above Chapter 3. 




creating such an environment he Commission hopes to maximise the benefits of the 
Single Market for the consumer and reduce the uncertainty and lack of confidence 
associated with entering cross-border transactions. With the economic potential of 
electronic commerce the perceived need for such an environment has become 
increased. "'
Articles 13-15 of the Brussels Convention allow the consumer to avail himself of 
the courts in his domicile, departing from the home-state principle, in specific 
circumstances. The consumer has the option of initiating proceedings against the other 
party in the courts of the State in which he is domiciled or in the courts of the State in 
which the other party is domiciled. Conversely, the consumer may only be sued in the 
courts of the state in which he is domiciled. "' To benefit from this provision the party 
must; 
1) fall within the Convention definition of consumer, and, 
2) enter a contract falling within one of the categories listed in the Article. 
4.3.5.2 The Definition of `Consumer' 
Article 13 defines `consumer' as a person entering a contract "for a purpose 
which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession. " The definition 
employed here is common to many European instruments. "' However, this definition 
does have the potential to exclude individuals who purchase a product, in a purely private 
capacity, which they may also utilise in their profession. For example the lawyer who 
purchases a computer to enable him to work at home, or a lecturer purchasing a 
computer to edit a book he has written. Arguably, both of these contracts have been 
entered into for a `professional purpose'. It would appear possible, albeit on a very 
narrow interpretation, for such individuals to be excluded from the scope of the 
provision. This interpretation would appear to restrict the application of the exception 
for consumers. Indeed it has been suggested that any of the exceptions to the 
`defendant's domicile' principle should be construed restrictively. "' However, in the 
120 See the 'Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The 
Economic And Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions - Consumer Policy Strategy 2002- 
2006'. http //euroaa eu int/comm/consumers/policy/intro/consume; _policy strategy en pdf. 
'21 Article 14 para. 3. The provisions do not affect the right of either party to bring a counter-claim to the 
court in question. 
122 For example, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, dcussed below in Section IV. 
123 See KLth zw t Benses Ltd v GlasgowQ'ty Caaoxil (No. 2) [1999] 1 AC 153 at 163 an d AnckwRayw v. ROwd 
D=ies [2002] EWCA Civ 1880; [2002] WL 31676420 (CA). 
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Report by Professors Giuliano and Lagarde'Z` on the corresponding Article in the Rome 
Convention, a broader interpretation is advocated. 
"It [the Article] should be interpreted in the light of its purpose which is to 
protect the weaker parry... the rule does not apply to contracts made by traders, 
manufacturers or persons in the exercise of a profession (doctors for example) 
who buy equipment or obtain services for that trade or profession. If such a 
person acts partly within, partly outside his trade or profession the situation only 
falls within the scope of [the Article] if he acts primarily outside his trade or 
profession. ""' 
This interpretation would appear to introduce an assessment of the degree to which the 
party is acting within his trade or profession. In the examples of the lawyer and the 
lecturer above if the computers were purchased primarily for use in their profession then 
they would be outside of the scope of the provision. If, on the other hand, the purchases 
were made primarily for uses outside of their profession then arguably they would fall 
within the scope of the provision. If the party enters the contract with a view to 
pursuing a trade or profession in the future they are also excluded. "' 
4.3.5.3 Type of contract 
Article 13 restricts the application of the consumer protection measures to 
certain defined types of contract. The contract must be: 
-a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; or, 
-a contract for a loan repayable by instalments, or for any other form of credit, 
made to finance the sale of goods; or 
- any other contract for the supply of goods or a contract for the supply of 
services, and 
124 Report by Professors Giuliano and Lagarde on: The Qnvmtion on LawAppliaUe to Coniractzral OHigat is, 
OJ 1980 C282/1,31st October. To which we are directed by Dr Schlosser in his report on the Accession 
Treaty to the Brussels Convention: 'Report on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the 
Court of Justice, by Professor Dr Peter Schlosser. (OJ C 59/715.3.79) at p. 119, para. 158. 
15 datp23. 
126 Case C-269/95 Frvxe oB thvzsa vlkntalkit Sri. (1997) ECR I-3767. 
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(a) in the State of the consumer's domicile the conclusion of the contract 
was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising; 
and 
(b) the consumer took in that State the steps necessary for the conclusion 
of the contract. "' 
Article 13 is clearly limited in the type of contracts in which the consumer is 
afforded added protection. In particular, to satisfy paragraphs 1 and 2 the contract must 
relate to the sale of goods, either on instalment credit terms or some other finance 
agreement associated with a sale of goods. However, it is the third paragraph of Article 
13 that raises several issues relevant o its general application and more significantly, for 
the purpose of this discussion, its application to contracts concluded electronically. 
4.3.5.1.1 'The sale of goods or supply of services' 
The first element to consider is the requirement that the contract must involve 
the sale of goods or alternatively the supply of services. Whilst the majority of 
transactions can be placed in one of these categories, the subject matter of an increasing 
number of contracts, particularly those entered into electronically, do not fit comfortably 
into one category or the other. "' The most common examples are computer software, 
music, video and other multimedia downloaded directly from the supplier's site to the 
customer's computer. Such intangible items are arguably not goods or services in the 
legal sense but, as has been suggested, are best treated sui game . 
129 If this analysis is 
correct, then there may be a strong argument that such subject matter is outside the 
scope of the provision, removing the benefits of this Article for a consumer, particularly 
in the field of electronic commerce. However, it is submitted that this conclusion should 
be avoided to prevent the consumer losing protection which he was clearly intended to 
benefit from by allowing the medium employed for the delivery of the material to dictate 
legal rights or obligations. 
However, if this first requirement is satisfied, the contract must have been 
`preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising' in the State of the 
consumer's domicile to fall within the scope of the provision. 
127 Article 13 (1-3). 
128 See the discussion above in chapter 3.2 on the 'nature' of many products supplied electronically. 
129 In Beta Comers (Europe) Lintel u Adobe System (Europe) Limizd [1996] F. S. R. 367, Lord Penrose 
suggested that such products such be treated sui gexris See also St Albars City and District C mail u 
Inte na&, ial Cbnt, tens Ltd [ 1997] F. S. R. 251. 
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4.3.5.1.2 Treceded by a specific invitation or by advertising' 
The phrase ̀specific invitation' is reasonably unambiguous requiring some form 
of direct communication, such as a letter, `mail-shot' or e-mail addressed to the 
consumer. However, it is the ̀ or by advertising' criteria which has caused some debate 
and more recently, speculative concern in relation to websites and the Internet. 
Advertising can encompass a very broad range of activities and if the phrase 
`preceded by advertising' were read literally it has the potential to encompass the vast 
majority of consumer transactions. The existence of a contract would suggest that the 
consumer's attention has been drawn to that supplier in some way and more often than 
not that ̀ way' is some form of advertising. The question for interpretation is whether the 
mere existence of an advertisement in the consumer's domicile will satisfy the 
requirement or whether the advertising needs to be intended for a particular jurisdiction 
or targeted toward it in some way? The answer to this question has particular significance 
to parties using a website to advertise, because in theory, the website has the potential to 
be seen anywhere in the world. An advertisement on the Internet by a French supplier 
may be seen by consumers throughout the EU. The question for a court would be 
whether this constitutes advertising in the consumer's domicile for the purpose of the 
Convention, because if it does, then the potential exists for a company engaging in 
electronic commerce to be faced with litigation in every Member State. This possibility 
gives suppliers cause for concern and arguably has the potential to stifle the growth of e- 
commerce within the EU. 
It has been suggested that the appropriate interpretation would be that the 
supplier took specific steps to market his product in the consumer's State, or in some 
way directed his advertising to that state. l'o This approach is supported by the 
interpretation suggested in the background documentation to the Convention. In his 
Report on the Accession Convention, Professor Schlosser refers us to the report by 
Professors Giuliano and Lagarde, and their consideration of identical terminology found 
in the Rome Convention: 
130 Susman, A. M. "International Electronic Trading: Some Legal Issues" [2000] Feb/Mar Carp an and 
Law. Susman argues that the trader must in some way solicit or target consumers in a particular state; 
°... the trader must have directed the advertising to that state: he is not subject to its jurisdiction 
merely because a publication in which he advertises finds its way into that state if he is not 
targeting consumers in that state; and the same is thought to apply in respect of an advertisement 
on a Web site accessible in a state which is not directed to consumers in that state. " Available at; 
http: //www. scl. orZ/Services/default. asp? p= 156&c=-999&ctID=12&cID-1140000216&pm =1. 
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"The first indent relates to situations where the trader has taken steps to market 
his goods or services in the country where the consumer resides. It is intended to 
cover inter alia mail order and door-step selling. Thus the trader must have done 
certain acts such as advertising in the press, or on radio or television, or in the 
cinema or by catalogues aimed specifically at that country, or he may have made 
business proposals individually, through a middle man or by canvassing. ""' 
Hence, some positive action on behalf of the supplier, demonstrating an intention to 
solicit business in that state, would be required. "' Recent cases in the courts of England 
and Wales have been decided on this line of reasoning. In And, vwPiers CourtauldRaynerv. 
Ric vl Davks, ̀ Morison j stated that: 
"The question is whether the defendant has been marketing his services in this 
country. What the Convention is looking for is the solicitation of business 
here. "134 
and concluded that in the immediate case, 
"The consumer has not been solicited in this country by the service provider, 
rather the service provider's business has been solicited by the consumer. "135 
In the Court of Appeal Waller LJ concurred with the view of Morison j in the 
court below16 and added that the appropriate test would seem to be the question "who 
invited whom to do business". "' 
Whether a website is soliciting business or directed toward consumers in a 
particular State will be a question of fact for the courts and will depend upon the 
activities of both parties. However, it would appear that the key consideration would be 
whether the website is deemed to be soliciting or inviting consumers in a particular State 
131 Report by Professors Giuliano and Lagarde on: The Convention on Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, OJ 1980 C282/1,311, October at p. 23-24. 
132 To an extent this question of interpretation has been clarified by the Regulation, see below at 4.3.6. 
133 [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 620; [2002] WL 340242 (QBD). 
134 At para. 13. 
135 Ibid 
136 AndrewRayraeru ROmd JJavies [2002] EWCA Civ 1880; [2002] WL 31676420 (CA), at para 23. 
137 Ibid at para 26. 
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to do business. In the vast majority of cases this will be the actual purpose of the 
website. 
Interestingly, in Rayner, Waller LJ also made a passing comment about the claimant's 
attempt to introduce details of the defendants ̀modest' and ̀ entirely ineffective' website 
into the proceedings. "' He felt that its introduction would not add anything to the 
resolution of the issue before him, particularly as the website was not "interactive" and 
there was "no reliance on the website itself either being advertising or being a specific 
invitation"! " It could be speculated that if his Lordship had been required to consider 
an "interactive website" as a "specific invitation" or "advertising", an alternative outcome 
may have resulted. Waller LJ also declined to comment upon the change in wording in 
the new Regulation and the impact (if any) it would have upon a case such as the one 
before him, "o a point which is returned to below. 
With the widely accessible nature of websites a supplier may be well advised to 
take clear and affirmative steps to demonstrate that he is not intending to contract with 
consumers in a particular State. Alternatively, he could simply decline from entering 
contracts with consumers in a particular State. There is clearly scope under the 
convention for a website to be construed as soliciting or inviting consumers to do 
business with the website proprietor. 
4.3.5.1.3 `Steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract' 
The third requirement in Article 13 is that the `consumer took in that State the 
steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract'. "' As is discussed elsewhere142 in 
England and Wales, and many other jurisdictions, the contract is concluded when there is 
an effective acceptance of the offer. It could be argued that for this Article to apply, the 
acceptance, being the final step necessary for the conclusion of the contract, must take 
place in the consumer's State. As a general rule, the acceptance is effective when 
communicated to the offeror and usually at the point where he receives that 
communication, which for the purposes of this provision would be in the State of the 
supplier and not the consumer. However, from the background material to the 
Convention it would appear that the Article does not require the consumer to take the 
final steps necessary for the legal' conclusion of the contract but rather that he takes the 
1381bid at para 12. 
139 Ibij 
140 Ibid at para 27. 
141 Article 13(3)(b). 
142 See the discussion of contract formation below in chapter 8. 
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necessary steps relevant to him; for example responding to the advertisement or the 
placing of an order. "' In adopting an autonomous definition of `contract' for the 
purpose of the convention, the ECJ has sought to avoid the divergent technicalities of 
offer and acceptance throughout the Member States. Indeed, this appears to have been 
the intended purpose of the original wording. "' 
On the basis of this reasoning it would appear that the fact that the contract may 
not be technically formed under the law of a particular state, should not be significant o 
the application of the provision. For example, the simple action of placing an order on 
an interactive website should suffice. However, the provision does require that the 
`necessary steps' were taken in the consumer's State. In the context of electronic 
contracting, and in particular contracting via an interactive website, it could be argued 
that the ̀ necessary steps' are actually taken on the computer or server upon which the 
supplier's website is hosted. However, this would appear an unlikely interpretation and 
the `necessary steps' would probably be considered to be the consumer typing on his 
keyboard or clicking a mouse button in his home State. 
4.3.5.4 The use of a 'branch, agency or other establishment' 
The existence of a `branch, agency or other establishment' is discussed in detail 
above. It is important to re-iterate at this point that parties entering contracts through a 
`branch, agency or other establishment' within a Contracting State are deemed to be 
domiciled in that state and hence, subject to the Courts of that jurisdiction in a dispute 
with a consumer. This prevents circumvention of the principles by parties operating 
through agents within the Contracting States but being physically domiciled in a state not 
party to the Convention. The service provider, as a defendant, is deemed to be 
domiciled in the state where he has his secondary establishment, whether he is domiciled 
in a contracting state or not. Clearly this has potential implications for parties domiciled 
in third states if electronic agents and websites can be brought within this definition. "' 
143 The Schlosser Report once again refers us to the words of Professors Giuliano and Lagarde: 
"The word `steps' includes »neralra writing or any action taken in consequence of an offer or an 
advertisement. " OJ C 282/1 at 24. 
144 I 
"the Group expressly adopted the words[... ] to avoid the classic problem of determining the 
place where the contract was concluded. " 
las Of course the enforcement of any such judgment may be a different matter in states who are not party 
to some reciprocal recognition of judgments arrangement. 
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4.3.5.5 Party Autonomy : The ability to depart from the consumer provisions 
The Convention measures relating to consumer contracts may only be departed 
from by an express agreement, entered into by the parties after a dispute has arisen. "' In 
this way the consumer is afforded protection against contractual clauses eeking to ouster 
the Convention rules. "' A separate agreement on jurisdiction may be entered into after a 
dispute has arisen, giving the consumer the opportunity to consider the consequences of
that choice. "' 
A number of issues have been highlighted in relation to the Convention 
provisions applicable to consumer contracts. The `new' approach adopted in the 
Regulations will now be examined. 
4.3.6 Consumer Contracts : Articles 15-17 of the Brussels Regulation 
The provisions in the Convention had not been controversial, but had produced 
some difficult questions of interpretation and hence uncertainty. In order to clarify the 
situation and to "develop a balanced position which reconciles consumer protection 
measures with measures that facilitate the take-off of electronic commerce", 149 the 
European Commission proposed new provisions to cover all consumer contracts. 
However, the approach adopted by the Commission also extended the protection 
afforded to consumers in a manner which according to some commentators may actually 
hinder the `take-off' of electronic commerce creating anxiety within the business 
community. "' During the consultation period the Economic and Social Committee of 
the European Union expressed reservations about the approach adopted stating that the 
provision in the new Regulation was `... not clear enough to foster a climate of trust 
between the parties"" emphasising that `the prospect of being brought before foreign 
courts could deter small and medium-sized enterprises from using the internet to 
promote their services'. "' Nevertheless, the Commission rejected Parliamentary 
146 Article 15. 
147 Clauses which may in any event be susceptible to the scrutiny of UCTA and UTC R, see below 
chapters 11 & 12. 
148 And perhaps obtain legal advice. 
1490p cit fn. 10. 
150 Meller, P. "Online Buyers Gain Ability to Sue. " (2000) December 15t New York Tvnn. 
http: //www. pyiimes. com/2000/12/01/technology/01NET. html. 
15t Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the `Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters'. OJ C 
117/6,26.4.2000, para 4.2.4. 
152 ihid at pars 4.2.2. 
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amendments on the issue15. and the new provisions can be found in Articles 15 to 17 of 
the Regulation. The following discussion will analyse the new provisions and assess the 
potential impact for both business and consumers. 
4.3.6.1 The New Articles. 
The purpose of the new articles is made clear in the preamble to the Regulation: 
"In relation to insurance, consumer contracts and employment, the weaker party 
should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than 
the general rules provide for. ""' 
The new provision, in Article 15 (1) states: 
"In matters relating to a contract concluded by a person, the consumer, for a 
purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, 
jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to Article 4 and 
point 5 of Article 5, if: 
(a) it is a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; or 
(b) it is a contract for a loan repayable by instalments, or for any other 
form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods; or 
(c) in all other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who 
pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the 
consumer's domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that 
Member State or to several States including that Member State, and the 
contract falls within the scope of such activities. " 
For the most part the provisions prescribing special rules for jurisdiction over 
consumer contracts are identical to those found in the Convention. Consumer is still 
defined as a person concluding a contract for a purpose which can be regarded as outside 
his trade or profession... and the options available to the consumer emain identical to 
153 Amended proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters. COM (2000)689 final. 1999/0154 (CNS) p. 5. 
154 Recital 13. 
155 And hence, the potential ambiguity remains. See above at 4.3.5. 
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those in the Brussels Convention in that he has a choice of where to bring an action, but 
an action may only be brought against him in the courts of his home-state. "' The ability 
to depart from the consumer provisions of the Regulation by agreement also remains 
identical to the Convention. The key, and to some commentators burdensome', changes 
to the provision15" are to be found in the third paragraph of Article 15. '58 
The earlier reference to goods and services is removed, thus negating the 
potential for inquiries into whether `data-products', such as software and multimedia are 
correctly categorised as either goods or services. "This removes a potential loophole in 
the provision's application to many electronic consumer contracts. The requirement that 
the consumer ̀ took the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract' is also deleted, 
avoiding the technical difficulties associated with determining the place where the 
contract was formally concluded. 160 The avoidance of uncertainty was the stated purpose 
of the original terminology, but in the light of modern technology the phrase still had the 
potential to encourage unnecessary and complex technical argument. The complete 
removal of this requirement in the Regulation also avoids technical arguments relating to 
'where' the acts or the `necessary steps' actually took place in the electronic 
environment. "' Some commentators have suggested that the removal of this 
requirement will also enable a consumer to take advantage of the consumer protection 
provisions when entering electronic contracts whilst visiting a State other than his home- 
State. "' Whilst this argument is a sound one on the basis that physical location is 
generally meaningless in relation to electronic contracts, if a supplier uses a variation of 
his site for each jurisdiction"3 there may be an equally sound argument that the contract 
does not fall within the scope of his commercial activities in the consumer's home State. 
The operative phrase "preceded by a specific invitation... or by advertising", a 
source of some uncertainty, '" is replaced with a requirement that the supplier "pursues 
156 Article 16 of the Regulation, and Article 14 of the Brussels Convention. 
157 See, Pullen, M. "On The Proposals To Adopt The Amended Brussels Convention And The Draft 
Rome II Convention As EU Regulations Pursuant To Article 65 Of The Amsterdam Treaty" EU Version - 
Posilibn Paper P"red For 71r A&atthig Assaciat n. 
http: //www. ilpf. org/events/jurisdiction/presentations/pullen_posit. htm 
158 Previously Article 13 (3) under the Convention. 
159 See the discussion in chapter 13.2. 
160 A potentially distracting assessment, particularly in electronic commerce. See the discussion in chapter 
8 below. 
161 Such as whether the steps were actually taken on the consumer's computer in his home state, or 
alternatively taken on the supplier's website, wherever that may be stored. 
162 Op cif fn 79 at p. 125; "... if an English domiciliary placed the order from an Internet Cafe while on 
holiday in France". 
163 As many do, using the country identifier such as . co. uk. 
164 See the preceding discussion at 4.3.5. 
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commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the consumer's domicile or, 
by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or to several States including 
that Member State". 165 Arguably this revised provision largely follows the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ on the earlier terminology. However, whilst the new Article removes some of 
the uncertainty attributed to its predecessor, the terminology adopted does raise new 
questions, in particular, what qualifies as ̀ pursuing' commercial or professional activities 
or `directing' such activities to a Member State or group of States? 
4.3.6.2 `Pursuing or Directing Commercial or Professional Activities' 
This terminology, and the intention behind it, has been responsible for much of 
the heated debate behind the Regulation's introduction. The Commission had made its 
intended interpretation of the phrase clear in earlier proposals for the Regulation. If a 
means of electronic commerce was accessible in a State, then that would constitute "an 
activity directed to that State". A recital was inserted to clarify this point but was later 
removed after pressure from business parties, other EU bodies and Member States, 
including the United Kingdom. The recital read. 
"... Account must be taken of the growing development of the new 
communication technologies, particularly in relation to consumers; whereas in 
particular, electronic commerce in goods and services by a means accessible in 
another Member State constitutes an activity directed to that State. Where that 
State is the State of the consumer's domicile, the consumer must be able to enjoy 
the protection available to him when he enters into a consumer contract by 
electronic means from his domicile. ""' 
Arguably, the new terminology is a natural progression encompassing the existing 
body of case-law and official reports associated with the Convention terminology. The 
idea that the trader had ̀ done certain acts' to promote his goods or services which were 
`directed' or `aimed' at a particular country can be equated to the pursuing or directing of 
activities. "' 
165 Article 15(1)(c) 
166 Amended proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters. COM (2000)689 final. Ex - Recital 13. This recital did 
nevertheless retain a reference to `goods and services', potentially excluding intangible items which are 
arguably not 'goods' or 'services'. 
167 See the discussion above at 4.3.5. 
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The response, provoked by the Commission's proposed recital, was centred on 
the suggestion that mere ̀ accessibility' would attract the application of the provision. For 
Internet traders the difficulty is clear. The Internet is an environment with unique 
attributes, one of which is the availability of its content anywhere in the world, at any 
time. 168 Hence, by simply advertising on a website the trader may be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts in any of the fifteen Member States. 
The removal of the clarifying recital has left the interpretation of this contentious 
provision to the ECJ and Member State courts. This has the potential to create 
uncertainty for the service provider and the consumer as to whether a particular website 
or other form of electronic communication will fall within the definition. The 
predominant methods of electronic communication will now be considered in the light 
of this new terminology. 
4.3.6.2.1 Direct Communication 
As was the case with the Convention provision a direct communication or 
`specific invitation' addressed to the consumer will clearly fall within the new criteria. 
This will include solicited or unsolicited e-mails and SMS messages received on an 
individual's computer or mobile phone. If a supplier targets consumers in one of the 
Member States in this way, he will be directing his commercial or professional activities 
there. Any contract falling within the scope of those activities entered into with a 
consumer in a Member State will fall within the provision. 
4.3.6.2.2 Websites and Website Advertising 
The uncertainty created by website activity and jurisdiction has led to the 
examination of websites and some discussion of whether a site is `passive' or 'active', "' 
the idea being that an `active' website will fall within the provisions whereas a `passive' 
site will not. Some consideration will be given to this discussion but it must be stated at 
the outset that, in the writer's opinion, the distinction is not a helpful or appropriate one 
in the context of the Regulation. 
168 As with all generalisations there are exceptions. The technology exists, and is in use in certain states to 
block sites from other jurisdictions. In China most external sites were blocked until 2001. 
169 This distinction is discussed above in chapter 3. 
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Advertising and Websites: The äct `or pý' distri =n. 
Websites can be quite passive forms of communication designed to disseminate 
information to a global audience. However, the majority of commercial websites are 
designed to allow a customer to enter contracts on-line. 170 Much of the discussion 
surrounding the issue has focussed on the distinction between these ̀interactive' websites 
and ̀ non-interactive' (passive) sites which simply advertise products or services. It has 
been suggested that merely ̀passive' websites will not be caught by the provision found 
in Article 15, but ̀ active' websites, i. e. interactive sites designed and programmed for the 
purpose of entering contracts with customers, will. "" 
This approach has been compared to the adaptation in the US of the `minimum 
contacts' doctrine to websites 12 (i. e. whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the 
forum to justify the court exercising jurisdiction over the case, and the pursuing of 
activities which cause a consequence in that particular state). "' In cases heard before US 
courts it has been suggested that `active' sites are sufficient to satisfy the doctrine"' 
whereas ̀ passive' sites, merely providing information, are not. 15 However, in this 
context the distinction is not helpful and arguably not appropriate when considering the 
application of Article 15. It should also be noted that the Commission has explicitly 
rejected the concept stating that it "is quite foreign to the approach taken in the 
Regulation"! ̀  
Alternatively, the courts could adopt an approach similar to that adopted under 
the now repealed Financial Services Act 1986 s. 57 to whether an advertisement for 
financial services had been ̀ directed' toward the UK. The Financial Services Authority 
concluded that a variety of factors should be considered in the assessment. These 
included: disclaimers and warnings, links and the format and content of the site; whether 
the site was promoted on UK based search engines and what steps were taken to limit 
access (whether effective or not) i. e. filters based on address and post code and IP 
110 This, after all, is one of the main benefits of the Internet and the basis of electronic commerce. 
171 See; McClean, D. Morris 71 eO it of Lanas, 5th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2000) at p. 112. 
172 See; Reed, C. Intema Laux Teti mud Materials (Butterworths: London, 2000) chapter 7. 
173 See Canpuvwu Patterxm 89 F 3d 1257 (6th Cir, 1996). The landmark case of SWerv. Heimer433 U. S. 
186 (1977), set the standard for future cases but the outcome must not offend the principles of fair play 
and substantial justice for which the standard was set in International Shoeu Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945) 
and more recently Asahi Metall z4csby Ca, Ltd u Superior C=4 480 U. S. 102 (1987). 
174 Maritz Incv CykvUInc 947 F Supp 1328 (ED Mo, 1996); Zippo Mfg Co u Zig Dot Can Inc 952 F, Supp 
1119. 
175 Bmusan Restaurant C ipvKmg 937 F Supp 295 (SDNY, 1996) affirmed in 126 F 3d 25 (2nd Cir, 1997). 
176 Amended proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters. COM/2000/0689 final - DINS 99/0154 (OJ C 062 E) at p 6. 
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address filters. " However, the effectiveness of disclaimers has been questioned. "" The 
language or currency used on a website has little relevance in the adjudication also. In 
their joint Statement1. the Council and the Commission stated the following. 
"In this context, the Council and the Commission stress that the mere fact that 
an Internet site is accessible is not sufficient for Article 15 to be applicable, 
although a factor will be that this Internet site solicits the conclusion of distance 
contracts and that a contract has actually been concluded at a distance, by 
whatever means. In this respect, the language or currency which a website uses 
does not constitute a relevant factor. ""' 
It is submitted that these discussions lose sight of the purpose of the Article and 
the correct analysis of the terminology. If the provisions in the Regulation are relied 
upon by a party, then clearly a dispute exists with a consumer and as the Commission 
points out, 
".... the existence of, a consumer dispute requiring court action presupposes a 
consumer contract. Yet the very existence of such a contract would seem to be a 
clear indication that the supplier of the goods or services has directed his 
activities toward the state where the consumer is domiciled. ""' 
It may be argued that this suggestion is tantamount o a presumption that activities have 
been directed to a state if a contract exists with a consumer domiciled in that state. But 
even if that is so, if the trader (who we must remember is in the more powerful position 
economically) can present a good arguable case that the consumer solicited his business, 
rather than visa-versa, the contract will not fall within the provision. '"' 
»> http//www. fsa. gov. uk/pubs/guidance/gr02=1998. pdf. 
178 Mike Pullen "On The Proposals To Adopt The Amended Brussels Convention And The Draft Rome II 
Convention As EU Regulations Pursuant To Article 65 Of The Amsterdam Treaty" EU Version " Position 
Paper Prepared For The Advertising Association. 
http: //www. ilpf. org/events/jurisdiction/presentations/pullen_posithtm 
179 Press release: Commission adopts draft Regulation on jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 12/99/510. (14thJuly 1999). Available at; 
http: //www. dti. gov. uk/cacp/ca/policy/jurisdiction/eustate. htm. 
isol( 
Is 1Op citfn 165. 
182 As is the case under the corresponding Brussels Convention provision, see A mlrtwRa nerv. Richvd 
Davies [2002] EWCA Civ 1880; [2002] WL 31676420 (CA). 
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The Article supports a strong consumer protection regime with the clear message 
to suppliers that if they wish to capitalise on the e-commerce consumer-market within 
the EU they must be prepared to go to the courts in the consumer's domicile in the 
event of a dispute. Support for this suggestion can be found in the Commission's refusal 
to yield any further ground on the possible scope of the paragraph. In rejecting the 
Parliament's suggestion that the Article should state that any attempt by the supplier to 
confine his commercial activity to a certain State should be a factor in the assessment of 
whether activities have been directed toward one or more Member States, the 
Commission stated that such an approach would "run counter to the philosophy of the 
provision". 183 The substantive issues in dispute remain distinct. The burden of bringing 
or responding to an action in another Member State is clearly disproportionate for the 
consumer and the prospect does deter consumers from entering electronic contracts with 
suppliers in other Member States. 184 Interpreting the provision narrowly would not sit 
comfortably with EU consumer protection policy and would be detrimental to the 
development of consumer confidence in entering electronic contracts. "' 
There are also significant benefits to the development of e-commerce if the strict 
approach suggested by the Commission is adopted. The provisions could serve to. 
1) Build consumer confidence to increase participation in e-commerce (although 
this is debated by those representing business). "' 
2) Promote good business practice, reducing the occurrence of disputes and the 
need to take court action. 
3) Encourage the development of effective and reliable alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms. 
Finally, it should be remembered that the accessibility of a website is not the key 
issue. The purpose of the provision is to afford consumers added protection where a 
dispute with a service provider has not been resolved amicably and the dispute resulted 
from a contract which was a consequence of the service providers' solicitation of 
business with consumers domiciled in a Member State. For service providers the 
183 Op cit fn 165 at p. 5. 
184 See the report by the National Consumers Council "E-Commerce and Consumer Protection" 
PD39/2000 (August 2000). 
185 See; ̀Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The Economic 
And Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions - Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006'. 
186 See Melier. P. op cit fn. 139. 
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decision is a simple one - they can choose whether to contract with consumers in a 
particular State or not. If they choose to do so, then they must be prepared to appear in 
the courts of that state in the event of a dispute with a consumer. Only if they can show 
that they were actively pursued by a consumer, or deceived by a consumer as to his 
domicile, will they be able to avoid the Regulation provisions. 
4.4 jurisdiction and states outside the scope of the Conventions and 
Regulation 
To be complete, some consideration must be given to contracts falling outside 
the scope of the Conventions and Regulation. Such contracts are covered by the rules of 
Private International Law. 
4.4.1 The Traditional Rules in England and Wales 
Historically, when the courts have been faced with a contractual dispute 
involving a ̀ new' method of communication, a level of pragmatism has been required to 
resolve the dispute equitably whilst adhering to established contractual principles and 
doctrine. "' Commercial expediency and the allocation of risk are often found to be 
relevant factors in the judgments. When referring to telex communications Lord 
Wilberforce suggested that when disputes arise, 
"... they must be resolved by reference to the intentions of the parties, by sound 
business practice and in some cases by a judgment where the risks should lie. "'ss 
With the progressive development of global communications technologies it is 
no co-incidence that many disputes before the courts have a jurisdictional issue to be 
resolved. In line with the judgments in the `classic cases' much of the discussion 
surrounding electronic contracting and questions of jurisdiction has focussed on the 
`place of formation' of the contract. This is often without acknowledgement of the fact 
that this issue forms only one element of a number of considerations in the court's 
decision to hear a contractual dispute. 
187 A classic example is the development of the postal system and consequentially the ̀ postal rule'. 
Considered below in chapter 8.4. 
188 Lord Wilberforce in Brinki%n v Stalazg Stahl rand Hmuleig lsz t Mba [ 1983] 2 A. C. 34 at p. 42, referring 




Under the Civil Procedure Rules18. as amended by the Civil Procedure 
(Amendment) Rules19' there are three bases of jurisdiction, presence, submission and 
service outside of the jurisdiction with the leave of the court. 
4.4.1.1 Presence 
`Presence' in this sense clearly requires some `physical' presence within the 
jurisdiction to which or whom a claim from may be served. "' The serving of a claim 
form on an individual who is present in England or Wales will be subject to the in 
pawn n jurisdiction of the court. The duration of the defendant's presence is not 
relevant. "' For a company present in England and Wales a claim form is effectively 
served if it is delivered or posted to the company's registered office. If the company is 
incorporated outside of Great Britain, the form may be served on an individual, 
nominated by the company and authorised to accept service of process on behalf of the 
company. 193 The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 contain a simplified provision requiring the 
service of the claim form on `a person holding a senior position' within the company or 
corporation. "` An `electronic presence' would not appear to be sufficient to fall within 
this heading; however, a claim form may be served on the agent of an overseas 
principle. "' There may be scope, perhaps as technology develops, for an argument that a 
claim form could be served on an ̀ electronic agent' present in the jurisdiction. "' 
4.4.1.2 Submission to jurisdiction 
A submission to the jurisdiction of the court can take place in various ways. By 
his conduct the individual precludes himself from objecting to the jurisdiction. 
However, if the individual attends the court in order to dispute jurisdiction he is not 
taken to have submitted to the jurisdiction. "' 
189 S. I. 1998 No. 3132. 
190 S. I. 2000 No. 221. 
191 Formerly known as a' writ' under the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) Order 11 rl before the 
introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules (S. I. 1998 No. 3132). 
192 MaharaiofRaraJa u Wrldazstein [1972] 2 Q. B. 283. However, this rule is subject to the application of 
the Brussels Convention (discussed above) in relation to the defendant's place of residence and 'domicile'. 
193 The person nominated to the Registrar of Companies as required by the Companies Act 1985, 
s. 691(1) (b) (u). 
194 CPR, r. 6(4). 
195 CPR, r. 6.16. 
196 See the discussion above at 4.3. However, as was argued in chapter 3, significant leaps in technology or 
judicial interpretation would be required if electronic agents are to be treated as 'agents' in law. 
197 C: PR, r. 11(1) and (3). Re Dulles' Seakma t (No 2)[1951] Ch 842 and Wz&vns and G1 n's &mk vu Astro 
DynrarumCiaNavieraSA [1984] 1All ER 760. 
79 
J 
4.4.1.3 Service out of the jurisdiction with leave of the court: Extended jurisdiction under 
the Civil Procedure Rules 
Under Rule 6.20 of the Civil Procedure Rules19' the court has a discretionary 
power to permit service out of the jurisdiction but only in a `proper case'. The court 
must take great care before it allows a claim form to be served out of the jurisdiction and 
any doubt or ambiguity in the application of Rule 6.20 must be resolved in favour of the 
respondent. 199 There must be full and fair disclosure of all the relevant facts by the 
claimant and the claim must be not only within the letter but also within the spirit of the 
rule. 200 The nature of the dispute, including legal and practical issues, will also be taken 
into account by the court to determine whether the jurisdiction is the ft im rim Zoi 
The claimant must convince the court that the case is a proper one for service out of the 
jurisdiction and that an English court is the appropriate forum. The claimant must show 
that a ̀ good arguable case' exists and there is a serious question to be tried under one of 
the sub-headings of the rule. For the purposes of this discussion the relevant sub- 
heading is CPR, r. 6.20 (5): 
"A claim is made in respect of a contract where the contract - 
(a) was made within the jurisdiction; 
(b) was made by or through an agent trading or residing within the 
jurisdiction; 
(c) is governed by English law; or 
(d) contains a term to the effect that the court shall have jurisdiction to 
determine any claim in respect of the contract" 
The claim has to be in respect of `a contract', which could be construed as excluding 
actions relating to the contract's existence. However, the previous provision, found in 
Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, was very broad in its scope and it has been 
Z°Z argued that the new provision should be no less widely interpreted. 
198 Formerly, Order 11, r. 1(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 
199 Societe Ga=le de Parrs u Dreyfus Bros (1887) 37 ChD. 215, The Hagen [ 1908] P. 189 and Re . Schmitz [1926] Ch. 710. 
200 Johnson u Taylor B%sý [1920] A. G144 and G oV Morro Ltd u American Cynanid Corp. [1944] K. B. 432. 
201 (ar Far East Ltd uB ank Marknazi Jcin& cri Is6m Irrot [1994] 1 A. C. 438, p 452. 
202 McClean, D. Morris 71v Cbgti t of Laws, 5th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2000) at p. 82. Therefore 
encompassing actions ̀ to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or otherwise affect' a contract in addition to 
those for breach. See B. P. Exploration (Lib}rc) Ltd u Hunt [1976] 1 W. L. R. 788 (Declaration that a contract 
has been frustrated). 
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Contracts madewithrn the ju icduz 
For many writers this subject has been the focus of discussion in matters relating 
to questions of jurisdiction when considering electronic contracts! " However, as can be 
seen from the previous discussion, the issue of where the contract is `made' is secondary 
to the `place of performance' in the context of the Brussels Convention and the new 
Regulation. Only when the Convention rules do not apply will the common law, or 
more accurately the Civil Procedure Rules, be relevant. 
In English law there are several well-established principles in relation to the time 
and place at which a contract is `made'. 204 Primarily the point at which an acceptance is 
effective dictates the time and place at which the contract is formed. If this occurs 
within the jurisdiction the court may exercise its discretion to hear the case and permit 
service out of the jurisdiction. The general rule prescribes that acceptance is effective 
when it is communicated to (i. e. received by) the offeror. This rule is displaced where 
the acceptance is communicated by post and the postal rule applies. The significance of 
this issue can be seen in the Entorvs v. Miles Far East Carp. "' and Brinkik'i Ltd v. Stang 
Stahl und Stahlztw lavthlgeseü mbH, 206 cases involving jurisdictional disputes 
determined on this basis. The receipt (or general) rule was preferred over the despatch 
(or postal) rule for acceptance with the courts expressing their reluctance to extend the 
dispatch rule beyond communications by post to the telex communications before them. 
Lord Wilberforce did however leave the potential for extending the dispatch rule open, 
stating that there could be `no universal rule' to cover all situations, preferring to deal 
with individual cases on their facts and considering ̀ sound business practice' and an 
allocation of where the risk of loss should he. If a party was at fault in some way in the 
failure of a communication, this may also indicate where the Court should allocate any 
subsequent loss. 
The issue of contract formation in the electronic environment is discussed below 
in chapter 8. It is argued that only in the most unusual of situations would the courts 
consider the application of the postal rule to electronic contracts. However, it is also 
indicated that with electronic forms of communication ascertaining the time and place at 
which the communication of acceptance is received may be open to interpretation. 
203 See for example; Murray, A. D. (2000) "Entering into Contracts Electronically: The Real W. W. W. " in 
Edwards & Waelde (ed. ) Law and the Ink met A Fr vnezwrk far Ela D nzc Ca mmm (Hart Publishing. Oxford) 
at p. 17. Davies, LJ, A Modal f Internet Regulation [1998] Society for Carprtas and Lary available at 
www. scl. org. 
204 This is discussed in chapter 8. 
205 [1955] 2 Q. B. 327. 
206 [1983] 2 A. C. 34. 
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Whether the contract was `made' within the jurisdiction may depend upon the 
interpretation of `received' adopted by the courts in England and Wales. If the 
acceptance is "deemed to be received when the recipient is able to access it", 207 then the 
`place' of receipt could be a server located in almost any State, with the conclusion that 
the contract is ̀ made' there and not within the jurisdiction. 
Cavraas made by or though English agc s of foreign prmczpals 
This sub-heading only applies where the principal is the intended respondent and 
not where he is a claimant. 208 It has been held that this provision encompasses not only 
contracts made by agents with authority to enter contracts but also those who do not 
have such authority but merely transmit orders to a foreign principal for his acceptance 
or rejection! " This sub-heading has potential significance for suppliers using interactive 
websites or electronic agents, based on servers within the jurisdiction. The courts will 
have to decide whether the collection and transmission of orders electronically fall within 
this subheading bringing foreign principles within the jurisdiction. 
Cavractsgrnamd by English law 
The correct law of the contract is determined by reference to the Contracts 
(Applicable Law) Act 1990 discussed below! " Where those rules indicate that English 
law is the proper law of the contract the courts have the discretion to seize jurisdiction 
and allow service out of the jurisdiction. However, the courts have emphasised that this 
discretion "should be exercised with circumspection"! " The courts are reluctant to 
exercise jurisdiction under this subheading in a case involving a foreign corporation with 
no place of business in England or Wales. 
Qntraas mmaritng a jza i dicthz daure selecth g tlx English Cann 
The courts will infer from such a term in a contract that the parties have 
submitted to the jurisdiction unless a party can indicate that such a clause should not be 
effective against him. 
207 An interpretation adopted in relation to orders and the acknowledgement of orders under the 
Electronic Commerce Regulations, below in chapter 8.4. 
208 Union 1nte nat 1a1Insu roxe Ca t Jubdx insaarxe Ca [1991] 1 W. L»R. 415. 
209 NatiaJMortgageand Agexy Co. of New Zealand u Gosselin (1922) 38 TLR. 832. 
210 In chapter 5. 
211 Lord Diplock in Amin Rast Slnppmg Corp. u Kurernt Inu rm Ca [1984] A. C. 50; see also Spilrada 
Marit'iine Corp. u C4marlex Ltd [1987] A. C. 460. 
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The Court may also seize jurisdiction in a case where a claim is made in respect 
of a breach of contract committed within the jurisdiction! " The breach must be of a 
part of the contract intended to be performed within the jurisdiction? " This need not be 
expressly stated, but the courts must be able to infer from the true construction of the 
contract that this was the intention of the parties! " For example, if a supplier of goods 
is based in England, then it is reasonable to infer that the buyer's obligation to pay was 
intended to be performed in England. As a general rule it is the debtor's obligation to 
seek out the creditor. "' 
The Civil Procedure Rules for deciding jurisdiction in cases involving parties 
based outside of the scope of the Conventions or Regulation are in many ways more 
reliant on a `physical presence' or ascertaining the `place' in which a contract was 
concluded or to be performed. 
4.5 Conclusion 
For electronic contracting, and electronic commerce in general, predictable and 
transparent rules on jurisdiction are necessary to promote confidence and produce legal 
certainty. However, from the preceding discussion, it would appear that there is a lack of 
a harmonised approach to the issue and a lack of clarity and legal certainty in the 
measures that are in place including recent developments intended to take account of the 
new forms of commerce. 
When determining which court has jurisdiction in a dispute, the frustrating 
starting point is the application of a number of different legal instruments within Europe 
alone, depending upon which other State is involved. By virtue of the most recent EU 
`harmonising' measure, for the courts of England and Wales there are now three 
different instruments, in addition to relevant elements of national law to consider. This 
study is primarily concerned with States within the European Economic Area; beyond 
this the situation becomes even more complex for the electronic trader. Discussions are 
on-going to obtain a broader consensus on this crucial issue under the auspices of The 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, which includes amongst others 
212 Under CPR, r. 6.20 (6). 
213 Rein u Stein [1892] 1 Q. B. 753. 
214 Ibid 
215 71r Eia f 1893] P. 119, but cf. Malik u Na rdni Bamka Ceskodo=ka [1946] 2 All E. R. 663. 
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Australia, Japan and the United States 21' However, a finalised Convention remains some 
way off. 
Even within Europe there is inconsistency with the terminology employed in the 
legal instruments in place and uncertainty in the interpretation of certain key elements. 
Unfortunately, many of these elements have the potential to impact upon electronic 
contracts. Arguably, some of the concepts fundamental to the Conventions and 
Regulation are inappropriate for application in the electronic environment because of 
their reliance on physical requirements. 
For example, the concept of domicile has been the subject of some criticism, 
particularly in relation to electronic commerce because by definition it requires some 
physical presence? " The heavy reliance upon the physical attributes of a party and the 
physical location of that party will often be fruitless or produce an entirely fortuitous 
conclusion, in the electronic environment, which may bear little relevance to the contract 
in question or the dispute before the court. 
The special rules on jurisdiction relating to contracts also have the potential to 
create uncertainty because the search for the ̀ place of performance of the obligation in 
question', particularly in contracts which are performed electronically, may lead to 
inappropriate or illogical results. "' The new Regulation has introduced some clarification 
for contracts for the sale of goods or the provision of services but adds nothing for 
contracts not falling within these categories. Where a `data product' or a license to 
obtain and use a copy of software is purchased, then it would appear that the courts 
remain undirected as to the assessment of the ̀ place of performance'. 
The Conventions and the Regulation contain favourable provisions for `weaker 
parties'. the most relevant ̀ weaker pary in this context is the consumer. If electronic 
commerce is to develop to its full potential consumers must have confidence in entering 
cross-border electronic contracts. The Convention provision has two elements which 
have been the source of some debate in traditional contracts and have the potential to 
create further debate in relation to electronic contracts: the requirements that the 
contract was ̀ preceded by advertising' and that the consumer took the `steps necessary' 
for the conclusion of the contract in his home State. If the second element is considered 
in its broadest context it can be interpreted as the basic steps such as placing an order. 
216 As of October 2002 the membership was 62 States. 
217 Reed, C. Inte, n Laien Text Emd Materials (Butterworths: London, 2000) at p. 192. 
218 Such as the 'place of performance' being a server in a state which has no other connection with the 
parties or their transaction. 
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However, if, as is possible with electronic contracts, the consumer is ̀ on the move' when 
he places his order using a mobile piece of technology and happens not to be in his 
home State at the time, then the provision would arguably not apply. 
Under Article 13 of the Brussels Convention, a consumer contract must be 
preceded by a specific invitation or advertising to qualify. What constitutes ̀ advertising' 
in a consumer's State has always been subject to some uncertainty and the advent of 
websites as a marketing tool has added to the uncertainty. Something more than 
`passive' advertising is required - the targeting of the consumer's State in some way, but 
with the global availability of a websites the question of whether that site `targets' a 
particular jurisdiction remains open to interpretation. 
Under Article 15 of the Brussels Regulation ̀specific invitation or advertising' has 
been replaced by a requirement that the other party pursues commercial or professional 
activity in the consumer's State or by any means directs such activity towards that State. 
In the preparation of the Brussels Regulation the changes to the provisions for consumer 
contracts were a source of concern for commercial parties utilising the Internet and other 
electronic forms of communication. The main concern related to the potential for the 
new provision to encompass a wide range of activities, including website advertising. 
The fear that the mere accessibility of a website in a particular State may lead to the 
courts of that State seizing jurisdiction resulted in vigorous lobbying and the removal of 
the clarifying recital. However, it is submitted that the concerns were misplaced and that 
the removal of the clarifying recital has left the potential for uncertainty which will 
ultimately be detrimental for business parties and consumers alike. There are a number 
of reasons why many of the concerns associated with the provision in the Regulation 
were unnecessary. First, the mere accessibility of the website is not the issue; the 
entering into contracts with consumers in that country is219 Second, the changes made 
by the Regulation are not quite as dramatic as perceived, particularly when the approach 
adopted by the ECJ is considered. Under the Convention terminology, the supplier has 
to direct his advertising to a particular State and essentially solicit business there. If, on 
the other hand, a supplier can show that he was pursued by the consumer and that his 
advertising was not directed towards the consumer's State the provision will not apply. 
The Regulation has essentially replaced the ambiguous phrase "or by advertising", with 
the terminology adopted by the courts - directing commercial activities. The activating 




factor remains the existence of a contract with a consumer, with the provision applying 
unless the supplier can show that he did not pursue or direct his activities in the 
consumer's State by soliciting business in some way, in that State. The question will 
remain, 'who invited whom' to do business. 
However, in the context of the electronic environment the provisions in both 
instruments are sufficiently unclear to risk divergent interpretation in the Member States 
and create uncertainty for businesses and consumers entering cross-border electronic 
contracts. The purpose of this provision is to promote both consumer confidence and 
good business practice. The fears of being brought before a foreign tribunal are 
overstated. Most consumer contracts are of low transactional value, making court action 
an uneconomical and unlikely occurrence. The fact that a consumer has the legal right to 
take action in his home State may do nothing more than to promote the efficient 
handling of consumer complaints by suppliers. If a dispute does go beyond the amicable 
negotiation stage then the threat of legal action in a foreign court may promote the 
participation in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) schemes by supplier. ADR, 
particularly by electronic means, is a far more appropriate method of resolving disputes 
relating to electronic commerce 220 It is also an approach promoted by both the business 
community and the European Commission. Consumer protection measures of the kind 
found in the Regulation may be just the incentive to promote the development and use 
of such schemes by online suppliers. " 
The phrase `branch, agency or other establishment' is used in a number of 
contexts in the Conventions and the Regulation and it has the potential to be a 
significant phrase for parties using automated technologies to enter electronic contracts. 
The phrase is traditionally associated with a physical presence in a State. The close link 
between the action and the courts of that State, created by the existence of a branch 
agency or other establishment, means that hearing a case in that court promotes the 
sound administration of justice. However, the phrase is also used in relation to the 
protected position of weaker parties, such as consumers. With the growth in electronic 
commerce and associated developments in electronic communications technology there 
may be a need for some reconsideration of what is meant by a `branch, agency or other 
establishment'. In the electronic environment a supplier can have a ̀ branch or agency' of 
his business in any State, performing all of the associated business activities including the 
220 See Hornle J, 'Disputes Solved in Cyberspace and the Rule of Law', Work in Progress, [2001] (2) 7 
Joumal oflnfomazic o Law vod T la(oyOIL7). http: //elj. warwickac. uk/jilt/01-2/hornle. html/. 
221 Such as "Which Webtrader" which had it's own code of conduct and dispute resolution mechanism. 
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entering of contracts, without any physical presence in that State. The consequences and 
effects of that activity will, in many cases, be identical to those which would result from 
there being a physical branch or agency in the State. It is submitted that electronic 
versions of branches or agencies can fall within the terminology as interpreted by the 
courts if a ̀ physical presence' in the State is not required. It is argued that as a matter of 
policy and for consistency, a physical presence should not be required for a supplier to 
operate a branch, agency or other establishment in a particular State. If a court were to 
decline jurisdiction on the basis of this lack of physical presence, it is submitted that the 
objectives of achieving the sound administration of justice and protecting consumers 
would be undermined. 
Where an electronic contract falls outside of the scope of the Conventions or 
Regulation the courts will apply the Civil Procedure Rules and the associated common 
law principles. The rules are heavily reliant on a physical presence or `place' in their 
assessment of jurisdiction. However, if the courts are faced with a new or novel situation 
created by an electronic contract reference may be made to the legislative provisions in 
place and underlying policy considerations, uch as consumer protection. 
If a court does have jurisdiction to hear a dispute relating to an electronic 
contract a further vital question must be considered before any assessment of the 
substantive issues of the dispute can begin. The court must establish the law applicable 





Once it is established that a court has jurisdiction to hear a dispute, the court 
must then determine the correct substantive law to apply, or the `proper law' of the 
contract. Rules associated with contractual obligations vary considerably from one legal 
system to the next and the outcome of a dispute may hinge on which country's law 
applies. In general, a party to a dispute will want the court to apply the laws of his home 
State which are familiar to him. Alternatively a party may desire the application of the 
law of another State, which are more favourable to his commercial interests. The 
increase in potential for disputes as to the proper law of the contract, due to the advent 
and development of electronic commerce, makes this issue a prominent one for those 
wishing to enter contracts electronically. Legal uncertainty in this area has the potential 
to undermine confidence in the use of electronic commerce and consequently hinder its 
development within the European Union and the United Kingdom. 
5.1 The Common Law Approach in England and Wales 
In England and Wales for contracts entered into on or before April In 1991 the 
applicable law of the contract will be determined by the common law. The introduction 
of the Rome Convention' has meant that the common law will play a minimal role in 
disputes relating to electronic contracting. However, for completeness the approach 
adopted at common law will be discussed briefly to allow for comparison with 
Convention provisions. 
At common law the predominant approach taken by the courts was to establish 
the ̀ proper law of the contract' by ascertaining, objectively, the intention of the parties. 
I The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations [1980] OJ L266. 
88 
Applica&Re Law 
"English law has.... treated the matter as depending on the intention of the 
parties to be ascertained in each case on a consideration of the terms of the 
contract, the situation of the parties, and generally on all the surrounding facts. "2 
The express selection of the proper law by the parties is persuasive in the court's 
adjudication but not always decisive' In the absence of any express, or implied, ̀ choice 
by the parties the courts determined the proper law by identifying the legal system with 
which the contract had its closest and most real connection. ' The court will consider a 
variety of factors including the place of contracting, the place of performance, the place 
of residence or business of the parties and the subject matter of the contract. ' Many of 
these factors relate to a physical presence which, as was highlighted in the previous 
chapter, may be a difficult and arguably fruitless search in the electronic environment. 
5.2 The Rome Convention 
The 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
and subsequent Accession Treaties' made steps towards the harmonisation of the rules 
relating to applicable law in contractual disputes in states within the European Economic 
Area. ' The Convention was given legal force in the United Kingdom by the Contracts 
(Applicable Law) Act 1990. ' Following the review of the Brussels Convention, the Rome 
Convention is due to be reviewed; however, this is unlikely to take place before 2004. 
Crucially the Rome Convention contains several of the phrases removed from the 
Regulation replacing the Brussels Convention. It is submitted that the review of the 
Rome Convention, when it comes, will do the same but until then the courts have the 
task of interpreting and applying these ambiguous phrases in the event of a dispute. 
Many of the difficulties, discussed in the previous chapter, associated with the 
interpretation of certain key provisions of the Brussels Convention are relevant to the 
application of the Rome Convention. 
2 Mount Allmon Borvugh Cowuil u Australasian Txipe mcpand Gaieral Assurmxo Society [1938] A. C. 224 per Lord 
Wright at p. 240. 
3 Publi c poli cy issues were also relevant. See Vita Food Products Inc v. (haus Shipping Ca [1939] A. C. 277 
Lord Wright at p. 290. 
4 Jacobs v. Ck Lynmzais (1884) 12 Q. B. D. 589 
5 The Assunzione [1954] P. 150 
6 Re Unitd RaiIznrysofAHacrmaandReg(a WweJxuses Ltd [1960] Ch. 52; [1961] A. C. 1007 at 1021. 
7 [1980] OJ L266. Accession Conventions; [1984] OJ L146, [1992] OJ L333/1 and [1997] OJ C15/10 
8 The European Union Member States and the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
9 Section 2. 
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5.2.1 Scope of the Convention 
The Convention rules apply "to contractual obligations in any situation involving 
a choice between the laws of different countries". " The phrase ̀contractual obligations' 
would appear to imply that the parties be actually bound, excluding situations in which 
the contract is void. However, it is clear that such an interpretation is not the correct 
one in the context of the convention, particularly when the convention contains a 
provision for dealing with the consequences of nullity of the contract. " 
The law specified by the Convention will apply "whether or not it is the law of a 
Contracting State", 12 giving parties considerable autonomy to select the most favourable 
contractual law. 
Exclusions from the scope of the Rome Convention include questions relating to 
wills; succession or property rights arising out of the matrimonial relationship; rights and 
duties relating to the family relationship; negotiable instruments such as, bills of 
exchange, cheques and promissory notes; questions governed by company or agency law; 
trusts and rules of evidence or procedure. " In addition, although not explicitly 
mentioned in the text of the Rome Convention, it has been suggested that intellectual 
property is also excluded from the provisions. " With the high incidence of computer 
software as the subject matter of electronic commerce transactions, this could be seen as 
a significant exclusion. However, the report distinguishes contractual obligations from 
property rights and intellectual property, which would indicate that the intellectual 
property itself is subject to the exclusion rather than a contractual licence to sell or use 
copies of the software protected by intellectual property rights. " 
5.2.2 Interpretation 
By virtue of an appended declaration, it was intended that the ECJ have 
jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of the Convention. " However, the Brussels 
10 Article 1(1). 
"Article 10(1) (e). McClean, D. Momr 71x Candid of lsavs, 5ýh ed. (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2000) at p. 
325. 
12 Article 2. 
13 Article 1 (a-h). 
14 Official Report by Professors Giuliano and Lagarde on The Convention on Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations', OJ 1980 C282/1,311 October (hereafter the Giuliano-Lagarde Report) at p10, 
interpreting Article 1. 
'S See Chissick, M. and Kelman, A. Camxrtr 1v Lw vdPnzziA 2nd Edition (Sweet & Maxwell: 
London, 2000) at para 4.23. 
16 Schedule 3 of the 1990 Act, The Brussels Protocol [1989] OJ L48. If ratified the implementing measure 
can be found in Section 3(1) of the 1990 Act. 
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Protocol, signed on 19`h December 1988, has not yet entered into force. ̀ If the Protocol 
ever does come into force, the ECJ will have the power to give preliminary rulings on the 
interpretation of the Convention. " Guidance to the interpretation of the Convention 
can also be found in the Official Report by Professors Mario Giuliano and Paul Lagarde 
published in the year of the Convention's introduction. " 
5.2.3 Key Provisions 
The applicable law, as determined by the Rome Convention, will govern all 
substantive issues relating to the contract. These include interpretation or construction 
of the contract, performance and discharge of the contract and the consequences of
breach or nullity? ' 
5.2.4 Party Autonomy 
The core principle of the Rome Convention is freedom of choice, contained in 
Article 3: 
"A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice must 
be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the 
contract or the circumstances of the case. " 
In cases where the parties have made no express choice of law, but where the 
terms of the contract and the relevant circumstances connect the contract to a particular 
legal system, the court may assume that it was the intention of the parties that the law of 
that country would govern the contract 21 The Convention allows the parties to choose 
the law of a country regardless of whether that country has any connection with the 
parties or the subject matter of the contract. The validity of a party's consent to the 
choice of law will be determined in accordance with the Convention's provisions on 
material and formal validity, and capacity. ' 
17 Belgium is yet to ratify the protocol. 
18 However, unlike Article 234 and the provision found in the Brussels Convention, there will be no 
obiigatory eference from courts of last appeal. It could be argued that this has the potential to undermine 
the harmonising intention of the Convention. 
19 Ibid fn 14. 
20 Article 10(1)(a)-(e). 
21 Egon Oldezbrffv. Lilie is Corp. (No. 2) [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 380 
22 Articles 8,9 and 11 respectively as dictated in Article 3 (4). 
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5.2.5 Mandatory Rules 
The `party autonomy' approach is tempered by the requirement that such a 
choice will not prejudice the "application of rules of law of [a] country which cannot be 
derogated from by contract, hereinafter called ̀ mandatory rules'"! ' Such mandatory 
rules will apply where "all the other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the 
choice are connected with one country only"! ' Where, for example, a party is selling 
property in State A and the contract is entered into in State A but the law of State B is 
chosen to govern the contract, the mandatory rules of State A will nevertheless apply. 
The question, which remains unresolved, is which factual elements are relevant to this 
determination? If some minor elements of the contract were not associated with State A, 
would the mandatory rules still apply? To extract this to an electronic example - the 
subject matter of a contract is to be electronically transferred from a source in Germany 
but the parties to the contract for supply are based in England and the product is 
transferred to the customer in England. However, if the chosen law is that of Germany, 
will the fact that the ultimate supplier is not based in the England prevent the English 
mandatory rules from applying? 
Article 7(2) contains an additional provision for mandatory rules which are 
regarded by the State as applicable whatever law applies to the contract as a whole. Rules 
falling within this provision will be those, which have a `policing' role in particular 
circumstances. " In the UK section 27(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
provides an example of a rule of this nature. 
(2) This Act has effect notwithstanding any contract term which applies or 
purports to apply the law of some country outside the United Kingdom, where 
(either or both) 
(a) the term appears to the court, or arbitrator or arbiter to have been 
imposed wholly or mainly for the purpose of enabling the party 
imposing it to evade the operation of this Act; or 
(b) in the making of the contract one of the parties dealt as consumer, 
and he was then habitually resident in the United Kingdom, and the 
23 Article 3 (3) and 7(2). In English law an example of this type of rule would be liability for negligently 
caused death, which cannot be excluded by a contractual term. Parties cannot contract-out of the 
provisions found within the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, save for `international supply contracts' 
discussed in s. 26. 
24 Iba 
25 The French text of the Convention head Article 7 as 7ois de palirn: 
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essential steps necessary for the making of the contract were taken 
there, whether by him or by others on his behalf. 
The section is intended to prevent the indirect evasion of the mandatory rules 
contained within the Act by the choice of a foreign law. Part (b) contains a measure 
intended to protect the consumer, habitually resident in the UK However, the 
consumer, or someone acting on his behalf, must take the "essential steps necessary for 
the making of the contract" in the United Kingdom. A similar phrase is contained 
within the Brussels Convention, a phrase omitted from the new Regulation because of 
the potential difficulties in establishing u& e necessary steps were taken in the electronic 
environment. In the context of the Brussels Convention it was submitted that the `steps' 
referred to were not the technical legal steps of offer and acceptance, but rather the 
practical steps, such as filling in a form, posting a letter or typing information into a 
computer. 26 However, the phrase contained in s. 27 refers to the `essential' steps for the 
making of the contract. This could be interpreted as requiring a consideration of where 
the technical legal steps for agreement, offer and acceptance were taken. In this context 
there would appear to be an opportunity for a complex and technical argument as to 
where offer and acceptance actually takes place in the electronic environment? ' 
5.2.6 Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice 
Article 4 of the Convention sets out complex rules for the determination of the 
governing law where there is no express choice made by the parties and the court cannot 
infer with reasonable certainty what the parties intended. The Article reads; 
"To the extent that the law applicable to the contract has not been chosen in 
accordance with Article 3, the contract shall be governed by the law of the 
country with which it is most closely connected. "" 
This provision is similar to the ̀ closest and most real connection' approach adopted by 
the English common law. Further guidance on the determinative factors is found in 
Article 4(2): 
26 Discussed above in chapter 4.3. 
27 This issue is addressed in chapter 8. 
28 Article 4(1) 
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"the contract is most closely connected with the country where the party who is 
to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has, at the time of 
conclusion of the contract, his habitual residence, or, in the case of a body 
corporate or unincorporate, its central administration. However, if the contract is 
entered into in the course of that party's trade or profession, that country shall be 
the country in which the principal place of business is situated or, where under 
the terms of the contract the performance is to be effected through a place of 
business other than the principal place of business, the country in which that 
other place of business is situated. " 
The presumption in Article 4(2) will not apply if the characteristic performance 
cannot be determined and none of the presumptions will apply if it appears in the 
circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected to another 
country! ' In the courts of England and Wales the factors previously discussed; the place 
of contracting, place of performance and place of residence or business of the parties 
and the subject matter of the contract, will all be relevant factors in assessing whether the 
contract is more closely connected to another country. The consequence is that in all 
circumstances primacy is given to the country of closest connection? ' Finally if separate 
elements of the contract have a closer connection with another country, then the law of 
that country may govern that part. There are a number of elements of Article 4 which 
may be difficult to apply to the electronic environment. 
5.2.6.1 Characteristic Performance 
The "performance, which is characteristic of the contract" is normally the 
performance for which payment is due, the delivery of goods or provision of a service 
for example" For certain subject matter the Article contains special provisions. For 
contracts dealing with immoveable property it is presumed that the contract is most 
closely connected to the country where the property is situated. " In relation to contracts 
for the carriage of goods it is presumed that the contract is most closely connected with 
the principal place of business of the carrier as long as that country is the place of loading 
29 Article 4(5). 
30 Seethe obitar comments in Baraa u Visya &vik [1994) 2 Lloyds Rep 87 at 91. 
31 The Giuliano and Lagarde Report explains this as the performance which "links the contract to the 
social and economic environment of which it will form patt' at p 20. 
32 Article 4(3). 
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or discharge" For the majority of contracts there will be little difficulty in determining 
the performance characteristic of the contract. However in some contracts, be they 
entered into electronically or via more traditional methods, difficulty will arise when there 
are a number of elements of performance which could be called characteristic of the 
contract. If different parties resident in different states are to perform these different 
elements then Article 4(2) may be of little help. The occurrence of such contracts with 
obligations to be performed in a number of States by different parties is likely to increase 
with the predicted rise in electronic ommerce. 
When the characteristic performance of the contract can be determined, then the 
law applicable to the contract will be the law of. 
- the habitual residence the party effecting that performance; or 
- the place of central administration of the body corporate or unincorporated 
effecting the performance; or 
- if the contract is entered into in the course of that parry's trade, business or 
profession the principal place of business or place of business through which 
the performance is to be effected. 
At this point an interesting contrast can be made with the `Special Rules' on 
jurisdiction in matters relating to a contract whereby the defendant may be sued in the 
courts of the Member State where the performance is to occur. 34 In this context the law 
of the place where the party effecting performance resides is the focus rather than the 
place in which that performance is to occur. 
5.2.6.1.1 The habitual residence or central administration of the party effecting the 
characteristic performance 
If the party effecting the characteristic performance is not acting in the course of 
his trade, business or profession then the presumption is that the relevant country is the 
place where the individual had his habitual residence at the time the contract was made 
or in the case of a corporate body, its central administration's 
;; Article 4(4). 
34 Discussed above at 43.4. 
35 Article 5(2). 
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5.2.6.1.2 Contracts entered into in the course of a trade, business or profession. 
If the party effecting the characteristic performance of the contract is acting in 
the course of his trade, business or profession then the presumption is that the country 
of closest connection is that in which the party has his principal place of business. 
However, if the performance is to be effected through some other place of business, 
such as a branch or agency, then the relevant country is the one in which that place of 
business is situated. " 
The latter part of this provision is an interesting one to consider in the context of 
electronic communications. If the characteristic performance is effected electronically 
via a website, is the ̀ website' the relevant ̀place of business'? If so, in the majority of 
situations this could result in a conclusion that there may be no place of business as such, 
relevant o the transaction from where the applicable law may be applied. In such cases 
the courts will be left to consider the country of closest connection on the basis of a 
parry's physical location, which, in the electronic environment may be unrelated to the 
transaction or the business activities of a party. 
In cases where the `characteristic performance' cannot be determined because the 
contract is a complex one, the presumptions found in Article 4(2-4) are disregarded and 
it will be for the court to decide the country of closest connection on the facts of the 
case. This may be a complex and arguably difficult analysis if the contract in question is 
made and performed in the electronic environment. The only `place' capable of being 
established in this situation would be the physical place in which the party responsible for 
the automated performance of the contract is located. 
5.2.7 Consumer Contracts 
When dealing with consumers the supplier's freedom to use a contractual clause 
to dictate the proper law of the contract is curtailed by the protected status given to the 
consumer in Article 5. Article 5 reads: 
1. This Article applies to a contract the object of which is the supply of goods or 
services to a person (`the consumer) for a purpose which can be regarded as 





2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3, a choice of law made by the 
parties shall not have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection 
afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law of the country in which he has 
his habitual residence: 
- if in that country the conclusion of the contract was preceded by a 
specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken in 
that country all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the 
contract, or 
- if the other party or his agent received the consumer's order in that 
country, or 
- if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from 
that country to another country and there gave his order, provided that 
the consumer's journey was arranged by the seller for the purpose of 
inducing the consumer to buy. 
Professors Giuliano and Lagarde emphasise that the consumer should not be deprived of 
the protection of mandatory provisions in the State of his habitual residence and add that 
"in this type of contract it is the law of the buyer (the weaker parry) which should 
normally prevail over that of the seller. "" However, it is clear that this will rarely be the 
case, with business parties habitually inserting choice of law clauses into their contracts. 
It is only those rules deemed mandatory that will apply in the face of a contrary choice of 
law clause. 38 
5.2.7.1 The `Consumer' 
The first paragraph defines ̀the consumer' as a party entering a contract for the 
supply of goods or services for a purpose, which can be regarded as being outside his 
trade or profession, or a contract for credit for the same. The terminology found in this 
definition is discussed in detail above. " At this point it is sufficient to re-iterate that the 
definitions of goods and services may not be appropriate to encompass modem data 
products, thus excluding a great many contracts entered into electronically. Professionals 
may also find themselves excluded from the protection contained within Article 5, if 
37 Op cit fn 14 at p. 24. 
38 The standing of such clauses may be affected by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulation 1999 is discussed below in section N. 
39 At 4.3.5. 
97 
Applicable Law 
goods which they purchase may be used for a purpose relating to their profession even 
though they may have no expertise in that area or possess the funds or legal support 
available to a business. 
The Article encompasses situations where a choice of law has been made and 
those where one has not. 
5.2.7.2 Where a choice of law is made 
Article 5 does not in itself invalidate a choice of law made by the parties, 
although a term doing so may attract the attention of the statutory regimes dealing with 
unfair terms. '° The parties choice of law will be effective, but the consumer cannot be 
deprived of the protection afforded to him by the `mandatory rules of the law of the 
country in which he has his habitual residence' in the circumstances prescribed by Article 
5(2). 
5.2.7.2.1 The Mandatory Rules 
The mandatory rules would encompass statutes and statutory instruments 
intended to provide the consumer with a level of protection in the contracts he enters. 
In the UK these would include the consumer protection measures relating to distance 
selling, the sale of goods or services and unfair contract terms. " Hence, the consumer is 
afforded greater protection but, as was the case with the Brussels Convention, certain 
circumstances have to exist for the provision to apply. 
5.2.7.2.1 Specific Invitation or by Advertising in the Consumer's Jurisdiction 
Article 5(2) proceeds to detail the specific circumstances which must exist for a 
consumer to benefit from the provision. The terminology employed is the same as that 
found in the Brussels Convention. " This terminology was omitted because of the 
uncertainty surrounding electronic forms of communication such as websites, in the 
recent Regulation introduced to replace the Convention. 
The contract must have been preceded, in the consumer's jurisdiction, by a 
specific invitation addressed to the consumer or advertising, and the consumer must 
have taken all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract in that 
country. As is discussed above the requirement of advertising in the country in question 
40 Discussed below in chapters 11 & 12. 
41 Ibrd 
42 See 4.3.5 above. 
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has the potential to encompass a wide range of activities, particularly on the Internet. 
The uncertainty created by this dated terminology is also discussed at length above. " It 
is sufficient to note at this point that Professors Giuliano and Lagarde envisaged that the 
advertising would have to be aimed specifically at a particular country and the ECJ 
adopted the approach that the advertising must be in some way directed towards that 
country. In the context of the Brussels Regulation, the phrase has been replaced by a 
requirement of `directing or pursuing' activities, " an approach already adopted by the 
courts to the terminology of the Brussels Convention. In the context of the Rome 
Convention the courts will continue to consider whether the supplier directed his 
advertising towards the consumer's State. It will be remembered that in the Andim Piers 
Cou#auld Rayner case45 the key question for the court was "who was inviting whom" to do 
business'. 
5.2.7.2.2. The Steps Necessary for The Conclusion Of The Contract are taken by the 
Consumer in His jurisdiction. 
Although this latter part of the paragraph was inserted to avoid the classic 
problem of determining the place where the contract was concluded it nevertheless raises 
issues, particularly in relation to electronic contracts. 46 For this reason in the context of 
jurisdictional disputes the phrase has been replaced in the new Regulation. The guidance 
on this phrase from Professors Giuliano and Lagarde suggests hat, 
"The word ̀ steps' includes bueralia writing or any action taken in consequence of
an offer or an advertisement. "" 
This would support the contention that only the practical steps necessary need to be 
taken by the consumer in his home State, rather than the technical legal steps (i. e. offer 
or acceptance). The phrase does leave a potential loophole however, where a consumer 
uses a mobile device to take the steps necessary whilst travelling in another country. In 
such a case the consumer has not taken the steps necessary in `his country' and on a 
literal interpretation the contract is outside of the scope of the Article. 
43 At p. 61. 
44 Although arguably, without a clarifying recital, the new terminology has the potential to create similar 
debate as to its scope. See above at p4.3.6. 





5.2.7.3 Choice of law in consumer contracts in the absence of a clear choice by the 
parties 
Where the parties to a consumer contract do not make a choice of law in their 
contract the contract will be governed by the law of the country in which the consumer 
has his habitual residence. " In this way the weaker party (the consumer) will benefit 
from the application of the substantive law of his home-state notwithstanding the fact 
that the contract is more closely connected to another state under Article 4. However, 
the consumer will still have to show that the contract was preceded by a specific 
invitation or advertising and that he took the steps necessary for the conclusion of the 
contract in the state of his habitual residence. 
5.2.7.4 Exclusions from the consumer related provisions in Article 5 
Article 5(4) contains a list of specific contracts excluded from the consumer 
measures: 
"This Article shall not apply to: 
(a) a contract of carriage; 
(b) a contract for the supply of services where the services are to be 
supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country other than that in 
which he has his habitual residence. 
The preferential treatment given to the consumer does not extend to contracts of 
carriage or to contracts for the supply of services where the services are to be supplied to 
the consumer exclusively in a country other than that of his habitual residence. While 
the first exclusion poses little difficulty, the exception relating to the provision of services 
has the potential to create some uncertainty for consumers and service providers who 
provide services electronically, such as web-hosting, data storage and mail handling 
services. It could be argued that a service provider who provides a data storage service 
via the Internet actually provides that service exclusively in the country where he, or 
more accurately his hardware, is based. The presence of that information on a 
consumer's monitor does not necessarily mean that the service is being provided in the 
country in which the consumer has his habitual residence. The consumer ̀ dials-up' the 
49 Article 5 (3). 
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service providers server and views his data from there, in much the same way as a 
telephone user would request information from an overseas operator or information 
service. It is submitted that such a narrow approach would be contrary to the intentions 
of the Convention. However, the approach adopted is a decision for the Member State 
courts. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The common law approaches to the proper law of the contract, although 
superseded by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act and the Rome Convention, may 
nevertheless still play a role in the interpretation of certain key provisions. In particular 
the relevant factors considered when determining the country most closely connected 
with the contract. 
The terminology in the Rome Convention is closely based on the Brussels 
Convention and hence contains many of the same ambiguous phrases responsible for its 
replacement. Unfortunately a replacement for the Rome Convention appears some way 
off. 49 Should a case arise, the courts would have no option but to apply the ambiguous 
terminology to the electronic environment. 
The rules contained within the Rome Convention are rather complex and have 
the potential to create legal uncertainty when applied to electronic contracts. However, 
the dominating principle in the Convention is party autonomy and where cross border 
contracts are in use there will almost inevitably be a choice of law clause in the contract 
terms. The majority of traders entering contracts in the electronic environment have a 
choice of law clause in their website conditions of use which will, in the majority of 
situations, effectively dictate the substantive law applicable to their contract. However, 
there are two situations where the Convention in its present state may lead to uncertainty 
in its application to electronic contracts; the position where there is no effective choice 
of law and consumer contracts. 
Where there is no effective choice of law the courts will look for the country of 
closest connection. The Convention contains some guidance to the assessment but it is 
submitted that this will often be of little help in relation to many electronic contracts 
entered into in the course of a party's trade or profession. The search for a ̀ principal 
49 On January 14,2003 the European Commission adopted a Green Paper that launches a consultation on 
the revision of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations. See 
http: //europa. eu. int/eur-lex/en/com/gpr/2002/com2OO2_0654en0l. 
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place of business' or a place of business through which the characteristic performance of 
the contract is effected may produce unworkable or inappropriate results in the 
electronic environment. The only alternative in this situation will be to decide the 
country of closest connection on the basis of where one or other of the parties is 
resident. 
As is the case with the Conventions and Regulation on jurisdiction, the consumer 
is afforded a protected position under the Rome Convention in relation to the 
mandatory rules applicable in his country of habitual residence and when no choice of 
law has been made. However, to benefit from these measures the consumer must enter 
the contract in specific circumstances. These circumstances equate to the criteria 
recently replaced in the new Regulation on jurisdiction because of the uncertainty 
surrounding their interpretation, particularly in relation to website activity and electronic 
contracts. Nevertheless, as was argued in relation to the rules on jurisdiction, the 
interpretation by the courts of the requirement that the contract be preceded by 
advertising equate to the directing or targeting of activities to the consumer's State and 
the enquiry of who invited whom to contract'. On this basis it is submitted that 
websites can be construed as advertising directed towards a consumer's State unless the 
supplier can demonstrate that he was not inviting business from consumers in that State 
but rather that the consumer took steps to pursue the supplier to enter the contract. It is 
clear that the taking of the `necessary steps' to conclude the contract in the consumer's 
country can be satisfied by the taking of any action, such as the typing and order into a 
website. However, it is equally clear that this requirement may create a loophole whereby 
the consumer will lose the benefit of the mandatory rules of his habitual residence, if he 
takes the necessary steps whilst in a different country using a mobile piece of technology. 
It is submitted that this interpretation could lead to absurd results, but it is nevertheless a 
potential interpretation of the phrase. 
The Rome Convention also contains a potentially problematic exclusion from the 
consumer protection measures. The exclusion of contracts for services supplied 
exclusively in a country other than the consumer's habitual residence has the potential to 
exclude services provided electronically. It could be argued that such services are actually 
provided in the country where the supplier has the technological means and the relevant 
material stored for the provision of that service to consumers, wherever they may be. If 
this argument is accepted the protection afforded to consumers may be significantly 
undermined in electronic contracts for these services. 
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The Rome Convention requires some amendment to enable it to accommodate 
electronic contracts and modem forms of communication in an effective way, 
particularly in the context of consumer contracts. However, it is submitted that the 
amendments must be carefully considered in the light of the objectives of the measure 
adopted to avoid creating further uncertainty for electronic contracts as has arguably 
occurred in relation to the rules on jurisdiction. This point will be returned to in the 
conclusion to this section. 
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As was stated at the beginning of this section, the two issues of jurisdiction and 
applicable law are of vital importance to electronic ontracting. 
For the business party legal clarity, certainty and consistency are needed when 
they are considering their business strategy, particularly when entering cross-border 
electronic contracts. Uncertainty as to their legal position and hence their potential 
liabilities may act as a deterrent to embracing electronic commerce. To benefit from the 
expanded market created by modern communications technologies suppliers need to be 
confident that they will not inadvertently find themselves the subject of legal action in a 
range of foreign jurisdictions because their website may be accessible there. Equally, 
they require a legal environment within which their customers feel confident to enter 
electronic contracts with them. 
For the consumer, confidence fostered by the knowledge that their rights and 
interests will be protected when they enter an electronic contract is of paramount 
importance. This trust and confidence will only be developed if the legal rules on 
jurisdiction recognise the fact that, as a general rule, a consumer will not have either the 
resources or the know-how required to pursue a supplier in a different State. It is equally 
unlikely that a consumer will be aware of his rights under the laws of a different State and 
as such it is important that he is afforded the protection of the laws of his home country 
to which he is accustomed. Without these safeguards cross-border consumer contracts 
are likely to remain rare and electronic commerce within the internal market will suffer. 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that although steps have been taken to 
harmonise the rules within the European Union and the European Economic Area, there 
are still significant areas of uncertainty in the application of the regulatory measures in 
relation to the electronic environment. It is also clear that certain key principles are 
inappropriate to be applied to electronic contracts because they are reliant on references 
to some physical presence; a presence that either does not exist, or if it does may be of 
little relevance to the parties and their transaction. Because of this lack of clarity and 
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legal certainty the needs of consumers and businesses wishing to enter electronic 
contracts are not being met by the relevant regulatory regimes. Unfortunately this 
remains the case even in the face of legislation specifically intended to recognise and 
accommodate new forms of communication and electronic ontracts. A combination of 
ill-considered political lobbying and a lack of sufficiently detailed consideration of the 
electronic environment and electronic ontracts has resulted in a Regulation which may 
not fulfil its declared objectives and will require interpretation by the ECJ if divergent 
application of its provisions is to be avoided. 
If amendments to the Rome Convention follow the same course as the 
amendments to the rules on jurisdiction, a vital opportunity to codify and clarify the rules 
applicable to cross-border contracts will have been missed at a time when the creation of 
a clear and consistent legal framework for electronic contracts is necessary for the 
development of electronic ommerce. 
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III 
The Creation of Electronic Contracts 
Section III- Inmx&ctkn 
Introduction 
In this section the creation of electronic contracts, fundamental to the 
development of electronic commerce, will be considered. A number of factors must be 
examined in order to assess whether their creation is permitted, facilitated or deterred by 
the existing legal principles. 
A particular problem is created by one of the main characteristics of the 
electronic environment - its penchant for anonymity. Whilst the formal identification of 
the parties to a contract is a legal requirement in only a limited number of circumstances, 
the lack of a physical or even a visible presence in the electronic environment makes 
identification a particularly relevant issue. A lack of information about the other party in 
addition to uncertainty as to that parry's identity can lead to a lack of confidence, making 
parties reluctant to contract in the electronic environment. The legislative response to 
this problem and the common law approach to identification in contract law will be 
considered. 
If requirements of form create legal barriers or inconsistencies in the application 
of the law to electronic contracts the growth of electronic commerce will be hindered. 
This potential problem has been a core issue in the formulation of legislation targeting 
electronic commerce in the United Kingdom and the European Community. Arguably 
few `barriers' are created by formal requirements in English law, but the potential barriers 
that do exist and the responses to those barriers must be considered. 
The formation of contracts is the domain of the common law with its principles 
derived from centuries of considered analysis of the contractual relationship. There is an 
inherent flexibility in the common law which allows for the accommodation of new 
technology and changes in society. Unfortunately the corollary of this flexibility can be 
legal uncertainty, which may have a detrimental effect on electronic contracting because 
of the difficulty in predicting how existing principles will be applied to electronic 
contracts. Of particular importance in the electronic environment is the question of 
when and where a contract is actually formed, bringing into existence binding obligations 
and potential liabilities. With no personal contact between parties and the use of 
automated systems being common a `new' set of circumstances will have to be 
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considered by the courts. To address this issue the common law rules on contractual 
offer and acceptance must be considered including the inevitable debate surrounding the 
postal rule. 
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6 
Identification, Trans agcy, Trust and 
Confidence 
In this chapter the increased significance of identification in the electronic 
environment is examined. The discussion proceeds to consider the potential responses 
to this need and the importance of the provision of information about contracting 
parties (transparency), in relation to the objective of promoting trust and confidence in 
entering electronic contracts. 
The common law approach to mistaken identity is highlighted as a potential area 
of legal uncertainty which may have a significant role to play in electronic contracts 
because of the difficulties associated with identification in the electronic environment. 
6.1 Identification in the Traditional Environment 
Identification is rarely a key issue in everyday contracts. In the usual course of 
events the identification of the other party to a contract is only important to the extent 
that a seller can obtain payment. 
However, the identification of the other party or parties to a contract may 
become crucial for a number of reasons. The first clear need arises in the event of a 
dispute because the obligations entered into are not performed, or performance is 
deficient in some way. Whether seeking payment for goods or services, or compensation 
for a faulty product, an action can only be taken if you can identify your contracting 
partner and provide sufficient evidence to show that they are the other party to the 
contract. A second situation whereby identification may become crucial arises when a 
party to the contract is under a legal obligation which necessitates the formal 
identification of their contracting partner. For example, where the supply of a product is 
restricted to individuals over a certain age, identification may be necessary to ensure that 
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products are not sold to people under that age. ' Transactions for financial services also 
usually require strict identification procedures to comply with legislative requirements, 
particularly regulation relating to the prevention of money laundering! Finally, a 
particular party may have been chosen as a contracting partner on the basis of his 
previous work or reputation, such as a well known brand name, and a level of trust and 
confidence in that supplier may already exist. 
In modern society, with the present state of technology, one could be forgiven 
for imagining that, with a little precaution, establishing the identity of a contracting party 
should be relatively straightforward. However, with identity fraud being one of the 
fastest growing crimes in the UK this would not appear to be the case' The statistics 
reflect the fact that in the majority of everyday contracts the only steps necessary, and 
indeed taken, are those minimal elements required to ensure payment. With cash 
transactions there is usually no identification required at all. With credit or debit card 
transactions, ensuring that the card has enough credit available, has not been reported 
stolen, and that the individual presenting the card can reproduce a ̀ close enough' copy of 
the signature on the back of the card, will usually ensure payment. 
6.2 Identification in the Electronic Environment 
The situations identified in the context of traditional contracts whereby 
identification becomes important to the parties may equally occur where the contract is 
entered into electronically. However, in the electronic environment identification may be 
more problematic because the nature of the environment means that a contracting 
partner will not be physically present and even the limited benefit of seeing that 
individual signing a credit card receipt for example, is removed. The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that in the electronic environment, such as the Internet, an 
individual can be whatever and whoever they want to be, as Reed indicates a party can 
assume almost any persona he or she desires because, 
".. a user's digital identity has no necessary connection with his physical world 
identity. "` 
I In addition, at common law a'minor' (< 18) is not bound by any contract which he makes whereas the 
other party will be bound, save for contracts for 'necessaries' and employment or analogous contracts. 
However, s. 3 of the Minors Contracts Act 1987 gives the courts discretion to grant restitutionary relief. 
2 See the Proceeds Of Crime Act 2002 (c. 29), section 327 et sm 
3 The Times, 13th August 2001. See the discussion of Shogun F'av LtdvHudson below at 6.3. 
4 Reed, C. Inte»rt Lace Teat and Matey als (Butterworths: London, 2000) at p. 119. 
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The nature of the electronic environment also has the potential to increase the 
occurrence of identity fraud. ' When services are provided electronically and delivered in 
real-time the potential losses for a service provider are large, if he is duped by someone 
using another person's identity or a purely fictional one. Hence, sellers and suppliers 
engaged in electronic commerce generally charge the value of the goods or services, or at 
least authenticate the payment method, before ̀despatch', be it electronic or physical. ' 
However, where two individuals enter contracts electronically or where a consumer is 
dealing with a supplier, they do not have this option. 
Online service providers whose services include the provision of a `virtual 
marketplace' for individual users are keen to highlight the difficulties associated with 
identification in the electronic environment to their users, as the eBay users agreement 
illustrates: 
"3.3 Identity Verification. We use many techniques to verify the accuracy of 
the information our users provide us when they register on the Site. However, 
because user verification on the Internet is difficult, eBay cannot and does not 
confirm each user's purported identity. Thus, we have established a user-initiated 
feedback system to help you evaluate with whom you are dealing. We also 
encourage you to communicate directly with potential trading partners through 
the tools available on the Site. You may also wish to consider using a third party 
escrow service or services that provide additional user verification. "' 
The potential for innocently caused confusion is also increased in the electronic 
environment. For example, a consumer may mistakenly believe that the sender of a 
message or the proprietor of a website is a well known business and enter a contract 
under that mistaken belief. Whether this is due to some deliberate `passing off or is just 
a completely innocent case of mistaken identity this possibility has the potential to 
undermine confidence in electronic contracting and the development of electronic 
commerce. 
5 See the comments made by the US Department of justice at; 
httl2: //wvvw. usdoi. gov/criminal/fraud/text/idtheft. htmL 
6 At least on the first transaction with a new customer. 
7 See http: // aý ges. ebay. com/help/policies/user-agreement. html. With an escrow service a third party 
provides identity verification fpr users. 
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Where parties have an existing business relationship, or a history of transactions, 
there is less risk of identity fraud or confusion, but as electronic commerce develops the 
majority of electronic contracts are unlikely to be based upon an existing relationship. 
To this end, and to promote trust and confidence in the use of electronic commerce, a 
number of solutions have been considered. The first are practical or technological 
answers, such as the use of electronic signatures and biometric data. In addition to 
recognising the technical processes developed to address this issue legislators have also 
introduced a second approach intended to reduce the potential for confusion and 
uncertainty in the electronic environment: the introduction of statutory information 
requirements. It is hoped that by requiring business parties entering electronic contracts 
to provide detailed information about themselves and the contractual process, 
confidence will be increased in participation in electronic commerce activities. 
6.2.1 Checking Identity in the Electronic Environment: Practical and Technical 
Approaches 
In the physical world certain documents are deemed to be particularly 
authoritative for identification purposes: birth certificates, passports and driving licences 
for example. ' The elevated position that these documents command is attributable to 
the steps required to obtain the document and the identity checks made by the body 
issuing the document. Although in the traditional environment such formal means of 
identification are rarely necessary, in the electronic environment there may be an 
increased need for a greater level of identification because of the anonymous nature of 
that environment. Steps have been taken to create electronic forms of identification 
functionally equivalent to the physical world documents mentioned above. As with the 
physical world counterparts there are varying levels of `reliability' associated with the 
methods adopted, but a common factor is the involvement of a third party. The various 
methods of checking identity in the electronic environment will now be considered. 
6.2.1.1 Domain Name Registers and Internet Service Providers (ISP's) 
When dealing with a supplier through a website the customer can make use of 
the domain name registry databases, such as the RIPE or NOMINET `whois' directories, 
8 Whether their position is justified is beyond the scope of this discussion, but it is submitted that it is 
difficult to sustain that any form of identification is conclusive, particularly if it does not bear an image of 
the individual. 
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to attempt to confirm the identity of the other party. ' However, the registry is only 
reliable if the registered domain name holder has given accurate information. The checks 
are only minimal and the information supplied limited, which makes this a form of 
identification of limited reliability. A party could also try to confirm an identity with the 
Internet Service Provider, however such service providers are subject to data protection 
requirements and usually have their own privacy policies which would prevent disclosure 
of relevant information. 
6.2.1.2 Webcams and Video-Conferencing 
With developments in technology it is possible to actually see the person you are 
contracting with using video conferencing or web-cams. At present he viability of such 
methods is restricted by the speed of communications, but for individually negotiated 
business contracts it is certainly a way forward. For years science fiction has pointed to 
the combination of a visual image and biometric data, such as a retina scan, to confirm 
identity. This approach is again reliant on a third party verifying the data collected. 
However, for regularly occurring electronic transactions this approach may well be 
considered unnecessary and in many situations would be completely impractical because 
suppliers will generally use automated ordering systems requiring little or no human 
interaction. " 
6.2.1.3 Biometric Data 
In this context the phrase ̀biometric data' refers to "the emerging field of 
technology devoted to identification of individuals using biological traits, such as those 
based on retinal or iris scanning, fingerprints, or face recognition". " The use of 
biometric data to verify identification has been technologically possible for some time. 
However, the most reliable forms have not yet become readily available to the mass 
market at an affordable price. " 
9 httl2: //www. 6pg. net/perVwhois; http: //www. nic. uk/. 
10 This is after all one of the main benefits of electronic commerce. 
11 "BIOMETRICS: A journal of the International Biometric Society. " http: //stat. tamu. edu/Biometrics/. 
See also http: //www. biometrics. ore/. 
12 See http: //www. biometrics. org/html/introduction html. 
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6.2.1.4 Security Certificates and Electronic Signatures 
spry CenfzazZ 
`Security Certificates' are usually associated with websites and are issued by a 
trusted third party who will verify the information given by the website proprietor. " To 
be issued with a certificate the website proprietor will usually be required to sign a code 
of practice, drafted by the certificate issuer. A member of a scheme will usually display 
the security certificate logo on his website and a user can ̀ click' on the logo to obtain 
details about the trader, the certification authority and any code of practice. The value to 
a potential customer of a security certificate as a verification of identity will depend on 
the trust and confidence the individual has in the certificate issuer. The well known 
consumer body `Which' ran its Web Trader' service for a number of years and 
confidence in the Web Trader logo developed from the existing reputation of `Which'. 
Other security certificate issuers have established a reputation in the electronic 
environment over a number of years, perhaps the most well known and trusted, being 
`VeriSign'. " 
Ekcmmk Signatures and ID G fcates 
Electronic signatures can take many forms, some of which may be very simple: 
the typing of one's name or initials at the end of a message; a simple scan of an 
individual's signature pasted into, or attached to, an electronic communication; an actual 
`signature' imposed onto the document using a light pen or similar device. At the other 
end of the technological scale, the phrases ̀ digital signature' or `advanced electronic 
signature' are often used to refer to electronic signatures based upon encryption and 
cryptographic techniques. 
Electronic signatures can fulfil a number of roles, one of the main roles being to 
identify the party responsible for a communication. Because electronic signatures can 
take a number of forms their reliability as methods of identification will vary according to 
the method used to `sign' a document. The most reliable forms of electronic signature 
are those based upon secure encryption technologies which use a third party to verify the 
identity of the signatory. The third party verification will usually take the form of an ID 
13 For examples ee http: //www. uk-shop-index. co. uk/security-certificates. htmL 
14 http: //www. yerisign. com. 
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certificate which demonstrates that the third party has obtained formal identification 
from the certificate holder. " 
In many ways electronic signatures differ from a `traditional' signature, in that 
there is no clear link between the signature and the identity of the party signing. The 
signature may not be physically related to the object in the same way as its physical 
counterpart. 16 However, the need to establish the identity of the party responsible for a 
communication in the electronic environment can be achieved successfully by the use of 
electronic signatures, and electronic signatures are perhaps the most reliable and readily 
available technology at present. However, the use of electronic signatures as a means of 
identification is heavily reliant on the role played by the third party, the certification 
authority. If electronic signatures are to be trusted as a means of identifying parties in 
the electronic environment those issuing certificates must maintain standards. The 
reliance placed upon certificates creates a need to regulate the activities of those issuing 
certificates and to fix them with liability, in appropriate circumstances, should the 
certificate be inaccurate resulting in loss. This need was recognised by the European 
Commission and was addressed by Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on a Community framework for electronic signatures, " the relevant 
elements of which were enacted in the Electronic Communications Act 2000. 
6.2.1.5 Certification Service Providers - Regulation and Liability 
R; elation of Serra ßnviders 
The registration and approval of cryptography service providers is dealt with by 
sections 1 to 6 of the Act. However, as a result of pressure from within the industry and 
bodies promoting self-regulation, this part of the Act has not come into force and will 
not do so until an appropriate order is agreed by Parliament. If the industry-led scheme 
is successful then the provision will be repealed after the expiration of five years. " The 
is The checks made to verify identification will vary from one certification authority to another. Common 
requirements however, include; passports, birth certificates, driving licenses and certificates of 
incorporation for limited companies. 
16 Angel, J. "Why use Digital Signatures for Electronic Commerce? " [1999](2) The journal oflnfamuthi, Law 
and Taiology (JILT) http: //www. law. warwickac. uk/jilt/99-2/angel. html at p. 6. The issue of whether 
electronic signatures should be treated as ̀ equivalent to'their more traditional counterparts is considered 
below. 
17 OJ L13, (19.1.2000) p. 12. 
18 Section 16(4). 
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Alliance for Electronic Business (AEB)" is responsible for the industry-led ̀tScheme . 2° 
The scheme is intended to promote best practice and to be registered under the scheme 
and awarded the ̀ tSclx mark' service providers must be thoroughly evaluated against 
rigorous criteria by independent experts; agree to keep to those criteria; subscribe to the 
schemes Code of Conduct; Z' and act promptly and fairly to remedy faults. 
Liability of icatian service provi M. 
The provision of information, in the form of ID certificates, intended to be relied 
upon by others, clearly creates potential liabilities for those issuing the certificates. 
Regulation 4 of the Electronic Signatures Regulations 200222 imposes liability on 
certification service providers when a person reasonably relies on a certificate, issued or 
guaranteed by, the service provider and suffers loss. There is no need to prove 
negligence on behalf of the service provider, but if the service provider can prove that he 
was not negligent he will not be liable. 
The regulation of those providing certification services, together with the fixing 
of liability on service providers in appropriate circumstances, should provide a high level 
of reliability in relation to identifying the sender of a communication by the use of an 
electronic signature based on cryptographic techniques. 
Even though reliable forms of identification exist in the physical world and the 
electronic environment, for the majority of transactions identification verification is not 
required and technologies such as electronic signatures are not employed. However, 
business parties entering high value or industrially sensitive contracts may require strong 
identification verification. Likewise banks and other financial service providers may be 
required by law to establish identity with strong verification and to this end, they 
generally remain in the `paper age', requiring new customers to show themselves 
physically in a branch with the types of paper identification document discussed above! ' 
19 An umbrella organisation encompassing the Computing Services and Software Association (CSSA); the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBT); the Direct Marketing Association (DMA); e-centre UK ; and the 
Federation of the Electronics Industry (FEI). 
20 www. tscheme. com. To-date the accredited and approved providers include by British Telecom ̀OnSite' 
uk/; http//www. btignite. com; the Royal Bank of Scotland, 'rrustAssured'http: //wwwtrustassured. co. 
and one by trustis, ̀Certificate Factoryhttp: //www. trustis. com/. 
Zt Although to call the list of good practice a code of conduct is a little generous. See 
http: //www. tsCheme. com/codeconduct. htn-J. 
22 Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 318. 
23 There are, of course, sound policy arguments for this approach, relating to money-laundering and 
organised crime. Further discussion of this issue is beyond this work, but see HM Treasury, "The UK's 
Anti-Money Laundering Legislation and the Data Protection Act 1998. Guidance Notes For The Financial 
Sector. " April 2002 at http: //www. hm-treasury. gov. uk/media/9A770/mongy laundering. pdf. 
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It is in these situations that digital signatures and certification authorities may have a key 
role to play. 
The use of electronic signatures and other technological methods of 
identification may not always be practical or appropriate. Even where they are, the 
promotion of transparency in dealings in the electronic environment may also help avoid 
uncertainty as to the identity of a party responsible for an electronic communication or 
website. The statutory information requirements embodied in a number of recent pieces 
of legislation may go some way to re-enforcing the identity of business parties in the 
electronic environment. The relevant provisions will now be considered. 
6.2.2 Statutory Information Requirements 
6.2.2.1 The Distance Selling Regulations 
On the 31' October 2000 the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) 
Regulations 2000 came into force. 24 The Regulations were introduced to implement 
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 1997 ̀on the 
protection of consumers in relation to distance contracts? Although dealing with 
distance selling to consumers in general, " the Regulations clearly have implications for 
parties involved in electronic commerce. The Regulations apply to "any contract 
concerning goods or services concluded between a supplier and a consumer under an 
organised distance sales or service provision scheme run by the supplier who, for the 
purpose of the contract, makes exclusive use of one or more means of distance 
communication up to and including the moment at which the contract is concluded" 27 
"Distance communication" is defined as "any means which, without the simultaneous 
physical presence of the supplier and the consumer, may be used for the conclusion of a 
contract between those parties"! ' The Regulations explicitly state that electronic mail 
falls within the definition, " but other means of electronic communication, such as web- 
24 Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 2334. 
25 O j. L144,19 (4.6.97). 
26 "Consumers" are defined in regulation 3 as, "any natural person who, in contracts to which these 
Regulations apply, is acting for purposes which are outside his business". 
27 Regulation 3. Certain contracts are excluded by Regulation 5. These include contracts for the sale or 
other disposition of an interest in land except for a rental agreement; for the construction of a building 
where the contract also provides for a sale or other disposition of an interest in land on which the building 
is constructed, except for a rental agreement; relating to financial services; concluded by means of an 
automated vending machine or automated commercial premises; concluded with a telecommunications 
operator through the use of a public pay-phone; and contracts concluded at an auction. 
2$ Ibid 
29 Schedule 1 para. 11. 
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based communications, are not mentioned. Nevertheless, it is clear that the definition of 
distance communication in the body of the directive is wide enough to encompass most 
electronic forms of communication in use at present. Support for this suggestion can 
also be found in the preamble to the Electronic Commerce Directive. " 
"... amongst others Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts and Directive 97/7EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of 
distance contracts form a vital element for protecting consumers in contractual 
matters; these Dims apply in Air ot vty to In fimnati n Society Sen c&s. "' 
The Regulations require that in good time prior to the conclusion of the contract 
the supplier shall provide information to the consumer including the identity of the 
supplier and, where the contract requires payment in advance, the supplier's address32 In 
addition the supplier must provide this information and the geographical address of the 
place of business to which the consumer may address any complaints, in writing, or in 
another durable medium which is available and accessible to the consumer. This must be 
provided `in good time', or at the latest at the time of delivery of goods, or during the 
performance of services. " Failure to comply with the Regulations may result in an 
enforcement body, " taking proceedings to obtain an injunction against a business to 
prevent further breaches " 
The overall objective of these information requirements is to promote 
transparency in distance transactions and a corresponding level of trust and confidence 
by ensuring that the consumer is not provided with less information simply because he is 
using a distance means of communication. The requirements in the Regulations provide 
the consumer with crucial information as to the identity of the business party he is 
dealing with36 
30 Directive 2000/31/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive 
on Electronic Commerce) OJ L178/1. Recital 11. 
31 Emphasis added. 
32 Regulation 7(1)(a)(i). 
33 Regulation 8. 
34 The Director General of Fair Trading, Trading Standards Departments in Great Britain and the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland. 
35 Regulation 27. 
36 The information is however, only as reliable as the party providing the information and where there is 
fraudulent activity the requirements will do little to help the consumer identify the other party. 
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6.2.2.2 The Electronic Commerce Regulations 
The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002" came into force on 
21st August 20021$ and they provide the long awaited implementation of certain key 
elements of the `Electronic Commerce Directive'. " The Regulations contain more 
stringent information requirements relating to the identity of a party and his place of 
business. A person providing an ̀ information society service' must make available to the 
recipient of the service and any relevant enforcement authority, in a form and manner 
which is easily, directly and permanently accessible, the following information - 
(a) the name of the service provider 
(b) the geographic address at which the service provider is established; 
(c) the details of the service provider, including his electronic mail address, which 
make it possible to contact him rapidly and communicate with him in a direct and 
effective manner; 
(d) where the service provider is registered in a trade or similar register available 
to the public, details of the register in which the service provider is entered and 
his registration number, or equivalent means of identification in that register; 
(e) where the provision of the service is subject o an authorisation scheme, the 
particulars of the relevant supervisory authority. `' 
Failure to provide this information can result in a `qualified entity"' bringing 
proceedings to obtain a "Stop Now Order", 42 requiring the supplier to cease his 
infringing behaviour and comply with the Regulation. The Regulations promote `good 
practice' and the provision of information about the identity of the service provider 
should give customers some confidence that they are dealing with the party they believe 
they are. 
It is conceded, however, that although technological methods exist to prove 
identity and that legislation requires that certain information about a party's identity be 
provided to a consumer, situations will inevitably arise in the electronic environment 
where a party has been duped into parting with goods by fraud. Where this has occurred 
37 Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 2013. 
38 Regulation 16 however, came into force on 23rd October 2002. 
390pckfn30. 
40 Regulation 6. 
41 See Regulations 2 of the The Stop Now Orders (E. C. Directive) Regulations 2001, Statutory Instrument 
2001 No. 1422. 
42 The Stop Now Orders (E. C. Directive) Regulations 2001, Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 1422, 
amending the Fair Trading Act 1973. 
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the courts will have to deal with the aftermath of the fraudulent behaviour and may have 
to resort to the common law approach to mistaken identity. 
6.3 Mistaken Identity in Contract Law: A Common Law `Gordian 
Knot'? " 
A not unlikely scenario could be as follows: 
An individual sees an mp y on e&y of partüular roteres He c zts tl e seller and nego¢rates 
a price for the ptathzse of thegoods. The contract is cmdu"and d5egoods are deli v tho his 
ham Unknoren to dye buyu; the seller is actzrall a mnfulaue trickster zv has f as dcrlm4 
obtai the goals fizin the ongvzal owier Thee cm)Waice trickster dicappran' and A 
original oztner s proau&p against the ptazhaser for Aconzerun of tbegcods 
The court's decision will depend upon whether the confidence trickster had ̀ title' or 
ownership of the goods to pass on to the innocent buyer. The title would be voidable 
because of the fraud but nevertheless the buyer would have ownership transferred to him 
under the contract. Section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 states: 
"When the seller of goods has a voidable title to them, but his title has not been 
avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, 
provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of the seller's defect of 
title. " 
The original owner of the goods will argue that the confidence trickster did not have title 
to the goods because he made a mistake as to identity and no contract was ever formed. 
Unfortunately the principles applied by the courts to disputes of this nature provide little 
certainty in the traditional environment and as such are unlikely to provide legal certainty 
when their application to the electronic environment is considered. The common law 
approach to mistaken identity will now be considered. 
43 Lord Justice Sedley in Shogcat F! mce Ltd v Hudson [2001] EWCA Civ 100; [2002] Q. B. 834, at 847. 
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6.3.1 The Case Law 
In the courts of England and Wales there is a line of case law associated with 
mistaken identity or `identity fraud' with which the judiciary themselves have expressed 
their concern and unhappiness' Most recently the situation has led the Court of Appeal 
to declare that the law is in such a `sorry state' that statutory intervention is urgently 
required. " 
Atiyah associates the current difficulties with principles developed in the 
nineteenth century and in particular two leading cases from that period "which have 
caused trouble ever since" 46 Cundy v Lindsay47and Kings Norton Metal Co. Ltd v Edri* 
Mernvtt & Co. "' It is perhaps rather the later application, or misapplication, of the 
principles decided in those cases which has resulted in the present state of the law. 
The case law relating to this issue is plagued with fine distinctions. In Shogun 
Finance Ltd v Hudscnt49 Sedley LJ expressed his frustration with the current situation; 
"the illogical and sometimes barely perceptible distinctions made in earlier 
decisions, some of them representing an unarticulated judicial policy on the 
incidence of loss as between innocent parties, continue to represent the law. "" 
His Lordship concludes that only Parliament or the House of Lords can remedy the 
present situation. However, Atiyah explains that; 
"... fine distinctions do not necessarily mean that the distinctions are inherently 
unsound. It is the business of the law to draw distinctions and fine distinctions 
are often a necessary consequence. "" 
Nevertheless, he continues to comment that in the cases associated with this issue the 
distinctions drawn by the courts are ̀ elusive and theoretical' and rather abstract, not 
being based upon real social or commercial distinctions. " 
44 Shogwi Fin aace Ltd v Hudson [2001] EWCA Civ 1000; [2002] 4 All ER 572; [2002] Q. B. 834 at 842, Sedley 
U. 
45 Ibid per Brooke L. J. at 855. 
46 Atryah, P. S, et al The Sale of Gads 10th ed. (Longman: London, 2000) p. 41-42. 
47 (1878) 3 App Cas 459 
48 (1897) 14 TLR 98. The cases are both discussed below. 
49 [2001] EWCA Civ 100, (2001); [2002] Q. B. 834, at 847. 
50 cit fn 44. 
51 Op cit fn 46 at p. 3. 
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6.3.2.1 The Identity/Attributes Distinction 
The key distinction made by the courts is between a mistake as to the identity of 
a contracting party and a mistake as to that party's attributes, in particular his 
creditworthiness. A genuine mistake as to the identity of the other party will allow the 
original seller to succeed but a mistake only as to the attributes of that party, such as his 
creditworthiness, will not. 
In Cwidy v Lindsaj3 the House of Lords felt that when a firm had been duped by 
a rogue called Blenkarn into thinking he was in fact a firm known to the plaintiffs, 
Blenkiron & Co, then the contract between the plaintiff and the rogue had never existed 
and hence the rogue could not obtain title to the goods. This was the equivalent to a 
finding that the alleged contract was void due to the mistake made by the plaintiff. The 
sellers had never intended to accept the offer made by the rogue, but rather an offer 
made by a third party, Blenkiron & Co. In this way no objective agreement had been 
reached and hence no contract. In Kings Norton Metal Co. Ltd v Edridge, Menvtt & Cos` the 
Court of Appeal distinguished Grundy on the grounds that in the case before them there 
was no identifiable third party in existence. All that had been mistaken was the 
creditworthiness of the writer of a letter, the rogue. As indicated above this is a fine 
distinction to draw, so much so that in Lewis v AwizrJ5 Lord Denning MR described it as 
a "distinction without a difference". " The only real distinction to be made is that in 
Kings Norton Metal there was no `other identity' with which to be mistaken. 
6.3.1.2 Face-to-Face Dealings 
The predominance of authority would appear to further indicate that when the 
two parties are in one another's presence, or `face to face' then a claim of mistaken 
identity will be difficult to sustain. In Phillips v Broms Ltd' the plaintiff's claim was based 
on the argument that he had never intended to contract with the rogue (North) in his 
shop, but rather with an existing third party (Sir George Bullough). Here there are 
obvious similarities with Gmulyv Lindsey, the main difference being that the two parties in 
this case were in one another's presence. Horridge j felt that this was significant and that 
where a party is identified by `sight and hearing', the seller contracted with the person he 
52 Atiyah continues to suggest that the unarticulated reasons behind some of the decisions, in particular 
whether a party could be considered `at fault', may have had a significant impact upon the judgments. 
53 (1878) 3 App Cas 459. 
s+ (1897) 14 TLR 98. 
55 [1972] 1 Q. B. 198. 
56 Ibid at 206. Indeed, what is a persons identity but a sum of his attributes? 
57 [191912 KB 243. 
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could ̀see and hear'. The property passed even though fraud or deceit may have induced 
the vendor to sell. " However, in Ingrran v Little" the Court of Appeal (Devlin LJ 
dissenting) felt that the true test was to identify to whom the offer was addressed, for 
only he could accept hat offer. In Ingiwn, when the plaintiffs made their offer to sell the 
car in return for a cheque rather than cash, the promise was made solely to the genuine 
Mr Hutchinson, the owner of the cheque book. This was a fact known to the rogue who 
could therefore not accept he offer and thus, there could be no contract. " The identity 
of the other party had become cnicialfy vnportant to the sellers. 
In a later case Lewis v Aw2%)P the Court of Appeal was faced with a situation 
almost identical to that before the court in Ingraan v Lick However, the court doubted 
and declined to follow the decision in Ingrvnv Little. Lord Denning MR felt that the two 
preceding cases, Phillips v Brooks and Ingram v Little, could not be reconciled and were 
indistinguishable on the facts. He expressed his support for the dissenting judgment of 
Lord Devlin in Ingrvn and concluded that in the case before him, the plaintiff, Mr Lewis, 
made a contract with the person in front of him, the rogue, and therefore that the 
property in the goods had passed to Mr Averay. The rest of the court agreed with his 
decision although their criticism of Ingram v Little was a little less robust. The court made 
it clear that the judgment in Phillips v Brooks was an accurate statement of the law and had 
been so for some fifty years. It is interesting to note that the House of Lords judgment 
in Qo4 v Lidy was briefly referred to in the arguments before the court, but not 
mentioned in the judgment. 62 
This vexed issue was revisited recently by the Court of Appeal in Shogtn Finance Ltd v 
HUdSC . 
b3 Mr Hudson had purchased a vehicle from an individual who turned out to be 
a `rogue'. The rogue had entered into a hire-purchase agreement relating to the vehicle 
through a dealer using a stolen or unlawfully obtained driving licence and had forged the 
signature from the licence on the agreement. He had subsequently sold it to Mr Hudson, 
who had purchased it in good faith. The credit company used by the dealer, Shogun 
Finance, sought to recover the vehicle. They succeeded at first instance and Mr Hudson 
581brd at p 247 referring to Ecbmads u Me v/ar s'Despztch Trarup rtation Co (1883) 135 Mass. 283. 
59 [1961] 1 QB 31. 
60 Ibid at p 49 per Sellers LJ. supporting the views of the judge in the court below. 
61[1972]1QB198 
62 One could be forgiven for inferring that the Court accepted counsel's argument that OuulyvLiywas 
a case of offer and acceptance and not one relevant o the law on ̀ mistake'. However, it is clear that a 
mistake of this nature goes to the very root of agreement i. e. the offer and acceptance. It is the effect of 
the mistaken identity upon the offer and acceptance which renders the contract void. 
63 [2001] EWCA Civ 100, (2001); [2002] Q. B. 834. 
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appealed. The issue before the court was whether the rogue was the "debtor" under the 
"hire purchase agreement" for the purposes of the Hire Purchase Act 1964 s. 27. If he 
was, then by virtue of section 27(2) the appellant Mr Hudson, being a "private purchaser 
... in good 
faith" would obtain title to the vehicle. Key to this question was whether the 
finance company had entered a contract with the `rogue'. 
The appellant argued that the contract with the finance company had been 
entered into via an agent, the garage owner, and was therefore made face-to-face. As is 
discussed above, if this point were accepted by the court then on the basis of the 
previous decisions in Phillips v Brooks and Lewis v Averay, it would be difficult for the 
finance company to succeed in claiming that they had not contracted with the rogue in a 
face to face situation. 
In contrast the respondent finance company argued that the garage owner was 
not their agent and that the transaction was not face to face, but rather at a distance and 
therefore the principle relating to face to face dealings should not apply. The case was of 
the nature decided in the cases of Candy v L»zdsay and Kings Norton Metal and therefore, 
the judgments in those cases should apply. In addition the respondents argued that the 
Court of Appeal decision in Hector v Lyon? decided that the principles applicable to 
`unilateral mistake', where the parties were in the presence of each other (i. e. face-to-face 
dealings inter praesenxs), should not apply to 'written contracts'. " 
It is this latter argument which found favour with the majority in the Court 
(Dyson LJ and Brooke LJ) in Shogun Fmmue Ltd v Hudson. The Court felt bound by the 
decision in Hertorv Lyons and therefore, as the `rogue' did not feature in the hire-purchase 
agreement he was never party to it, and hence not `the debtor' for the purpose of section 
27. Brooke LJ stated that 
"... the hire-purchase agreement, if it was made between anyone, was made 
between the claimants and Durlabh Patel of 45 Mayflower Road, Leicester. The 
claimants did not make this agreement with anyone else. Durlabh Patel is a real 
person who lives at 45 Mayflower Road, Leicester"66 
On this basis he distinguished the present case from Kings Norton Metal. Dyson LJ went 
on to consider the position if the principle in Hector v Lyons did not apply, concluding that 
64 [1988] 58 P. & C. R. 156, The Times, December 19,1988. 
65 Ilia 
66 2002] Q. B. 834 at p 855. 
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there was insufficient evidence to give rise to any relationship of agency between the 
finance company and the car dealer and therefore that the case was akin to Gpuly v 
Lindsay. In this situation His Lordship was satisfied that the identity of the customer, a 
Mr Patel who did exist, was of fundamental importance to the respondents and therefore 
the ̀ contract' between themselves and the rogue was void. " 
Sedley LJ delivered a strong dissenting judgment. He felt that if the decision in 
Hecto-v Lyons was not to conflict with judgments in Qoidyv Lip dsay and Kings Norton Metal 
it had to be read in the context of its own facts, a case concerning an individual who had 
not been named in a written contract, seeking to enforce that contract 68 However, in the 
case before him he felt that Hectorv Lyons was distinguishable on its facts and proceeded 
to consider the law relating to unilateral mistake. His Lordship acknowledged that he was 
bound by precedent, in particular Gerdy v Limey, but continued that he could distinguish 
Oo7dy on the grounds that the car dealer was acting as an agent of the finance company 
albeit in the very limited capacity envisaged by Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Brmuehn'te 
v Wo caster Works Finaw Ltd when he pointed out that a "dealer may for some ad hoc 
purpose be the agent of a finance company". " To this extent although the facts did not 
support the argument that the car dealer was the finance company's agent for the 
purpose of making the hire purchase agreement, he was their agent for certain specific 
purposes connected with that agreement. His Lordship proceeded to explain: 
"One such purpose was to ascertain the identity of the hirer; another was to 
convey by fax the proffered proof of his identity, the driving licence; a third was 
to submit by fax the draft agreement signed by the hirer. These were the very 
elements which, had they been carried out in the claimants' offices, would have 
amounted to face to face dealing with the rogue. "" 
This analysis led him to consider the principles applicable to unilateral mistake in 
face to face dealings and on this basis he concluded. 
67 However, the rationale behind this conclusion is, at the very least, open to criticism. Dyson LJ felt that 
as the identification and location of the hirer was essential for the finance company to be able to serve a 
notice of default under the Consumer Credit Act 1974, the identity of the hirer was to be regan1d as being 
of fundamental importance to the respondent. This should not of itself, be sufficient to support an 
argument that the identity rather than the creditworthiness of the other party was crucial to the respondent. 
Surely this adjudication should be made on the facts of the particular case, as indicated in the earlier 
caselaw. 
68 cit fn 44. 
69 [1969] 1 AC 552, at 573. 
70 Op cit fn 44 at p. 844. 
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"I would hold that the claimant finance company, using the dealer as its agent, 
had in law contracted face to face with a fraudsman in circumstances insufficient 
to rebut the presumption that it was with him, and not with the person he 
claimed to be, that they were contracting. "" 
All members of the court voiced their disquiet with the state of the law applicable to 
cases of this kind commenting that it was `remarkable' that the law governing the 
consequences of a common fraud of this nature was ̀ still in doubt'. ' 
6.3.2 Alternative approaches? 
In light of this criticism it is important to consider the comments of the Law 
Reform Committee in their 12' Report: Trm stir of Title to C1'auels in 1966. " It is also 
necessary to consider whether any of the alternative options discussed in that report 
could form the basis of a way forward for the House of Lords or Parliament. The 
options suggested were, to allow for the apportionment of loss by the courts on the basis 
of culpability, or, the treating of contracts as voidable rather than void in situations of 
mistaken identity, to provide some protection for innocent third parties. 
The suggestion that the courts should be given the power to apportion the loss 
between the two innocent parties has, not surprisingly, received support from the 
judiciary. In Ingrmn v Little, Lord Devlin proffered the apportionment of loss between 
the parties on the basis of culpabilityT. 
"... the loss should be divided between [ the parties ] in such proportion as is just 
in all the circumstances. If it be pure misfortune, the loss should be borne 
equally, if the fault or imprudence of either party has caused or contributed to the 
loss, it should be borne by that party in the whole or in the greater part. "" 
In adopting this solution his Lordship indicated that he was suggesting nothing novel 
and merely satisfying the "true spirit of the common law" by "doing practical justice". "
71 Ibid 
721bidatp836 
73 Law Reform Committee, 12thReport: Tr fer of Tide to Chz&& (Crnnd. 2958,1966). 
74[196111 QB 31,73-74. 
75 Ibid He referred to the Law Reform Acts of 1935,1943 and 1945 as examples of "a modem inclination 
towards a decision based on a just apportionment rather than one given in black or in white according to 
the logic of the law. " At p. 842. 
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There is a distinct practical logic in suggesting that sellers or finance companies 
take reasonable steps to confirm the identity of the buyer in the modern world with the 
technology available. To have the steps actually taken figure in any assessment of where 
the loss should he would prima facie appear to be just. This approach would also have the 
advantage of being a question of fact in each case, an adjudication which is transparent 
based upon a distinction between sound commercial practice and less responsible 
behaviour! ' As Dr Brian Jack states: 
"Ultimately the question of the blameworthiness of each party, in allowing 
themselves to be drawn into a contract with the rogue, will be a question of fact 
in each case. It would therefore appear more satisfactory for courts to be given 
statutory powers to assess the facts and to apportion loss between the parties in 
accordance with their culpability in causing the loss. "" 
At the very least it is inequitable to allow a party to succeed in avoiding a contract on the 
basis of mistaken identity if that party has not taken what would appear to be reasonable 
steps in the circumstances to confirm the other party's identity. 
However, in 1966 the Law Reform Committee rejected the idea of equitably 
distributing the loss because "judicial power to apportion loss in this way would 
introduce too much uncertainty into the law. "78 Even without considering the present 
level of uncertainty in the law it is submitted that any uncertainty created by the power to 
apportion loss would at least be transparent, being based upon questions of fact and 
would certainly be more palatable than the present position with its inherent potential for 
injustice. 
After their dismissal of the idea of empowering the judiciary to apportion loss the 
Law Reform Committee concluded that the best way forward would be to treat cases of 
mistaken identity as addable so far as third parties are concerned, rather than void" In 
this way title could pass to the third party at a point prior to the original owner taking 
steps to avoid the contract. However, it has been commented that his approach would 
76 It could be suggested that this is why the finance company in Hudson accepted afaxed copy of a driving 
licence and a signature on a credit agreement to confirm that Mr Patel was indeed entering the agreement. 
As a method of confirming identity these steps are of minimal reliability, but as the finance company felt 
assured that they could recover the vehicle in the event of fraud that this approach was adequate. With 
identity fraud on the increase this approach must be considered as socially irresponsible. 
n Jack, B. "Mistaken identity in contract law: a re-examination. ' [2001] Not. L 10(2), 57-63 at p 63. 
78 Op citfn 73, at para9. 
79 Ibid at para 15. 
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nevertheless be rather arbitrary, because the position of the innocent third party would 
depend upon the speed at which the original seller took steps to avoid the contract. " 
This may well be one of the factors why the report was not acted upon. 
6.3.3 Mistaken Identity and Electronic Contracts 
Regardless of criticisms and suggested alternative approaches, if courts are faced 
with disputes of the nature identified in the scenario above, the principles discussed will 
bind until the House of Lords or Parliament decide otherwise. 
Electronic contracts are generally concluded at a distance and without the parties 
to the contract being simultaneously present. It follows that in the majority of situations 
a contracting party is not identified by `sight and hearing' but by the information he 
provides in his message or in an online form. This analysis highlights two points relevant 
to a claim of mistaken identity. First, that the contracts are not usually concluded face to 
face and second that the contracts are usually reduced to writing. " In light of the case 
law discussed above both of these factors would indicate that the principle applied in 
Csmdy v Lindsey to non-face-to-face situations would apply. Therefore, if a party could 
show that he was duped into thinking that he was contracting with a third party, who 
existed at the time, he could succeed in a claim to recover the goods he parted with. This 
approach could have significant implications for those entering electronic contracts 
because, for the purchaser, there is a risk that an unknown third party (the original seller) 
could make a successful claim against goods purchased in good faith for value. At 
present the law places a significant burden on the buyer to ensure that the person selling 
the goods is the bona fide owner of the goods and can pass title to him. 82 
With the scale of identity fraud at present his situation is cause for concern and 
on a wider perspective it does little to persuade vendors to take steps, in identifying the 
buyer, that would contribute to reducing fraud and the associated losses. Statistics show 
that the fear of fraud is one of the factors cited as deterring the use of electronic 
commerce. Any policy intended to promote legal certainty and confidence in electronic 
contracting must surely take this problematic doctrine into account. 
80 Atiyah, P. S, et al 71x Sale of Goals 10th ed. (Longman: London, 2000) p. 44; Op cit fn 77, Jack at 62. 
81 Or at least an electronic form of writing. See chapter 7 for a discussion of electronic communications 
and writing'. 
82 However, the significance of the issue may be reduced in the electronic environment where 'intangible' 
products - which are probably not capable of being classified as goods, are an increasingly common 
subject matter for electronic contracts. See chapter 3 above and 13 below for a discussion of this issue. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
In situations where formal identification is a contractual requirement, in the 
physical world the combination of particular documentation and a physical presence of a 
party can provide a high level of reliability in identification. In the electronic 
environment technology has provided electronic signatures and related certificates and in 
the future may provide accessible biometric identification to fulfil this role. These 
methods can be considered functionally equivalent to their real world counterparts. 
Unfortunately, having to take such steps to identify the other party with a degree of 
certainty does require additional steps in the contracting process, making it more 
cumbersome, time consuming and therefore expensive for the supplier and the customer. 
In the electronic environment, distance, anonymity, automation and a lack of face 
to face contact create the potential for increased fraudulent activity. Steps have been 
taken to protect consumers and most credit card companies emphasise that they ̀protect' 
their customers against online fraud. By virtue of regulation 21 of the Distance Selling 
Regulations card issuers must, where a consumer's payment card83 is used fraudulently in 
connection with a distance contract, allow the consumer to cancel the payment and 
where the payment has already been made, provide a re-credit or refund all sums paid. 
The card issuer will no doubt pass on any potential losses to the supplier and it is 
submitted that this may promote an increased desire to confirm identification in 
electronic contracts. 
It is clear that two issues need to be addressed. the fraudulent activity and the 
fear of fraud expressed by consumers and businesses alike. To an extent the fraudulent 
activity can be addressed by the use of technology and the promotion of good practice 
by suppliers. The majority of `responsible' suppliers have taken steps to `get to know' 
their customers, particularly first time customers, by confirming details and checking 
delivery address details with payment card issuers details. " To address the fears 
associated with fraud and the electronic environment it is important to provide 
information about the technology available. It is equally important for contracting 
parties to provide information about themselves to promote the development of trust 
and confidence. 
For vendors and service providers the primary concern is the obtaining of 
sufficient information to obtain payment. While this approach is not morally 
83 Which includes debit, credit or store cards. 
84 See Thorntons< http: //www. thomtons. co. uk/>, Interflora< http: //www. interflora. co. uk/> and 
Amazon <http: //www. amazon. co. uk> sites. 
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reprehensible (it does of course reduce costs because it is quick and convenient), cases 
like Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson do indicate that there is a serious question to be 
addressed in relation to which party should bear the responsibility for losses due to 
identity fraud. 
Where the identification of a party or authentication of particular information is 
considered important, or the contract is of particular significance, the law has previously 
imposed `formal requirements' or `requirements of form' to be fulfilled before the 
contract or communication to be valid. In the next chapter, those ̀ requirements of form' 
will be considered. The discussion will also consider whether the role of formal 
requirements may be of increasing importance in the electronic environment. 
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7 
Formal Requirements 
In the previous chapter the increased significance of identification in contractual 
relationships created in the electronic environment was highlighted and the practical and 
technological solutions to the issue were considered. The importance of detailed 
information about the identity of the contracting parties, particularly in contracts 
between businesses and consumers, was illustrated by reference to legislative 
developments applicable to electronic contracts. The unsatisfactory state of the law in 
relation to identity fraud was demonstrated by an examination of the common law 
approach to mistaken identity in contracts. 
In this chapter formal requirements in the contractual process and their 
implications for electronic contracting will be considered. The issue has led to academic 
comment' and even a report containing advice for government from the Law 
Commission, entitled "Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial 
Transactions"! Existing formal requirements, found in numerous legislative provisions 
and those applicable to certain ̀ types' of contract, have been considered as potential legal 
barriers to the use of electronic contracts. Their removal is seen as a key requirement in 
order to facilitate the use of electronic contracts and to promote the development of 
electronic commerce. The issues surrounding formal requirements and their perception 
as `barriers to electronic commerce' will be examined with the relevant legislative 
provisions introduced to address the issue. 
The discussion of `traditional' formal requirements is followed by a consideration 
of formal requirements transferred to, or created expressly for, the electronic 
environment. Certain formal requirements are justifiable due to strong policy 
considerations and functionally equivalent requirements may be necessary for contracts 
entered into in the electronic environment. There may equally be justification for the 
introduction of formal requirements specifically intended for application to electronic 
I See for example; Davies, LJ, A Model for Internet Regulation, 1998, available at http: //wwwscl. ore. 
2 Law Commission, "Electronic Commerce: Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions" 3,, 1 
December 2001, available at http: //www. lawcom gov uk 
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contracts because of the nature of the electronic environment. The problems associated 
with identification, discussed in the previous chapter, may be seen as one such 
justification. 
The inappropriate introduction of new formal requirements applicable to 
electronic contracts is also considered. The regulation of electronic contracts may in 
some situations inadvertently create new electronic requirements of form, where no 
formal requirement exists for their non-electronic counterparts. As a consequence 
requirements imposed upon electronic contracts may be seen as more extensive, creating 
further barriers to their use. These ̀e-formalities' and their potential effects on electronic 
contracting are examined. 
7.1 The Role of Formal Requirements 
As a general rule, in English law, contracts do not have to be in writing, signed, 
or follow a particular form to be effective. However, with certain contracts relating to 
particular subject matter the law, for a variety of reasons, prescribes certain requirements 
of form such as writing, signature, original documentation and so on. For example, 
section 2(1) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 provides that 
contracts for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land can only be made in 
writing. 
Fuller' suggests a number of reasons for the certain formal requirements in 
relation to contractual obligations: 
1. to promote certainty by requiring clear evidence of the terms; 
2. to encourage the parties to give full consideration to the legal obligations 
being undertaken; and 
3. to provide protection to the person in the weaker bargaining position! 
In addition to providing certainty, encouraging consideration and providing protection 
for weaker parties, requirements of form appear in what could be considered ̀gateways' 
to certain legal rights or protection. For example section 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms 




Act 1977 provides that a party will be afforded a level of protection against exemption 
clauses if he ̀ deals as consumer' or on the other party's ̀w iam standard terms'. ' 
7.2 Electronic Communications and Formal Requirements: The 
problem 
Existing formal requirements, such as writing and signature, pose prbna facie 
difficulties when using electronic forms of communication with their ephemeral nature 
and predominantly intangible form. Many of the accepted definitions of formal 
requirements infer a physical, permanent or visible form. ' If electronic communications 
cannot satisfy formal requirements there exists a potential restriction on the ability of 
electronic commerce to fulfil its economic potential because certain transactions will be 
excluded from the environment. International bodies, ' the European Union and the 
United Kingdom government have all recognised the potentially detrimental effect 
formal requirements may have on the growth of electronic ommerce. 
During the introduction of the Electronic Commerce Directive the European 
Commission stated that 
"Electronic commerce will not fully develop if concluding on-line contracts is 
hampered by certain form and other requirements which are not adapted to the 
on-line environment. "8 
To this end the approaches adopted to regulating electronic commerce have a common 
goal of removing formal requirements which may act as `barriers' to electronic 
contracting. However, before legislative attempts to address the perceived problem are 
considered it is prudent to examine whether, by their own virtues, electronic forms of 
5 Emphasis added. For a more detailed analysis of this particular problem see, Macdonald, E& Poyton, D. 
"A particular problem for e-commerce: Section 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977" (2000) 3 Web 
JCLI available at http: //webjcli. ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue3/macdonlad3. htn1. 
6 See the discussion of' writing' below at 7.2. 
7 See the Guide to Enactment of the UNC1TRAL Model Law on electronic Commerce (1996) at pars 46 et 
s_ General Assembly Resolution 51/162 of 16 December 1996, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce. Available at, http: //www. uncitral. o g/english/texts/electcomi ml-ecomm. htm. 
UNCITRAL 
e "Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic 
commerce in the internal market' COM(1998) 586 final. OJ C 030 (05/02/1999) at p. 4. This sentiment 
was echoed by the British government in the DTI `Consultation Document on Implementation of the E. 
Commerce Directive' at p 15.10' August 2001. Available at 
http: //www dti. gov. uk/cii/ecommerce/europeanpolicy/arch condoc shtml. 
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communication are capable of actually satisfying the most problematic and common 
requirements of form - writing and signature. 
There are two pertinent issues to consider at this point: 
- whether electronic communications can satisfy the formal requirements; and, 
- if they can, whether that proposition can be stated with sufficient certainty to 
promote confidence in the use of electronic contracts where formal requirements 
exist. 
7.2.1 Will electronic communications satisfy existing requirements of form? 
7.2.1.1 The Literal and Purposive Approaches. 
The analysis of a requirement of form may be approached by the courts in two 
ways. The first is a straightforward literal approach, requiring an examination of whether 
an electronic form will satisfy the existing definition of a requirement. If electronic 
forms can fall within existing definitions, such as ̀ signature', 'writing' or a `document', 
then there is no problem. However, even if the `new' forms of communication can be 
accommodated by the existing definitions, the failure to take the opportunity to evolve 
the definition may be questioned. ' 
The second approach would require a more imaginative and purposive 
interpretation to be adopted by the courts. This approach would take into consideration 
the function and purpose behind the requirement of form and examine whether the 
electronic form of communication can fulfil that function. If it can, then arguably it 
should be treated as equivalent to the more traditional forms and accommodated within 
the existing definition as ̀ recognition of technological change. " This was the approach 
adopted by Mann LJ, in Lock .d 
Arabia v. Ozwi. In his consideration of whether a 
photocopy could be classed as ̀ writing' for the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Act 
1865, citing Benn, Stanrtory 1nterpretatian", his Lordship reiterated the opinion that 
"an ongoing Statute ought to be read so as to accommodate technological 
change. "" 
9 The argument being that at mr pmt technology is likely to out-grow a dated definition and it is better, 
for commercial certainty, to be proactive rather than reactive. 
lo However, it must be remembered that this approach can only be adopted where there is sufficient scope 
in the definition in question. 
1I Bennion, F. A. R Statuto y Interpnwt n. A Dade 2" ed (Butterworth: London, 1992) at p. 627. 
12 Lock awd Arabia u Ckwz [1993] Q. B. 806 at p 814. 
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A further illustration of this approach can be found in Victor Uh ler Intematiaial v. 
Cärntssianers of HM Gastamis & Excise. " In the Court of Appeal Sir Richard Scott VC 
stated that 
".. it is now a well known rule of statutory construction that an "ongoing" 
statutory provision should be treated as "always speaking". "" 
By applying this purposive approach His Lordship concluded that the distribution of a 
teletext page could be considered to be the distribution of a ̀ document' for the purposes 
of the Betting and Gaming Act 1981 because the activity clearly fell within the range of 
activities Parliament intended to address in the section. 
When considering whether an electronic form of communication satisfies a 
requirement of form in an existing statute this approach may be adopted to deduce 
whether the form in question fulfils the purpose for which the original requirement was 
introduced. This `purposive' approach requires the courts to discover Parliaments 
intention in introducing the measure and to implement that intention: 
"It must be very clear that the new situation falls within the Parliamentary 
intention. "" 
This accommodating approach will be restricted if it would require the distorting 
of a meaning to an absurd level or if the purposes of the provision would be undermined 
by the accommodation of this technological change. However, if an electronic 
communication fulfils the intended purpose of the statutory requirement there appears 
little reason why it should not be treated as equivalent to their traditional counterparts 
and accommodated within existing and "ongoing" statutes. 
Nevertheless there remains a difficulty with this approach where a requirement of 
form serves a number of functions. The courts may have to consider whether the 
electronic communication must satisfy all or just song of the functions in question. This 
may require an investigation beyond that with which the courts may feel comfortable. 
The greatest limitation on this approach, however, is the situation where the court feels 
that it cannot adequately discern the intention of Parliament from the material available 
13 [2000] 2 All E. R. 315. 
14 At para 27, also citing Bennion op cit fn 11. 
5 Op czt fn 13 at para. 32. 
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and as a consequence is unable to extend the boundaries of the definition of a particular 
requirement to accommodate lectronic form. 
It is necessary at this point to analyse these two approaches in the context of the 
two most commonly occurring formal requirements - `writing' and `signature'. It must 
be noted before this analysis is undertaken that in the opinion of the Law Commission 
"statutory requirements for writing' and a `signature' are generally capable of 
being satisfied bye-mails and by website trading (but not by EDI). "16 
However, the Commission conceded that there was a lack of consensus on these issues. 
It is respectfully submitted that any ̀ generalisation' of these issues in relation to the 
rapidly changing electronic environment is inherently dangerous and unlikely to promote 
the legal certainty required to increase and maintain confidence in electronic contracting. 
7.2.2 ̀ Wtitin ' 
7.2.2.1 The Literal Approach 
In a normal sense the words writing' or written' connote a visible mark on some 
physical medium. However, even the New Oxford Dictionary of English recognises that 
writing may differ in the computing context and defines it as "to enter (data) into a 
specified storage medium or location in store. "" Electronic communications can take a 
variety of forms. When printed out a data message is indistinguishable from other forms 
of writing and when displayed on screen it is clearly visible as writing. However, in other 
forms data messages or electronic communications have no visible or real physical 
form: " for example when a message is transmitted digitally from a mobile phone or 
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), sent via copper telephone lines or optical fibre, or 
stored on a medium such as a hard disk drive, CD ROM or other form of digital storage. 
In this form the messages assume their intangible, ephemeral and invisible form. In 
electronic communications such as EDI the communications rarely, if ever, assume their 
tangible or visible form. It must be considered which if any of these forms of electronic 
communications will satisfy a requirement of 'writing. 
16 Opci fn2atp. 40. 
17 New Oxford Dictionary of English 1998. 
1e It is accepted that there is a physical form, as in a change to the carrier or storage medium - but not a 
physical form recognisable as writing. 
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If legislation requires that a particular type of contract or contractual 
communication be 'written', then the courts will have a number of aids to the 
interpretation of that requirement. The first may be an autonomous definition in the 
particular Act. For example, in the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988, the 
requirement of 'writing' is satisfied by, 
"any form of notation or code, whether by hand or otherwise and regardless of 
the method by which, or medium in or on which it is recorded. "" 
The definition is couched in very general terms, clearly capable of encompassing 
`electronic writing'. An undoubtedly `medium neutral' definition is adopted which does 
not discriminate against forms of electronic writing or a data messaging. 
However, if, as occurs in the majority of situations, there is no autonomous 
definition in the Act in question, then the courts may turn to the definition found in the 
Interpretation Act 1978. This Act provides default definitions for use in statutory 
interpretation for certain words and phrases, which will apply unless the precise wording 
or context of the section indicates to the contrary! ' Schedule 1 of the Act defines 
`writing' as including 
"... typing, printing, lithography, photography and other modes of representing 
or reproducing words in visible form and expressions referring to writing are 
construed accordingly. " 
The definition and the forms expressly included in the definition demonstrate the need 
for the representation or reproduction of words `in visible form'. As is indicated above, 
with electronic forms of communication this will depend upon the `phase' of the 
communication in question. If it is in its normal storage or transmission phase then, 
unless put under an electron microscope, there is nothing visible to the human eye and 
hence no `visible' representation of 'words'. " In this state the communication would 
appear not to satisfy the Interpretation Act requirement, being 
19 Section 178. 
20 Section 5. 
21 Even what is visible when viewed under an electron microscope can not really be classed as 'words'. 
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"on/off states of switches in a processing chip or as magnetic or optical 
variations on the surface of some recording medium. "" 
However, when an electronic message is received and displayed in some way, it 
clearly becomes a representation of words in visible form and correspondingly should 
satisfy the definition. EDI communications, which invariably do not move out of their 
transmission or storage phase, would appear not to satisfy the requirement 23 
"Because the parties are not able to view the EDI message, the Interpretation 
Act requirement of visibility will not be satisfied and such a message will not, in 
our view, be capable of satisfying a statutory writing requirement. "" 
However, it is submitted that examining the medium to this extreme is perhaps not 
necessary, and some support can be found by drawing an analogy with another medium 
explicitly mentioned in the Interpretation Act. 
For all practical purposes the contents of an electronic communication or data 
message are only active when they are viewed on screen or printed out, and again for all 
practical purposes it is impossible to prove their existence until they are ZS Here, an 
analogy can be drawn with photography and photographic film, the former being 
specifically mentioned in the statute! ' When a picture is taken it is stored on the film, 
whatever the subject matter of the picture; be it a portrait, a landscape or a picture of a 
written document, it is nothing more than a variation in the composition of a variety of 
chemicals. This image will be ̀ stored'Z' until the film is developed and a print, negative 
or slide is produced. There is no way of viewing any recognisable representation of the 
image or the writing in a photographed document whilst the film is in its primary form. 
In a similar way by looking at the surface of a floppy disc or other form of storage, even 
with the aid of an electron microscope, you cannot discern anything more than the 
magnetic or optical variations on its surface. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the 
Interpretation Act the developed photograph of the document can constitute 'writing'. 
u Reed, C. Digital In nit i Lac¢r ELxvvnicDxwno z v7d theR&Fdnnnazts of Fonn. (London : Centre for 
Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College, 1996). 
23 In some circumstances the communications can be displayed by one of the parties if required, which 
would then appear to satisfy the requirement. 
24 Op cit fn 2 at p. II para. 3.20. 
25 Except via an electron microscope. 
26 Macdonald, E& Poyton, D. "A particular problem for e-commerce: Section 3 of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977" (2000) 3 WebJCLI available at http: //webjcli. ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue3/macdonlad3. htmi. 
27 Barring deterioration over long period of time or poor storage. 
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By analogy there is no reason why digital information or electronic communications, 
displayed on screen or printed out should not be classed as 'writing' for the purpose of 
the Act. 
However, transactions which take place directly between computers, such as EDI 
and electronic agents, are rarely reduced to a visible form or anything resembling a visible 
representation of words. Such communications would probably not, even with a broad 
interpretation, fall within the definition. 
7.2.2.2 The purposive approach - the `function' of writing 
Reed suggests that requirements for writing are imposed because they are a 
"historical hangover from the Statute of Frauds" or "the transactions are somehow more 
`formal' or `serious' than other contracts, and require writing to emphasise their unusual 
nature. "" In the UNC1 RAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce the functions served 
by the formal requirement of writing are stated as including providing tangible evidence 
of the party's agreement; to make the parties aware of the obligations they were 
undertaking; to provide an unaltered and permanent record of the agreement for 
subsequent reference; and to allow for the easy reproduction of the data. When 
considering the purposive interpretation of a requirement of writing in a statute the 
courts will consider which of these functions the requirement was intended to fulfil and 
assess whether the electronic form of communication will equally fulfil that function. 
This is referred to in a legislative sense in the Model Law as a `functionally equivalent' 
approach! ' Section 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 provides a useful 
illustration. The protection provided by section 3 will only apply if a party to the 
contract ̀ deals as consumer' or on the other party's 'written standard terms'. The Act is 
discussed in detail in chapter 11 but for the purpose of this discussion it can be 
summarised that the legislative intention behind this requirement was to protect weaker 
parties to a contract against ̀standard form' agreements, over the content of which they 
have no control. The 'written' part of the requirement is there to indicate that the terms 
of the agreement are pre-formulated. On a purposive construction a set of pre- 
formulated terms recorded or transmitted electronically would clearly be within the 
`mischief' targeted by Parliament's introduction of the section. 
28 Reed, C. Digitallnfarnnathi Laie El clbaonýz acrd theR Hams of Form. (London : Centre for 
Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College, 1996) at p. 88. 
29 Op cit fn 7, at para. 15etsec 
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However, even if this analysis is correct, the problem remains that it is, at 
present, purely speculative and there is at least a level of uncertainty as to how the courts 
will approach the question. The uncertainty created, even if wrongly perceived, is 
capable of acting as a deterrent to commercial parties looking to enter electronic 
contracts, hindering the development of electronic ommerce" 
7.2.3 `Signature' 
Where a statute requires a `signature' or that a document be `signed' the courts 
have only occasional and limited guidance what is required and very little guidance as to a 
definition of 'signature. ̀ Hence, a body of case law has developed and in England and 
Wales which has given the formal requirement of a ̀ signature' a generous interpretation, 
accepting everything from a cross on a page to a rubber stamp or facsimile of the 
signature. " Signatures also retain great significance as indicators of a party's 
commitment to an agreement. " 
In the electronic environment a signature can also take a variety of forms. At the 
most basic a typed name or initials at the bottom of a message and at the other end of 
the scale cryptographic and biometric techniques can provide a technologically advanced 
method of `signing' a document. As Reed indicates, " at common law the ̀ benchmark' 
has been the `manuscript signature' with a variety of other forms of signature being 
considered by analogy to it: 
"Variations on this theme have been considered by the English courts from time 
to time, ranging from simple modifications such as crosses35 or initials36, through 
pseudonyms" and identifying phrases38, to printed names39 and rubber stamps. 4° 
30 See, Smith, G. J. H. Internet Lawmd REgulatiat (Sweet and Maxwell; - London)at p. 471. 
31 For example, there is no definition of 'signature' in the Interpretation Act. See Reed op cz1 fn 28 at p. 
262. 
32 See Beraaettu Bnor tt (1867) LR. 3 C. P. 28 and J krnsu Gaisýforrland 7hth (1863) 3 
Sw. & T. 93. 
31 See chapter 9 below, and the discussion of incorporation. 
34 Reed C, 'What is a Signature?, 2000 (3) 7be jWnd oflnfonnazioo, Iawand Ta a(ogq (/IL 7). 
hnp: //elj. warwickac. uk/jilt/00-3/reed. ht nl/ at p 2. 
35 Bakeru D=ig (1838) 8 A&E 94. 
36 Hrll u Hi/i [1947] Ch 231. 
37 Paid* in re (1850) 14 Jur 1052,2 Rob. Ecc. 339. 
38 Cook, In the Estate of (D ). Munson u Cook mnd Anot er [1960] 1 All ER 689 (holograph will signed 
'your loving mother). 
39 Br. & Dix (1891) 7 TLR 215; Frmzru D itmn, [1891] 2 Q. B. 208. Typewriting has also been 
considered in Ne t. t Se'2did (Groat Britain), Ltd [1954] 1 QB 45. 
"o Lazanss Estates, Ltd u Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702; London Coaoory Caaviu V thn»z; Ltd, London Qwzty 
Cwxil u Agriadtwal FaalThrx s, Ltd [1955] 2 QB 218. 
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In all these cases the courts have been able to resolve the question whether a 
valid signature was made by drawing an analogy with a manuscript signature. " 
However, as Reed explains the developments in communication technologies may mean 
that "analogies with manuscript signatures may no longer be appropriate or even 
possible. "" 
It can be seen that the courts have tended to adopt a flexible and purposive 
approach in the past and such an approach would continue to fit well with the 
philosophy behind regulating electronic commerce. This `functional' approach has been 
recognised by the Law Commission in their advice on formal requirements in e- 
commerce transactions: 
"The common characteristic of the cases is that the courts looked to whether the 
method of signature used fulfilled the function of a signature [... ] rather than 
whether the form of signature used was one which was commonly recognised. "" 
The functions of a signature are various but the generally accepted functions include 
authenticating a message; ensuring the integrity of a message; and demonstrating intent 
to participate or accede to the contents of a message 43 The approach adopted by the 
court would depend upon the purpose of the requirement in a specific statute but with 
the generous approach adopted by the courts it would appear that electronic signatures, 
whatever their form, would probably be capable of satisfying formal `signature' 
requirements. This conclusion is supported by the Law Commission: 
"Digital signatures, scanned manuscript signatures, typing one's name (or initials) 
and clicking on a website button are all methods of signature which are capable 
of satisfying a signature requirement. " 
However, the problem remains that this proposition has not been tested in the 
courts and the reliance on analogy or previous approaches adopted may not be sufficient 
to promote confidence in their use and the legal certainty required. For this reason, the 
41 
42 Op cit fn 2, at p. 13, para. 3.26. 
43 See, Angel, J. "Why use Digital Signatures for Electronic Commerce? "[1999](2) 71x jmn l of In) nnat i, 
Law and Tethth yc71L7). http: //elj. war%ick. ac. uk/jilt/99-2/angel. html. 
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need to regulate to clarify the position of electronic communications in relation to 
requirements of form has been a predominant issue in the regulation of electronic 
commerce. 
7.3 Regulatory Solutions to the Potential Barriers Created by Formal 
Requirements 
Whether or not the existing legal definitions could encompass electronic 
communications, governments and supranational bodies have recognised that the 
uncertainty created has the potential to undermine commercial confidence. The general 
consensus in recommendations and legislation appears to be that formal requirements 
which may discriminate against electronic forms of communication and contracting 
should be removed unless doing so would undermine the purpose of the requirement. 
The approaches of the United Nations, the European Union and the United Kingdom 
will now be considered. 
7.3.1 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
`Model Law on Electronic Commerce" 
The UNCTIRAL Model Law was one of the earliest examinations of the needs 
of the developing commercial activity known as ̀electronic commerce'. The Model Law 
was developed to 
".. assist all States significantly in enhancing their legislation governing the use of 
alternatives to paper-based methods of communication and storage of 
information and in formulating such legislation where none currently exists. "" 
The Model Law has been the template upon which many pieces of national electronic 
commerce related legislation have been developed46 and the European Commission has 
referred to the work of UNCTIRAL and the Model Law in a number of its framework 
Directives. " 
44 Opthfn7. 
45 General Assembly 85th plenary meeting 16 December 1996. 
46 For example see the background material to Australia's Electronic Transactions Bill 1999, available at, 
http: //wwwlaw. gov. au/publications/ecommerce/etaem. htmL 
47 See, the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: "A European Initiative in Electronic Commerce" (COM(97) 157 final) 
Brussels, 29 October 1997; and the Common position adopted by the Council with a view to the 
141 
FOmIa1 Reqtdhynoz 
The approach adopted in the Model Law to formal requirements is one of 
`functional equivalence' which is described as 
"based on an analysis of the purposes and functions of the traditional paper- 
based requirement with a view to determining how those purposes or functions 
could be fulfilled through electronic-commerce techniques. "48 
The approach is applied whether the formal requirements amount to an "obligation to 
comply" with the requirement or simply the provision of "consequences in the absence 
of a particular formal requirement" 49 The objective of this approach is to 
"enable such data messages to enjoy the same level of legal recognition as 
corresponding paper documents performing the same function. "" 
The Model Law gives legal recognition to electronic communications (data messages)" 
and decrees that they will meet formal requirements of `writing' providing they are 
accessible and available for subsequent reference 52 With signatures the `functional 
equivalence' approach takes into account the reliability and appropriateness of the 
method adopted in the circumstances. " 
The functional equivalence approach suggested in the Model Law provides for a 
non-discriminatory approach to electronic forms of communication where they can fulfil 
the function of their paper-based counterparts. 
adoption of Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain legal aspects of 
Information Society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ("Directive on 
electronic commerce")98/0325 (COD) 14263/99. 
48 Op cit fn 7 at para. 15. 
49 Ibid 
° bid at para 18. 
51 Article 5 Legal recognition of data messages 
Information shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it 
is in the form of a data message. 
52 Article 6(1) Writing 
Where the law requires information to be in writing, that requirement is met by a data message if 
the information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference. 
53 Article 7 Signature 
(1) Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation to a data 
message if: 
(a) a method is used to identify that person and to indicate that person's approval of the 
information contained in the data message; and 
(b) that method is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for which the data 
message was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including 
any relevant agreement. 
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7.3.2 The European Union 
7.3.2.1 The General Approach 
The European Community recognised the need to remove formal requirements 
which could create barriers to electronic contracting or uncertainty as to the validity of 
electronic contracts in the early preparatory work to producing a legal framework' for 
electronic commerce: 
"For electronic commerce to develop its full potential, it must be possible for 
contracts to be concluded on-line unrestricted by inappropriate rules (such as a 
requirement that contracts be drawn up on paper). ̀ 
However, the Commission was also concerned that disparate approaches being adopted 
in the Member States may in themselves create problems for those wishing to enter 
cross-border electronic contracts within the internal market: 
"Moves in certain Member States to enact new legislation are apparent and there 
are already differences in approach which entail a real risk in the short term of 
fragmenting the internal market. "" 
Consequently a measure was included in the Electronic Commerce Directive to address 
formal requirements and create a harmonised approach throughout the European 
Union. " The provision is found in Article 9 of the Electronic Commerce Directive and 
it requires Member States to ensure that 
"... their legal system allows contracts to be concluded by electronic means. 
Member States shall in particular ensure that the legal requirements to the 
contractual process neither create obstacles for the use of electronic contracts 
nor result in such contracts being deprived of legal effectiveness and validity on 
account of having been made by electronic means. "57 
s4 'See press release; "Commission adopts draft Regulation on jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement 
of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters', Brussels, 14 July 1999, IP/99/5 10, at p. 2. 
55 "Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic 
commerce in the internal market' COM(1998) 586 final. OJ C 030 (05/02/1999) at p. 8. 
56 Ibrd 
57 Article 9. 
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Two distinct approaches to the implementation of this provision and the removal of legal 
barriers to electronic commerce and electronic contracting can be identified. 
The first would be to adopt a ̀ medium neutral' approach declaring that electronic 
communications will satisfy formal requirements such as writing unless legislation 
expressly provides otherwise. " The second approach would be to amend the legislation 
containing formal requirements, which may act as barriers to the use of electronic 
communications, on a piecemeal basis. While the former provides for the rapid adoption 
of electronic communications, the latter, slower approach allows for the analysis of the 
purpose and function behind a requirement to ensure that the electronic form is 
`functionally equivalent' to its `real world' counterpart. The language included in the 
Article is wide enough to encompass either approach which, arguably, has weakened its 
harmonising effect. From the material published in the development of the Directive it 
can be suggested that the desired approach was the more rapid of the two requiring a 
medium neutral approach with exceptions for certain specific types of contacts' 
"... the Member States have an obligation to succeed, carry out a systematic 
review of those rules which might prevent, limit or deter the use of electronic 
contracts and to carry out this review in a qualitative way, i. e. not seek simply to 
amend the key words in the rules (e. g. "paper") but to identify everything which 
might in practice prevent the "effective" use of electronic contracts. "" 
7.3.2.2 The EU Approach to `Signatures' 
An electronic communication can be `signed' in a number of ways including the 
simple typing of a name or initials at the bottom of an e-mail or the use of encryption 
technology to create an ̀ electronic signature'. The European Commission recognised the 
potential importance of electronic signatures to electronic commerce at an early stage: 
"In order to make good use of the commercial opportunities offered by 
electronic communication via open networks, a secure and trustworthy 
58 This approach was first adopted in Singapore in the The Electronic Transactions Act 1998. 
59 See Recital 34 
`Each Member State is to amend its legislation containing requirements, and in particular 
requirements as to form, which are likely to curb the use of contracts by electronic means; the 
examination of the legislation requiring such adjustment should be systematic and should cover 
all the necessary stages and acts of the contractual process, including the filing of the contract; the 
result of this amendment should be to make contracts concluded electronically workable; ' 
60 Op cif fn 55 at p. 25. 
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environment is therefore necessary. Cryptographic technologies are nowadays 
widely recognised as the essential tool for security and trust in electronic 
communication. Two important applications of cryptography are digital 
signatures and encryption. "" 
The Electronic Signatures Directive62 was introduced in 1999 and one of its objectives 
was to give electronic signatures legal validity. 
"In order to contribute to the general acceptance of electronic authentication 
methods it has to be ensured that electronic signatures can be used as evidence in 
legal proceedings in all Member States"" 
The Directive envisages a distinction being made between the various forms which an 
electronic signature may take. The most secure and reliable forms of electronic signature 
are classed as ̀ advanced electronic signatures'. An `advanced electronic signature' is one 
which: 
(a) is uniquely linked to the signatox ; 
(b) is capable of identifying the signatory; 
(c) is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control; 
and 
(d) is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent 
change of the data is detectable; "
When an electronic signature satisfies these requirements and is based on a `qualified 
certificate' and created by a `secure-signature-creation device', it is afforded equivalent 
status to a traditional signature: 
61 European Commission document "Towards A European Framework for Digital Signatures and 
Encryption" COM (97) 503 final (8.10.1997). 
62 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a 
Community framework for electronic signatures OJ L 13/12 (19/01/2000). 
63 Recital 21. 
64 Article 2(2). 
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"Member States shall ensure that advanced electronic signatures which are based 
on a qualified certificate and which are created by a secure-signature-creation 
device: 
(a) satisfy the legal requirements of a signature in relation to data in 
electronic form in the same manner as a handwritten signature satisfies 
those requirements in relation to paper-based data; and 
(b) are admissible as evidence in legal proceedings. "65 
In this way the most reliable and secure forms of electronic signature would 
automatically fulfil any formal legal requirement of signature. 
The Directive also provides that other electronic signatures, whatever form they 
may take, shall not be denied legal effectiveness or admissibility as evidence solely on the 
grounds that they are in electronic form or do not fulfil the criteria for advanced 
electronic signatures. 
If implemented correctly the Directive removes legal uncertainty as to whether 
advanced electronic signatures can fulfil formal legal requirements. 
7.3.3 United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom Article 9 of the Electronic Commerce Directive was 
implemented by Section 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000. The approach 
adopted in the legislation is a piecemeal approach whereby an ̀ appropriate' minister may 
introduce an amending statutory instrument where existing legislation is found to contain 
a potential barrier to electronic commerce. 
"(1) Subject to subsection (3), the appropriate Minister may by order made by 
statutory instrument modify the provisions of 
(a) any enactment or subordinate legislation, or 
(b) any scheme, licence, authorisation or approval issued, granted or given 
by or under any enactment or subordinate legislation, 
in such manner as he may think fit for the purpose of authorising or facilitating 
the use of electronic communications or electronic storage (instead of other 
65 Arcide 5(1). 
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forms of communication or storage) for any purpose mentioned in subsection 
(2). 
(2) 
(a) the doing of anything which under any such provisions is required to 
be or may be done or evidenced in writing or otherwise using a 
document, notice or instrument; 
(c) the doing of anything which under any such provisions is required to 
be or may be authorised by a person's signature or seal, or is required 
to be delivered as a deed or witnessed. 
A number of amendments have been made removing or amending formal requirements 
to date, but while it is clear that this method of implementation is within the terms of the 
article it is potentially a piecemeal and slow method of creating a level playing field for 
electronic communications. " This over-cautious approach may ultimately lead to 
uncertainty and arguably has not made the UK the `best place to do e-commerce by 
2002.67 
7.3.3.1 The UK Approach to Signatures. 
As indicated above, electronic signatures are likely to be accepted as capable of 
satisfying formal requirements of signature because of the broad interpretation of a 
`signature' adopted by the courts. However, to provide legal certainty it is desirable to 
have this speculative analysis declared by statute in some way. From the preceding 
discussion of the European Electronic Signatures Directive it could be assumed that with 
the implementation of that provision would come a degree of legal certainty as to the 
ability of the most reliable from of electronic signatures to satisfy formal requirements. 
However, this is not the case because the UK government felt that it would be more 
appropriate to allow the courts to adjudicate on whether such a formal requirement has 
been satisfied. In the Electronic Communications Act 2000 the requirements of the 
Directive are allegedly satisfied by section 7 which declares that electronic signatures are 
66 To 31!, August 2002 12 orders had been made. See http: //www. e- 
envov. gov. uk/oee/oee. nsf/sections/index/$ file/index. htm. 
67 Despite the obvious contradiction in this goal it was nevertheless undermined by this piecemeal and 
tentative approach to medium neutral legislation. 
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admissible in legal proceedings. It is submitted that this approach undermines the legal 
clarification intended by the introduction of the Directive. " 
7.4 Formalities for the Electronic Environment 
The removal of `barriers' to electronic contracting and the need for clarity and 
legal certainty are seen as essential pre-requisites to the development of electronic 
commerce. However, in taking steps to achieve these objectives legislators must avoid 
the creation of new `obstacles' to the use of current or future technology. 69 
Inappropriate or unnecessary legislative requirements, prescribing minimum standards 
for legally acceptable electronic communications may result in unintended and 
undesirable consequences. Requirements of form, adopted specifically for the electronic 
environment, may have the effect of excluding some forms of electronic communication 
and not others. This can lead to further uncertainty and potential disputes as to whether 
particular forms of electronic communication comply with the requirements. Such 
disputes are both unnecessary and costly, and have the potential to undermine 
confidence rather than to promote it. Smith explains that, ideally, 
"... electronic commerce legislation should create, so far as possible, a single 
medium-neutral legal environment governing paper and non-paper transactions, 
rather than to create separate parallel regimes for paper and electronic form. "" 
There are a number of justifications for the introduction of new regimes for the 
electronic environment. First, the new and novel nature of the technology may mean 
that no parallel can be drawn with existing forms of communication creating a need for 
new regulation. "' Second, there may be a need to remove legal uncertainty regarding the 
status of electronic communications to promote commercial confidence. 'Z Third, there 
may be a desire at State level to ensure that citizens are afforded the levels of protection 
68 "Advanced electronic signatures" do not feature in the Electronic Communications Act 2000 but they 
are referred to in the Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002 (Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 318). 
However, this provision only deals with the supervision of certification-service-providers, their liability in 
certain circumstances and data protection requirements concerning them. 
69 The requirements will usually be based upon present technology but even with expert advice legislators 
are ill equipped to predict future developments in such a rapidly changing technological environment. 
Prescriptive rules introduced on this basis are inevitably going to create problems for future technologies. 
70 Smith, G. J. H. Intemet LawandRegrdatton. (Sweet and Maxwell: London) at p. 471. 
71 This possibility is uncommon even with modem advancements in technology. However, electronic 
signatures, cryptographic and biometric techniques may serve as examples in this context. 
72 For example, the validity of electronic contracts and requirements of form under discussion here. 
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to which they are accustomed, in particular consumers. Finally, and arguably most 
importantly for the use of electronic contracts and development of electronic commerce, 
the promotion of trust and confidence in the use of electronic communications. 
Uncertainty or a fear of the unknown creates a lack of trust and confidence in the use of 
electronic contracts, particularly for small businesses and consumers. All of the 
preceding factors may be cited to justify regulation which introduces formal 
requirements, unique to the electronic environment, or `e-formalities'. A number of e- 
formalities and their implications for those entering electronic contracts will now be 
considered. 
7.4.1 ̀E-Formalities' 
Formal requirements have been introduced into electronic contracts in two main 
ways: first, where a requirement of form is retained from the traditional environment 
because of the function it performs; and secondly, where requirements are introduced for 
electronic contracts where previously there were none in the traditional environment. By 
introducing new e-formalities legislators are often seeking to facilitate electronic 
commerce by promoting confidence in the use of new forms of communication and 
create legal certainty for electronic contracts. 
7.4.1.1 Requirements retained from the traditional environment 
A formal requirement may be as important in the electronic environment as it is 
in the traditional environment because of the function it performs and the policy behind 
that function. In such a case an equivalent method of fulfilling that function must be 
found for electronic contracts. Where a requirement of form, such as `signature' or 
'writing', is retained for the electronic environment because of the function or purpose it 
serves it is important to examine the standards set for electronic communications to 
ascertain if they are truly equivalent to their traditional counterparts or if the standards 
set are higher. If they are, then this will create a discriminatory approach and a dual set 
of standards for parties entering contracts dependant upon the communication medium 
used. A discriminatory approach of this nature may deter parties from using electronic 
communications to enter contracts and as a result act as a barrier to the development of 
electronic commerce. Smith" uses the example of a pencilled cross on a paper 
document which will satisfy the formal requirement of `signature' at common law, 
73 Op citfn70. 
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despite its lack of permanence and inherent unreliability. The standard set for an 
electronic signature to be acceptable is arguably higher, creating a dual level and non- 
equivalent requirement of form. " The risk of adopting over-burdensome requirements 
has been recognised by legislators, as illustrated in the advice given to the Australian 
Attorney General by the Electronic Commerce Expert Group in 1998 prior to their 
adoption of electronic commerce related legislation: 
"There is always the temptation, in dealing with the law as it relates to unfamiliar 
and new technologies, to set the standards required of a new technology 
higher than those which currently apply to paper and to overlook the 
weaknesses that we know to inhere in the familiar. Many proponents of 
government action in the area of electronic commerce, particularly digital 
signatures and certification authorities, seek legislation in order to clarify rights 
and responsibilities, as well as to adapt the law to the perceived needs of new 
technology. In some instances, the legislation which has been enacted seeks to 
pick technology winners, apportion liability among private parties to electronic 
transactions, grant special liability limitations for certain parties, and generally 
introduce regulatory controls beyond that currently required under other 
bodies of law, such as consumer law, contract law and commercial law. "75 
7.4.1.2 Requirements Where Previously There Were None - New E-Formalities 
It was indicated above that there may be justifications for the introduction of 
formal requirements into electronic contracts where in traditional contracts none existed. 
One specific justification was discussed in the previous chapter, the anonymity of the 
electronic environment and the difficulties with identification. However, even where the 
introduction of formalities is prvna fade justified the requirements introduced must be 
appropriate for the electronic environment, sufficiently clear to avoid legal uncertainty 
and the consequences of failing to comply with the requirements must be proportionate 
to their function. Two particular pitfalls, which appear to have been overlooked by the 
legislature, are the introduction of unqualified and undefined standards which require 
74 Without providing a higher level of legal recognition. 
75 "Electronic Commerce: Building the Legal Framework". Report of the Electronic Commerce Expert 
Group to the Attorney General, 31 March 1998. Chapter 4,2.11 (Emphasis added). 
Available at <http: // 152.91.15.15/aghome/advisory/eceg/ecegrevort. html>. Laddie J. adopts a 
complementary approach in Re a dekor (No 2022 of 1995), ex parte In , ýv d Recaure Cawnissionei v The debtor 
[1996] 2 All ER 345. 
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further interpretation by the courts and the introduction of standards which may require 
an analysis of the technology involved to decide whether the standard has been complied 
with. This submission can be illustrated by examining certain requirements found in the 
Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 and the Electronic Commerce 
(EC Directive) Regulations 2002.76 
7 he C zgrrerProtest (Distmue Sellig)Regula&i »is 2000 
These regulations require a wide range of information be provided to the 
consumer ̀in writing or in another durable mean which is available and accessible to 
him'. ' The same requirement is contained within the regulation detailing how a 
consumer may exercise his right to cancel the contract. 78 However, neither the 
Regulations nor the original Directive, give guidance as to the meaning of this phrase, in 
particular which technologies and electronic forms of storage and communication will be 
considered a`durable medium'. 
Uncertainty as to which forms of communication will satisfy the `durable 
medium' requirement may encourage (or require the court to undertake) a technical 
analysis of the form of communication employed. With a wide range of communication 
mediums in existence (and undoubtedly more in the future) this kind of analysis may be 
unhelpful and confusing. The preferable and more likely approach would be a pragmatic 
and purposive (or teleological) one. If a communication medium serves the intended 
purpose of the requirement that should be sufficient, whatever form the communication 
medium takes. "' 
In its guidance on the Regulations the Department of Trade and Industry has 
indicated that fax and electronic mail are likely to meet the requirement of a durable 
medium but no further guidance is given. 80 This clearly leaves scope for uncertainty. 
Although the Distance Selling Directive, upon which the Regulations are based, 
contains no definition of `durable medium', in later directives some attempt was made to 
define the phrase 81 It could be argued that reference should be made to these later 
76 Statutory Instrument 2000 No. 2334. and Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 2013 respectively. 
77 Regulations 8,10 and 17. 
78 Regulation 10. 
79 In this way debates about individual forms of communication such as 'voicemail'and text message will 
be avoided. This approach would have the added advantage of being sufficiently flexible to encompass 
new developments in technology as they arise. 
80 DTI Guidance on The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 
http: //www. dti. gov. uk/ccp/topicsl/guide/distseff. htm 
81 Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 on 
insurance mediation. Official Journal L 009,15/01/2003 P. 0003 - 0010.2003 OJ L 9. Directive 
151 
Fom a1 Rqpdnwxnts 
definitions when considering the term in the context of legislation based upon earlier 
directives where no definition was given. However, it would appear that cross 
referencing in this manner must be approached with some caution. The European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) has indicated that this may not be a suitable approach to the 
interpretation of European legislation, favouring interpretation based upon the context 
and purpose of the particular instrument rather than a unified standard interpretation for 
a particular word or phrase. " 
However, in this particular situation the phrase in question, ̀ durable medium', 
has been introduced to accommodate or acknowledge the wide variety of modem 
communication technologies in use and as such the phrase is employed for the same 
purpose in each of the instruments. Arguably this could provide support for a uniform 
interpretation of the phrase. With only minor changes the definition found in the 
Distance Selling of Financial Services Directive83 is reproduced in later directives 
containing the phrase. Article 2(0 of the directive reads: 
" `durable medium' means any instrument which enables the consumer to store 
information addressed personally to him in a way accessible for future reference 
for a period of time adequate for the purposes of the information and which 
allows the unchanged reproduction of the information stored" 
Arguably, since the potential uncertainty in the meaning of the phrase ̀ durable 
medium' has been recognised a `uniform' definition has been adopted in later directives. 
Further, indicative lists of appropriate media have also been included for guidance. 
Recital 20 of the Distance Selling of Financial Services Directive reads: 
2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the 
distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC and 
Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC. Official Journal L 271,09/10/2002 P. 0016 - 0024.2002 OJ L 271 (the amendments to Directive 97/7 do not include the definition of durable medium). Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning credit for consumers /* COM/2002/0443 final 
- COD 2002/0222 */. Official Journal C 331 E, 31/12/2002 P. 0200 - 0248.2002 OJ C 331. In this 
proposal reference is made to the definition found in 2002/65, indicating than a uniform approach is being 
adopted? 
82 See Case C-168/00 Sznxne Leitnerv TUI Deus hLmid GmbH & Ca KG, [2002] ECR 1-2631. The opinion 
of the Advocate General in this case favoured a more methodological approach whereby an abstract term 
could be interpreted in the light of the whole aquis ar rmrdtaime The Commission has also expressed the 
opinion that the approach adopted by the court in the Leitrom case could led to fragmentation of EC law at 
national level. See Communication form the EC Commission to Parliament and Council on'A More 
Coherent European Contract Law: An Action Plan', Brussels, 12.2.2003. COM(2003) 68 final, at para. 2 1. 
83 OJ L 271/ 16. A'partner' to directive 97/7 which concerns distance selling generally but does not apply 
to financial services. 
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"Durable mediums include in particular floppy discs, CD-ROMS, DVDs and the 
hard drive of the consumer's computer on which the electronic mail is stored, 
but they do not include Internet websites unless they fulfil the criteria contained 
in the definition of a durable medium. 
The initial exclusion of an Internet website may appear significant for electronic 
commerce, however, if steps are taken to allow the customer to store and reproduce the 
relevant information through the site then the criteria will be satisfied. The methods 
commonly used would include the provision of a reference area or specific data storage 
area on the site accessible to the customer. 
The phrase is defined in terms of its function or purpose, retaining an element of 
flexibility in relation to the period of time for which the information must be accessible. 
What is an ̀adequate' period of time must be decided by reference to the purposes of the 
information. Whilst this flexibility is understandable because of the wide range of 
information involved, it does leave some room for a divergent approach in national 
Courts. 
It can be concluded that the essential characteristics of a ̀ durable medium' would 
appear to be a storage medium which allows the customer to access and the reproduce 
the information, unchanged, at a later date. The information must be available in this 
way for an appropriate period of time taking into consideration the nature and purpose 
of the information. 
Failure to satisfy the formal information requirements in the Regulations may 
have a significant impact upon the rights of the service provider and the consumer. For 
example, a service provider's failure to provide the appropriate information can extend 
the consumer's right to cancel the contract, without penalty, to up to three months and 
seven working days after the delivery of goods or the signing of a contract for services. " 
The failure may also lead to a ̀ qualified entity' bringing proceedings under section 35 of 
the Fair Trading Act 197385 to obtain an injunction to prevent further infringement 
('Community infringement) or alternatively to ensure compliance. Such a declaration 
would require the trader to stop the infringement or not to engage in the conduct which 
would constitute an infringement. The may also lead to further damage to the suppliers 
94 Regulations 11& 12. 
95 As amended by the Stop Now Orders (E. C. Directive) Regulations 2001. 
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reputation due to the publication of the infringement in reports by the Office of Fair 
Trading. Further failure by a supplier may even lead to contempt of court proceedings. 
While the formal information requirement can be justified on the grounds of 
promoting consumer trust and confidence in entering distance contracts, in particular 
electronic contracts, the lack of a clear definition creates the potential for uncertainty and 
a lack of clarity which may act sa deterrent to sellers and suppliers to entering electronic 
contracts. 
The Elerdtnic Coiv (ECDirttx) Regulatians 2002 
The Electronic Commerce Regulations also contain provisions requiring certain 
information to be provided to customers in a particular form. In regulation 6 general 
information about the service provider must be given "in a form and manner which is 
easily, directly and permanently accessible". The requirement is without further 
qualification and raises several questions including what methods of providing 
information in the electronic environment will be considered ̀ permanently accessible'. 
The DTI has suggested that temporary `down time' will not prevent information from 
being considered ̀permanently accessible', but little further guidance is added. However, 
in relation to electronic contracts, key information to be provided prior to the placing of 
the order need only be provided "in a clear, comprehensible and unambiguous manner"86 
with no requirement that it be in a permanent form. Clearly a distinction is made 
between the two sets of information to be provided, the former being available to the 
consumer for review and reference whereas the latter need only be readable and 
understandable without necessarily being available for review. However, the provision 
contains far too much scope for interpretation to promote certainty. It could be argued 
that information on website would be `permanently accessible' if the user chose to copy 
and save the page to his hard drive, or alternatively printed the page out. The provision 
has alternatively been interpreted as requiring, for example, a `hard copy' of the 
information required to be sent with goods delivered. 
Regulation 9(3) states that "where the service provider provides terms and 
conditions applicable to the contract to the recipient, the service provider shall make 
them available to him in a way that allows him to store and reproduce them. " This 
regulation raises two points. The first is the fact that it imposes a requirement not 
applied to non-electronic ontracts - the provision of terms in a manner which allows 
96 Regulation 9. 
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for storage and reproduction. This `e-formality' can arguably be justified on the grounds 
of promoting trust and confidence by ensuring transparency in electronic contracts. 
Secondly, the provision requires the information to be provided in a manner which 
allows the recipient to store and reproduce it. This would appear to infer that all that is 
required is that the information may be copied in some way which arguably can be 
satisfied by the provision of the information by almost any electronic means. It is 
submitted that the multiple standards of delivery and accessibility required of different 
sets of information the Regulations do not assist the creation of clarity and legal certainty 
for parties entering electronic contracts. 
7.4.3 The Consequences of Failing to Comply with the E-Formalities 
The failure to comply with a requirement of form must also be considered in the 
light of the consequences of that failure. The outcome must balance the objective of the 
requirement with the potential for injustice created by the denial of a person's rights 
because of a failure to comply. This is particularly so when technical knowledge may be 
required in order to determine what complies with the electronic requirement of form. 
The deprivation of rights and defeating of expectations, caused by the invalidating of a 
contract for a failure to comply with requirements of form, may be seen as wholly 
disproportionate to the original purpose of the requirement. The potential for injustice 
will inevitably deter use rather than promote good practice. 
This potential problem was highlighted during the implementation of the 
Electronic Commerce Directive. In the draft implementing regulations if a service 
provider failed to comply with three specific requirements that went to the `substance' of 
the contracts (the availability of the terms and conditions, the acknowledgement of the 
order and the provision of means allowing input errors to be identified and corrected) 
the consumer was entitled to cancel the contract ̀ at any time'. During the consultation 
period interested bodies emphasised that such an approach had the potential to create 
injustice and impose disproportionate penalties on service providers. " The Government 
recognised the validity of this argument and the right to rescind, at the court's discretion, 
is now limited to situations where the service provider has not made available means of 
allowing the consumer to identify and correct input errors. " Failure to comply with the 
other information requirements is now limited to the more proportionate penalty of 
87 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002: Public Consultation - Government Response. 
July 31,2002. Available at http: //www. dti. gov. uk/cii/docs/ecommerce/govtresponse. pdf 
88 As is required by regulation 11(1)(b). 
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damages for breach of statutory duty and where appropriate a court order for 
compliance. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Formal requirements often have sound policies behind their application, but they 
may equally be indicative of a particular state of affairs at the time of their introduction. 
The ability, or inability, of electronic contracts and electronic methods of communication 
to fulfil these requirements has resulted in the introduction of legislation to deal with the 
issue. In this chapter the necessity of such regulation and the ability of electronic 
communications to fulfil formal requirements were considered. It was concluded that 
although in many cases electronic communications could probably fulfil existing formal 
requirements this proposition could not be asserted with sufficient certainty or 
consistency. Therefore the legislative removal or amendment of formal requirements 
appears justified for the promotion of legal certainty and confidence in the use of 
electronic contracts. 
Two legislative approaches to this issue can be identified. The first would be a 
`blanket' approach declaring electronic communications as equivalent to their paper- 
based counterparts unless indicated otherwise; and the second would be to examine each 
formal requirement individually and amend it as appropriate. The former approach 
provides for the rapid adoption of and use of electronic communications with the 
possibility of excluding certain types of contract if, for policy reasons, the use of 
electronic communications was deemed inappropriate. The latter allows for a more 
conservative approach to the adoption of electronic forms of communication and the 
detailed consideration of whether electronic communications can provide a functionally 
equivalent means of fulfilling the formal requirement. In the United Kingdom the 
second approach was preferred and section 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 
provides for the piecemeal amendment of formal requirements which may act as barriers 
to the use of electronic communications. 
Formal requirements may be transferred to, or specifically developed for, the 
electronic environment. However, they may also be introduced inadvertently by the use 
of terminology in regulatory requirements which is ambiguous or undefined, as illustrated 
by the Distance Selling and Electronic Commerce Regulations. Formal requirements of 
this nature have the potential to create uncertainty and as a consequence undermine the 
use of electronic contracts. A provision which may require a technical or expert analysis 
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of the technology used to establish whether a requirement has been complied with may 
create an additional ̀barrier' to the use of electronic contracts. 
From the preceding discussion it can be concluded that although the ideal 
solution for electronic contracting is the creation of a medium neutral and non- 
discriminatory legal environment, any regulatory changes must also ensure that 
appropriate safeguards remain in place to protect parties entering certain specific 
contracts or those in a weaker bargaining position. The approach adopted by the UK 
government to the removal of formal requirements demonstrates a policy-driven 
approach to the issue. However, the inevitably slow speed at which this approach 
produces the required legislative changes combined with the sustainable, but nevertheless 
speculative, belief that certain electronic communications will, probably, generally fulfil 
formal requirements may ultimately prove to have been detrimental to the use of 
electronic contracts. 
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8 
The Formation of Electronic Contracts 
In this chapter the legal issues relating to contract formation will be discussed in 
the light of modem electronic forms of communication. The `nature' of electronic 
contracting is discussed above in chapter 3. At this point it is sufficient to note that 
whichever method of electronic communication is employed, the basic principles 
governing the formation of that contract should remain the same. 
The focus of discussion will be the traditional breakdown of contract formation 
into the search for an offer and corresponding acceptance. The discussion will proceed 
to consider proposed and recently enacted regulatory measures having a direct impact on 
the formation process or intended to permit and facilitate electronic contracting. 
Whilst the offer and acceptance analysis may appear rudimentary it is 
nevertheless the predominant approach adopted by the courts and establishing the 
existence of a contractual relationship is crucial to subsequent analysis of parties' rights 
and obligations. For the parties concerned, establishing the precise time and place of 
contract formation not only allows them to know with some certainty exactly when they 
are contractually bound but will also dictate which contractual terms form part of their 
agreement. ' The DTI and the Law Commission have made it clear they believe that the 
common law in England and Wales is more than capable of accommodating the new 
forms of communication and that there is no need to change any of the existing 
principles or introduce specific legislation to deal with contract formation! 
In relation to applicable law and jurisdictional matters the significance of the 
place of contract formation has been significantly reduced with the introduction of 
harmonising Conventions and Regulation; nevertheless, it still has a role to play as part of 
I See below chapter 9.1 
2 See the Department of Trade and Industry (March 2002) "Interim Guidance to the Electronic Commerce 
(EC Directive) Regulations 2002" at p. 22; and The Law Commission guidance, "Electronic Commerce: 
Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions" 3rd December 2001, available at www. lawcom. gov. uk. 
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the private international aw of England and Wales in disputes falling outside of the 
relevant Conventions and Regulations? 
8.1 Agreement: Objectivity and Intention 
Before embarking upon analysis of contract formation the courts' approach to 
assessing agreement must be considered. The courts are looking for an ̀ intention to be 
bound' and the predominant approach is to make an objective assessment of the parties' 
behaviour, subjective intention is rarely a consideration! Whatever medium of 
communication is used, it is the objective assessment of the party's words and conduct 
that is important. In the words of Blackburn J in Sn ivHughes5 
"If, whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a 
reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by the 
other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into the contract with 
him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had 
intended to agree to the other party's terms... "6 
and more concisely, Lord Denning in StoivrvMancMterCity Coinuü: ' 
"In contracts you do not look into the actual intent in a man's mind. You look at 
what he said and did. A contract is formed when there is, to all outward 
appearances, a contract. "' 
The courts are interested in outward appearances of the communication's 
content rather than its form; hence websites, e-mail, SMS messaging and other forms of 
electronic communication will be considered individually on their own particular merits. 
It is important to note that the offer and acceptance analysis will need to be considered 
in the light of the fact that the vendor's ̀ responses' may be automated. More often than 
not, particularly with interactive websites, the person responsible for the site's presence, 
3 See chapters 4&5 above. 
4 The subjective assessment may be important where, for example, one party is aware or should reasonably 
be aware of a mistake by the other party. See Ha togv Cohn & Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566 and Cernvth7dal 
Estates pkv Me6att Irteston Assurmxr Co Ltd [1983] Com LR 158. 
5 (1871) LR 6 QB 597. 
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the web site proprietor, will have no knowledge of each individual transaction as it is 
made. This raises the question of whether the requisite intention to be bound can be 
ascribed to him in this situation. Specifically, can the words or conduct of the automated 
electronic system be attributed to the website proprietor as his own acts, signifying his 
`intention to be bound'? 
8.2 Intention and Automated Systems 
The use of electronic agents was considered in chapter 3 and it was highlighted 
that the use of automation to effect contracts is not a new occurrence. For many years 
automatic vending machines have been in use, from ticket machines to the office drinks 
dispenser. In the past decade fully automated stock ordering systems using Electronic 
Data Interchange (EDI) have become the norm for many commercial enterprises. 
However, with EDI transactions, the requisite intention to be bound is usually expressly 
stated in the parties' Interchange Agreement 9 In the context of the present discussion it 
is the actions of interactive websites and other automated electronic systems such as 
`electronic agents', where no prior agreement exists between the parties, that are the 
focus. These systems are designed and programmed by, or on behalf of, the supplier to 
fully automate the contractual process. As Gringras has commented, such web sites 
"fuse the advertising and the shop". " They act as the advertisement and when so 
programmed carry out the transaction, sometimes delivering the product or beginning 
the service automatically with no human intervention. The benefits of such systems to 
the electronic trader are clear. they provide the ability to enter transactions at any time 
with as many customers as the system will allow with minimal implications for human or 
physical resources (such as employees, office space and equipment). 
Previously the courts have found little difficulty in attributing the actions of 
automatic machines to their owner and thus providing evidence of the requisite intent. 
In the words of Lord Denning in 7hamtcn v Shoe Lane Parking', a transaction facilitated 
by an automated ticket machine 
9 See chapter 2. 
lo Gringras, C. 71 Lars of the 1nte»et (Butterworths: London, 1997) at p 14. 
11 [1971] 2 QB 163. 
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"... can be translated into offer and acceptance in this way. the offer is made 
when the proprietor of the machine holds it out as being ready to receive the 
»iz money.... 
By implication, the placing of the machine there to perform a task (in 7homton to enter a 
contract with the customer for the use of the car park), indicates that the proprietor 
intends to be bound by transactions entered into by that machine. If this analysis were to 
be applied to automated websites then the actions of that website could be attributed to 
the supplier. By designing a website in this way the proprietor holds the site out as ready 
to contract on his behalf. " 
International developments in this area would appear to support this analysis. 
The Guide to Enactment of the UNCTTRAL" Model Law on Electronic Commerce15 
states that, "data messages that are generated automatically by computers without human 
intervention should be regarded as ̀ originating' from the legal entity on behalf of which 
the computer is operated. "" However, it has been suggested that there are some 
significant differences between the system considered in Thom m and interactive web 
sites. " 
In Thomson the machine in question was a stand-alone offer for a unilateral 
contract; a customer could either accept or decline the offer. There was no room for 
negotiation or further discussion, the conduct of placing the coin in the machine 
concluded the contract, and all that remained was the performance of the contract vis-a- 
vis the parking of the car in the facilities provided. Many modern automatic vending 
machines do not work in this way and interactive websites and electronic agents can go 
beyond merely communicating an offer of a unilateral contract to the extent that they can 
create the illusion that they are actually making 'decisions. ̀ Hence, it could be argued 
12 Ibid at 169. 
13 See Glatt, C, "Comparative Issues in the Formation of Electronic Contracts" (1996) 6 Int JLIT 34. 
14 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
15 General Assembly Resolution 51/162 of 16 December 1996, UNCTTRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce. Available at, http: //www. uncitral. org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm. htm. 
16 Paragraph 35. Article 2 of the Model Law states; 
(c) "Originator" of a data message means a person by whom, or on whose behalf, the data 
message purports to have been sent or generated prior to storage... 
17 In that they go beyond ̀ mere communication' of contractually significant messages by emulating actual 
human decision making. See Nicoll, C. C. "Can Computers Make Contracts? " [1998] ganuai Journal of 
Busross Law (JBL) 35; and the discussion in chapter 3.2. 
18 For example -a standard soft drink vending machine. The items are displayed and priced 'offering' the 
soft drink of choice should adequate remuneration be placed in the slot. However if there is no stock left 
in the machine no drink can be dispensed. Is this a conditional offer (on there being sufficient stock)? An 
analysis more congruent with existing case law is that the offer is made when the drink of choice is 
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that the computer has taken the decision to make an offer or acceptance. The human 
proprietor has no knowledge of these decisions at the time. How then can the requisite 
intention to be bound be attributed to the human proprietor? In fact, the answer would 
seem to be a simple one. The computer is only emulating human decision making to the 
extent permitted by the programming. The programming was introduced by, or on 
behalf of, the proprietor for that very purpose. Thus, by creating the website in that 
manner it must be presumed that the proprietor intends to be bound by the activities of 
that site. As Glatt states, 
"Even the most sophisticated software does not make autonomous decisions, but 
operates according to previous programming. The responsibility therefore, 
remains with the principal, who decides to use such software with the intention 
of being bound by its declarations"" 
More importantly, to the objective observer the computer is demonstrating an intention 
to be bound. The prior instructions given to the computer by or on behalf of the 
proprietor are responsible for this. It can only be concluded that objaiidy he intends to 
be bound by the activities of that website or electronic agent, for the duration that the 
website or agent remains active. To hold otherwise, would require a step away from the 
objective view of agreement and require an apportioning of the risk of errors or failures 
in such automated systems on a party who has no control over the system. In a variety 
of contexts the common law has developed an approach to mistakes as to the subject 
matter of a contract, be it the price, quantity or some other quality. It is submitted that 
there is no reason why, in situations whereby an electronic agent or website makes a 
mistake, or acts erroneously, the existing principles should not apply. As a general rule, 
the user of an electronic agent or a website proprietor will only be able to escape his 
apparent consent to a contract in situations where the other party knew or reasonably 
ought to have known of the mistake or error. 2° 
selected. The machine is automated and performs pre-programmed tasks, but there are still variables in the 
system. If there is no stock left, or inadequate remuneration is inserted the machine will 'reject' the offer 
and suggest an alternative selection or return the money. The contract is only concluded when the 
machine accepts the offer by dispensing the drink. Interactive web sites will often work on the same basis. 
19 Op citfn 13, at p. 46. 
20 This issue is returned to below at 8.3.1.3. 
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8.3 Traditional concepts: Offer and Acceptance 
The traditional categories of offer and acceptance are by no means definitive and 
the courts themselves have emphasised the fluidity in the contract formation process. 
Sometimes even identifying an offer or an acceptance is problematic! ' Nevertheless the 
courts have re-iterated the value of the traditional approach and are of the view that cases 
incompatible with the offer and acceptance analysis will be unusual: 
"... there may be certain types of contract, though I think they are exceptional, 
which do not fit easily into the normal analysis of a contract as being constituted 
by offer and acceptance"22 
Hence the traditional offer and acceptance analysis will form the basis of the following 
discussion. It is first necessary to distinguish offers from invitations to treat. 
8.3.1 Offers and Invitations to Treat 
In the search for agreement the law distinguishes offers from invitations to treat. 
The former can be accepted to form a contract whereas the latter is seen as merely part 
of the negotiating process or alternatively an invitation to others to make an offer. The 
basis for the distinction is an objective assessment of the intention of the parties. The 
courts will consider whether the words or conduct of a party indicate a willingness to be 
bound should the other party unequivocally accept the terms of the offer. Such 
willingness distinguishes an offer from an invitation to treat. 
A body of case law has developed placing many regularly occurring transactions 
into a particular category. For example, advertisements, trade circulars, shop windows or 
displays and auctions are not generally treated as offers but merely as invitations to treat, 
inviting offers from the public! ' It is often argued that this approach reflects 
commercial reality in as much as it relates to the intention of the parties. Illustrating this 
21 In C arkevDunrmm (The Sat al) [1897] AC 59 an offer and acceptance between the two parties is 
difficult to find, but nevertheless a binding agreement was found. In the electronic world, E-bay (and 
other virtual 'auction' sites), and group buying sites would appear to require the same analysis with the 
parties creating a binding agreement between themselves on the common terms of the service provider. 
See also Tied n LtdvArthüal Luxfer[1993] 1 Lloyds Rep 25 per Steyn LJ at p 30. 
22 GibsonvMandssterCity Cwzil [1979] 1 WIR 294, per Lord Diplock at 298. 
23 See Parr *z; 0ý [ 1968] 2 All ER 421, PhamzaxtoU Society of Great Bnza»t u Boots Cash Ctvn&s 
[1953] 1 QB 401 and Pr ti Cite (1789) 3 Term Rep 148, respectively. 
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point, Lord Herschell, when referring to a trade circular in Grainger & Son v. Gough 
(Surxyorof Taxes/4 stated 
"The transmission of such a price list does not amount to an offer to supply an 
unlimited quantity of the wine described at the price named, so that as soon as an 
order is given there is a binding contract to supply that quantity. If it were so, the 
merchant might find himself involved in any number of contractual obligations 
to supply wine of a particular description which he would be quite unable to 
carry out, his stock of wine of that description being necessarily limited. "" 
To hold that such a circular or advertisement was an offer would leave the seller with no 
flexibility if, for example, he ran out of stock or received a response from a customer to 
whom he did not intend to supply his product. 26 However, this analysis becomes less 
convincing once the alternatives available are considered. " Nevertheless, general 
classifications of advertisements, circulars and shop displays have become established. 
It is important to remember that it is the objective assessment of the words and 
conduct of the parties in the particular case which will be decisive. Hence, auctions 
promoted as being 'without reserve" and certain advertisements" have been construed 
as offers. With unilateral contracts, the classic case Carlill v. Gvivlic Smoke Ball Cd' serves 
as an illustration. The wording of the advertisement combined with the advertiser's 
conduct, the depositing of £1000 in its bank to show its `sincerity in the matter', satisfied 
the court that it should be construed as an offer. In a more recent case, Bozeermmz v. 
Associa&n of British Trail Agents Ltd' Hobhouse LJ re-iterated the point in his analysis of 
an ABTA notice: 
"In my judgement this document is intended to be read and would reasonably be 
read by a member of the public as containing an offer of a promise which the 
customer is entitled to accept ... it satisfies the criteria for a unilateral contract 
24 [1856] AC 325. 
25ihd at p334. 
26 For example, due to some regulatory or licensing requirement. 
27 For example the 'offer' could be treated as conditional on there being stock available etc. However, this 
has not been the approach taken by the courts. See Glatt, op cit fn 13 above, and Macdonald, E and 
Rowland, D. I16mution Tn ogy law (Cavendish: London, 2000) at p297. 
28 Wadowu Harrison (1859) 1 E&E 309. Barryu D=ia [2000] 1 WIR 1962. 
291n particular the 'reward'or `unilateral contract' cases. See the discussion below of CWu Cvidic 
Smoke Ball Go [1893 ]1 QB 256. 
30 [1893] 1 QB 256. 
31 [1996] CLC 456. 
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and contains promises which are sufficiently clear to be capable of legal 
enforcement. The principles established in the Ca ivlic Smoke Ball case apply. "32 
In the light of these points the most common forms of electronic communication will 
now be considered. 
8.3.1.1 E-Mail and Text Messaging (SMS 
As with all forms of communication the courts will deduce from the language 
used (m addition to relevant conduct)" whether a party had the requisite intention to be 
bound in determining whether an offer has been made. 
An interesting issue raised by these particular forms of electronic communication 
relates to the use of `sparr' or unsolicited commercial communications to an e-mail 
address or mobile phone. In general such communications take the form of 
advertisements promoting a (usually completely unwanted) product or service. With 
some of the new generation of mobile phone systems subscribers receive messages 
relating to promotions in their geographical area or area they are visiting from automated 
systems. Even though they may be mass promotional communications, such messages 
will be analysed on the basis of their content to ascertain if an intention to be bound 
exists. If they are phrased unequivocally, in the form of a promise in return for certain 
acts, i. e. "The first fifty customers to register on `anon DVDs dot com' web site will 
receive the new Harry Potter' movie absolutely free", " the courts may well construe 
them as offers, binding on the seller once the requested conduct is performed. The 
senders of the message may argue that such e-mails are merely promotional material or 
`mere puffs of advertising' but nevertheless if the words used indicate an intention to be 
bound they will be construed as unilateral offers, or offers to the whole world. Anyone 
fulfilling the requirements contained within the e-mail may bind the sender (which in the 
case of e-mail could be a lot of potential customers). 
32 ibid at p 463. 
33 'Short Message Service' (SMS) affords the user the ability to send and receive short (160 characters) text 
messages to and from GSM (Global System for Telecommunications) mobile phones almost anywhere in 
the world. Most modem mobile phones accommodate this service. 
34 Such as the depositing of £1000 in the bank to settle claims in the Carlill case. 
35 Based upon an actual e-mail received by the author. 
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8.3.1.2 Websites 
For legitimate commercial entities the most effective form of promotion via 
electronic media is a collection of pages on a website on the Internet or World Wide 
Web. Websites can vary in complexity from a basic text format with perhaps a few 
images, to a framed and fully interactive multimedia site. They are primarily used to 
promote products and services to a potentially vast audience at relatively low cost but 
increasingly, with developments in technology, they are also used to facilitate contract 
formation and actually deliver products or services. " In the context of the Internet this 
possibility represents perhaps the most valuable asset inherent in the system. Because 
websites can be divided into distinct `types', for the analysis of contract formation it is 
important to consider whether such sites will generally be construed as offers or 
invitations to treat. 
Passi e Sites' 
A website may be used solely for marketing purposes, taking the format of a 
catalogue or price list with illustrations or descriptions of products or services. If the 
site does nothing more and is not couched in terms which might suggest a unilateral 
offer, it will probably be looked upon as an invitation to treat. There is no intention to 
be bound, just a desire to disseminate information about services or products" The 
courts' analysis of such a site would probably reflect the approach taken by Herschell LJ 
in Grainer and Son v. Gough. 38 The courts recognise the need to permit sellers to freely 
disseminate information about their products or services without the risk of being 
obliged to supply everyone who sees their promotional material. The seller is not 
indicating an intention to be bound by advertising his products or services, simply 
inviting members of the public to consider making an offer. 
However, it must also be remembered that, where appropriately worded, the 
courts will classify promotional materials as offers, capable of being accepted to form 
binding agreements. A website, which promises something in return for a customer's 
conduct, will probably be construed as an offer. 39 For example, websites offering free 
36 The most common service contract entered into by electronic means is for Value Added Network 
Services (VANS) such as file-storage and electronic mail. The direct download of computer software and 
the procurement of electronic media products such as music or video are the most popular products 
delivered electronically. See http: //www. yahoo. com. 
37 The contents of the site may be significant in relation to any representations made therein which may be 
relevant o the terms of the contract or a subsequent claim for misrepresentation. 
39 [1856] AC 325, see above at 83.1. 
39 See the Cvi dk Smoke &rll and Bozwmvi cases above. 
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downloads or services in return for the customer filling details in an on-line form leave 
little room for further negotiation and the supplier would appear to intend to be bound 
should a customer perform the requested conduct. A popular trend in electronic 
advertising is the `Click here for FREE trial' on a page promoting a service or product. 
On the wording of the advert there would appear to be a clear offer, the free trial in 
return for the conduct requested - the clicking on the icon. ̀ o 
7nteractuv Sixes' 
Many websites go beyond the basic promotion of products or services and 
provide the customer with a `virtual shopping experience', reproducing some of the 
familiar elements of the self-service store. " After perusing the products on offer, the 
customer selects the items he desires and symbolically places them in his `virtual basket'. 
When his selection is complete, he is instructed to click on an icon taking him to the 
`checkout'. Once again the analogy can be drawn with the site's real-world counterpart. 
As stated above, a shop display will usually be treated as an invitation to treat with the 
customer making the offer by handing the selected goods to the cashier. Somervell LJ 
illustrates this analysis in Phamzacrutical Society of Gat Britain v. Boots Cash Clxrnists: 
"I can see no reason for implying from this self-service arrangement any 
implication other than that, [... ] it is a convenient method of enabling customers 
to see what there is and choose, and possibly put back and substitute, articles 
which they wish to have and then to go up to the cashier and offer to buy what 
they have so far chosen"" 
The clicking on the `checkout' or `purchase' icon is the equivalent of taking the 
selected items to the cashier or shopkeeper and offering to make a purchase. The 
40 It may be argued that with such 'free' offers the customer provides no consideration. However, the 
information provided, usually e-mail address and personal profile, is of considerable commercial value, 
clearly capable of satisfying consideration requirements. In addition to the 'click'the site will often request 
credit card details in addition to personal information and e-mail addresses. 
41 In the US this approach has been commonplace for some time. From this approach has developed the 
`virtual mall' bringing websites from various well known suppliers ̀under one roof to create a familiar 
environment for shoppers to have confidence in. For an example of this approach see ̀ShopSmart' at 
<hgtp: //www. barclaysquare. co. uk> or UK online virtual shopping mall at 
<http: //www. codehot. co. uk/shopping. htm>. 
42 [1953] 1 Q. B. 401 at p 405. 
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customer makes the offer at that point and the web site owner can then chose whether 
or not to accept he offer. " 
However, an alternative analysis of the website situation is possible. With an 
interactive shopping website the `actions' of the website are controlled by the pre- 
programmed software, programmed by the proprietor or on his behalf, to emulate 
human decision making. The conclusion of the contract and often the despatching of 
the goods or provision of the service is performed without the intervention or immediate 
knowledge of the proprietor. When considered in this way the website demonstrates 
characteristics similar to the ticket machine in 71xmtaz v Shoe Lane Parking. " Although 
the customer can browse the site and select items he is interested in, choose delivery 
dates and even add gift wrapping and personal messages, he cannot negotiate the 
contract, in any real sense, with the software. In this way an argument can be 
constructed that the website is making a unilateral offer to sell the goods to the 
customer. If the customer performs the acts requested by the website proprietor - select 
goods, input delivery and payment details and click on a `confirm' icon, he can do no 
more and the automated system does the rest. There is little difference between this 
situation and Mr Thornton's, when he chose to use the Shoe Lane Car Park. For website 
proprietors this conclusion would be very unwelcome because it would mean that they 
would be bound to any mistakes made on the website or by their software. With this in 
mind many websites, in their website ̀ terms of use, state that no contract is formed until 
the proprietor's software has confirmed the despatch of the goods requested. " In this 
way they are expressly negating any intention to be bound until a specific point, 
preventing the activities of the site being treated as an offer. In two of the recent 
erroneous pricing incidents, namely the Amazon mis-priced iPaq Pocket PC and the 
Kodak £100 digital camera, " the legal advice given turned on the nature of the 
communications between the parties and in particular the Amazon. com conditions of 
website use which clearly state that, 
43 As is discussed in chapter 3, this may be an automated response rather than a conscious act by the 
website owner. 
44 Op cit fn 11. 
45 See the Terms of Use' at the bottom of the Amazon. com website. http: //www. amazon. co. uk/. 
46 Reported at http: //news. zdnet. co. uk/ 19/03/2003 and 31/01/2002 respectively. 
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"No contract will subsist between you and Amazon. co. uk for the sale by it to you 
of any product unless and until Amazon. co. uk accepts your order by e-mail 
confirming that it has dispatched your product. "47 
A dispute of this nature has not reached a court yet but as a caveat, it must be noted that 
the effectiveness of such a clause will depend upon how clearly such terms of use were 
brought to the user's attention. The issue of mistakes in the agreement process is 
considered further below. 
In Zhornton Lord Denning placed emphasis on the fact that Mr Thornton had 
become irrevocably bound at the moment he inserted his coin, giving him no 
opportunity to object or get his money back. 
"He is committed beyond recall. He was committed at the very moment when 
he put his money into the machine. The contract was concluded at that time. "48 
Sir Gordon Willmer also referred to the absence of an opportunity for Mr 
Thornton to change his mind or withdraw: 
"[.. ]in the case of a ticket which is proffered by an automatic machine there is 
something quite irrevocable about the process. There can be no locus 
poenitentiae. "49 
This factor was clearly influential in their Lordships' decision. In the majority of 
website transactions there will be an opportunity, or for a consumer a number of 
opportunities to withdraw from the transaction. This may also be a factor for 
consideration in the analysis of any electronic contractual process so 
However, with automated websites further analysis of the transaction may be 
necessary to consider whether a ̀ counter offer' is made when the system responds to the 
customer's order. Following the submission of his order a customer will usually receive a 
response from the vendor's website, containing details of his order and terms and 
47 Op cit fn 45. 
4e (1971] 2 QB 163, at 169. 
49 Ad at p 174. 
50 To an extent the Electronic Commerce and Distance Selling Directives (and implementing regulations) 
provide opportunities for a consumer to withdraw from an electronic contract in certain circumstances. 
Discussed above at 7.4. 
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conditions relating to the transactions' If the response does no more than clarify terms 
of the original offer in a manner anticipated, then the customer's offer will stand. "Z 
However, if new terms are introduced or existing terms are amended then the customer's 
offer will be extinguished and the response he receives will be an offer from the vendor 
(or his automated system) which is then open to being accepted or rejected by the 
customer. 53 
8.3.1.3 Mistakes and Errors in Contract Formations' 
If a contractually significant communication contains an error, or is sent or made 
available by mistake then the question may arise as to whether a party will be bound. 
Clearly the party will not have the relevant intention on a subjective analysis, but from 
the objective point of view the courts may consider him bound due to the objective 
appearance of his intent. 
The potential for disputes in this area was highlighted recently when a catalogue 
of `errors' on the web-sites of high profile retailers, including Argos, Amazon and Kodak 
were brought to light in the media. " In all of the incidents an item was illustrated on a 
website at the wrong price. " In the 'Argos free TV debacle', as it was dubbed, 57 a 
television was advertised for two pounds ninety-nine rather than two hundred and 
ninety-nine pounds. A small computer error, according to the company, but one with 
considerable impact. The error did not become the subject of court action, but 
nevertheless led to some academic comment and consideration of the relevant 
contractual principles. On the basis of the common law principles discussed above there 
is persuasive argument that in such situations the web pages would be considered no 
more than invitations to treat. On this basis the retailer was quite entitled to `reject' the 
51 The most common being terms relating to delivery and product returns, but often more significant terms 
relating to liability, applicable law and jurisdiction will often be included. 
52 Being equivalent to further enquiries or simple clarification of the existing terms and conditions. Stet izmn 
vMcLean (1880) 5 QB 346. 
53 Such a response would be considered acounter-offer by the courts. JonesvDco id [1894] 2 Ch 332. This 
will not only have implications for the timing of the conclusion of the contract but may also affect issues 
such as jurisdiction (above at 4.4) and incorporation of terms (below at 9). 
54 Mistakes are also considered in the section on mistaken identity in contract law at 6.3. Here, the focus is 
a more detailed analysis of errors in pricing and the activities of electronic agents, such as interactive 
websites. 
55 See Azim-Kahn, R. & MacQueen, H. L. "The Argos Free TV Debacle: Two Legal Opinions" (1999)1(9) 
E&troviic Business Law 9-10; ZDNet News (news. zdnet. co. uk) on 19/03/2003 and 31/01/2002 respectively. 
56 A regular occurrence in the 'real' world and one which is met with disbelief when the customer is 
informed that, on the strict letter of the law, the store owner is not obliged to sell the item to them at the 
marked price. 
57 See Azim-Kahn, R& MacQueen, H. L. op cit fn. 55. 
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offers made by customers responding to the erroneous advert 58 However, the potential 
exists, particularly with the development of interactive websites, for the `offer' to be 
made by the vendor rather than the customer, which the customer may then accept. 
Alternatively the customers offer could be accepted by the vendor's automated website 59 
In these situations the question of whether the seller is bound to sell at the erroneous 
price will be raised. 
It has been indicated that the law takes an objective approach to agreement. 
Whether the offer was made due to human or computer error the vendor will be bound 
by his `apparent' agreement. In Cenzniv. z al Estates plc v Me, vh mt Iv=v= Assurm ce Co. 
Lta ° the court decided that 
"In our opinion... it is contrary to the well established principles of contract law 
to suggest that the offeror under a bilateral contract can withdraw an 
unambiguous offer, after it has been accepted in the manner contemplated by the 
offer, merely because he has made a mistake which the offeree neither knew or 
could reasonably have known at the time when he accepted it. "61 
By implication this judgment suggests adifferent conclusion where the offeree knows or, 
as a reasonable person, should have known of the mistake. Hence, in Hartcg v Colin Emd 
Shieldsb2 Singleton J concluded that, 
"The plaintiff could not reasonably have supposed that the offer contained the 
offeror's real intention"63 
and on this basis could not enforce the agreement against the offeror. If a `reasonable 
man' in the position of the offeree ought to have known of the error then he will not be 
permitted to `snap up' that erroneous offer. " Clearly there is potential here for arguing 
that in the Argos case, the erroneous error on the website could not be `accepted' to 
58 It must also be remembered that advertisements and other promotional devices are subject to regulation 
and controlled on public policy grounds. Of particular elevance is the Consumer Protection Act 1987, 
s. 20 (misleading price indications). 
59 This was the position in the Kodak incident op czt fn 55 above. 
60 [1993] Corn. LR 158. 
61 Ibid per Slade LJ. 
62 [1939] 3 All E. R. 566. 
63 See also Watkin v WatsomSmizh Fr Trnes, July 3,1986. 
64 See also ScrnnnBms & CovHind y& Co [1913] 3 KB 504. 
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form a binding contract on the basis that a `reasonable person' ought to have realised 
that there was a mistake bs 
However, there is some debate as to the correct outcome in a situation where the 
offeree does not know that the ̀ offer' does not contain the offeror's real intention but 
does not necessarily believe, or has not formed an opinion on, whether the offeror has 
the requisite intention. One view is that the offeror is bound because the objective test is 
satisfied as long as the offeree does not know that the offer does not contain the 
offeror's intention. " Whilst this approach would appear in line with the dicta in 
CoV=iz ial Estates there is some criticism of this reasoning and its potentially harsh 
consequences for the offeror. Professor Atiyahb' has criticised the approach taken in the 
CG racial case and suggested that the decision in 77 Harmab Bkonent a! 8 casts doubt 
on Caitmv acial and similarly decided cases 69 In Tae Hannah Bkon nthal Brightman L 
states that "The test in my opinion is not wholly objective"70and he proceeded to 
emphasise the importance of the offeree's subjective state of mind. 
Atiyah argues that the outcome of such cases hould not be based on whether a 
communication can be classified as an offer which has been accepted or not, but rather 
on a party's reliance on the communication. It is the altering of the offeree's position in 
reliance on the apparent offer which should give rise to obligations. " 
"Why should an offeree be entitled to create legal rights for himself by the bare 
act of acceptance when he has in no way relied upon the offer before being 
informed that it was made as a result of a mistake and did not in reality reflect the 
intention of the offeror? "72 
It can be concluded therefore, that even where there is an objective appearance 
of an intention to be bound, the subjective state of mind of the offeree may be decisive. 
65 However, in the modern commercial market this argument may not always be available, particularly 
where websites are using very low prices or'loss-leaders', to attract custom. The travel industry is a 
particularly good example with airlines and holiday firms offering ridiculously cheap deals to the first few 
customers (a classic example being the `Hoover free flights' offer in the 1990's). 
66 TxAm%k7d Ahn3, ý- GnbHvFrabuil SA (The Mukr ik Holsatia) [1988] 2 Lloyds Rep. 486 at 492; Fumess 
Wirhy (Australia) Ltd v Metal Disý (UK) Ltd (Ike Anuczonral [ 1990] 1 Lloyds Rep. 236 at 242. 
67 At yah, P. S. "The Hannah Blumenthal and classical contract law" (1986) 102 (Jul) Law QuartedyRetiew (LQR) 363 - 369 at 368. 
68P)j¶ &CA A/SvPxWvwireHarrahBh#nmthal[1983]1 All ER 34([IL); [1983]1A. C. 854. 
69 For example 71h Leonidas D [1985] 2 All E. R. 796. 
70Opcitfn68atp924. 
11 See also Treitel, G. K 7 Law q'Qrzma 11th ed (2003) p. 9. 
72 op cit fn 66. 
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It may also be relevant whether his state of mind puts him in a position to suffer some 
prejudice from reliance on that objective appearance. " 
One additional consideration in the electronic environment is the ease with 
which an error may be made and the speed at which that erroneous communication may 
reach the other party. Even if a party is aware of the mistake he has made, the nature of 
electronic communications means that before he has any chance to retrieve the message 
an automated system may have confirmed the order and concluded the contract. This 
particular type of mistake has, to an extent, been considered by legislators and as a 
consequence provisions have been introduced to minimise the risk, particularly in 
relation to consumers. 
The potential for customers to input errors by, for example, hitting the wrong 
keys or striking the enter key too soon and accidentally concluding a contract, was 
recognised during the development of the Electronic Commerce Directive. " In the final 
Directive the following provision can be found in Article 11; 
"Member States shall ensure that, except when otherwise agreed by parties who 
are not consumers, the service provider makes available to the recipient of the 
service appropriate, effective and accessible technical means allowing him to 
identify and correct input errors, prior to the placing of the order. "75 
The opportunity to identify and correct errors, including those which the 
consumer may not have been aware of when initially inputting his information, was seen 
as an important factor in the development of trust and confidence in electronic 
commerce and new technology. The provision does not apply to contracts concluded 
exclusively by means of electronic mail or equivalent individual communications, which, 
although the preamble to the Directive states that it should not, has the potential to 
create a loophole. "' It is assumed that with an e-mail you will always have an opportunity 
to amend it before sending it whereas with an interactive website a customer may not 
n Ibid 
'4 See 'Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic 
commerce in the internal market' COM(1998) 586 final. OJ C 030 (05/02/1999) at p. 12. 
75 Article 11(2). Implemented by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002 No. 
2013). See below at paras. 8.43 & 8.4.5. 
76 Recital (39) "The exceptions to the provisions concerning the contracts concluded exclusively by 
electronic mail or by equivalent individual communications provided for by this directive, in relation to 
information to be provided and the placing of orders, should not enable as a result, the by-passing of those 
provisions by providers of information society services. " 
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always have the opportunity to check what he has typed. " Nevertheless with e-mail 
communication mistakes may be made or the message may have been corrupted in 
transmission. 
If the analysis indicates that an offer has been made, a corresponding acceptance 
is required to form a contract. 
8.4 Acceptance 
As a general rule the time and place at which acceptance is effective indicates the 
conclusion of the contract. This `point' in time is of great significance to the parties 
indicating the moment at which they become bound and further, the point after which 
no more terms or conditions may be introduced into the contract. '' Although in relation 
to jurisdictional and applicable law issues, the `place' acceptance occurred has become 
less influential, it nevertheless retains a residual role, particularly when one of the parties 
is domiciled in a non EU or EFTA (EEA) State. 79 
In the electronic environment ̀when' and ̀where' a contract has been concluded 
may be difficult to ascertain. This uncertainty has led to much debate as to which rules 
should apply and also whether legislation should be introduced to clarify the position. 
Much of the impetus behind attempts to clarify the situation has resulted from the desire 
to provide a harmonised approach, particularly within the EU, to facilitate and aid the 
development of electronic commerce. On the need to provide a legal framework for 
electronic commerce in the internal market the European Commission stated that: 
"Moves in certain Member States to enact new legislation are apparent and there 
are already differences in approach which entail a real risk in the short term of 
fragmenting the internal market. "" 
Nevertheless, the starting point for a discussion of the issues remains the common law 
principles in England and Wales. 
Acceptance is the final and unequivocal assent o the terms of the offer. An 
acceptance should not contain any new terms or variations of the terms of the offer. If it 
does so, the courts will treat it as a counter-offer and the original offer will be brought to 
n In practice the supplier's ite will usually send an e-mail to the customer clarifying the order and giving 
the customer opportunity to check and amend the order where necessary. 
'a Unless the contract allows for such introduction either expressly or impliedly. 
79 See chapters 4&5 above. 
80 pp ciý fn 70 at p. 8. 
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an end. 81 However, if the communication merely seeks to clarify or confirm the detail of 
the offer it will not be treated as a counter-offer but rather a `mere inquiry' and the 
original offer will stand. 82 
At this point the approach adopted by some interactive websites must be 
considered. Often the customer's order, which will usually equate to a contractual offer, 
will be followed by a message (either on screen or via e-mail) from the supplier, or his 
electronic agent, confirming that the order has been received. However, in addition to 
this confirmation it is common for the message to include additional terms relating to 
delivery, choice of forum and applicable law. If this was not clearly provided for in the 
original offer then this communication will be a counter-offer equiring an acceptance by 
the customer before the contract is concluded. 83 
8.4.1 Acceptance: The General Rule 
As a general rule acceptance must be communicated to the offeror. Silence may 
be seen as equivocal and there would have to be compelling evidence to satisfy the court 
that a contract had been concluded. 84 However, there are at least two situations where 
although the offeree is silent an acceptance may still be found. 
In a unilateral contract the performance of the conduct stipulated in the offer 
constitutes acceptance. 85 Hence, if an e-mail or SMS message offers a ̀ free gift' in return 
for your presence at a particular venue, then fulfilling that request will constitute 
acceptance. Communicating your intent to accept the offer to the offeror is not 
necessary. 
In a bilateral contract, if the offeree is silent but his conduct is unequivocal then 
the courts may find that the conduct itself provides the objective manifestation of intent 
required. In Brogden v Metr titan Rai zwy Co8'the court upheld the existence of a bilateral 
contract on the basis of the parry's conduct. The railway company did not communicate 
its acceptance to Brogden but their conduct clearly indicated their intention to accept and 
Brogden was aware of this conduct. Lord Cairns felt that 
81 HuevW ich (1840) 3 Beav 334 and joraesvLI=id [1894] 2 Ch 332. 
82 See Lush LJ in SwunsmvMcLean (1880) 5 Q. B. D. 346. 
83 Even if the original offer was made 'on the suppliers terms and conditions' which provided for this 
occurrence, questions would still remain as to the effectiveness of such clauses, particularly against a 
consumer. See below chapters 10 & 11. 
84 See Feld usevBindley (1862) 11 C. B. (N. S) 869, where the facts would appear to support a compelling 
argument that the nephew had accepted the offer. cf. ie Hannah Bl al [1983] AC 854. 
85 See Csnrlrll u Co-&& Smoke Ball Co [1893 ]1 QB 256 and Bourmuaz u Association of British Tratd Agents 
Da[1996] CLC 456. 
86 Brogdm v Mehvpo&4n Rai zwy Co (1877) 2 App Cas 666. 
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"... approbation was clearly given when the company commenced a course of 
dealing which is referable... only to the contract, and when that course of dealing 
was accepted and acted upon by [Brogden] in the supply of coals. "87 
The conduct was in itself unequivocal and could not be attributed to anything other than 
acceptance of the offer. 88 In later cases the courts have emphasised that the conduct 
must only be referable to the contractual document in question, otherwise the courts will 
not infer that the parties had agreed to that document 89 It is also clearly important that 
the offeror is aware of the conduct. 
In addition to establishing what will constitute an acceptance it is also necessary 
to consider the point at which that acceptance is effective. There must be some 
"external manifestation of assent" which "the law can regard as communication of the 
acceptance to the offeror" 9° This may take a variety of forms depending upon the 
nature of the case but in general, communication of acceptance is effective when it is 
`received' by the offeror or brought to his attention. At what point an electronic 
communication is actually ̀received' may be the subject of some uncertainty. " However, 
before this point is considered it is necessary to examine whether a well-established 
exception to the general rule on acceptance - the postal rule - has a role to play in the 
electronic environment 92 
8.4.2 Acceptance: The Postal Rule 
The most significant" exception to the rule that acceptance is only effective when 
communicated to the offeror, is the `postal rule'. In Ento s Ltd v Mzla Far East 
Crnpratior? ' Lord Denning expressed the rule thus: 
87 Aid at p 680. 
88 See also Trerrthvn Ltd vArrhital Luxfer [1993] 1 Iloyds Rep 437. 
89 See Rix J. in Jayuur Immix Ltd v Toakaz Group Ltd [1996] 2 Lloyds Rep 437 at p 446. 
90 Poudl v Lee (1908) 99 LT 284. 
91 See below at 8.4.3. 
92 See Murray, A. D. "Entering Into Contracts Electronically: The Real W. W. W. " in Edwards, L. & 
Waelde, C. (eds) Law and the Intent A Fran ork for El c Cam m 2nd ed. (Hart: Portland, Oregon, 
2000) at p. 17 and Downing, S. & Harrington, J. "The Postal Rule in Electronic Commerce: A 
Reconsideration" (2000) 5(2) Cavramz iaru Law 43. 
93 And undeniably the most academically debated. See Houghton, K. & Vaughan-Neil, K. "E-mail and 
the postal rule" (2001) 12(5) Q» pi eas & Lacy, 31-35; Werner, J. "E-commerce. co. uk - local rules in a 
global net: online business transactions and the applicability of traditional English contract law 
rules. "(2001) 6 Intenuaia ai Jamd of C. o'v1 c1ications Law aid Policy (IJCLP); Iri sh Law Times. "01d 
commercial law rules: traps for the unwary? " (1995) 13(2) Irish Law Tares (IL7) 25; Stone, R. "The postal 
rule in the electronic age. " (1992) 5(Spr) Stmt LawRwrew 15-16,18; Gardner, S. "Trashing with Trollope: 
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"When a contract is made by post it is clear law throughout the common law 
countries that the acceptance is complete as soon as the letter is put into the post 
box, and that is the place where the contract is made. "95 
In effect the rule, or more correctly the exception to the general rule, brings the point of 
contract formation forward. In order to assess the merit of any suggestion that the 
postal rule should apply to any form of electronic communication, the origin and 
purpose of the postal rule must first be considered. 
The case usually attributed with the ̀ creation' of the rule is Adens v. Lindsell'6. In 
this case the courts were faced with adjudicating which of the parties should bear the risk 
of a lost or delayed communication of acceptance. On the facts it would appear that the 
court placed the risk with the party in error (in this case the offeror), however, that was 
not the stated reasoning in the case. Lord Ellenborough CJ. felt that the rule was 
necessary because without it no contract entered into at a distance could be concluded. 
"... no contract could ever be completed by the post. For if the defendants were 
not bound by their offer when accepted by the plaintiffs till the answer were 
received, then the plaintiffs ought not to be bound till after they had received the 
notification that the defendants had viewed their answer and assented to it. And 
so it might go on ad ritýn 
97 
However, as Professor Treitel explains, the potential for infinite communications is 
avoided with any rule whether that rule dictates that the letter becomes effective on 
posting or delivery, the existence of a rule will suffice. 98 (Although this obvious point did 
not prevent the debate surfacing in early drafts of the Electronic Commerce Directive in 
the Commission's attempts to clarify the point of contract formation). " Gardner 
a deconstruction of the postal rules in contract. " (1992) 12 (2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 170-194; 
Morrison, P. "E-Commerce In The Construction Industry" (2002) 7.1 On & Eng Law 7; Glatt, C. 
"Comparative Issues In The Formation Of Electronic Contracts" (1998) 61JL SIT 34. 
94 [1955] 2 All E. R. 493 
95 Lord Denning in Entmin Ltd vMi(es Far East Q» oration [1955] 2 All E. R. 493; [1955] 2 Q. B. 327at p. 331. 
96 (1818) 1B& AId 681. However, this case was in fact decided before any general rule that acceptance 
must be communicated existed, see Simpson, "Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law" (1975)91 
Law Qatar 1y Rev 247. 
97 Ibrd 
98 Treitel, G. H. The Lary of Contract 10th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1999) at p. 24. See also Gardner S, 
"Trashing with Trollopei A Deconstruction of the Postal Rules in Contract" (1992) 12 OJLS 170. 
99 A debate which bore a striking resemblance to Lord Ellenborough's statement in Adonsv. Lindsell. 
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suggests that the court's reasoning in Ada'ns v. Lindsell was rather more focussed on an 
older subjective notion of contract than practicality: 
"Perhaps the best explanation for the court's choice of posting is that on the 
facts of the case this view involved the lesser departure from the consensus model. 
At posting, the parties happen simultaneously to contemplate contracting 
together... ; whereas by the time of the letter's delivery the defendants no longer 
intended contracting with the plaintiffs. "10° 
Here what must be emphasised is that, for whatever reason, in Adam v Lindsell 
the court decided that a letter of acceptance would be effective on posting. 
In later cases, further justifications for the postal rule were put forward. In 
Household Firn and Carriage Amt Insw- ce Co v. Grant101 Thesiger LJ suggested agency as 
a basis for the rule. In attempting to reconcile the need for communication of 
acceptance to the offeror with the postal rule and the principle of cons us ad idon he 
continues: 
"How then are these elements of law to be harmonised in the case of contracts 
formed by correspondence through the post? I see no better mode than that of 
treating the post office as the agent of both parties. ""' 
Faced with such irreconcilable principles the concept of agency was a convenient 
distraction, but as was stated at the time.. ' and has been stated many times since, the idea 
that the post office is an agent of both parties for such communications is but a 
fiction. 104 It must be said that a consistent and sustainable justification for the postal rule 
is difficult to ascertain: 
"The decisions which established these rules offered various justifications for 
them, but it has for some time been accepted that these justifications are not 
100 Gardner, op cit fn 94, at p. 171. 
101 (1879) 4 Ex D 216,223-4. 
102 Ibid at 221. 
103 See the dissenting judgment of Bramwell L. J. at p 238. 
104 See Atiyah In r -hicva: to the Lawof Contract 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at p. 71; Macdonald, 
E& Rowland, D. Infomratias T Law. 2°d ed. (Cavendish: London, 2000) at p305; Downing and 
Harrington (2000) 5(2) CommL 43; Gardner 'Trashvzgwith Trollop A dexnanxtbnofdrPostdRules in 
Garnniet " (1992)12 OJIS 170,173. 
178 
Elazrmic Car-act Formation 
wholly successful. It has proved harder, however, to find satisfactory alternative 
explanations. ""' 
Presented with the task of apportioning a loss due to a failure in the communication of 
acceptance by post, the courts chose to favour the offeree. The risk of loss or delay in 
the post through neither party's fault had to be placed on one party or the other. The 
apparent injustice created by such allocation has been tempered by the acknowledgement 
that the offeror may readily exclude the effect of the rule. 106 In addition the rule should 
not apply where the offeree is at fault through, for example, failing to correctly stamp 
and address the communication or where the rule's application would result in `manifest 
inconvenience or absurdity. "' 
However, further consideration has been given to the scope of application of the 
postal rule in relation to more modem forms of communication. In particular, the 
question of its application to telex or fax has been addressed and can provide some 
guidance to the likelihood of its use in the context of e-mail or web-based contracting. 
In Entares Ltd v Miles Far East Corp ratid °8 the Court of Appeal was invited to 
consider the extension of the postal rule to telex communications. In rejecting this 
possibility Denning LJ emphasised the `instantaneous' nature of telex communication as 
a decisive factor in the decision: 
"My conclusion is that the rule about instantaneous communications is different 
from the rule about the post. The contract is only complete when the acceptance 
is received by the offeror. and the contract is made at the place where the 
acceptance is received. ""' 
However, in his judgment Lord Denning did not discuss the underlying principles or 
purpose of the postal rule; rather he concentrated on the relative knowledge of the 
parties in relation to a failed or delayed communication. In his assessment, he party at 
fault or who should reasonably have known of an error or problem will be ascribed the 
risk of any subsequent loss. Where this assessment does not indicate that one party was 
in a better position to know of the error, Lord Denning felt that there was no need to 
105 Ibid Gardner, referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Henthorn u Fraser[1892]2 CH 27. 
106 Hotel SaxailresvHug/ [1974] 1 AH ER 161. 
107 ibid pier Lawton LJ at p. 168. 
108 [1955] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 511; [1955] 2 Q. B. 327. 
109 Ad at p 515. 
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depart from the general rule on communication of acceptances when dealing with 
`instantaneous' forms of communication. "' 
In the more recent case of Brinkilron v Stahag Stahl und Stahhavw v7delgesellsahafi 
mbH' the House of Lords was faced with a situation similar to that in the Entores case. 
Once again the possibility of extending the postal rule principles to telex communication 
was rejected. However, the court was more forthcoming with a discussion of underlying 
principles and reasoning. Referring to Harris's Case112 and Househeld Fire acrd Co* 
Aaident Insurv7c Co v. Grant'" Lord Wilberforce stated his view of the rationale behind 
the postal rule. In his judgment he acknowledged that the rule's development could, in 
part, be attributed to the potential for fraud and other unscrupulous behaviour should 
the general rule on acceptance be applied to the post. "' He also emphasised that the 
exception relating to postal acceptances had its "foundation in convenience". "' Arriving 
at the same conclusion Lord Fraser explained the practical convenience of the postal rule 
in the light of the inevitable delay associated with the delivery of a letter. However, he 
continued to express his disquiet regarding the `instantaneous communication' 
distinction: 
"There is very little, if any, difference in the mechanics of transmission between a 
private telex from one business office to another and a telegram sent through the 
Post Office, especially one sent from one large city to another. Even the element 
of delay will not be greatly different in the typical case. "16 
However, he continued that a telex sent directly between acceptor's and offeror's offices 
should be treated `as if it zeum an instantaneous communication. "' His reasoning was 
thus: 
"One reason is that the decision to that effect in Entorvs Ltd v Miles Far East Corp 
[... ] seems to have worked without leading to serious difficulty or complaint 
110 For some time the focus of debate has been the issue of whether communication is 'instantaneous' or 
not. However, even Denning conceded that communications uch as telex were, at best, 'virtually 
instantaneous' indicating that perhaps this issue was not the focus of his reasoning? 
111 [1983] 2 A. C. 34. 
112 (1872) LR 7 Ch App 587. 
113 (1879) 4 Ex D 216. 
»' For example the offeree denying the existence of a contract should the deal turn sour in the time 
between posting and delivery. 
1's Reiterating the words of Lord Thesiger op cit fn 98 at p224. 
116 Opcitfn 107atp43. 
117 Ibid emphasis added. 
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from the business community. Secondly, once the message has been received on 
the offeror's telex machine, it is not unreasonable to treat it as delivered to the 
principal offeror, because it is his responsibility to arrange for prompt handling 
of messages within his own office. Thirdly, a party (the acceptor) who tries to 
send a message by telex can generally tell if his message has not been received on 
the other party's (the offeror's) machine, whereas the offeror, of course, will not 
know if an unsuccessful attempt has been made to send an acceptance to him. It 
is therefore convenient hat the acceptor, being in the better position, should 
have the responsibility of ensuring that his message is received. ""' 
To deal with these reasons individually, the first is an observation relating to the 
practicality of the rule. While the validity of this statement could be debated either way, 
it does not really indicate a principle of law. The second of Lord Fraser's observations 
does not relate to the application of the postal rule at all, but rather to the general rule 
and the point at which acceptance is deemed to be received by the offeror. 19 The third 
point, and arguably the basis of the decision, relates to the allocation of risk of a failure in 
communication to the party in the best position to be aware of such failure. This will 
inevitably be the offeree because, in the usual course of events, only he will be aware that 
an acceptance has been sent. 
It is debatable whether in this or the Entoivs case the court's adjudication was 
based on whether the method of communication was instantaneous or not. Rather the 
underlying rationale was whether in the normal course of events errors or failures in 
delivery of the communication would be apparent to either party. With a letter sent by 
post, the sender cannot reasonably be expected to know that the letter has been delayed 
or lost. With telex and other forms of communication a considerable delay is not 
`inevitable' and there is a persuasive argument that one or other party may reasonably be 
expected to be aware of a problem within a short period of time. In addition, in both of 
the cases the court emphasised that if there was an element of fault in relation to the 
delivery of the communication, then the culpable party would bare the risk of any 
subsequent loss. 
In spite of the reluctance to extend the postal rule to telex the courts appear to 
have left some discretion for further exceptions to the general rule: 
us 1bU 
119 This issue is returned to below at 8.4.3. 
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"No universal rule can cover all such cases; they must be resolved by reference to 
the intentions of the parties, by sound business practice and in some cases by a 
judgment where the risks should lie. "'zo 
Although in his judgment Lord Wilberforce is referring to telex communication this 
passage does reinforce the suggestion that the courts will take a pragmatic approach 
when confronted with a similar problem. The introduction and increased use of the 
postal system resulted in particular problems for the courts to solve. The solution was 
the `postal rule' and that is exactly what it is -a rule for the post. As Professor Atiyah 
states: 
"... the rule must now be accepted for what it is, no better and no worse than any 
other solution of a practical problem. ""' 
With the dramatic increase in the use of modern electronic forms of 
communication the courts may once again be required to find a solution to a difficult 
problem. Faced with parties in dispute as to if, when, or where a contract has been 
formed, when messages have been sent via e-mail or some other form of electronic 
communication, the courts may be required to decide between the `receipt' and 
`despatch' rule in their adjudication. This does not necessarily mean that the solution 
applied to an earlier problem can be transferred to the new situation. However, without 
legislative intervention the courts will be bound to interpret the rather unsatisfactory case 
law in order to resolve the dispute. 
Some commentators have suggested that the postal rule may be applied to e-mail 
communication but not to online transactions, such as interactive websites. lu E-mail 
demonstrates many features similar to the postal system. After the point of despatch the 
sender of the communication has very little control over what happens to it and he has 
done `all he can do' in handing control over to a third party. There is inevitably some 
'20 Lord Wilberforce in Brinki&m v StakStahl wrd StalAawvAv WgeO bt mbH [ 1983] 2 A. C. 34 at p 42, 
referring to the multitude of possible telex communication scenarios. His sentiments were echoed by Lord 
Fraser at p 43. 
121 Atiyah, op cit fn 100. 
122 See; Murray, A. D. "Entering Into Contracts Electronically: The Real W. W. W. " in Edwards, L. & 
Waelde, C. (eds) Lary cord the Inten A Fra naeork for Elazraic Cam m 2nd ed. (Hart: Portland, Oregon, 
2000) at p. 26 and Downing, S. & Harrington, J. "The Postal Rule in Electronic Commerce: A 
Reconsideration" (2000) 5 (2) Carmaicz&ns Law 43. 
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form of delay with the use of e-mail because more often than not the two parties are not 
communicating simultaneously. It has been suggested that the postal rule should be 
reformulated in the ̀ twenty-first century, focussing on the nature of the communication 
itself. 
"Where an offer contemplates acceptance by a non-immediate form of 
communication, that acceptance is effective from the time it leaves the acceptor's 
control. ""' 
However, as Murray observes, such a definition is heavily reliant on the distinction 
between immediate and non-immediate forms of communication; a volatile and difficult 
distinction at present and one which may become increasingly blurred in the future. 
More importantly however, it is a distinction based on the references to `instantaneous 
communication', which, it is argued above, detract from the substantive reasoning of the 
courts in the Entrnvs and Brinkilzn cases. 
The treating of a contractually significant communication in different ways, solely 
on the basis of the means of communication adopted is difficult to justify. The difficulty 
is highlighted by the attempts to identify the rationale behind the introduction of the 
postal rule in order to ascertain whether it is applicable to other forms of 
communication. New forms of electronic communication raise new legal questions and 
it is important that a sound rationale forms the basis of their treatment by the law. 
Without a sound rationale for different treatment or alternatively a uniform approach to 
the treatment of all forms of communication there will be uncertainty in the law. 
In the more recent cases addressing the issue, the courts have placed the 
emphasis on the allocation of risk and a consideration of which party is in the better 
position to know of, and take action on, a failure in communication. Within this 
rationale the courts have re-enforced the application of the general rule on the 
communication of acceptance. With telex communication a delay is quite possible and at 
times inevitable. Although the same can be said of e-mail and other forms of electronic 
communication, in relation to telex, the courts have not found it necessary or desirable to 
make an exception to the general rule on acceptance on the grounds of commercial or 
judicial convenience. It is submitted that the case will be the same for e-mail and other 
forms of electronic communication. 
123 See Murray 1d 
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One of the few clear points to arise out of this analysis is that if the offeror is at 
fault in some way in not receiving an acceptance or delaying its receipt, the court will rule 
in favour of the offeree. In the electronic environment, if a party fails to download or 
read e-mail or data from a website, or fails to ensure that an interactive website is dealing 
effectively with communications of acceptance, a court may rule that in law he has 
`received' that communication and is thereby bound. 
8.4.3 When is an Electronic Communication of Acceptance `Received'? 
If the courts decide that the general rule on acceptance applies to an electronic 
communication, so that it must be received to be effective, then the crucial issue 
becomes the time and place of rxipt of that communication. In the electronic 
environment there are numerous identifiable points along the communications network 
at which a communication may be considered ̀received' by the addressee. "' 
In the assessment of whether a communication has been ̀ received' the objective 
approach to agreement adopted by the courts of England and Wales must be considered. 
It would appear that `actual' communication to the offeror or to an agent is not 
necessary. Statements supporting this suggestion can be seen, in the context of telex 
communication, in the speeches of Lord Denning in Eno m and Lord Fraser in Brmkd 
Lord Fraser stated that: 
"... once the message has been received on the offeror's telex machine, it is not 
unreasonable to treat it as delivered to the principal offeror, because it is his 
responsibility to arrange for prompt handling of messages within his own 
office. ""' 
As a caveat, however, it must be accepted that if a communication arrives at a time when 
it would not be reasonable to expect the offeror to receive communication of acceptance 
then this principle will not apply. For example, if a communication were to arrive 
outside of office hours, then the offeror cannot reasonably be said to have ̀ received' it 
until the beginning of the next working day. 126 
124 For example, the point at which an e-mail arrives at his service provider's server or the point at which 
the e-mail is downloaded to the recipient's computer. 
us CO th fn 107, per Lord Fraser at p. 43. 
126 See Gatehouse J in Mon&al Shipping and G6ar i? gBVvAstmte Sh: ppmg Ltd [1995] CLC 1011. His 
comments were in the context of contractual notice rather than acceptance of an offer, but the principle is 
consistent. See also Sc &e Delta Shipping RVv Astarte Shipping Ltd (The Aanela) [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 249. 
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If a business party is using e-mail, a website or other form of electronic 
communication then Lord Fraser's treatment of telex can readily be applied, placing the 
responsibility to efficiently handle communications on the offeror. However, the nature 
of the electronic environment raises yet another important question; what are the ̀ office 
hours' of the on-line environment? The lack of geographical and temporal constraints 
on the Internet means that it is conceivable, or arguably usual for interactive websites to 
operate twenty-four hours a day. This is after all one of the main advantages of 
electronic commerce. For the purpose of this present discussion it could be argued that 
the ̀ office hours' are all-day every-day. This would suggest that as soon as a message of 
acceptance is received on the service provider's site it is effective. The service provider 
may attempt to limit the virtual office hours of the site to specific period, within which 
he or his staff are able to monitor the communications. Naturally the site owner will 
have to state which time-zone he is referring to (GMT for example) if wishing to restrict 
his ̀ office hours'. The problem with adopting this approach would be the risk that such 
restrictions may deter custom from individuals in different time zones, removing one of 
the key benefits of the electronic environment. "' 
In Entores Lord Denning emphasised the point that if the offeror is at fault in 
some way he may be "estopped from denying the receipt of the acceptance where it 
would be reasonable to expect him to ensure that the message is received. ""' Hence, the 
collection or `prompt handling' of communications will clearly be the responsibility of 
the party using the technology, as will be the maintenance of that technology (this is 
analogous to ensuring that a telex machine does not run out of paper). Lord 
Wilberforce's declaration that no universal rule can cover all cases and that reference 
must be made to not only the parties' intentions but also "sound business practice"129 
and risk allocation must also be remembered. This pragmatic approach is particularly 
relevant when the wide range of business practice in the electronic environment is 
considered. The key question for the purpose of this discussion is; how may this 
objective view of receipt be applied to electronic forms of communication? "o 
With web-based and e-mail communications there are various points at which the 
communication could be considered received - when downloaded to the offeror's 
127 This may explain why many commercial websites do not restrict their business hours' and have 24hr 
helplines. 
128 Op cit 104 per Lord Denning at p. 515. 
129 Op cit fn 107. 
130 For an interesting comparison with the German civil system on this point see; Niemann, Jan-Malte. 
"Cyber Contracts -A Comparative View On The Actual Time of Formation" (2000) 5,2 C, aranL at p48. 
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computer or when it arrives on the server from where he is able to access the 
communication. By analogy with Lord Fraser's statement in Brinkilvn, it has been 
suggested that as the offeror is responsible for the `prompt handling of messages', the 
arrival in the offeror's electronic mailbox on the server is the appropriate point. "' 
However, the distinction has also been made between an offeror operating his own 
server and one utilising an Internet Service Provider's facilities. "' The communication in 
the former being `received' when it arrives on the server and in the latter only being 
`received' when it is downloaded from the server. In any event, with an objective 
approach the point at which the communication is considered received will vary 
depending on the factual scenario. However, this approach does create an unfortunate 
amount of uncertainty, particularly for parties looking to commercially exploit the 
electronic environment. This has led to a perceived need amongst service providers to 
explicitly state the intended legal consequences of every communication. Whilst this 
does give the illusion of creating certainty it makes websites cumbersome, containing 
extensive terms and conditions which, in any event, may be ineffective in the face of 
local rules and legislation in different Jurisdictions. "' 
8.4.3 Regulatory Clarification of the Point of Acceptance? 
The `receipt' of electronic communications has been addressed in both the 
UNCTI'RAL Model Law and the Electronic Commerce Directive. While the question of 
whether that communication is an acceptance and whether acceptance is effective on 
despatch or receipt will remain to be decided by the courts on the basis of common law 
principles, the provisions in these instruments, the Electronic Commerce Directive in 
particular, may influence the court's assessment of when that communication is received. 
8.4.3.1 The LJNC1TRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. 14 
The UNCTIRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce contains the following 
provision which deals with the time and place of despatch as well as receipt: 
», The equivalent to the arrival on the telex machine. See Rowland and Macdonald, op cit fn 27 at p. 306. 
132 See Chissick, M. and Kelman, A. El ric Caron Law and Praa 2nd ed. 2000, (Sweet and Maxwell: 
London, 2000) at para. 3.45. 
'33 See chapter 4 above. 
134 General Assembly Resolution 51/162 of 16 December 1996, UNCTIRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce. Available at, http: //www. uncitral. org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm. htm. 
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Article 15 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, the 
dispatch of a data message occurs when it enters an information system outside 
the control of the originator or of the person who sent the data message on 
behalf of the originator. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, the time 
of receipt of a data message is determined as follows: 
(a) if the addressee has designated an information system for the purpose 
of receiving data messages, receipt occurs: 
(i) at the time when the data message enters the designated 
information system; or 
(n) if the data message is sent to an information system of the 
addressee that is not the designated information system, at the 
time when the data message is retrieved by the addressee; 
(b) if the addressee has not designated an information system, receipt 
occurs when the data message nters an information system of the 
addressee. 
(3) Paragraph (2) applies notwithstanding that the place where the information 
system is located may be different from the place where the data message is 
deemed to be received under paragraph (4). 
(4) Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, a data 
message is deemed to be dispatched at the place where the originator has its place 
of business, and is deemed to be received at the place where the addressee has its 
place of business. For the purposes of this paragraph: 
(a) if the originator or the addressee has more than one place of business, 
the place of business is that which has the closest relationship to the 
underlying transaction or, where there is no underlying transaction, the 
principal place of business; 
(b) if the originator or the addressee does not have a place of business, 
reference is to be made to its habitual residence. 
An `information system' is defined as ̀ a system for generating, sending, receiving, 
storing or otherwise processing data messages. "' A data message `enters' an information 
135 Article 2(0 
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system at the time when it becomes available for processing within that information 
system. 136 
The message is considered despatched when it "enters an information system 
outside the control of the originator, which may be the information system of an 
intermediary or an information system of the addressee. ""' So for example, if an e-mail 
is being sent from an individual's PC, the moment that the message leaves the sender's 
outbox it enters the Internet Service Provider's system from where it will proceed to the 
senders mail-host. M From the moment of clicking `send' the data message moves to a 
system beyond the sender's control. When using an interactive website the information 
input by the customer (the data message) enters the service provider's system when the 
`submit' icon is clicked. 
The time of receipt is defined with reference to whether the recipient has 
`designated an information system for the purpose of receiving data messages' or not. A 
`designated information system' is intended to include the situation where a party has 
specified an address for the receipt of a data message, for example a communication of 
acceptance, but not the situation where an address is simply included on a website or 
other documentation without any specific indication that it should be used for such 
purposes. 139 
To summarise the provision - if a system is specified or designated by the 
addressee the message is deemed received when it is available for processing on that 
system. So, for example, as soon as an e-mail is available for downloading on the web- 
host's server it is deemed received. As soon as information is submitted on a supplier's 
interactive website it is available for processing and hence, deemed received. 
Consequently, if the data message in question were to be a legal acceptance then it would 
be effective at that point. If the message is sent to a system other than the one specified 
then it is only received when the addressee actually retrieves the message from the 
system. In this case the e-mail would only be deemed received when the recipient has 
actually downloaded the message or information to his machine or accessed the 
information remotely from his server. If the addressee does not specify a system then 
the message will be deemed received when it is available for processing on an 
information system of the addressee. This once again places the onus on the recipient to 
136 Guide to Enactment of the UNCTTRAL Model Law on electronic Commerce (1996) at para. 103. 
137 Aid para. 101. 
138 In many cases these will be one and the same. 
139 Op cit fn 133 at para. 102. 
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specify the address for significant communications or to maintain a continuous check on 
all of his addresses or sites. While this approach may be suitable for business parties, 
putting the onus on them to handle their communications efficiently, it is arguably not a 
suitable system for the individual or consumer. 
If it is not ̀ otherwise agreed by the parties', then the message of acceptance may 
be deemed received and therefore effective at a point before the offeror has read or may 
even be aware that the message xists. This places the onus very firmly with the party 
making the offer. If you are aware that you have an ̀ offer' ̀ out there' and you have 
indicated an address and mode of communication it is reasonable to make you 
responsible for dealing with those messages efficiently. 
The Model Law does not explicitly deal with the issue of whether the message is 
intelligible or useable by the addressee or take into account system down-time or faults. 
This may be seen as a potential flaw. In relation to the attribution of data messages the 
Model Law does however incorporate an approach similar to the common law position 
to the `snapping up' of erroneous offers (discussed above 8.3). Article 13 is intended to 
prevent the originator of a message from denying that the message, as received, was the 
one sent by him or on his behalf. If a data message is received with errors and the 
recipient "... knew or should have known, [.. ], that the transmission resulted in any error 
in the data message as received" he will not be entitled to assume that the message is as 
the originator intended to send, or act upon that assumption. 140 
8.4.3.2 The Electronic Commerce Directive 
The Directive does not explicitly deal with contractual acceptance but it does 
indicate the point at which a communication is deemed to be received. If the 
communications referred to happen to be the contractual acceptance, then the relevant 
provision may be of influence in the court's adjudication. Article 11 of the Electronic 
Commerce Directive deals with `receipt' of a data message in the context of the placing 
of an order with a service provider and the service providers' obligation to acknowledge 
the receipt of that order. "' 
140 Article 13 (5) and para 90. In the preliminary materials to the proposed UNCTTRAL Convention on 
Electronic Contracting (A/CN. 9/WG. IV/WP. 95 available at http: //www. uncitral. org) the issues of input 
mistakes and transmission errors are discussed and it is suggested that in certain situations natural persons 
my not be bound by such errors when contracting with automated systems. See chapter 3.2. above. 
141 Communications which may, or may not amount to an offer and acceptance on the application of the 
principles discussed above. 
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"- The order and acknowledgement of receipt are deemed to be received when 
the parties to whom they are addressed are able to access them. " 12 
The phrase `able to access them' leaves some scope for interpretation. The 
Regulation implementing the Directive in the UK143 imports the phrase verbatim in 
regulation 11(2)(a) and the Guidance for Business suggests that when the message is 
`capable of being accessed' by the recipient it will be deemed received, which adds 
little. "' The meaning of `access' is not further clarified and it is stated that its meaning 
`may vary according to the circumstances'. "' During system downtime, there would be 
scope for an argument that the message is not capable of being accessed by the intended 
recipient. However, if the system downtime is controlled by the recipient or is due to his 
poor maintenance this may be a factor, particularly if the courts are faced with an 
allocation of risk for losses incurred. Even if the message is ̀ capable of being accessed' it 
would appear necessary to consider whether it is reasonable to expect the recipient to 
access it at that time. A message sent in the middle of the night is `capable of being 
accessed' but if the recipient is a consumer or even a small business with restricted 
business hours then it is surely not reasonable to deem a contractually significant 
message as ̀ received'. The Article does not explicitly deal with contract formation and 
hence, it is open to the courts to adopt whichever approach they deem appropriate. To 
this end the uncertainty as to the time of `receipt' of a message and hence, the point at 
which a contract is concluded, remains. 
8.4.5 Contract Formation and the Electronic Commerce Directive: A Missed 
Opportunity? 
One of the five key issues to be addressed by the Electronic Commerce 
Directive1" was the on-line conclusion of contracts. Disparities in the legal approach 
adopted in different Member States to the formation of electronic contracts, could have 
a detrimental effect on the economic benefit to be gained from the development of 
142 Article 11. 
113 The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, S. I. 2002 No. 2013. 
144Guidance for business on the Regulations 5.29 (a) available at 
http: //www. dti. gov. uk/cii/docs/ecommerce/businessguidance. pdf 
us IM 
'46 Directive 2000/31/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive 
on electronic commerce) OJ L178/1. 
190 
Elatranic Georad Formaar: 
electronic commerce. "' The European Parliament148 in its report on electronic 
commerce in May 1998 observed that, 
"The conclusion of contracts electronically in a transfrontier and networked 
environment brings about a number of important questions which will have to be 
addressed in order to facilitate electronic commerce transactions across borders. 
For instance, the determination of where and when an electronic contract is 
concluded and which country's law is applicable, could be addressed differently 
by the Member States. These questions... should be clarified in order to facilitate 
electronic contracting within the EU. "149 
In addition to facilitating their use, it was hoped that the Directive would remove 
"legal insecurity by clarifying in certain cases the moment of conclusion of the 
contract... ". 'so Unfortunately the final Directive fell short of this stated goal. In fact, it 
may well be that the goal itself was responsible for its downfall. 
The provision introduced to "determine clearly the time at which the contract is 
concluded""' could be found in the original draft of Article 11. The Article was entitled 
Moment at which the contract is concluded' and read, 
"Member States shall lay down in their legislation that, save where otherwise 
agreed by professional persons, in cases where a recipient, in accepting a service 
provider's offer, is required to give his consent through technological means, 
such as clicking on an icon, the following principles apply: 
(a) the contract is concluded when the recipient of the service: 
- has received from the service provider, electronically, an 
acknowledgment of receipt of the recipient's acceptance, and 
147 Particularly the different approach in systems based in the common law to those developed on the basis 
of Roman Law in the civil system. 
148 Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy. 
'49 "Report on the communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European Initiative in Electronic 
Commerce" (COM(97)0157 - C4-0297/97). (A4-0173/98) at p 21. This opinion was echoed by other 
Community bodies in the subsequent Troposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive' 
COM(98) 586 final; Official Journal C30,05/02/99. Available at; 
'-10 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic 
commerce in the internal market" COM(1998) 586 final OJ C 030 (05/02/1999). Executive Summary at 
p. 4. 
151 Op cit 146, at p 27. 
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- has confirmed receipt of the acknowledgment of receipt; " 152 
The Article respected party autonomy by excluding ̀professional persons' from its 
application where they had express provision in their agreement. "' 
The fact that the proposed Article only covered situations where the recipient 
responded to a service provider's offer appeared to immediately restrict its application. "' 
Whilst it could be argued that it is unlikely that the phrase was intended to mean 
`contractual offer' in the sense discussed above, some of the background material would 
suggest otherwise. The Commission clearly stated that the Article only addressed the 
situation whereby 
"- a concrete offer made by a service provider (the situation in which the service 
provider only issues an invitation to offer is not covered). "155 
The provision also appeared to add complexity to the process of forming electronic 
contracts by requiring an additional communication from both parties before a contract 
was concluded. This requirement led some authors to dub the Article the `ping-pong' 
provision. "' In England and Wales, if the service provider has made an `offer' in the 
legal sense and the customer has communicated his `acceptance' of that offer, then the 
contract is complete. Izma facie, the wording of this early provision appeared to require 
the abandonment of the traditional analysis by requiring two further communications 
before the contract is concluded. The draft Article was also criticised by the European 
Parliament in their draft report on the proposed Directive: 
"On the surface this procedure appears rather cumbersome: while it is quite 
normal for the recipient to receive confirmation from the service provider so as 
to be certain that his or her order as been recorded, it appears rather strange to 
require the recipient to restate his or her desire to conclude the contract. ""' 
1521bid at p 45. 
153 A phrase intended to allow businessmen the freedom to conduct business as they desired, later 
rephrased to ̀ parties who are not consumer'. 
154 Primarily because in the most common commercial scenarios it is the customer who makes the offer. 
Issppciý fn. 146atp26. 
156 See, Lodder, A "Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce" (2000) Eumpm Netzwrk For LegalIr(onnaii 
Study raus Train»zg (ENLIST). http: //itlawJaw. strath. ac. uk/ENLIST/subjects/ec/commentate/. 
I57 European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights "Draft Report on the proposal 
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the 
internal market. " 10d1 February 1999 A4-0000/99, DOC EN\PR\370\370547 at p 31. 
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Although the stated purpose of the Article was to clarify the point of contract formation, 
it is clear that the focus of the Commission was the protection of individuals against 
becoming bound inadvertently or accidentally. In doing this they isolated one particular 
form or method of electronic contracting. 
"The Article addresses a specific situation: 
-a contractual process in which the recipient of the service only has the 
choice of clicking "yes" or "no" (or the use of another technology) to 
accept or refuse an offer. ""' 
Rather than being a provision to deal with difficult contractual issues in general, it 
became absorbed in one particular cause for concern with electronic contracting. In the 
drafting, the proposal added complexity and lacked clarity, leaving the potential for 
disparate implementation in the Member States. The final removal of any attempts to 
harmonise national laws in relation to the conclusion of contracts came when the 
Council adopted its Common Position: 
"The Council considered that it was not appropriate to harmonise national law 
regarding the moment at which a contract is concluded. For this reason Article 
11 has been renamed and now limits itself to certain requirements regarding the 
placing and receipt of orders on-line. "159 
The Commission was clearly frustrated at the lack of willingness in Council and 
Parliament to accept its attempt to harmonise the law relating to electronic contract 
formation. This was expressed in their communication to the European Parliament: 
"In order to facilitate rapid adoption of the Directive, which is a matter of 
urgency, the Commission has accepted these changes to its amended 
proposal. "160 
158 Op c* fn 146 at p. 26. 
159 Common Position (EC)No 22/2000 adopted by the Council on 28 February 2000 "with a view to 
adopting a Directive 2000/... /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... on certain 
legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market" 
(Directive on electronic commerce ). OJ C128/32 (8.5.2000) at 49. 
160 SEC(2000) 386 final 1998/0325 (COD). 
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In the final Directive the Commission's desire to protect against parties being 
bound accidentally or in error is fulfilled with the insertion of the requirement that 
service providers 
"make available to the recipient of the service appropriate, effective and 
accessible t chnical means allowing him to identify and correct input errors, prior 
to the placing of the order. "161 
It is unfortunate that the Commission did not focus on clarifying uncertainties in 
the formation of electronic contracts in general, rather than this particular problem. 
However, it is conceded that whatever the terminology used, in such a measure 
significant resistance would probably have still been encountered in the Council. 
Nevertheless, the opportunity remained for some consideration of this important 
issue in the implementing Regulations of the Directive. 
8.4.5.1 The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 120021'6' 
The Article adopted in the final Directive is solely concerned with the placing of 
the order and associated obligations of the service provider. Nevertheless, the UK 
Government had an opportunity to clarify the point of contract formation in its 
transposition of the Directive into domestic law. However, as is the case with the 
majority of the Directive, the implementing Regulations import the terminology 
wholesale from the relevant Articles with only certain definitions and sanctions added to 
the text where required. "' In the Government's opinion issues of contract formation, as 
with other substantive contract law issues, could be left to the courts and the common 
law. 16 
Regulation 9 contains the requirements relating to the provision of information 
when contracts are concluded electronically and regulation 11 contains the service 
provider's obligations in relation to the placing of the order. "' The Regulations apply 
when any order is placed through technological means where one party is a consumer or 
where neither party is a consumer but the parties have not agreed otherwise. 
161 Article 11(2). 
162 SI 2013. 
163 The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 2013. 
164 DTI Interim Guidance March 2002 p 18 para 5.27. 
165 Found in Article 11 of the Directive. 
194 
Eta tnic Qn rad Formatar 
Although the Regulations contain no direction on technical contract formation 
issues, Regulation 12 does make reference to `contractual offers' declaring that in relation 
to Regulation 9(1)(c)1' and Regulation 11(1)(b)167 the order "shall be the contractual 
offer". 
This provision raises two questions; firstly, is the regulation referring to a 
`contractual offer', as understood at common law and discussed above? And second, if it 
is, what are the implications for the contracting parties? 
As to the first question, the language used makes it quite clear that the `offer' 
referred to is a contractual offer as understood at common law. The regulation contains 
the expression of parliament's approach that questions of whether an `order' is a 
`contractual offer' are left to the common law and the courts, except in the two situations 
clearly identified. This interpretation is also consistent with one of the main purposes of 
the provision which is to ensure that before committing to a contractually significant 
communication, after which they may be irrevocably bound by the service provider's 
acceptance, the customer is afforded the opportunity to examine their order and correct 
or delete any errors. "' 
The consequences of this provision would appear to be that where an ̀order' is a 
contractual offer at common law, prior to a customer placing that order, 
- he must be provided with, in a clear, comprehensible and unambiguous 
manner, the information regarding the technical means of identifying and 
correcting input errors; and, 
- provided with appropriate, effective and accessible technical means allowing 
him to identify and correct input errors. 
Failure to provide the relevant information will allow a customer, or `service 
recipient', to bring an action against the service provider for damages for breach of 
statutory duty. "' Failure to provide the means to identify and correct input errors will 
allow the customer to rescind the contract, at the discretion of the court. 
166 The requirement to provide information "in a clear, comprehensible and unambiguous manner... the 
technical means for identifying and correcting input errors prior to the placing of the order'. 
167 The obligation to "make available to the recipient of the service appropriate, effective and accessible 
technical means allowing him to identify and correct input errors prior to the placing of the order". 
168 It could be argued that this is regulatory overkill and repetition, particularly with respect to consumers 
with the Distance Selling Regulations in place. However, as is discussed above in 7.4.1. there are some 
significant exceptions to the Distance Selling Regulations which may be caught by this provision. 
169 Regulation 13. 
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The `order' or contractual offer must be acknowledged without undue delay by 
technological means. Whether this acknowledgement is considered an acceptance of an 
order which constitutes a `contractual offer' will depend upon the application of the 
common law principles discussed above. Regulation 11(2)(b) states that `the 
acknowledgement of receipt may take the form of the provision of the service paid for 
where that service is an information society service'. Where this is the case, if the order 
was a contractual offer, the provision of the service would equate to acceptance by 
conduct. 17° However, if the service is provided and additional terms, not introduced 
before the original offer, are included this will equate to a counter offer and hence be 
open to acceptance or rejection by the customer. Naturally, if the service has begun this 
creates a dilemma. 
In practice, the provision of information and the means to correct errors is 
usually achieved on interactive websites by the display of a confirmation screen after the 
customer has input his or her requirements. This gives the opportunity to correct errors 
before the final submission of the order and the making of the contractual offer. 
If the interpretation discussed above is correct, it is submitted that there are a 
number of potential anomalies with its application. 
Whether a `contractual offer' is made is undoubtedly a question for the courts, 
who will apply the common law principles discussed earlier in this chapter to the facts of 
the particular case. With the penalties for failing to comply with regulation 9(1)(c) and 
11(1)(b) being dependent upon the customer making the `contractual offer', this would 
appear to require the pre-judging of whether the customer is making an offer in the legal 
sense by the supplier in his decision when to provide the information and the 
opportunity to correct errors. This is arguably a rather unfair burden, particularly when 
the means of electronic communication used may dictate how much information can be 
provided and at what point in the contractual process. "' The government has indicated 
that technical limitations associated with the means of electronic communication in use 
and temporary interruptions in service will not be treated as a failure to satisfy the 
information requirements in the Regulations. However, it will be for the service provider 
to demonstrate that he has fulfilled the requirements, and whether attempts have been 
made to resolve technical problems will clearly have an impact upon whether 
170 See Brv 7vM rtcm Railway, op cit fn 82. 
171 For example, the limit of 160 characters which may be included in an SMS message to a mobile phone. 
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appropriate, effective and accessible technical means of identifying and correcting input 
errors have been provided. " 
Another anomaly in this provision is created by the situation whereby the 
customer is not technically making the offer but rather ultimately `accepting' an offer 
made by the service provider. By implication it would appear that this provision does 
not cover the situation where the service provider makes the offer and not the customer, 
which would appear strange if the justification for this approach is to avoid parties, 
particularly consumers, being erroneously or un-intentionally bound to electronic 
contracts. Surely there is at least a significant possibility that a consumer may unwittingly 
`accept' an offer, and it could be argued that this possibility is even more likely to occur, 
with actions such as the `clicking' of an icon requiring less conscious thought and 
conduct. Users will not give thought to such technical legal analysis of their actions and 
it cannot have been intended, but the provision as it stands remains open to 
interpretation. 
The reason for the exclusion of `contracts concluded exclusively by exchange of 
electronic mail or by equivalent individual communications' from the information 
requirements in regulation 9(1) & (2) and the correction of input errors in regulation 11, 
is not immediately clear. It is nevertheless a direct transposition of the relevant Articles 
in the Directive. From the preparatory material and the Directive's preamble, it would 
appear that the purpose of this exclusion was to clarify the definition of `Information 
Society Service' and hence the applicability of the Directive's provisions. Hence, Recital 
18 reads: 
"... television broadcasting within the meaning of Directive EEC/89/552 and 
radio broadcasting are not information society services because they are not 
provided at individual request; by contrast, services which are transmitted point 
to point, such as video-on-demand or the provision of commercial 
communications by electronic mail are information society services; the use of 
electronic mail or equivalent individual communications for instance by natural 
persons acting outside their trade, business or profession including their use for 
the conclusion of contracts between such persons is not an information society 
service. " 
172 See the Department of Trade and Industry "Interim Guidance for Business on the Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002. ° March 2002 p 18 pars 5.3. 
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The reference to "natural persons acting outside their trade, business or 
profession" clearly indicates that the exclusion is intended to encompass 
communications between individuals, including contracts entered into by electronic 
communications in a purely private capacity. The exclusion is clearly not intended to 
cover business parties or service providers even if their contracts are entered into via e- 
mail or equivalent with an individual. This position is supported by recital 39 in the 
context of electronic contracts: 
"The exceptions to the provisions concerning the contracts concluded exclusively 
by electronic mail or by equivalent individual communications provided for by 
this Directive, in relation to information to be provided and the placing of 
orders, should not enable, as a result, the by-passing of those provisions by 
providers of information society services. " 
However, without the benefit of the preamble the regulation is open to 
interpretation and on a literal reading of the provision, its application would appear to 
depend upon the interpretation of the phrase ̀ concluded exclusively'. If interpreted as 
referring to the technical `conclusion' of a contract, this would include only the 
acceptance of the offer - the point at which, in law, the contract is concluded. This 
would mean that as long as the contract was technically concluded by e-mail or 
equivalent individual communication it would fall within the exclusion whether one of 
the parties was a consumer and the other a business. However, such a technical 
definition is unlikely to have been intended in this context. At the other extreme this 
phrase could be interpreted as requiring the complete contractual process, including 
initial contact and negotiation, to be concluded exclusively by e-mail or equivalent 
individual communications. This interpretation could result in a contract between two 
individuals, which began on an open forum or website but was concluded via e-mail or 
equivalent, falling outside of the exception and being subject to the information and 
contractual requirements of the Regulations. 
Either one of these interpretations, would have the potential to create a 
significant loophole in the protection provided by the Directive. An interpretation 
somewhere between these two extremes may be proposed, but when the almost infinite 
variables and possible permutations are considered, any intermediate interpretation 
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would result in considerable uncertainty and arguably defeat one of the main objectives 
of the Directive. 
It is submitted that the exception should be interpreted as excluding individual 
communications, by e-mail or equivalent forms of communication, between parties 
acting outside their trade, business or profession. In this way the integrity of the 
protection afforded by the Directive, particularly to consumers, and the promotion of 
trust and confidence in electronic contracting, will be maintained. 
8.5 Conclusion 
The formation of electronic contracts is an essential element of electronic 
commerce. In all commercial activity legal certainty is important to enable parties to 
establish their obligations and liabilities and assess the potential risk involved with any 
venture. In the developing world of electronic commerce a lack of legal certainty has 
been identified as a potential barrier to its use and to the promotion of trust and 
confidence in the electronic environment. 
In the absence of any new regulatory instrument and a change in position by the 
UK government, the common law rules relating to offer and acceptance will be applied 
to disputes relating to the formation of electronic contracts for the foreseeable future. "" 
From the preceding discussion it would appear that the common law principles 
of contract formation can be applied to electronic communications with little difficulty. 
For example, the distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat, based upon the 
objective assessment of the words and conduct of the parties requires an essentially 
factual investigation. One point to note however, is that by virtue of the wide variety of 
electronic forms of communication available and in particular the unique attributes of 
interactive websites, what may be considered 'just advertising' by a supplier could be 
construed as an offer because of the `automation' of the contractual process. This would 
require the courts to adopt an approach similar to that of Lord Denning in 7homtai, 
which may be distinguished in cases where the customer is not "committed beyond 
recall" by his initial actions. Nevertheless it remains a potential risk for those using 
interactive websites, a risk which has been met in some cases by the introduction of 
`terms of use' on websites expressly stating that no contract exists until confirmation of 
the order by the supplier. 
173 Where the law of England and Wales is the applicable law of the contract. See chapter 5 above. 
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In the past the common law has adapted to new forms of communication as they 
have been introduced. The history of the common law is punctuated by litigation testing 
existing principles in the context of the new methods of communication. The postal rule 
is a notable example of an adaptation to a new communication development and the later 
examination of the rule adopted for the post in the context telex and fax illustrates the 
need to test existing principles as technology develops. No doubt the existing principles 
will be tested in the context of the new methods of electronic communication at some 
point. However, the example of the postal rule also serves to illustrate a fundamental 
problem with the common law approach. If the rationale behind a particular principle is 
not articulated clearly by the courts then the ability to predict the later application of that 
principle to new situations becomes problematic. 
With electronic contract formation considerable debate has surrounded the rules 
on acceptance with comparisons being made between the postal system and electronic 
forms of communication, in particular e-mail. It is submitted that for electronic contract 
formation the focus of discussion should be the issue of when the acceptance is deemed 
received. The postal rule is just that, a rule for the post. However, the assessment of
when an electronic communication should be considered received can be identified as a 
further potential source of some uncertainty because of the range of possibilities created 
by the nature of electronic communications. A clarifying regulatory measure would not 
only prevent costly litigation but would also create legal certainty and confidence in the 
use of electronic contracts. 
At a regulatory level attempts have been made to address the issue of contract 
formation. In the European Union the Commission sought to clarify the point of 
contract formation in the early drafts of the Electronic Commerce Directive. The 
Commission's attempt did not come to fruition for two reasons; first, the measure 
introduced was ill-conceived and confusingly drafted because of a lack of focus on the 
general issue of contract formation rather than one potential problem, and second, there 
is resistance to European approaches to the harmonisation of contract law principles in 
general from a number of States (particularly the United Kingdom). " Hence, this issue 
of vital importance to electronic contracts and more generally electronic commerce is left 
to the uncertainties of litigation. The common law is more than capable of adapting to 
174 This is illustrated by the lack of interest in the ratification of the European Contract Law principles by 
Member States. A new bout of discussions on the issue of the harmonisation of contract law principles 
has recently begun. See the `Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council -A more coherent European contract law - An action plan' COM/2003/0068 final. OJ C 063 
(15/03/2003). 
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the new forms of communication and accommodating electronic contracts, but for the 
growth of electronic commerce legal certainty is needed sooner rather than later. The 
common law does, as a general rule, have a predisposition for `later' rather than sooner. 
The common law has encountered automation in the contractual process in the 
past and the approaches adopted then remain appropriate today. However, the nature of 
automation in the electronic environment and developments in artificial intelligence may 
challenge more than just the principles and presumptions of the common law in the 
future. Nevertheless, the attribution of the actions of automated ̀machines' to the party 
responsible for putting the machine into use should not be affected by what is essentially 
a question of liability for the failure or malfunctioning of the machine. The objective 
approach to the formation of contracts ensures that a party is able to rely on the 
apparent intention of another party, however that intention is communicated. 
It can be concluded that whilst the common law principles of contract formation 
are flexible enough to accommodate electronic contracts, uncertainty exists in relation to 
the potential application of a number of crucial issues in the electronic environment. 
This uncertainty has the potential to undermine confidence in the use of electronic 
contracts until such time as the issues find their way to the courts for clarification. As a 
consequence, there is a temptation at this point to lament the demise of the original 
version of Article 11 of the Draft Directive on Electronic Commerce, a measure 
intended to clarify the point of contract formation. However, even the most favourable 
reading of that provision would do little to aid clarity or create certainty in the contract 
formation process. It is regrettable that the Commission did not find more support for 
their attempt and were not able to develop the Article into a more functional solution to 
a problem which will inevitably find its way into the courts of England and Wales at a 
point in the future. 
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Conclusion 
In this section a number of potential problems relating to the creation of 
electronic contracts have been identified. 
The anonymity of the Internet and other forms of electronic communication has 
the potential to undermine confidence in parties seeking to enter electronic contracts. In 
response to this problem, methods of facilitating identification in the electronic 
environment, in particular electronic signatures have been given legal recognition in 
statutory provisions. Measures, in the form of statutory information requirements, have 
also been introduced to alleviate the problem with identification by making the activities 
of suppliers contracting in the electronic environment transparent. These measures may 
go some way to developing trust and confidence in electronic contracting, particularly 
with consumers. 
Formal requirements have been demonised as potential barriers to electronic 
commerce; however, in reality in England and Wales their potential impact upon 
electronic contracting would probably be minimal. It is the confusion and uncertainty 
created in relation to the ability of electronic communications to satisfy formal 
requirements which has the potential to damage confidence in electronic commerce. In 
response to this issue the European Community introduced a pro-active measure in the 
Electronic Commerce Directive requiring Member State governments to remove legal 
requirements which may pose potential barriers to the use of electronic communications. 
It was argued that the approach adopted by the UK government in section 8 of the 
Electronic Communications Act is too conservative to achieve the desired objective with 
sufficient speed to facilitate the use of electronic communications. 
Finally, and arguably most importantly the common law principle of contract 
formation were considered. Here, because of the generic rules developed by the 
common law and the objective approach to agreement few fundamental difficulties in 
application can be identified. The potential problems created by the rules on contract 
formation are created because of the uncertainty in predicting how those principles will 
be applied in the electronic environment. The slow speed at which the common law is 
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developed means that the issues may not be resolved for some time. Legal uncertainty in 
this crucial area may have detrimental consequences for electronic commerce and it is 
submitted that regulatory intervention on this issue is required to create a clear and 
consistent legal environment for the creation of electronic ontracts. 
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The Contents of Electronic Contracts: 
Terms and Overriding Legislation 
Introduction 
The chapters in this section examine the contents of a contract or more 
specifically the terms of the contract, which dictate the rights and obligations of the 
parties. Terms can be expressed by the parties or implied in a number of ways. ' The 
incorporation of express terms and relevant legislative control of those terms form the 
basis of the discussion in chapters 9 and 10. The discussion of implied terms in 
electronic contracts in chapter 11 provides the opportunity to examine the debate 
surrounding computer software and other intangible goods which form the subject 
matter of an increasing number of electronic contracts. 
In the previous section the formation of electronic contracts was considered. 
The discussion highlighted a number of critical issues relating to the time and place of 
contract formation in the electronic environment as indicated by the existing common 
law principles. The lack of regulatory guidance on the issue of electronic contract 
formation, despite the concerted efforts of the European Commission, means that the 
common law principles will continue to apply where the law of England and Wales is the 
proper law of the contract. It was concluded that the common law is capable of 
accommodating contract formation by electronic means however, but until there is 
judicial pronouncement in relation to issues such as contractual acceptance by electronic 
means, there will be scope for speculation and legal uncertainty. 
A particular problem created by uncertainty as to the time and place of electronic 
contract formation relates to the effective introduction and incorporation of contractual 
terms and conditions. It is a basic tenet of the common law that new contract terms 
cannot be introduced after the point at which the contract is formed. If the point of 
contract formation is uncertain, ensuring the effective incorporation of terms may 
become problematic. 
Parties entering electronic contracts must consider the common law rules relating 
to the manner in which the terms may be effectively introduced. Practical constraints 
may affect the approach adopted to incorporating terms and conditions in the electronic 
environment. For example the 160 character limit on text messages to many mobile 
I See below on implied terms. 
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phones and the difficult balance between the effective introduction of terms and 
conditions on a website without detracting from, or completely undermining, the 
promotional effect of that website and its ease of use. The application of the legal 
principles of incorporation of terms must not have the effect of removing the advantages 
associated with modern forms of electronic communication. 
Once the parties to electronic contracts have taken steps to incorporate their 
terms they must also consider the potential effects of regulatory measures upon those 
terms. Such regulatory measures, intended to `police' the content of contractual terms, 
may be considered ̀mandatory rules' within that jurisdiction and apply regardless of any 
choice of applicable law made by the parties? In the United Kingdom the two key 
measures are the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA) and the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UTCCR). The application of such measures may 
render contractual clauses ineffective on the basis that a particular term is ̀ blacklisted" or 
that it falls foul of the requirement of reasonableness applied by UCTA or the fairness 
test found in UTCCR. The consumer is afforded a significant degree of protection 
against ̀ unfair terms' and terms attempting to exclude or limit a seller or supplier's 
liability. In appropriate circumstances the use of terms deemed unfair in consumer 
contracts will result in a supplier facing legal proceedings instigated by the Director 
General of Fair Trading (DGFI) or other body charged with the elimination of unfair 
terms in consumer contracts. The seller or supplier will usually be unable to exclude the 
application of the consumer protection regulation effective in the consumer's domicile. 
The parties to electronic contracts will also need to consider terms implied into 
certain types of contract by legislation, in particular the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and the 
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. These terms have recently been the subject of 
judicial consideration in the context of computer software, a popular subject matter for 
electronic contracts. The obligations contained in these implied terms may have 
important consequences for parties entering electronic contracts in relation to standards 
of contractual performance. 
As the terms of a contract dictate the rights and obligations flowing from the 
agreement they are crucial to all parties concerned. Contract terms allow commercial 
parties to adjust their price and service in the light of a risk analysis of their obligations. 
So for example, a photographic developer may offer a cheap service which has a strict 
2 The approach taken to `mandatory rules' is considered above at chapter 4.3. 
3 For example, in a consumer contract terms purporting to exempt liability for the implied terms of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 are automatically ineffective by virtue of s. 6 of UG'TA. 
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limitation of his liability should something go wrong, but may accept higher risk and 
greater liability if the customer pays a premium rate. ` In the electronic environment he 
desire to control the risks and liabilities associated with a business venture is no less than 
it is in the physical environment. The potential impact of existing common law 
principles and regulatory measures upon the content of electronic contracts will now be 
considered. 
The discussion will begin with the rules on incorporation and their application in 
the electronic environment. 
4 The usual compensation would be restricted to the price of a film and free processing. The premium rate 
allows the trader to either obtain insurance against those risks or alternatively put additional systems in 
place to negate the risk 
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9 
The Incorporation of Contractual Terms in 
Electronic Contracts. 
The first hurdle for parties entering into electronic contracts is to ensure that they 
adopt appropriate methods to ensure incorporation of their terms. In an ideal world all 
parties to an agreement would have complete knowledge of all of the terms prior to 
giving their consent and hence be fully aware of their rights and obligations. However 
the reality of commercial practice is very different. Parties will rarely read all of the terms 
of a contract prior to agreeing, particularly where the contract is based upon a standard 
form agreement rather than being individually negotiated between the parties. The terms 
are usually simply referred to in some way and it is for the other party to decide whether 
to consult the terms or not. The majority of business is conducted on this basis to save 
time, reduce costs and increase efficiency. The courts recognise the commercial 
necessity of this practice and the objective approach to incorporation of terms adopted 
by the courts does not require actual knowledge of the terms but rather a reasonable 
opportunity to become acquainted with the terms. 
In the electronic environment the need to refer to contractual terms contained 
elsewhere is often a necessity because of practical constraints created by the technology. 
With mobile phones the length of text message sent is often restricted to 160 characters. 
Clearly if a supplier had to include terms and conditions in the message there would be 
little room for the information he was attempting to convey. With websites, if a service 
provider had to include all of his terms and conditions on his main webpage, navigation 
would become cumbersome and there would be little room left for promotional 
information about his products or services. Hence, the terms and conditions are often 
only referred to in the main document or communication and are accessible via a 
hypertext link, sent via a separate e-mail or alternatively available in a scroll box. This 
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not only avoids cluttering the front page or main contract page, it also saves the 
customer from having to trudge through a long list of terms. 
The rules developed by the courts are commonly referred to as incorporation by 
signature, notice and a consistent course of dealing. These methods will now be 
considered in the context of electronic contracting. 
9.1 Incorporation by Signature 
In the UK the simplest and most common method of demonstrating 
acquiescence to the contents of the contract is by a signature. Although it has been 
criticised for its `artificiality', ' the approach adopted to incorporation by signature, as 
illustrated by L'Estran v Grauwb, remains prevalent? If a party signs a document, in the 
absence of a claim of fraud, misrepresentation' or non est factzm, then the court will 
conclude that "the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether he has 
read the document or not". ̀  In the context of the incorporation of terms into electronic 
contracts it must be considered whether an electronic form of `signing' a message 
containing terms and conditions will be treated in the same way as a more traditional 
form of signature. 
Electronic signatures have been considered already in the context of formal 
requirements and their fulfilment by electronic means of communication. ' The courts' 
flexible approach to the concept of `signature' at common law would appear to indicate 
that electronic methods of signing will be treated as equivalent to their traditional 
counterparts. 
In Re a debtor (No 2021 of 1995), ex parte Inland Reum e Car m&sioners v 71ae debtor, 
Re' Laddie j made reference to the ability of modem technology to apply a ̀ signature' on 
behalf of its user; 
"For example, it is possible to instruct a printing machine to print a signature by 
electronic signal sent over a network or via a modem. Similarly, it is now possible 
with standard personal computer equipment and readily available popular word 
processing software to compose, say, a letter on a computer screen, incorporate 
' See Lord Devlin in McOadtnn vDa' id MacBra)m Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 125 at 133. 
2[1934]2 K. B. 394. 
3Curtis va'aynidClem tgandD ngCo[1951]1KB805. 
4 [1934] 2 K. B. 394 per Scrutton U. at 403. 
5 See chapter 7.2 above. 
6 Also known as U id Re<sze C miqknen v Onbeer [1996] 2 All E. R. 345, at 353. 
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within it the author's signature which has been scanned into the computer and is 
stored in electronic form, and to send the whole document including the 
signature by fax modem to a remote fax. The fax received at the remote station 
may well be the only hard copy of the document. It seems to me that such a 
document has been ̀signed' by the author. "' 
By analogy it could be argued that if a party electronically signs an electronic 
document in any way the approach in L'Estrmzge should be adopted and, in the absence 
of fraud, misrepresentation or a claim of non est facnm, the signatory should be bound to 
the contents of the agreement he has signed. 
However, it is submitted that there are a number of reasons why the courts may 
not accept such a direct application of the principle embodied in LEstrange to electronic 
signatures. 
First there are a wide range of actions which could be categorised as ̀ signing' in 
the electronic environment and it would be inappropriate to give them all the same 
evidential weight as the manifestation of a party's intent to be bound to contractual 
terms. For example the use of a 'digital' or electronic signature created by cryptographic 
software is one of the more advanced methods and the process required to use the 
signature would indicate a strong intention to assent or authenticate the contents of a 
message on behalf the signatory. However, the typing of one's name or initials at the 
bottom of an e-mail or into a data field on a website and the clicking of the `send' or `I 
accept' icon represents a less reliable indication of an intention to assent to the contents 
of a message or webpage. Although it is argued above that all of these methods would 
be capable of satisfying a formal requirement of a signature, they should perhaps not be 
given equal weight as evidence of a party's intent to assent to contractual terms. The 
suggestion that different forms of electronic signature should be given different 
evidential weight is supported by the approach adopted in the Electronic Signatures 
Directive! In Article 5 of the Directive a distinction is made between `advanced 
electronic signatures' based on a qualified certificate and other forms of electronic 
signature, with the former being afforded a superior legal status to the latter. In the 
United Kingdom, the implementation of this provision in section 7 of the Electronic 
7 Ibid at 353. 
8 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a 
Community framework for electronic signatures. OJ L 13/12 (19.1.2000). 
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Communications Act 2000 leaves the matter of evidential weight to the courts declaring 
only that electronic signatures are admissible in evidence. 
Secondly, the approach adopted in L'Estrm has the benefit of creating legal 
certainty, but as indicated at the beginning of this section it has been criticised for its 
artificial approach to the incorporation of contractual terms, both in the courts of 
England and Wales' and other common law jurisdictions. It has been suggested that 
where clauses are particularly unusual or unreasonable then a signature on the document 
should not be conclusive unless reasonable notice of the terms has been given to the 
person signing. " There may be scope for an argument that with the advent of new 
technology and modern methods of contracting this less restrictive approach should be 
adopted. However, the potential success of such an argument must be doubted in the 
light of the regulatory measures now in place to enable the courts to deal with unfair or 
unreasonable contract clauses. 
Finally, another factor which may exclude the application of the strict L'Estr 
approach to electronic signatures may be the manner in which the purported `signature' 
is made in relation to the electronic document or message containing the terms. The 
electronic signature may not be `attached' to the document containing the terms but 
rather made on an order confirmation page which refers to terms and conditions found 
elsewhere. If this is the case then the question will be whether there has been reasonable 
sufficient notice of the terms. - 
The real issue is not whether the actions equate to a `signature' in the traditional 
sense, but rather what emphasis should be placed on that action in so far as it indicates 
intent to be bound. 
9.2 Incorporation by Notice 
If there is no `signature' indicating assent to the terms of a contract, and it is 
submitted that this will be the case in the majority of e-commerce transactions, the 
question before the courts will be whether the party has been given ̀ reasonably sufficient 
9 See Lord Devlin in McQ&b%n vD=&MacBrayne Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 125 at 133, [1964] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 16 
at 25; Lais vPat nt Stea'n Co [1978] 1 QB 69(per Lord Denning MR at p 78); Jones vNo#Jxvnptan 
Borough Caod and arnd*1990) Court of Appeal (Civil Division), The Times 21 May 1990, The 
Independent 25 May 1990; and C U,, = C%iucul Transport IncAndAnot/ rV Exnor O-aggs Ltd [2000] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 446, (per Evans LJ at paras 48&49). 
10 In Ti1doRent A-Carv Cz (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 400 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that unusual 
and onerous terms were not incorporated into the contract by a signature. A signature could "... only be 
relied on as manifesting assent to a document when it is reasonable for the party relying on the signed 
document to believe that the signer really did assent to its contents. " 
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notice' of the terms of the contract. " Where there may be no actual knowledge of the 
terms (either because the customer ignored them, only read part of them, or was not 
aware of them) the person seeking to rely upon the terms has to take reasonable steps to 
bring the terms to the attention of the other party, either before or at the time of 
contracting. 
9.2.1 Timin 
The conclusion of the contract is the defining moment in relation to the parties' 
rights and obligations. To be effective terms must be introduced or brought to the other 
parry's attention before or at the latest at the time of contract formation. Terms 
introduced after this point cannot form part of the parties' agreement12 It has been 
indicated that in many electronic contracts the point of contract formation may be 
unclear and as a consequence many service providers and online retailers attempt to 
prescribe the point of contract formation in their terms of website use. " 
9.2.3 Notice 
The test for whether a party has been given ̀reasonably sufficient notice' of terms 
displayed on a sign or contained within an unsigned document is a question of fact based 
upon all of the circumstances of a particular case. " The objective approach adopted 
means that notice of the existence of the terms is necessary rather than notice of their 
contents: 
"the customer is bound by the [.. ] condition if he knows that the ticket is issued 
subject to it; or, if the company did what was reasonably sufficient to give him 
notice of it. "" 
If the `document' containing the contractual terms is not of a type which a 
reasonable person would expect to contain contractual terms then the court may 
11 Parkerv South Eastern Railway Co Ltd [1877] 2 CPD 416. 
12 Olley vMaiil ri gh Caaat Hotel [1949] 1 KB 532; and the discussion of Lord Denning in 7 piton v Slzae 
Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163. In the electronic environment the point of conclusion of the contract has 
been a contentious issue. See chapter 8 above. 
13 For example Amazon. com state that; 
"No contract will subsist between you and Amazon. co. uk* for the sale by it to you of any product 
unless and until Amazon. co. uk accepts your order by e-mail confirming that it has dispatched 
your product. " 
The validity of this approach will of course depend upon whether these terms are effective. 
14 Parkerv Sowh Eastern Raiiw y Co Ltd [ 1877] 2 CPD 416. 
15 7honiton v& ve Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163, per Lord Denning at 170. 
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conclude that reasonable notice has not been given. "' Equally, if a document is part of a 
transaction which is well known to have standard terms and conditions associated with it, 
then it may be easier to show that reasonably sufficient notice has been given. " If the 
inclusion of contract terms in a particular document is customary or common within a 
trade this may also provide evidence that reasonably sufficient notice has been given. " 
The test is objective but if the party seeking to rely on the terms knows or reasonably 
ought to know that the individual or group individuals he is dealing with may have 
difficulty acquiring the information about the terms this may affect the amount of notice 
he must give. " 
An important practical effect of this approach is that terms and conditions may 
be incorporated into a contract by reference to another document. It was indicated 
above that in the electronic environment there may be practical and technological 
limitations upon the amount of information which may be displayed on a screen or sent 
in a particular message format. If using a mobile phone or Personal Digital Assistant 
(PDA) reference to another document may be the only way to introduce terms and 
conditions. This makes incorporation by reference particularly important to electronic 
contracting. 
The practical solutions adopted to the incorporation of terms by those entering 
electronic contracts have been varied and are, as of yet, untested by the courts. It can be 
speculated that simple references such as `this agreement is subject to the supplier's 
terms and conditions' may be ineffective because they do not provide the customer with 
any opportunity to acquaint himself with the terms. However, the use of references with 
a hypertext-link to another webpage may be reasonably sufficient notice provided that 
the link features prominently at some point before the contract is concluded. Likewise 
the popular use of dialogue boxes requiring the customer to at least scroll through the 
terms and conditions before proceeding to contract will provide strong evidence that the 
supplier has given reasonably sufficient notice of his terms. In the mobile phone 
environment reference is often made to a website where the terms and conditions may 
be found or a telephone number linked to a recorded message of the terms and 
conditions. 
16 Parkerv Sowh Eastern Radutzy Q Ltd [1877] 2 CPD 416, per Mellish LJ at p 422; Gkipleton v Barry UDC 
[1940] 1 KB 532. 
17 AkxandervRaiiuay Ex ice [1951] 2 KB 882. 
1$ Briksli Crane Hiie Corjrrasicn v Ipswi h Rmt Hire [1975] QB 303. 
19 71x npsin v LM &S Raik [1930] 1 KB 41; Ridaz nn, Spaa &Q vRac pow [1894] AC 217 and Geierv 
Kujaun We i mud Warne Bros (Transport) [1970] 1 Lloyds Rep 364. 
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At common law one further factor must be considered in relation to 
incorporation of terms by notice and that is the approach adopted to clauses which could 
be considered unusual or unreasonable. Prior to the introduction of legislative control of 
contractual terms the courts developed common law rules which could be used to 
control the incorporation and use of unreasonable and unusual contract terms. One 
method employed was the more restrictive approach to whether reasonably sufficient 
notice had been given of particularly onerous contractual terms, or those considered 
`unusual or unreasonable'. Lord Denning's `Red Hand Rule'2° remains the most well 
known declaration of this principle and even with the introduction of legislation the `rule' 
retains a role in the incorporation of contractual terms 21 Dillon LJ expressed the rule 
thus: 
"if one condition in a set of printed conditions is particularly onerous or unusual, 
the party seeking to enforce it must show that that particular condition was fairly 
brought to the attention of the other party. "" 
Whilst the use of such terms is by no means excluded by this principle the notice given 
of such terms would need to be explicit, drawing the other contracting party's attention 
to the term or terms. 
9.3 Incorporation by a Consistent Course of Dealing 
Where parties have contracted on a number of occasions previously the court 
may infer that, in the absence of contrary indication, the parties intend to contract on the 
terms used consistently in their previous dealings, even if the terms have not been 
introduced in the instant case 23 The argument that a consistent course of dealing has 
incorporated terms will usually arise in a situation where there has been a breakdown in 
communication between the parties and the document containing the terms and 
conditions has arrived after the contract has been concluded. This occurrence is by no 
means unlikely in the electronic environment whereby e-mails can on occasion 
mysteriously vanish for hours, if not days. However, the courts appear to be less willing 
10 Spu76igvBradthaw[1956] 1 WLR 461; 7lx»mtanvShoe Lane Parking[1971] 2 QB 163. 
21ln&7foto Pkwm Libraryv Stilleuo Kwd Fmgra+rrw [1988] 1 All ER 348; [1989] Q. B. 433; Montginery Litho 
Ltd v Maxzedl [2000] S. C. 56; [1999] S. L. T. 1431; O'Brien v MGN Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1279; [2002] C. L. C. 
33; Times, August 8,2001 (CA). 
u InteFoto Pictrnr Librmyv S&k to Visual Pmgnvn'i es [1988] 1 All ER 348; [1989] Q. B. 433 at 439 per Dillon 
L. J. 
23 HemyKaxlall & Sonsv I zV4vn Lillim & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 197 per Diplock L. J. 
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to incorporate terms by a consistent course of dealings where one of the parties is a 
consumer! ' If this approach is adopted in the electronic environment it may have 
implications for suppliers who only introduce their terms and conditions explicitly on the 
first visit of a particular consumer. 
Attempts have been made to harmonise the approach to the incorporation of 
terms in the electronic environment in the UNC1TRAL Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce and the early drafts of the Electronic Commerce Directive. These attempts 
will now be examined. 
9.4 Attempts to Regulate the Incorporation of Terms 
9.4.1 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce25 
An addition was made to the Model Law in 1998 introducing Article 5bis to 
accommodate incorporation of terms by reference. 
"Information shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on 
the grounds that it is not contained in the data message purporting to give rise to 
such legal effect, but is merely referred to in that data message. "" 
The new Article was introduced to recognise that "in an electronic environment, 
incorporation by reference is often regarded as essential". " However, the Article simply 
indicates that a permissive approach should be taken to incorporation by reference and 
arguably reflects the existing approach at common law. 
The approach adopted in the European Commission in the development of the 
Electronic Commerce Directive however, had the potential to significantly alter the 
approach adopted to the incorporation of terms. 
24 HodiervRvnYerMotors [1972] 2 QB 71. 
25 UNC1 RAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996). General Assembly Resolution 51/162 of 16 
December 1996, UNC1TRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce. Available at; 
http: //www. uncitral. org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm. htm. 
26A r6de 5 bis Inarp ravan by mfevxe as adopted by the Commission at its thirty-first session, in June 1998. 
27 Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on electronic Commerce (1996) at para 46-2. 
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9.4.2 The Draft Electronic Commerce Directive and incorporation by reference in 
electronic contracts 28 
The provision in the draft Directive was introduced to develop consumer 
confidence in electronic contracts by promoting transparency in the contractual process 
and fair dealing. The draft Article 10(2) read: 
"Member States shall provide in their legislation that the different steps to be 
followed for concluding a contract electronically shall be set out in such a way as 
to ensure that parties can give their full and informed consent. "" 
Although clearly intended to deal with the contract formation process the 
requirement of `full and informed consent' had implications for the incorporation of 
terms by reference. How can a party be said to have given his full and informed consent 
to a contract when he may not have read or even seen the terms and conditions? The 
Article had the potential to create uncertainty in the contractual process rather than 
promote confidence. 
The terminology was removed from the final Directive and the only reference to 
contractual terms is the requirement that where the service provider makes terms and 
conditions available to the recipient of a service, they are made available in a way that 
allows him to `store and reproduce them. " The Article is reproduced verbatim in 
Regulation 9(3) of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations and failure to 
comply can result in a court order requiring compliance. However, in the light of the 
preceding discussion the object of the requirement must be questioned. The provision 
refers to situations 'where the service provider provides terms', yet, if the service 
provider does not provide terms to the recipient of a service, whether by reference or 
otherwise, it must be questioned whether they will form part of the contract at all. The 
early versions of this requirement simply stated that contract terms and general 
conditions provided to the consumer must be made available in a way that allows him to 
store and to reproduce them" With no further comment from the Commission on the 
Article it can only be concluded that the addition of 'where the service provider provides 
terms... ' has little effect, with the clear object of the Article being the accessibility of the 
28 Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of 
electronic commerce in the internal market COM(1999)427 final. 
29 Emphasis added. 
30 Article 10(3). 
31 Op citfn 28 at p 25. 
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terms and conditions of the transactions to the recipient of the service for future 
reference. The Department of Trade and Industry guidance on the Regulations simply 
explains that the provision does not require that the making available of the terms take 
the same form as in the original transaction'' It is submitted that where the service 
provider does not provide the terms and conditions of the contract to the recipient, they 
will only be incorporated into the contract where there has been reasonably sufficient 
notice by reference to the terms or a previous consistent course of dealing between the 
parties. 
9.5 Conclusion 
The common law principles of incorporation can readily be applied to electronic 
contracts but there are a number of potential difficulties which may result in uncertainty. 
It is unclear what approach the courts will take to particular acts performed in the 
electronic environment, which are often referred to as `signing' the terms so as to 
acquiesce to their content. There are a number of sustainable arguments why the strict 
common law approach to incorporation by signature, illustrated by L'EstrmV v Gra id', 
should not be applied to even the most `reliable' forms of electronic signature. It is 
submitted that the act of using an encryption based method of authenticating a 
communication will provide strong evidence of a party's intent, although it may still be 
argued that the signatory has not actually ̀ signed' the document containing the terms. 
In the majority of electronic contracts the question will ultimately be one of 
whether reasonable sufficient notice has been given of the terms. Here a potential 
problem is created by the lack of certainty as to the precise point of contract formation 
in the electronic environment highlighted in chapter 8. The terms must be introduced 
before the contract is concluded and uncertainty as to that point poses a pry w fade 
problem for the incorporation of terms. There are numerous methods of introducing 
contractual terms in the electronic environment and as of yet none have beentested as to 
whether they provide reasonably sufficient notice of the terms. It is uncertain whether 
simple references will be sufficient to incorporate terms and the general approach 
adopted by the courts indicates that this assessment may depend upon the status of the 
32 Department of Trade and Industry `A Guide for Business to the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2013) 31 July, 2002. The example given is the sending of a copy of the terms 
along with the goods. Naturally such terms would have to have been introduced prior to the conclusion of 
the contract in any event. 
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parties to the contract and whether the terms are unusual or unreasonable" While this 
provides the courts with flexibility in their adjudication it does little to enhance the 
predictability of the legal environment within which electronic contracts will have to 
operate. 
Incorporation by a consistent course of dealings will have a role to play in 
electronic contracts because parties using websites often do not require returning 
customers to scroll through or visit their terms pages. However, it may be difficult to 
successfully argue there has been a consistent course of dealing where one of the parties 
is a consumer or where there have only been limited previous dealings. 
Regulatory measures have not substantially addressed the issue of incorporation 
of terms. The UNCTTRAL Model Law simply recognises the importance of 
incorporation by notice in the electronic environment. The provision with the potential 
to have a co-incidental impact on the incorporation of terms, found in early versions of 
the Electronic Commerce Directive was removed in the final Directive. It is submitted 
that a requirement of `full and informed consent' would be impractical in the electronic, 
or any other contractual environment. 
For the creation of a predictable and consistent legal environment for electronic 
contracts guidance is needed in relation to the incorporation of terms. For the 
promotion of electronic commerce this guidance is required sooner than is likely to 
occur if it is left to the unpredictability of a judicial pronouncement on the issue. For 
this reason regulatory guidance is required, indicating in particular what steps are 
necessary to provide reasonably sufficient notice of terms to customers on a website or 
other electronic medium whilst at the same time complying with technical constraints 
and attempting to offer a suitably attractive format to encourage custom. 
33 For recent examples of this approach see Ville!! a vMFI Furnitzav Cein, vs Ltd, [1999] I. R. L. R 468 and 
OBnei vMGN Lt4 [2001] EWCA Civ 1279; [2002] C. L. C. 33; Times, August 8,2001. 
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10 
Legislative Measures Relevant to the Terms in 
Electronic Contracts 
Legislative intervention, policing contractual terms, has become commonplace in 
the modern commercial environment. The intervention is often justified on the grounds 
of social policy, protecting weaker or vulnerable parties and reducing economically 
wasteful practices. The approach taken may vary and the regulation may be based on the 
particular type of contract, the legal status of the contracting parties or the particular type 
of clause in use. 
In the United Kingdom the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 was introduced, to 
an extent, reflecting the approach adopted by courts and the prevailing judicial attitude 
towards exemption clauses. ' The intervention of Parliament in this matter served the 
dual purpose of satisfying the need for clarification of the legal position at a pace 
appropriate to the needs of commerce and equally placating the constitutional argument 
that the legislature is the correct forum for a control based on social policy. 
The European Community has had a considerable impact on the approach to 
contractual terms, specifically in relation to consumer protection. The desire to 
maximise the potential of the internal market by promoting confidence in cross-border 
transactions and the free movement of goods and services has led to a number of 
Community based provisions, in particular the Council Directive on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts! A significant development introduced by the Directive was the 
involvement of certain organisations to take action against undesirable contractual 
clauses and practices rather than restricting the right to those individually affected and 
relying on their desire and financial ability to litigate. 
Electronic Commerce raises identical concerns to those associated with more 
traditional commerce, in particular the need to control the use of unfair contractual terms 
by the party in a dominant position. To an extent these concerns are magnified by the 
cross-border nature of the electronic medium. The extent to which regulatory measures 
already in existence apply to the world of electronic contracting is as important an issue 
I The development of the Red Hand Rule' for example. See above at 9.2. 
2 93/13/EEC. (1993) OJ L95/29 (21.4.93). 
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as ensuring that new or proposed regulation accounts for the needs of the electronic 
environment. 
However, it is accepted that legislative regimes alone cannot guarantee the 
development of the desired confidence in cross border transactions. Many sellers exploit 
the lack of knowledge of many of their customers regarding their legal rights' and the 
same lack of knowledge means that confidence is not increased. Information about the 
rights and protection available empowers the customer and removes the ability of a 
supplier to utilise unfair terms and conditions to influence the customer's behaviour and 
perception of his position. The need to ensure the availability of information, about 
consumer rights in particular is recognised in the European legislation as can be seen in 
the Distance Selling Directive-! 
"Member States shall take appropriate measures to inform the consumer of the 
national law transposing this Directive and shall encourage, where appropriate, 
professional organizations to inform consumers of their codes of practice. "' 
Nevertheless legislative controls have the ability to considerably influence the 
development and exploitation of the electronic marketplace. Indeed, the existing 
legislation may mould the development of electronic contracting with suppliers wishing 
to enter and exploit markets where the regulation may be high but the customer 
confidence is correspondingly high. Equally, overbearing regulation may have the 
negative effect of stifling commercial expansion with service providers establishing and 
marketing in jurisdictions with less stringent control. 
If electronic contracts fall within the jurisdiction of particular legislation, then 
that legislation will be applied to them in the same way that it applies to more 
traditionally formed contracts. The application and potential effects of UCTA and 
UTCCR to electronic contracts will now be considered. To assess the impact of the 
legislation effectively its background and purpose must also be considered. 
3 See; Macdonald, E. "The emperor's old clauses: unincorporated clauses, misleading terms and the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations. " [1999158 (2), CUJ. 413-436. 
4 Directive 97/7/EC of the European, Parliament and the Council on the protection of consumers in 
relation to distance contracts, (1997) OJ L144/19 (4.6.97). 
5 Article 16 ̀Consumer information'. 
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11 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 ("The Act") is a complex piece of legislation 
with a variety of distinct elements. Many commentators' have expressed the opinion that the 
short title to this Act is somewhat misleading! The Act does not deal explicitly with the 
"fairness" of contract terms, nor does it deal solely with "contractual" terms. Essentially the 
Act tackles the use of exemption clauses, the generic phrase for terms that aim to exclude, 
restrict, or limit particular liabilities. 
The application of the Act follows a logical formula and it is the application of the 
key provisions of the Act, and the elements most relevant o electronic contracting that will 
form the basis of the following discussion. 
The core questions raised by this thesis will be addressed 
9 Are the background and objectives of the Act compatible with contracting in the 
electronic environment? 
" Does the scope of the Act encompass electronic contracting? 
" Does the application of the Act to electronic contracting produce logical, appropriate 
or desirable results?, and if not 
" What amendments or changes are necessary or appropriate? 
At the time of writing, these questions are particularly relevant because the Law Commission 
is embarking on a major consultation on the amendment of the legislative regimes on unfair 
terms. 3 
' See for example, Macdonald, E. "Mapping the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Directive on 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts' [1994] Sep JRL. 441-462; and Rogers, W. VH and Clarke M. G. 
W air Contract Tema Act 1977 (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 1978). 
2 The original long title of the Act does to some extent clarify its scope; 
"An Act to impose further limits on the extent to which under the law of England and Wales and 
Northern Ireland civil liability for breach of contract, or for negligence or other breach of duty, 
can be avoided by means of contract terms and otherwise, and under the law of Scotland civil 
liability can be avoided by means of contract erms. ' 
3 The Law Commissions Consultation Paper No 166 3RD July 2002. http: //www. lawcom. gov. uk 
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11.1 Background to the Act 
The text of the Act broadly follows the recommendations found in the Law 
Commission's ̀ Second Report on Exemption Clauses'! The Commission recommended 
legislative provision to curtail the use of exemption clauses. Such control was considered 
necessary and in the public interest, to protect parties against potential injustice arising from 
the abuse of exemption clauses by business parties in a dominant bargaining position. In the 
words of the Law Commission: 
"It is clear that exemption clauses are much used both in dealings with private 
individuals and in purely commercial transactions. We are in no doubt that in many 
cases they operate against he public interest and that the prevailing judicial attitude 
of suspicion, or indeed of hostility, to such clauses is well founded. "' 
It can be seen from this short passage that in formulating their proposals the Commission 
acknowledged the pragmatic approach taken by the courts to instances of injustice created 
by the use of exemption clauses. ' Perhaps the best example of the `prevailing judicial 
attitude of suspicion and hostility' referred to in the report is the often cited judgment of 
Lord Reid in Suisse Ad4ntiqw' Of exemption clauses, Lord Reid said: 
"Probably the most objectionable are found in the complex standard conditions 
which are now so common. In the ordinary way the customer has no time to read 
them, and if he did read them he probably would not understand them. And if he 
did understand and object to any of them, he would generally be told he could take it 
or leave it. And if he then went to another supplier the result would be the same. 
Freedom to contract must surely imply some choice or room for bargaining. "' 
In some respects, the reference made by Lord Reid to `freedom to contract' with no 
`room for bargaining' epitomised the decline in favour of the traditional doctrine of freedom 
4 Law Comm No. 69 (1975). 
51bid at p4. Paragraph 11. 
6 There are many examples of the approach taken by the courts to exemption clauses they feel are 
'objectionable'. A full discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter, but examples the ̀ tools' created by 
the courts to deal with exemption clauses, such as the rules of incorporation, in particular the 'Red Hand 
Rule' are discussed in the preceding chapter (10). 
7 Suisse Adv74e Societe d'Ammxw Marit ne SA v. NV Roz niiandrKok-n Cei ale [1966] 2 All ER 61. 
[1967] 1 AC 361. 
8 Ibrd at p. 409. 
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of contract. References can be found within the extract to some of the key issues often 
associated with the decline of the doctrine and also to the emergence of legislation such as 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act. For example, the increased use of standard form contracts 
in business practice; the often obscure methods of presentation and incomprehensible 
terminology employed by suppliers in their contractual documents; and the dominance of 
business parties in the contractual process due to the increasingly monopolistic market and 
the entrance of the ̀ consumer' into that market. ' 
Hence, the lack of influence over the contents of the contract by the weaker party 
and the corresponding lack of real freedom to contract exemplified by Lord Reid added 
credence to the Commissions argument for legislative control. Nevertheless, although 
persuasive argument existed for controlling the use of exemption clauses, questions 
remained regarding the correct application of that control. The principal fear was that in 
order to fulfil its objectives the Act would interfere with the parties' contract to such an 
extent that the outcome would 
".. be tantamount o remaking the parties' contract for them". " 
The need to strike an appropriate balance between the competing interests of the 
parties whose contracting practices would be affected by the legislation is clear. The 
argument for the control of exemption clauses focussed on the desire to protect 'weaker' 
parties against the unfair and unreasonable use of such clauses and the potential for injustice. 
In contrast, the need to allow commercial entities to contract freely and exercise an element 
of control over their liabilities was accepted as essential in modern commerce. It was 
recognised that in many cases exemption clauses operate in a beneficial manner and satisfy 
commercial realities and the undeniable need for parties to establish boundaries to their 
liabilities. " The corollary effect being, in theory, lower prices based on commercially efficient 
allocation of risk. 
To an extent the final version of the Act takes account of these competing interests. 
This is achieved by the layering' of the level of control exerted by the `active sections' of the 
Act, in their application to exemption clauses. The greater the public interest in the subject 
9 Further analysis of the doctrine of freedom of contract is beyond the scope of this thesis but see, Atiyah, 
P. S. Intrac än to the Law of Qmact 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p. 15. et sec. Atiyah isolates 
three influential factors in the decline of the doctrine, 1) The increase in use of standard form contracts, 2) 
The decline in the importance of free choice and intention as grounds for legal obligation and 3) The 
emergence of the consumer as a contracting party and a litigant. 
Io Op cit fn. 4 at p. 53 n. 138. 
11 
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matter of the exemption clause the more absolute the protection afforded. For example, 
clauses purporting to exclude or limit liability for negligently caused death or personal injury 
face an absolute ban. " Where a party to the transaction `deals as consumer' they are 
afforded greater protection by the Act due to the inherent inequality of bargaining power. " 
Finally, where the Act dictates, the assessment of the exemption clause is made on the basis 
of the test or requirement of reasonableness. Here the courts are charged with the task of 
balancing the interests of the parties in the light of various guiding factors to assess how 
reasonable the use of the exemption clause was. 14 
11.2 Background in Relation to Electronic Commerce. 
In relation to electronic methods of contract formation the relevant background 
issues on the Act's inception remain constant. The same potential exists for the use and 
abuse of exemption clauses in electronic contracts and the same desire to limit potential 
business liabilities drives commercial interests. In fact, due to the international nature of 
electronic commerce the need for a supplier to control potential liability increases and hence 
curbs on his ability to influence that potential liability may become a relevant factor in his 
entrance into a particular market. However, even if the background objectives of the Act 
make it appropriate to apply to electronically formed contracts, the question of whether the 
scope of the Act can encompass electronic contracts remains. 
11.3 The Scope of the Unfair Contract Terms Act. 
As indicated above the short title of the Act does not do justice to its broad scope of 
application and its potential impact on the use of exemption clauses. Prima facie, the scope 
of the Act would appear broad enough to encompass contracts made via an electronic 
medium. However, the Act does contain specific limitations on its applicability and it is 
important to consider the implications of these restrictions in the light of electronic 
contracts. 
A common concern in relation to the facilitation of electronic commerce is the 
inclusion of particular formal requirements in legislative provisions. " However, the use of a 
formal requirement which cannot be fulfilled by electronic contracts not only has the 
potential to affect the proliferation of electronic contracting but may exclude a contracting 
12 Section 2(1). 
13 Section 6, for example. 
14 See the discussion of section 11 below at 11.6. 
15 See the discussion in chapter 7 above. 
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party from valuable protection by virtue of their chosen medium of communication. In 
general, the Unfair Contract Terms Act contains no specific requirements of form. Hence 
contracts and notices, facilitated via e-mail, EDI, the Internet and other electronic media are 
all potentially subject to the Acts provisions. " However, there is one reference to a 
particular ̀ form' in section 3 which has the potential to inhibit the application of the Act. 
This will be returned to in the discussion of that section. 
The Act is not restricted to a particular class of customer or a particular contractual 
relationship, although a significant element of the Act does relate to the protection of parties 
who `deal as consumer'. In contrast to the Regulations on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, " which are restricted to `natural persons', commercial entities may benefit from 
the provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act even if they have taken corporate form. 18 
With one of the key barriers to the participation in cross border electronic contracting being 
a lack of customer confidence, this added protection may be seen as an important factor to 
small or medium sized enterprises looking to procure goods and services online. 
A business can benefit from the Act's mandatory provisions prohibiting the use of 
clauses that relate to 
" negligently caused death or personal injury-, " and 
" the obligations as to title implied into contracts for the sale of goods or hire 
purchase20. 
In addition any party may challenge the validity of an exemption clause in a contract on the 
grounds that it is unreasonable if 
" the clause excludes liability for negligently caused loss or damage (other than death 
or personal injury)21; or 
" the clause limits or excludes liability arising in contract and is contained in the other 
parties "written standard terms of business"'; or 
16 Providing always that they fall within the Acts geographical jurisdiction. See chapter 4. 
17 S. I. 1999/2083. Discussed in chapter 12 below. 
18 Although the form of any replacement legislation is still unclear, there is strong support for the 
protection afforded business parties being retained, or even expanded. See the Law Commission 
consultation paper op cit fn 3. 
" s. 2(1). 
20 s. 6(1). 
21 s. 2(2). 
22 s. 3. (Discussed below at 11.5.2). 
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" the clause excludes or limits liability for breach of the implied terms in contracts for 
the sale of goods or hire-purchase23. 
Finally, a business party may also benefit from the provisions of the Act when they 
deal outside their regular field of business and satisfy the definition of "dealing as consumer" 
for the purpose of the Act! ' 
As with any regulatory measure emanating from the UK the Act is, of course, 
confined in its application to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, save for specific 
situations. " However, the key restrictions contained within the Act relate to the type of 
clauses within its remit, the basis of liability and specific express exclusions from the scope 
of the Act. The influence of these restrictions, in the light of electronic contracting, will now 
be considered. 
113.1 Exemption Clauses: Terms Which `Exclude or Restrict'. 
The Act is restricted in application to exemption clauses relating to certain categories 
of business liability. The term `exemption clause' is seldom used in the Act itself, instead the 
Act refers to terms which `exclude or restrict' the particular liability. However, to limit the 
scope of the Act to clauses which explicitly `exclude or restrict' liability, would leave the Act 
susceptible to evasion by employing terms which whilst not explicitly excluding or restricting 
liability, nevertheless have an equivalent effect. The response of the Law Commission was 
to extend the scope of the Act to clauses, which have equivalent effect to excluding or 
limiting liability, "' and clauses often described as exemption clauses "in disguise"? " The 
main provision can be found in section 13 and by virtue of this section, terms which are 
drafted in the form of an obligation, or impose onerous criteria for the enforcement of a 
liability, are treated as if they had directly limited or excluded that liability 28 
13. Varieties of exemption clause. 
(1) To the extent that this Part of the Act prevents the exclusion or restriction of 
any liability it also prevents- 
23 s. 6(3). 
24 s. 12. See the discussion below at 115.2. 
25 Section 27 provides specifically for situations where parties ̀ opt in" to the provisions of the Act and 
situations where a deliberate attempt is made to oust the jurisdiction of the Act, when dealing with a 
consumer. 
26 Section 13. 
27 Section 3 (2) (b). See, Macdonald, E. ExarVtia: Clauses and Umfair Teims (Butterworths: London, 1999) at 
p. 3; Yates, D. Exc/ucion C srs in Ca&-z s 2ed, (Sweet and Maxwell: London, 1982), pp88-94. 
28 Steuwt GO Ltd v Horatio 14yer & Co Ltd [ 1992] 2 All ER 257. 
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(a) making the liability or its enforcement subject to restrictive or onerous 
conditions; 
(b) excluding or restricting any right or remedy in respect of the liability, or 
subjecting a person to any prejudice in consequence of his pursuing any 
such right or remedy; 
(c) excluding or restricting rules of evidence or procedure; 
and to that (extent) sections 2 and 5 to 7 also prevent excluding or restricting liability 
by reference to terms and notices which exclude or restrict the relevant obligation or 
duty. 
(2) But an agreement in writing to submit present or future differences to 
arbitration is not to be treated under this Part of this Act as excluding or restricting 
any liability. 
Subsection 1(a) deals with clauses which make the liability or its enforcement subject 
to restrictive or onerous conditions. These would include time limits on the making of 
claims which in reality do not allow sufficient time to discover the problem giving rise to a 
claim, 29 or alternatively clauses, which require the party making the claim to pay for the 
return of a faulty product before a claim can be made. This additional cost has the potential 
to deter the pursuit of a legitimate claim, particularly with relatively small ticket items. 
The use of terms requiring the customer to pay for returns may be a particular 
problem in electronic contracts because of the increased opportunities for cross-border 
transactions. The additional costs associated with returned items may be a deterrent to 
businesses wishing to take advantage of the electronic commerce market and contract terms 
passing this cost on to the customer may be popular. However, these potential costs may 
also act to deter customers from entering cross border electronic contracts because they will 
usually be less able to accommodate the additional cost 3° In the electronic environment the 
items purchased are often relatively inexpensive consumables and the risk of additional 
delivery costs may completely remove the financial benefits associated with e-commerce. 
Subsection 13(1)(b) addresses clauses which exclude or restrict a right or remedy in respect 
of the liability, or subject a person to any prejudice in consequence of his pursuing any such 
right or remedy. This would include clauses which allow a claim for damages but purport to 
exclude the right to terminate a contract on breach. Clauses promising free repairs or 
29 Law Commission op cit fn 4 at paras. 162 et sm 
30 Consumers are specifically afforded protection against such terms, but for the small business UCTA may 
be a very important source of protection. See below at 11.5.2. 
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replacement but precluding the right to reject the goods would also fall within this 
category. '' 
Finally, clauses that attempt to exclude or restrict rules of evidence or procedure are 
brought within the scope of the Act by subsection 13(1)(c). This would include a clause 
proclaiming that a signature on a delivery note unequivocally demonstrates that the goods 
supplied satisfy the specifications or description in the contract. 
The clauses described in section 13 will, where the Act indicates, be subject to the 
requirement of reasonableness and the facts surrounding their use will become relevant'' 
Section 13 merely brings the clauses within the scope of the Act, to be tested in the courts. 
The final part of section 13(1) applies to sections 2 and 5 to 7 and is designed to capture 
clauses which define the parties' obligations under a contract in a manner which has the 
equivalent effect of removing or limiting a liability which would otherwise arise, i. e. 
preventing the liability from arising ab inilio. The intention behind this subsection is to 
prevent the evasion of the Act by articulate drafting. " 
The courts have adopted the "but for" test when applying this section to determine 
whether a term falls within the scope of the Act. " Hence, if the obligation would have 
arisen "but for" the term, then the term will become subject to the Act. An example of such 
a clause would be the obligation in an employment contract for a junior doctor to work 
-exceptionally long hours, potentially leading to injury. The clause had the effect of trying to 
exempt the employer from his duty of care which would exist "but for" the clause. " 
Another example would be a term indicating that goods are ̀ sold as seen' in an attempt to 
evade the obligation arising under the Sale of Goods Act that the goods comply with their 
description. " 
The interpretation adopted by the courts to this section of the Act has been 
criticised as too wide and lacking discrimination, bringing some clauses inappropriately 
within the scope of the Act. It has been argued that an "expectations test" would be 
more appropriate being less mechanical and enabling the courts to "make an appropriate 
`form and substance' distinction for the purposes of section 13(1)"" In extending the 
31 On a literal interpretation this subsection also has the potential to encompass clauses compelling the use 
of arbitration, which is returned to below. 
32 Discussed below at 11.6. 
33 To a large extent it mirrors the provision found in section 3(2)(b). 
34 Smv Eric S Bush (a f nn) [1989] 2 All ER 514 and Philips Products Ltd v k&nd [1987] 2 All ER 620. 
35 johnswnev Bbanslu7 Health Autfreity [1991] 2 All ER 293. 
36 This implied obligation may only be excluded against a party not dealing as consumer and the term 
satisfies the requirement of reasonableness - ection 6(2). 
37 Macdonald, E. "Exclusion clauses: the ambit of s 13 (1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977" 
(1992)12(3) LS 277. An extensive analysis of this issue is not within the scope of this thesis, but it is 
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scope of the Act to clauses with equivalent effect the Law Commission sought to limit 
the potential for evasion. However they also appreciated that in doing so they gave rise 
to the possibility of bringing certain contractual terms inappropriately within the Acts 
control. One such type of clause, particularly relevant to the electronic environment, is 
the arbitration clause38 which could be construed as attempting to restrict a right or 
remedy in respect of a liability. " However, arbitration clauses are not contrary to public 
policy and do not oust the jurisdiction of the courts 4° When used appropriately they can 
reduce costs and save the parties and the courts time and inconvenience. In addition, 
arbitration is subject to specific legislation" as recognised by the Law Commission. 
"we consider that the possibility that an arbitration clause may operate to the 
detriment of a party to a contract is a matter which should be regulated by the 
law relating to arbitration. "42 
Hence, section 13(2) attempts to place such clauses beyond the scope of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act. " One point which must be highlighted, however, is the 
requirement that the agreement to arbitrate be `in writing'. The application of 
requirements of form of this nature to electronic contracts is discussed above in chapter 
7. However, it must be re-iterated at this point that without an amendment to the Act by 
the `appropriate minister', " there will be scope for speculation and legal uncertainty as to 
whether electronic forms of 'writing' will satisfy the requirement in section 13(2). 
However, in the context of section 13(2), a consideration of the purpose, or function, of 
the requirement of writing may help remove some of the uncertainty. 
undeniable that the issue raises the same criticisms whatever the form of the contract, be it electronic or 
more traditional. See also op cit fn 27. 
38 Arbitration and other methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) are particularly important for 
electronic commerce because of their speed, reduced costs and ability to operate effectively in the 
electronic environment, when compared to the judicial system. A discussion of the importance of 
arbitration and other forms of ADR is beyond the scope of this research. For a more detailed discussion 
of the issues see Homle J, "Disputes Solved in Cyberspace and the Rule of Law', Work in Progress, 
[2001](2) The journal c(I? z m ion, Law and T ogy aIL7). http: //elj. warwick. ac. uk/jilt/01- 
2/hornle. html/. 
39 The right to go to court to obtain a remedy. 
40 . &vttvAwry 
(1885) 5 H. LC. 811 
41 For example the Arbitration Act 1996. Arbitration has bee the subject of legislation since the 1950's. 
42 Op cit fn 4 at para. 163. 
43 "But an agreement in writing to submit present or future differences to arbitration is not to be treated 
under this Part of this Act as excluding or restricting any liability. '
44 Section 8 of the Electronic Communications Act 2000, see chapter 73. 
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It is submitted that the requirement of a 'written agreement' in section 13(2) relates 
directly to the desire only to exclude those agreements regulated by the Arbitration Acts 
from the provisions in the Act. This proposition is supported by references in the Law 
Commission Report and the scope of the Arbitration Act 1996, the application of which is 
generally limited to `agreements in writing': ̀ s 
"The provisions of this Part apply only where the arbitration agreement is in writing, 
and any other agreement between the parties as to any matter is effective for the 
purposes of this Part only if in writing. "" 
However, in contrast o UCTA the Arbitration Act does include guidance on the 
requirement of writing in section 5(6): 
"References in this Part to anything being written or in writing include its being 
recorded by any means. "" 
This definition could therefore be satisfied by an agreement to arbitrate being recorded 
in electronic form. However, the agreement must be `recorded', indicating that a 
permanent copy must be held somewhere which may mean that if the `agreement' is 
entered into on a website or by two `electronic agents' and therefore transient in nature, 
it may not satisfy the requirement. 
11.3.2 Business Liability. 
With the exception of section 6(4) the control exerted by the Act is restricted to 
clauses relating to "business liability", that is liability for breach of obligations or duties 
arising from things done, or to be done, by a person in the course of a business (whether his 
own business or another's). 48 `Business' includes a profession and the activities of any 
government department or local authority. " This definition was adopted to encompass a 
I5 The reference to writing relates to Part I of the Act. This Part contains the key provisions of the Act 
including; stay of legal proceedings, arbitral proceedings and tribunal formation and conduct, jurisdiction, 
awards, costs and powers of the courts in relation to the award. 
46 Section 5(1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (1996 c. 23). 
47 Emphasis added. 
48 Section 1(3)(a). 
49 Section 14. 
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broad spectrum of activities, including business to consumer and business to business 
activities and not restrict the scope of the Act. 
"We refer to a transaction where one party is, and the other is not, acting in the 
course of a business as a "consumer transaction", and to a transaction in which each 
party is acting in the course of a business as a "commercial transaction", using the 
word commercial in its widest sense as covering commercial, industrial, official and 
professional activities. "" 
Contracts formed between individuals, via e-mail, auction sites and private web pages 
will be beyond the scope of the Act. Regulation of transactions between individuals was felt 
unnecessary by the Law Commission; 
"No one has suggested to us that the use of exemption clauses in connection with 
services supplied in a purely private capacity is widespread or gives rise to concern;... 
we have confined our attention to situations in which the use of exemption clauses 
appears to be the source of a social problem. "' 
A key phrase in the assessment of whether activities are within the scope of the Act 
is "in the course of a business. " This phrase can be found in a number of sections of the 
Act and there remains some debate as to its correct interpretation. " The predominant 
definition in the context of the Act was established in R &B Custtrns Brokers v Lhzitad 
Doninians Trust" in relation to section 12 of the Act which defines "dealing as consumer" s' 
The court decided that to be "in the course of a business" the activity had to be "integral" to 
that business or, if incidental to that business, occurring with "sufficient regularity". " 
However, it has been argued that this interpretation is inappropriate for application to the 
definition of "business liability" in section 1(3)56 because it would have the effect of 
restricting the scope of the bulk of the Act considerablys' Sections 2 to 7 of the Act would 
50 pp c fn 4 para. 4, n 18. Emphasis added. 
51 Ibid para. 9. 
52 See, Macdonald, E. In the course of a business -a fresh examination" (1999) 3 WebJCLI available at; 
http: //spade3. ncl. ac. uVI999/iSsue3/macdonald3. html. 
53 R &B Gasfan Bmken v Unite D xnkb? s Trust [ 1988] 1 All ER 847. 
s' Discussed below at 11.5. 
ss pp c fn 53. 
56 Opcitfn52. 
57 Specifically sections 2 to 7. 
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only apply to activities, which are "integral" to the business of the seller or "incidental but 
occurring with sufficient regularity". 
One possible alternative to this definition was adopted by the Court of Appeal in 
Swanson v Rogers, " a case concerning the phrase "in the course of a business" in the Sale of 
Goods Act. The court preferred a distinction based upon whether the contract was made in 
a "purely private capacity" outside the confines of a business. This test would provide a less 
restrictive approach to the definition of `business liability' in section 1(3) more in keeping 
with the underlying purpose of the Act, but restrict the scope of the definition of "dealing as 
consumer". However, the definition of a purely private sale is open to wide interpretation, 
potentially creating further uncertainty. 
11.3.3(a) Exemptions from the Scope of the Act: Section 26 `International Supply 
Contracts' 
The limits and controls on the use of exemption clauses, imposed by the Act are 
not applicable to international supply contracts. This exclusion could have significant 
consequences for parties engaging in cross-border electronic commerce. The excluded 
contracts are defined in section 26: 
s 26 International supply contracts. 
(1) The limits imposed by this Act on the extent to which a person may exclude 
or restrict liability by reference to a contract term do not apply to liability arising 
under such a contract as is described in subsection (3) below. 
(2) The terms of such a contract are not subject to any requirement of 
reasonableness under section 3 or 4 and nothing in Part II of this Act shall 
require the incorporation of the terms of such a contract to be fair and 
reasonable for them to have effect. 
(3) Subject to subsection (4), that description of contract is one whose 
characteristics are the following- 
(a) either it is a contract of sale of goods or it is one under or in 
pursuance of which the possession or ownership of goods passes; and 
(b) it is made by parties whose places of business (or, if they have none, 
habitual residences) are in the territories of different States (the Channel 
58 Stet ivn vRogers [ 1999] 1 All ER 613. A judgment based on the Sale of Goods Act 1979, but dealing 
with the same phrase. Discussed below at 11.6. 
231 
7lr Uhrfair C retract Te»ru Act 1977 
Islands and the Isle of Man being treated for this purpose as different 
States from the United Kingdom). 
(4) A contract falls within subsection (3) above only if either- 
(a) the goods in question are, at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, in the course of carriage, or will be carried, from the territory of 
one State to the territory of another, or 
(b) the acts constituting the offer and acceptance have been done in the 
territories of different States; or 
(c) the contract provides for the goods to be delivered to the territory of a 
State other than that within whose territory those acts were done. "
The exclusions only apply to contracts for the sale of goods or those under or in 
pursuance of which the possession or ownership of goods passes. The definition of 
`goods' in relation to the subject matter of many electronic contracts is considered above 
in chapter 3 and discussed in detail below in chapter 13. It is sufficient to note at this 
point that although many electronic contracts are for `traditional' goods and will 
potentially fall within the scope of the exclusion in section 26, an increasing number will 
not, being for services or intangible products. As a consequence, the provisions 
controlling exemption clauses considered in this chapter will remain relevant to many 
electronic contracts in spite of their `international' nature. 
In addition to being a contract concerning goods, the contract in question must 
involve the carriage of the goods between States, offer and acceptance across State 
borders or delivery in a different State to that where the contract was made. 
In situations where an electronic contract falls within the scope of section 26 
there are some significant consequences to consider, particularly if a consumer is party to 
the contract in question. Perhaps the most significant consequence would be the 
removal of the protection afforded by section 6 of the 1977 Act relating to terms implied 
by section 12 and sections 13 - 15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 59 Under the Act terms 
seeking to exclude or limit liability for breach of obligations arising from section 12 
(implied undertaking as to title) are automatically ineffective. Attempts to exclude or 
limit liability for obligations arising under sections 13 - 15 of the 1979 Act (implied 
undertakings as to conformity with sample, or as to the quality of goods or fitness for a 
59 The section also applies to corresponding provisions in the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. 
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particular purpose) are automatically ineffective against a consumer and only effective 
insofar as they satisfy the requirement of reasonableness against a non-consumer. 
To an extent the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations can fill this 
potential loophole however their effect would only be to subject he term in question to 
the fairness test rather than providing a prohibition on the use of such terms bo 
An examination of the background and purpose of this provision may provide a 
basis for a consideration of whether the exclusion remains an appropriate one for 
application to electronic contracts. 
According to the Law Commission of the time there were a number of 
justifications for the exemption introduced in section 26. " They felt that a country of 
destination approach should be adopted in relation to goods that were exported from the 
United Kingdom, with the laws of the country to which the goods were exported 
regulating contractual freedoms in relation to consumers and other purchasers. The 
Commission believed that in this way UK exporters would not be placed at a 
disadvantage in relation to some of their foreign competitors. A second relevant issue 
was the fact that international supply contracts ̀ordinarily involved transactions of some 
size between parties who were engaged in commerce' and as such the terms of such 
contracts should be left to the discretion of the business parties dealing at arms length. 
Since the 1975 report was produced there have been a number of significant 
changes in the character of international trade. In particular increased harmonisation of 
the European Union including an extensive consumer protection policy and the 
promotion of cross border commerce. With the increased accessibility of foreign 
markets due to modern communication technologies and the increasing involvement of 
consumers in contracts whereby goods may be provided or delivered in states other than 
the consumer's habitual residence, the justifications for the exemption found in section 
26 may need reconsidering. 
In their recent consultation document on unfair terms in contracts"' the Law 
Commission considered the exclusion found in section 26 in the light of current 
commercial activity and the developments in consumer protection at the European level. 
The Law Commission identified the potential gap in the protection afforded by the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act and highlighted the failure to draw a distinction between 
60 The Director General of Fair Trading may use his powers under the Regulations to suggest to sellers and 
suppliers that the terms in question should be removed. See below at p 257. 
61 Law Commission Second Report on Exemption Clauses (Law Com. No. 69. August 1975) 
62 Law Com No. 166 (loin Consultation document, November 2002) 
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consumer and non-consumer contracts in section 26. The Commission concluded that 
in the light of European Legislation relating to unfair terms in consumer contracts" and 
consumer guarantees" the exemption found in s. 26 may be contrary to European Law 
and policy in relation to consumers. The Commission also noted a potential discrepancy 
in relation to the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
(enacted in the UK in the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990) in that the consumer 
retains the protection of the mandatory rules of his or her home state, regardless of 
whether the applicable law as dictated by the Acts provisions is the law of his or her 
home state. 
The Commission makes a preliminary proposition that in any new regulations on 
unfair terms the exclusion found in section 26 is not reproduced in relation to consumer 
contracts. In this way the consumer does not lose any of the protection afforded by the 
laws of his habitual residence. 
In addition it is suggested that the implied undertakings as to title are so 
fundamental that the prohibition on excluding or limiting liabilities arising out of s. 12 of 
the Sale of Goods Act should be affirmed in relation to consumer or non-consumer 
purchasers of goods, whether or not those goods are delivered to the UK. 
113.3(b) Exemptions From the Scope of the Act: Schedule 1 
The contracts contained in Schedule 1 of the Act are either wholly or partly excluded 
from its application. In general they reflect the need or existence of specific provisions with 
appropriate safeguards and controls for the particular subject matter. " Sections 2-4 of the 
Act do not extend to contracts of insurance; contracts or parts of a contract relating to the 
creation or transfer of an interest in land or intellectual property rights; any contract relating 
to the formation or dissolution of a company or its constitution; or the transfer of 
securities; 66 charterparties and carriage of goods by ship or hovercxaft. 61 Contracts of 
employment are excluded from the scope of Section 2 of the Act, except insofar as they 
favour the employee. " 
63 Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (Oj. No. L95,21.4.93, p. 29) 
implemented I the UK by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (previously 1994). 
64 Directive 1999/44/EC "on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees" 
implemented in the UK by The Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 2002. 
65 In a similar vein to the discussion of arbitration clauses above. 
66 (Sch 1,1(a-e)). 
67 (Sch 1, paragraph 2& 3). 
68 (Schi, ss4). 
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A number of the contracts excluded by Schedule 1 are increasingly being formed 
electronically. However, the most common of these excluded contracts being formed 
electronically are those involving material protected by copyright and other intellectual 
property rights. Computer software and a wide range of entertainment media can be 
`dematerialised' and transferred easily, quickly and conveniently by electronic forms of 
communication, particularly the Internet. The majority of these items will be protected by 
copyright and if the exclusion in Schedule 1(1)(c) were to encompass uch contracts a 
significant number of electronic contracts would be beyond the scope of UCTA. However, 
the vast majority of transactions only involve the transfer of a licence to use, which is 
arguably not the creation, transfer or termination of a right or interest in the intellectual 
property. 
If a particular contract does involve the transfer or creation of a right or interest in 
intellectual property there may be a further limit on the effects of Schedule 1(1) if the 
Schedule is interpreted correctly. By virtue of section 1(a) it is clear that any contract of 
insurance is beyond the scope of sections 2-4 of the Act. However, the ousters contained in 
subsections (b) to (e) contain a subtly different terminology and appear to be of a more 
limited effect than subsection 1(a). In subsections (b)-(e) contracts are only excluded from 
the scope of sections 2-4 of the Act in so far as the contract relates to the particular subject 
matter contained within those subsections. For example, if a customer were to enter a 
contract for a piece of software and the contract contained the transfer of a right or interest 
in the intellectual property, then only the aspects relating to that intellectual property would 
be excluded from the scope of sections 2-4 of the Act. Support for this interpretation can 
be found in the judgment of Thayne Forbes, J. in 7iae &dwge Association v CAP Financial 
Services Ltd 9 that a restrictive approach will be taken in the application of the paragraph. 
"The use of the words ".... any contract so far as it relates to.... " in subparagraph (c) 
shows clearly that the subparagraph is strictly limited in its application and that it 
does not necessarily extend to all the terms of a relevant contract. "" 
And 
"If a term is one which is concerned with aspects of the contract between the parties 
other than the creation or transfer of rights in the intellectual property attaching to 
the product, then paragraph 1(c) does not apply. "" 
69 [1995] F. S. R. 654. 
70 Ibid at p. 663. 
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Hence, only the terms which directly relate to the creation, transfer or termination of 
intellectual property rights will be excluded. This approach is consistent with the 
terminology used in the Schedule, particularly when the omission of the words "so far as it 
relates to" in the subparagraph excluding contracts of insurance is considered. " 
113.4 Evasion of the Act by the use of a ̀ choice of law' clause 
It has already been noted above that under the Rome convention a consumer 
cannot be deprived of the protection of the mandatory rules of his habitual residence, 
examples of which would include the provisions in the UCTA. However, to benefit 
from this protection the consumer must enter the contract in specific circumstances; the 
contract must be preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising and 
the consumer must take the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract in his 
habitual residence. " 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act also contains a provision in s. 27(2) (b) to attempt 
to deal with evasion of its protection by choice of law. The provisions of the Act apply 
notwithstanding a contract term which applies or purports to apply the law of some 
country outside the United Kingdom where a consumer, who is habitually resident in the 
United Kingdom, has taken the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract here. "
In tandem, these provisions provide the consumer with significant protection when 
entering electronic contracts, particularly with overseas vendors who may seek to exclude 
the protection afforded by UCTA by using a choice of law clause. 
In relation to non-consumers, party autonomy is retained with parties free to choose 
the law of any country to apply to their contract. However, s. 27(2) (a) does allow the court 
to retain some discretion to apply the provisions of the Act in the face of a conflicting 
choice of law clause where it appears to the court or arbiter that the clause has been 
included ̀ wholly or mainly' to evade the operation of the Act 
11.4 Structure of the Act. 
The Act can be divided into `active' sections and ̀ definition' sections. The ̀ active 
sections' determine the application of the Act. These sections dictate the type of notice or 
71 Ibid 
72 There has been some debate regarding the correct interpretation of the clause, see Mickled vSAC 
Tedmology [199 1] ALL ER 275 and Elan*ily Supplies Nanirares Ltd uMF Group plc [1993] All ER 372. 
73 See Chapter 5 para 5.2.7 above. 
7 This requirement is discussed in detail above in chapter 4 (4.3.5). 
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contractual clause subject o control and the form of that control, in particular whether the 
clause is subject o total prohibition or to the test of reasonableness. Key definition sections 
supplement the active sections. The definition sections explain the terminology used within 
the Act, to aid application. 
115 Substantive Elements of the Act and their potential impact on 
electronic contracting. 
115.1 Negligence Liabilitv. 7' 
10.5.1.1 Definition of "negligence": Section 1(1). 
The word `negligence' has a specific definition in the context of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act. The definition encompasses a breach of any obligation, arising from the express 
or implied terms of a contract, to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill in the 
performance of the contract; of any common law duty to take reasonable care or exercise 
reasonable skill (but not any stricter duty); and, of the common duty of care imposed by the 
Occupiers Liability Act 1957 or the Occupiers Liability Act (Northern Ireland) 1957. 
This is a deliberately broad definition of negligence, expressly including reasonable 
care and skill in the performance of a contract in addition to the common law duty to take 
reasonable care. The need to bring as many clauses as possible within the scope of the Act, 
beyond the technical meaning of negligence in English Courts, reflected a growing concern 
regarding clauses or notices restricting or excluding liability for negligence. In the words of 
the Law Commission: 
"... clauses or notices exempting from liability for negligence are in many cases a 
serious social evil and our review of the powers at present at the disposal of the 
court for dealing with such clauses hows that they are far from adequate. "76 
75 Negligence liability 
(1) A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice given to persons generally or 
to particular persons exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal injury resulting from 
negligence. 
(2) In the case of other loss or damage, a person cannot so exclude or restrict his liability for 
negligence xcept in so far as the term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. 
(3) Where a contract erm or notice purports to exclude or restrict liability for negligence a
person's agreement to or awareness of it is not in itself to be taken as indicating his voluntary 
acceptance of any risk 
76 Op cit fn 4 above at page 19 para. 44. 
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Section 2 of the Act places a total prohibition on the exclusion or limitation of 
liability for death or personal injury' and permits the exclusion or limitation of liability 
for other damage only insofar as the term or notice satisfies the requirement of 
reasonableness. 78 The section is not limited to contractual terms but extends to non- 
contractual notices purporting to restrict or exclude liability for negligence. " Notice', 
for the purposes of the Act includes: an announcement, whether or not in writing, and 
any other communication or pretended communication. " A classic example of this type 
of notice would be a notice declaring that the use of a car park, building or other facility 
is at the `owner's risk'. Notices delivered in electronic form clearly fall within this 
definition with the express exclusion of a need for 'writing' and the inclusion of `any 
other form of communication'. 
The inclusion of notices in this section extends its application to a growing 
practice in the online environment. On the Internet in particular, many Internet Service 
Providers and other web sites utilise notices purporting to exempt them from liability for 
negligently caused loss. These notices are usually introduced at the point of entrance to 
the site as ̀ terms and conditions of website use, before the downloading of material or 
in e-mail disclaimers. With no contractual nexus being required by the section these 
notices are within the scope of the provision and subject to the corresponding controls 
on their use. Clauses seeking to exempt liability for negligence will often be found with 
downloads of software or other media. Such downloads have the potential to transfer 
viruses and the service provider will seek to exclude or restrict his liability against a claim 
that he negligently allowed a virus to be downloaded with his media causing damage to 
the recipient's machine. By virtue of this section, such a clause will have to satisfy the 
`requirement of reasonableness' to be effective. 
The section does not discriminate between those who deal as consumer for the 
purpose of the Act and those who do not. This approach gives the section a broad 
scope for application, in line with the approach taken to the definition of negligence 
discussed above. Small and medium sized enterprises can benefit from this provision, 
which may in turn increase confidence in the use of the Internet and other electronic 
media. 
n Section 2(1). 
78 Section 2(2). 
79DauresvPany[1988] 1 EGLR 147 andMcüdlaghvLaneFox & ParmersLtd[1996] 1 EGLR35. 
80 Section 14. 
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The injured party's apparent agreement to, or awareness of, the term should not, 
in itself indicate voluntary acceptance of any risk. 8' The Law Commission stated that, 
"awareness of the content of the term or notice is a matter to take into account, but 
cannot of itself be regarded as conclusive: the courts must still have regard to all the 
relevant facts of the case". ' Hence, an apparent consent to the risk of loss or damage 
will not automatically provide a defence for a service provider in an action for loss due to 
negligence. 83 The clause or notice will still be either subject to the complete prohibition 
in section 1(1), or subject to the requirement of reasonableness in section 1(2). 
Internet Service Providers (ISP), those wishing to sell products on-line and even 
businesses providing free or trial period offers or services will have to consider the 
possibility that their exemption clauses may be tested under section 2 of UCTA. 84 One 
of the most significant potential risks for an ISP is liability for loss or damage occurring 
due to a breach in security on his server. Most service providers employ security 
safeguards for their own protection and to promote confidence in the minds of their 
customers or users. For the majority such protection involves the use of a secure server 
and some form of encryption. However, even with the implementation of security 
measures there remains a tangible risk that a customer's personal or financial information 
may be `stolen' or that a virus may be transmitted to a customer directly, or within a 
downloaded piece of software or information. With this possibility in mind, service 
providers see exemption clauses or disclaimers as a necessary safeguard against the 
possibility of a flood of actions should their security be breached. By virtue of Section 2 
of UCTA such clauses will be subject to the test of reasonableness. " 
A potentially important benefit of the application of section 2 of the Act to 
electronic contracting is the ability to control, to some extent, the use of exemption 
clauses and notices by service providers to transfer the risk of using the electronic 
medium to the customer or user. 
81 Section 2(3). 
82 Op cif fn 4 above, page 5lpara 134. 
83 The defence of zdaii run fit v jw a. 
84 Naturally the fact that the service is ̀ free' may go some way to demonstrating the reasonableness of the 
clause. 
85 Discussed below at 11.6. 
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11.5.2 Contractual LiabilityRb 
Section 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act is a broadly applicable provision 
concerning contractual liability. The wide scope of the section creates the potential for 
overlap with other parts of the Act, in particular sections 2 and 6. Contractual terms 
excluding or restricting liability for breach of contract are the main targets of the section, 
although terms that stipulate that a party may render a contractual performance 
substantially different from that reasonably expected, or render no performance at all, are 
included by virtue of section 3 (b). " 
The application of the section to any breach of contract, rather than to a specific 
category of breach, contributes to the overall breadth of applicability of the Act. 88 This is 
complemented by the fact that the section offers protection to parties who deal as 
consumer and to those who do not, but who deal on the other parties 'written standard 
terms of business'. A contractual term falling within the scope of section 3 is subject o 
the requirement of reasonableness in any adjudication of whether the term is effective. 
The section has three discernible elements: 
a) the applicable forms of contractual relationship, or`gateways'89 to the section; 
b) the nature of the contract terms which will attract the application of the 
section; and 
c) the application of the requirement of reasonableness to the term in question. 
11.5.2.1 The "Gateways". 
Section 3 is only applicable where one party either ̀ deals as consumer' or on the 
other party's `written standard terms of business'. Although these `gateways' are 
86 Liability arising in contract. 
This section applies as between contracting parties where one of them deals as consumer or on 
the other's written standard terms of business 
As against that party, the other cannot by reference to any contract term- 
when he himself is in breach of contract, exclude or restrict any liability of his in respect of the 
breach; or claim to be entitled- 
(i) to render a contractual performance substantially different from that which was 
reasonably expected of him, or 
(ii) in respect of the whole or in any part of his contractual obligation, to render no 
performance at all, 
except in so far as (m any of the cases mentioned above in this subsection) the contract erm 
satisfies the test of reasonableness. 
87 This subsection is, in many ways, analogous to the provision found in section 13(c) of the Act. 
88 Section 6 for example is limited to breaches of the statutory implied terms in contracts of sale or hire 
purchase. 
89 This label is used by Jacobs, E. EJfaxizz Exdusion Clauses (Fourmat: London, 1990). ch. 5. 
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essentially distinct, there is some scope for overlap between them. By their very nature 
consumer contracts will almost invariably contain the seller's ̀written standard terms'. At 
this point two factors require consideration; the definition of the phrase ̀deals as 
consumer' and the definition of 'written standard terms of business'. 
`Dealing as consumer"' 
This definition is of considerable importance within the Act because those who 
`deal as consumer' are afforded greater protection against exemption clauses. To `deal as 
consumer' a party must neither make the contract in the course of a business or hold 
himself out as doing so, and the other parry must enter the contract in the course of a 
business. The Act does not define ̀ in the course of a business' and interpretation has 
been left to the courts. The approach adopted by the courts has been the subject of 
criticism from academic ommentators" and the courts themselves have departed from 
the interpretation adopted in the context of UCTA when considering the meaning 
identical terminology in different consumer protection oriented Acts 92 Nevertheless, the 
approach adopted in R &B Custaru Brokers v Unitab Da ni nuns Trust remains the leading 
authority on the matter. " 
`In tJe ae ofa business' 
To `deal as consumer' the buyer must not make, or hold himself out as making 
the contract ̀in the course of a business'. Equally, the seller must make the contract ̀in 
the course of a business'. The inclusion of this second requirement reflects the desire 
90 Section 12 "Dealing as consumer". 
(1) A party to a contract "deals as consumer" in relation to another party if- 
(a) he neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself out as 
doing so; and 
(b) the other party does make the contract in the course of a business; and 
(c) in the case of a contract governed by the law of sale of goods or hire-purchase, or by 
section 7 of this Act, the goods passing under or in pursuance of the contract are of a 
type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption. 
(2) But on a sale by auction or by competitive tender the buyer is not in any circumstances to be 
regarded as dealing as consumer. 
(3) Subject to this, it is for those claiming that a party does not deal as consumer to show that he 
does not. 
91 Macdonald, op ci fn 52. 
92 See Stemm vRogcrs [1999] 1 All ER 613. The most recent attempt to alter the situation arose out of the 
government's beleaguered attempts to implement the EC Directive on consumer guarantees. 
Unfortunately due to the rather rushed (poor) drafting the phrase remains. It is hoped that the issue will 
be redressed in the forthcoming Law Commission overhaul and amalgamation of UCTA and UTCCR. 
93 [1988] 1 All ER 847. 
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expressed by the Law Commission not to interfere with individuals entering contracts in 
a private capacity. " The contracts targeted were those between businesses and 
individuals acing in their private capacity. However, when interpreting the provision, 
rather than attaching importance to the Law Commission's distinction of those 
agreements entered into in a `purely private capacity' from those entered in a 'business 
capacity' the courts adopted a definition applied previously to cases concerning a 
similarly worded provision in section 1 of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 (FDA). " 
In the context of the TDA, in Davies V Stowie, '6 Lord Keith considered tasks 
which were ̀ integral' to a business clearly ̀in the course of a business', but that if the 
contract was for a purpose not `integral' to the business then a certain degree of 
regularity was required before the activity could be considered `in the course of a trade or 
business'. 
"The expression ̀in the course of a trade or business' in the context of an Act 
having consumer protection as its primary purpose conveys the concept of some 
degree of regularity... "97 
This definition was discussed in detail by the Court of Appeal and applied to the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act in R &B Cusmrns Brokers v Unital Dwizkns Tnist. 98 Dillon LJ 
explained the definition of `in the course of a business' thus: 
"There are some transactions which are clearly integral parts of the business 
concerned, and these should be held to have been carried out in the course of 
those businesses; this would include, apart from much else, the instance of a one- 
off adventure in the nature of trade where the transaction itself would constitute 
a trade or business. There are other transactions, however, such as the purchase 
of the car in the present case, which are at the highest only incidental to the 
carrying on of the relevant business; here a degree of regularity is required before 
94 pp cit fn 4 at para. 9. 
95 1(1) Any person who, in tlx course ofa trade or buss, - (emphasis added). The purpose of the two Acts is 
however, somewhat incompatible. 
96 Davies v Ssoi r[ 1984]3 All ER 831, [1984] 1 WIR 1301 (HL) 
971bid at 835. See also Ha wing Lo nn Boraigb v Swanson [1970] 3 All ER 609. 
98 [1988] 1 All ER 847. 
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it can be said that they are an integral part of the business carried on and so 
entered into in the course of that business. " 99 
His Lordship explained that the primary purpose of both the TDA and UCI'A was 
consumer protection and that it would be ̀ unreal and unsatisfactory' to conclude that the 
phrase ̀ in the course of a business' had a significantly different meaning in the two Acts. 
In particular he felt that the phrase should not be given a wider meaning in the context 
of section 12. 
Hence, three forms of transaction can be identified as `in the course of a 
business' for the purpose of section 12: 
1) transactions being integral to the business concerned, 
2) transactions not integral to, but occurring with `sufficient regularity' and, 
3) one-off adventures in the nature of trade. 
The advantage of this approach is the expansion of the protection afforded by the Act to 
business entities entering transactions not integral to the business and not occurring with 
a sufficient degree of regularity. In R &B Cusmms Brokers this gave the company valuable 
protection against a clause which would have resulted in an extensive and unexpected 
loss for them. However, the approach taken in RIB Custans has been criticised and at 
times overlooked. 10° 
The first criticism relates to the function of the statute from which the definition 
was taken. The Trade Descriptions Act, although concerned with consumer protection, 
is a criminal statute and the definition relates to the boundaries of a criminal offence. It 
is arguable that in this context a narrow approach should be adopted in defining who 
may be liable for a criminal act. The Unfair Contract Terms Act deals with civil liability, 
the approach and reasoning adopted in the context of criminal liability is not necessarily 
apposite when dealing with civil liability and the purpose of the 1977 Act. Arguably a 
wider definition should be adopted in the context of section 12. 
99 Ibid per Dillon LJ. at p 854. 
'00 As indicated above. See also St Alhvu Qty & District C. oaad vlntematwnal Canp &-a Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 
491; [ 1997] F. S. R. 251. The court did not make any reference to the judgment in R &B Customs Brokers 
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The second argument relates to the scope and applicability of the Act. Section 
12(1)(b) requires that the seller or supplier does act `in the course of a business' for any 
party to qualify as dealing as consumer. "' The consequence of the approach adopted in 
R &B Custans Brokers is that the protection afforded by the Act may be restricted. For 
example, any subsequent sale by R &B would deny the other party the protection of 
dealing as consumer because R &B would not be dealing in the course of a business as 
required by s12(1)(b). 
Finally, as has already been indicated, the phrase ̀in the course of a business' is 
also used in Section 1(3) defining ̀business liability' and correspondingly the scope of the 
majority of the Act. If the definition accepted in RIB Custarnu were applied here it could 
severely restrict the scope of the Act. Sections 2 to 7 of the Act would only apply to 
sales, which are ̀ integral' to the business of the seller or `incidental but occurring with 
sufficient regularity'. This would appear to be over restrictive and not in the spirit of the 
legislative purpose of the Act. 
The differing degrees of protection against unfair contract terms, afforded by 
UCTA are intended to reflect the need to protect the consumer as a 'weaker party'. The 
basis for differentiating under R &B Custo ns is the nature of the business carried on by 
the seller rather than anything to do with strength of bargaining power. If R &B is 
applied consistently it will restrict the application of the Act. 
An alternative approach to avoid the risk of unduly restricting the scope of the 
Act, would be to use a different definition of `in the course of a business', in the context 
of different sections of the Act. However, as pointed out by Kidner, to give the same 
phrase different meanings in the same statute would lead to confusion and be something 
of an absurdity. "' There would appear to be some justification for a reconsideration of 
the definition of `in the course of a business' in the context of UCTA. 
In the most recent judicial discussion of the phrase ̀ in the course of a business', 
Steunson v Rogers, 103 the Court of Appeal decided that the definition adopted in R &B 
Gasfans Brokers and Davies vS on' er was inappropriate to apply in the context of the Sale 
of Goods Act. When dealing with the implied terms of the Sale of Goods Act the Court 
felt that a wider definition should be adopted to broaden the application of the implied 
101 The purpose behind this requirement being the exclusion of `purely private sales' between individuals 
from the scope of the Act. 
1°2 Kidner, R. "The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 - who deals as consumer? " (1987) 38 NILQ 46. 
103 [1999] 1 All ER 613. 
244 
71e Umfair G, i -a t Teams Act 1977 
term. The Court felt that the phrase ̀in the course of a business' should be given it's 
natural meaning which Potter L j. explained would help the courts to 
"distinguish between a sale made in the course of a seller's business and a purely 
private sale of goods outside the confines of the business (if any) carried on by 
the seller. "104 
The emphasis in this definition would be whether the sale was a `purely private' one or 
not. This definition would appear to extend the term `in the course of a business' to a 
wider range of activities. However, if this definition were adopted uncertainty would 
remain - how should the phrase ̀ purely private sale' be defined? Nevertheless it would 
encompass the more `natural' meaning of `in the course of a business' vis-a-vis ̀ anything 
done by and for a business'. "" There are also a number of references to contracts made 
in a `purely private' capacity in the Law Commission Report. Finally, there is certainly 
scope for an argument that the definition adopted for UCTA should be the same as the 
one adopted in for the SGA and not the one applied to the TDA. UCTA and SGA 
provide consumer protection in relation to civil liability whereas the TDA deals with 
criminal liability. 
At present a business entering contracts outside of their normal field of business 
is afforded an added level of protection by the definition adopted in R &B Customs. For 
business parties, particularly small businesses, this additional protection will be welcomed 
when contemplating entering contracts with larger and more powerful corporations. 
However, the broader effect of the provision may be undermined by this interpretation. 
`Holdingout' 
To `deal as consumer' a party must not enter the contract `in the course of a 
business' or `hold himself out' as doing so. By `holding out' the customer is giving the 
impression that he is entering the contract as a business party, usually to obtain a trade 
discount, extended credit or to buy products not usually sold retail. By holding out the 
customer assumes the potentially higher liability risk associated with a non-consumer 
transaction. Due to the lack of any physical meeting of the parties in the electronic and 
104 Ibid per Potter LJ at 623. 
105 Macdonald, op cit fn 52. 
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in particular on-line environment he question of whether a party is `holding out' may 
become more important because of difficulties in identifying the contracting parties. 
The burden of proof is on the party claiming that the other has held himself out 
as acting in the course of a business and hence did not deal as consumer. In R &B 
Custans this burden was apparently not satisfied by showing that the contract and finance 
application were made out in the company's corporate name and the business details 
were entered on to the finance form. The issue of holding out was not discussed further 
in that case and the issue has received little attention in the courts. A difficulty exists in 
assessing where the courts will draw the line on holding out. 
Many businesses using websites provide a different set of terms for consumer or 
business customers, reflecting the statutory regime of the jurisdiction involved. This 
system usually operates by asking whether the customer is a trade customer or an 
individual. While this does not necessarily dictate the legal standing of a customer it may 
be the only realistic way that a supplier can distinguish between his customers for the 
purpose of trade discounts. By declaring that they are ̀ trade' the customer would obtain 
the discount, but may enter the contract on less favourable terms than the normal 
consumer. It would appear clear in this situation that the customer is `holding himself 
out' as making the contract `in the course of a business'. However, if the R&B Custans 
definition of `in the course of a business' were applied consistently, this would require 
that the buyer gives the impression, or `holds out, that the transaction is integral to his 
business or occurring with sufficient regularity. This would be a rather artificial and 
difficult approach for the courts to apply. The more realistic approach would be to 
investigate whether the customer indicated that he was acting in a business rather than 
private capacity. Unfortunately this approach would create a rather bizarre and 
unacceptable dichotomy whereby a customer may be holding itself out as acting ̀ in the 
course of a business', but under the test in R &B Custans, not actually acting in the course 
of a business because the transaction itself is not integral to his business or occurring 
with sufficient regularity. Once again the definition in R&B Customs appears 
incompatible with the rest of the Act 
It is submitted that what should be required here is that the seller reasonably 
believed that he was dealing with a business party, in the broadest sense. This would 
include the taking of appropriate steps if there is uncertainty. At this point the definition 
of "in the course of a business" adopted in Stec son would appear more appropriate, if 
the party is assessed on the basis of whether or not he is holding out as entering the 
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contract in the capacity of a purely private individual or not? This would be a more 
logical and arguably fairer approach. 
A practical approach for a supplier in this situation may be to attempt to create 
some form of collateral contract with the customer, by requesting that the customer 
electronically ̀signs' a document declaring that he is entering the contract in the course of 
his business and indemnifying the seller for any additional liability incurred due to the 
purchaser transacting on "trade" terms. Nevertheless, such an agreement may be open 
to challenge under other sections of the Unfair Contract Terms Act and potentially 
UTOCR. 
Goads `orý supply for priuue use orcr n ian, 
Section 12(1)(c) requires that goods purchased must be of a `type ordinarily 
supplied for private use or consumption' for a party to qualify as dealing as consumer. 
The phrase is clearly intended to exclude purchases of goods not usually sold in the 
consumer market. However, the phrase is rather ambiguous in what is meant by a ̀ type' 
of goods. Many `types' of goods are not ordinarily supplied for private use because of 
their cost. Does this mean that because an individual can afford the goods he does not 
qualify as a consumer? With more competitive markets and advancements in technology 
the cost of products not ordinarily associated with private use has been reduced. 
Electronic commerce means that these products are also readily available. Computer 
software is a case in point. Computer software, if it can be categorised as goods, "" can 
have many applications. Some of these could be seen as ̀ ordinarily supplied for private 
use' such as home office products, but what if someone purchases the professional 
version of a package or state of the art video capture devices, mixing and editing deck? 
Some individuals hobbies may also mean that they purchase items not ordinarily supplied 
for private use. 
An item may ordinarily be supplied for private use or consumption in small 
quantities, but if an individual buys a very large quantity of that item does that take him 
outside the definition of `deals as consumer? In the context of `one-off adventures in 
the nature of trade'107 an analogy has been drawn with revenue law cases whereby the 
large quantities of an item purchased led the court to determine that the items were not 
'06 See the discussion in chapter 13.2. 
107 Such ventures will also be classed as 'in the course of a business' because they have the 'flavour of 
trading'. See Dillon LJ in R &B Gastons Broken v Unifad itht is Tn st [ 1988] 1 All ER 847 at p 854. 
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meant for private use. 1°8 It is submitted that even before the advent of electronic 
commerce the ̀ quantity' of an item purchased is not a good criteria upon which to define 
activities as ̀ in the course of a business'. Advances in cross channel transport have 
resulted in hundreds of people purchasing goods in quantities which would suggest that 
they are not for private use or consumption. However, the cheap prices mean that 
individuals will buy `unusual' quantities to save money. With the advantages of the 
internet the likelihood of purchases of `unusual' quantities of certain items may increase 
with individuals taking advantage of better value and a one time transportation cost. The 
nature of a market may dictate what is purchased and in what quantity. 
A decision on whether a party may or may not be classed as a consumer and 
afforded the additional protection provided by the Act based upon the nature of the 
goods purchased would appear to leave room for considerable uncertainty. This is 
particularly undesirable in the electronic environment where the ̀ type' and the ̀ quantity' 
of goods may not be 'ordinary. "' 
The issues discussed above in relation to the definition of "in the course of a 
business" result in uncertainty in the definition of consumer and have the potential to 
create an undesirable dichotomy within the Act. "' 
It is important for parties entering a potentially large number of cross border or 
international contracts to ascertain and control their foreseeable liabilities. Whilst this 
concern remains constant regardless of the medium used for entering such contracts, the 
borderless nature of the Internet and other electronic media makes the issue particularly 
relevant for electronic contracts. 
108 See Koffman, L and Macdonald, E. 7h e Law ofContraa 4th ed. (Polley, 2001) at p. 197. Rutla%evlnland 
Recrruee Caivissi e, s (1929) 14 TC 490 and Martin v Lorz y [1927] AC 312. 
10' The position has recently been amended by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers Regulations 
2002 (Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 3045), Regulation 14. From March 1K 2003, where the first partynot 
dealing in the course of a business' is an individual this subsection will not apply. In section 12, after 
subsection (1) the following subsection is inserted, "(IA) But if the first party mentioned in subsection (1) 
is an individual, paragraph (c) of that subsection must be ignored. " This position acknowledges that a 
business or corporate entity may'deal as consumer', but retains the perceived limitations associated with 
subsection (c) in place. The uncertainties discussed in the preceding section remain in place. 
"o This contention relates to the use of the phrase "in the course of a business" in section 1 in the context 
of "business liability" and the approach adopted in relation to section 12 under R &B Castors Broke, To 
avoid restricting the scope of the Act the two identical phrases would appear to require different 
definitions. 
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`On the Others Written Standard Terms' 
The second ̀ gateway' to the section requires a party to contract on the others 
"written standard terms of business". This phrase raises a number of questions of 
interpretation, particularly in the electronic environment. 
The first point to note is that the standard terms must be in 'written' form. 
Traditional requirements of form such as writing and signature have the potential to 
create uncertainty in the context of electronic communications. "' If electronic forms of 
communication do not satisfy this requirement then many electronic contracts will be 
excluded from the scope of section 3 and parties, particularly small businesses, may lose 
valuable protection. "' The issue is discussed in chapter 7 where it is concluded that 
electronic communications which take visible form will probably satisfy a formal 
requirement of writing, whereas communications which remain solely in their `electronic 
phase' (such as EDI or contracts concluded by electronic agents) probably will not. If 
this interpretation were adopted by the courts then there would be scope for the 
argument that where contract terms remain in `electronic form' they are not `written' and 
will not fall within this part of section 3.1' 
The remainder of the terminology used in the second ̀gateway' to the application 
of section 3 also requires some consideration. There are three important questions: 
" Whose standard terms? 
9 How `standard' do the terms have to be? 
" Which terms are subject o the Act? 
Whose stand vd w" s? 
A party may contend that the standard terms are not `his', but rather standard 
terms drafted by his supplier or a particular trade body and therefore beyond the scrutiny 
of section 3. For example a party may supply goods on a standard form common to a 
III See above in chapter 7. 
112 Macdonald, E. & Poyton, D. `A particular problem for e-commerce: Section 3 of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977. " [2002] 3 WebJCLI. Available at http: //webjcE. ncl. ac. uk/2000/issue3/macdonald3. html. 
113 However, the clear objective of the section is to deal with standard form contracts (particularly when 
the section applicable to Scotland is considered. Section 17 uses the phrase ̀standard form contract' rather 
than 'written standard terms). The court may consider that the 'written' requirement should not be an 
obstacle capable of defeating the purpose of the section. 
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particular trade or industry, which may have been drafted by a regulatory body. Certain 
goods, computer software for example, may be supplied with standard terms in a license 
agreement from the producer of the software. In neither of the preceding scenarios can 
the `standard terms' be properly called the supplier's standard terms. However, a court 
may reject such a proposition on the basis that in joining a particular trade body, or using 
an agent, or supplying particular goods, the supplier has adopted the terms or conditions 
`as his own'. What is important is that the terms are the basis on which his business is 
conducted rather than the origin of the terms. 
How hvzdarci'do the teens haw to 1e? 
Clearly if the parties have negotiated the individual contract to their specific 
needs the terms will not be `standard'. In The Flamm- J3 14 Potter LJ felt that the fact 
that the contract was 
"negotiated between the parties, in that the standard form of [... ] agreement 
which the defendants possessed at the time [... ] was subject to a number of 
alterations to fit the circumstances of the plaintiffs' case before its terms were 
finalized between the parties. ""' 
precluded it from falling within s. 3 (1) of the Act. However, the `negotiations' must 
actually have an effect on the substance of the standard terms otherwise section 3 will 
still apply. In St Alms City & District Cowuil v Intemaliavzd Cain Ltd" Nourse LJ 
agreed with the words of Mr Justice Scott Baker in the court below, that the 
"... defendant's general conditions remained effectively untouched in the 
negotiations... the plaintiffs accordingly dealt on the defendant's written standard 
terms for the purposes of section 3(1)"" 
114 Fl =InterMmVDaVnac(71rFlwwM1eand7llFlla=i gmsS)[1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 434. 
115 Ibrd at (p. 438). 
116 St Albans Uy & District Ca o1v Int in tJx ial Qmpriters Ltd[1996] 4 All ER 491; [1997] F. S. R. 251. 
""7 Ibid at p. 263. See also Saht Associatian v CAP F»uouial Se, z ces Ltd [1995] F. S. R. 654 and W4»zl 
Ela isms Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2000] 2 All E. R. (Comm) 984. 
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There has been some judicial indication that where there has been no negotiation 
of the relevant exempting terms in a contract, then the contract will be treated as on 
`written standard terms'. 118 In Pegler Lri l v. Wang (UK) Lrinixerl"9 the court did not 
consider it necessary for the entire contract to be in standard form; just standard in 
relation to the `material clauses'. The exemption clauses inserted by the seller were non- 
negotiable and therefore the contract had been concluded on the seller's `written 
standard terms of business'. It could be argued that this is a rather generous 
interpretation of the phrase but it is certainly in line with the purpose of the Act. 
The predominant approach to whether a contract has been entered into on the 
other party's 'written standard terms' would appear to require that the seller's pre- 
formulated terms and conditions had not been significantly altered or departed from as a 
result of negotiations. It has also been suggested that the relevant case law suggests that 
the exemption clause in question must not have been the subject of negotiations. "' 
However, it is submitted that this factor should not be decisive in the question of 
whether the contract is made on written standard terms but rather a relevant factor in the 
assessment of the reasonableness of that clause. The `gateways' to section 3 are 
indicative of contractual relationships where one party has a dominant or controlling 
level of bargaining power. "' The important question in relation `standard terms of 
business' should be the existence of pre-formulated terms and the extent to which they 
are varied by the parties negotiations. 
For many electronic contracts, particularly those entered into via interactive 
websites or by other electronic agents, the terms and conditions will be pre-formulated 
and fixed with no room for negotiation. There may be a ̀ choice' as to the terms relating 
to payment method and delivery, but such choices cannot truly be called negotiations 
and would not preclude the contract from being on standard terms for the purpose of 
section 3. 
Whtd7 tens are subject tothe Act? 
A final question which must be considered is whether the offending clause itself 
has to be one of the 'written standard terms' of the contract. It will often be the case 
118 St Alh= City & Dzth*i Cowz lv Intem, &kn l Canputers Ltd [ 1996] 4 AUER 491; [ 1997] F. S. R. 251per 
Nourse U. at 253. 
119 [2000] B. L. R. 218. 
120 Poole, J. Contract Lacy 6th ed. (Blackstone Press: London, 2001) at p. 203. 
121 Or in more popular terms, where one party is 'weaker'. 
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that the exclusion or limitation clause will be part of the standard terms used by a party, 
but it is possible that situations will arise where the clause in question cannot be 
considered part of the standard terms. For example an exclusion clause may only be 
added by a party when he has a dominant position in the transaction whereby he can 
impose a term usually unacceptable to his more ̀equal' business partners. 
Comments made in the St Albans and Pegler cases would appear to indicate that 
the exemption clauses are the ̀ material clauses' for the purpose of assessing whether the 
contract was entered on standard terms and would therefore have to form part of the 
standard terms. However, as was indicated above this approach would arguably be 
contrary to the terminology employed in section 3(2). 
Section 3(2) contains the phrase "by reference to any contractual term" which, on 
a literal reading, would appear to include all terms whether they are express or implied, 
written or standard. 122 This interpretation would also appear to correspond with the 
objectives of the Act. Once a contract falls within the scope of section 3 (i. e. the 
contracting parties pass through one of the `gateways), then any term, of the nature 
mentioned in subsection 2,123 will be subject to the test of reasonableness, which is 
discussed below. 
115.3 Implied Terms in Contracts of Sale and Hire-Purchase 
Sections 6 and 7 of the Act contain specific provisions relating to terms 
purporting to exclude or limit liability for breaches of the statutory implied terms in 
contracts for the sale or supply of goods. "' Liability for breaches of the implied 
condition relating to the seller's title to the goods he is selling"' may not be excluded or 
restricted by reference to any contractual term. 126 
122 There is little case law relating to this issue but the case law which does exist, would suggest a different 
interpretation. See McOt v. Boots Farm Sales Ltd [1981] S. L. T. 103, which considers the application of the 
equivalent., but slightly differently worded, Scottish section of the Act. 
123 Terms excluding or restricting liability for breach of contract and terms that stipulate that a party may 
render a contractual performance substantially different from that reasonably expected, or render no 
performance at all. 
124 Implied terms are discussed below in chapter 13.. 
125 Sale of Goods Act 1979 s. 12. The corresponding term in relation to hire-purchase iss. 8 of the Supply 
of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. 
126 s 6(1)(a). 
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The ability to exclude or restrict liability for breaches of the implied terms as to 
conformity with sample, satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose, "' is dependent upon 
the status of the other contracting party. If the contract is with a party who `deals as 
consumer' then the liability cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any contract 
term. "' If the contract is with a party acting otherwise than as consumer, then the 
liability may be excluded or restricted, but only in so far as the term satisfies the 
requirement of reasonableness. "' 
The control of the use of terms purporting to restrict liability for breach of the 
implied terms is particularly important to maintain standards of performance in contracts 
for the Sale of Goods. The implied terms of the Sale of Goods Act are discussed further 
in the next chapter but it is important to note at this point that the protection in UCTA 
only explicitly applies to the terms implied under the Sale of Goods Act and not 
equivalent terms implied at common law. This point may be relevant when the legal 
categorisation of `dematerialised goods' is being considered. 
11.6 The "Requirement of Reasonableness" 
The requirement of reasonableness is defined in Section 11 of the Act with 
additional guidance to be found in Schedule 2. "o The requirement is applied to 
exemption clauses under a number of sections of the Act. Some commentators have 
suggested that the "judicial discretion" provided by the requirement creates uncertainty 
and has the potential to inhibit efficient business liability management and contract 
planning. "' The potential risk of inconsistent application due to the broad nature of the 
discretion has also been highlighted. "' This argument may be re-enforced by the fact 
that application of the requirement is a very factual process unlikely to be considered on 
appeal. "' Nevertheless, there is considerable guidance as to the application of the test 
within the Act itself and this has been complemented by a number of prominent cases. 
127 s 13 - 15 Sale of Goods Act 1979 and 9- 11 Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. 
itss6(2). 
129s6(3). 
130 Schedule 2 specifically refers to the application of section 6 and 7 of the Act, but the courts have 
indicted that the factors listed within Schedule 2 are relevant to any application of the requirement of 
reasonableness. Steuwt Gill Ltdv Horatio Myrr &0 Ltd [1992] 1 QB 600, per Smith LJ at p. 608. 
131 Adams, J. and Brownsword, R. "The Unfair Contract Terms Act: a decade of discretion. " [1988] 104 
L. Q. R. 94-119. 
132 Collins, H. RTda6g Qntracrs (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
133 See St Alb vu vQy vd District Cooxilvlntemational Computers Ltd [1995] FSR 686; [1996] 4 All ER 481. 
cf. Watford El rirnia Ltd v Svuler m CFL Ltd [2000] 2 AUER (Comm) 984. 
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11.6.1 The Test. 
The clause must have been a "fair and reasonable one to be included having 
regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or 
in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made". 134 It is for the party 
seeking to rely on the clause to prove that it is a fair and reasonable one. 135 A variety of 
factors will be considered in this assessment and the courts will 'weigh up' all of these 
factors in a particular case to come to their decision. 136 Certain factors are referred to in 
relation to particular sections of the Act or types of clause, "' however, the courts have 
given these factors a wider and more general application. "' 
In relation to clauses seeking to restrict or limit liability rather than exclude it 
altogether two specific factors are highlighted by section 11(4); the resources available to 
a party for the purpose of meeting the liability should it arise; and the cost and availability 
of insurance cover. 
Schedule 2 of the Act lists among the "matters to which regard is to be had"; the 
relative bargaining strength of the parties; whether an inducement (such as a lower price) 
was given in exchange for agreeing to the term; whether through trade custom or 
previous dealings between the parties the customer ought to have known of the existence 
and extent of the term; whether any condition placed upon the enforcement of liability 
was realistic or practicable (such as a time limit); and whether the goods to be supplied 
had been personalised for the customer. 
Although each case will turn on its own facts, the relative strength of bargaining 
power of the parties appears to be a leading factor in the court's assessment. Where 
consumers are involved the courts have adopted a predictably protectionist approach 
when considering the reasonableness of a clause. "' In contrast, where two business 
parties are involved the courts have indicated that the parties themselves are the best 
judges of the commercial fairness of their transaction and in particular the 
134 Section 11(1). 
135 Section 11(5). 
136 GeJ7 MitaW (CFk4z riWi) Ltd v F»»aey Lock Spa Ltd[ 198312 AC 803. 
137 For example s 11(2) refers to Schedule 2 in relation to the application of section 6 or 7 and s 11(4) 
factors relevant in the assessment of limitation clauses. 
138 Stete v Gill Ltd v Horatio Afwr & Co Ltd [1992] 1 QB 600, per Smith LJ at p. 608 and Photo ßtduc&n v 
Se<-kor Trawprnt Ltd [1980] AC 827. 
139 Smith v Enc S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831. 
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reasonableness of the terms of their agreement. In Watford Ehe ics Ltd v Sanc%rson CFL 
Ltdl" Chadwick LJ stated that 
"... the court should be very cautious before reaching the conclusion that the 
agreement which [the parties] have reached is not a fair and reasonable one. ""' 
Nevertheless, where a party does not `deal as consumer' but there is a clear inequality of 
bargaining power the courts may still adopt a protectionist approach in the assessment of
the reasonableness of an exemption clause. "' 
11.7 Conclusion 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act has played an important role in policing 
exemption clauses since its commencement. It continues to do so and in recent years the 
Act has played a prominent role in a number of disputes relating to computer software, "' 
which has been identified as a popular subject matter for electronic contracts At the 
beginning of this chapter the stated objectives were to consider whether, the background 
and objectives of the Act were compatible with contracting in the electronic 
environment; the scope of the Act could encompass electronic contracting; the 
application of the Act to electronic contracting would produce logical, appropriate or 
desirable results and whether amendments to the act were necessary. These questions 
will now be considered. 
The reason for the introduction of the Act, the control of the use of exemption 
clauses, remains an important consideration in the modem business environment. There is 
evidence of the use of potentially unreasonable exemption clauses in electronic contracts 
from the work of the Office of Fair Trading under the Regulations discussed in the next 
chapter. The balance achieved by the Act, between legitimate business needs and the 
protection of parties in weaker bargaining positions, is particularly relevant to the electronic 
140 [2001] EWCA Civ 317 [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 696. 
141 Ibid at para 54. 
142 See St Albansv CirymndDi. ct ict Caao iJvIntemational C, ampcrten Ltd [1995] FSR 686; [1996] 4 All ER 481. 
143 Wa frnd Elaxroma Ltd v Srmdersnn CFL Ltd [2000] 2 All E. R. (Comm) 984; SAM Business Systai Ltd v 
Halley & Co [2002] EWHC 2733 [2003] 1 All E. R. (Comm) 465; Horace Hob= Group Ltd v Sherwood 
Intematiauw! Git q Ltd [2000] unrep (WL 491372); and Pegler Ltd v Wang (UK) Ltd (No. 1) [2000] B. L. R. 218 
70 Con. L. R. 68 [2000] I. T. C. U. 617. 
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environment. Small ̀start-up' businesses, able to prosper and benefit from the opportunities 
created by modem electronic forms of communication, must be able to control their 
potential risks and liabilities in order to remain viable. Customers, in particular consumers, 
must be confident that they will not be subject to excessively harsh, or unreasonable, 
contractual clauses in order to promote involvement in electronic commerce. 
The Act is generally `medium neutral' and will therefore encompass electronic 
contracts; however, it does contain two references to the requirement that an agreement 
must be 'written', which may be seen as having the potential to exclude, at least some, 
electronic forms of communication. Section 3 is a very important part of the Act providing 
protection against the exemption of liability for breach of contract in general. The 
requirement that a non-consumer party enters the contract on the other's `written standard 
terms of business', has the potential to exclude electronic contracts, if they are not 
considered in `written' form. However, this potential problem may be overcome by the 
courts declaring that an electronic communication containing standard terms will be 
considered ̀ writing' for the purpose of the Act. "' This interpretation could be further 
supported by reference to the purpose of the section which is clearly to address ̀standard 
form contracts' containing exemption clauses. The reference to an ̀ agreement in writing' in 
relation to arbitration agreements can be attributed to the regulatory measures applicable to 
arbitration in general, wherein it clearly states that agreements may take any form. 
Electronic agreements would therefore satisfy the requirement as long as they are ̀ recorded' 
in some way. Ideally, in any revision of the legislation the references to writing should be 
either qualified with a definition including electronic forms of communication or removed. 
The application of the Act to electronic contracts will cause few undesirable results. 
However, the definition of `in the course of a business' as adopted in R&B Custarns Brokers, 
has been the source of some general criticism. When considering the amendment of the 
legislation on unfair terms this issue will probably be addressed by the adoption of a uniform 
definition of consumer akin to the definition found in UTCCR. However, although his may 
bring consistency it will remove a level of protection afforded business parties at present 
when they deal outside of their usual business activity. This protection may be particularly 
important in promoting confidence in the entering electronic contracts with more powerful 
trading partners, facilitated by the development of electronic communications. It would 
therefore be beneficial to ensure that some provision is introduced to protect business 
parties entering occasional contracts outside of their usual business activities. 
144 See the discussion in chapter 7. 
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12 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations' 
In tandem with the Unfair Contract Terms Act the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations (`the Regulations) should provide a formidable careat for sellers 
and suppliers when formulating their standard terms for use in their daily business with 
consumers. The Regulations contain several unique elements, capable of influencing 
consumer contracts in general; however certain elements may have particular 
implications for electronic contracting. 
A dual approach to the control of unfair terms in consumer contracts is adopted 
in the Regulations. First, in a dispute between a seller or supplier and a consumer the 
consumer may use the Regulations to argue that a term is `unfair' and hence ineffective 
against him. 2 Secondly, the Regulations provide the Director General of Fair Trading 
(DGFT) and other "Qualifying Bodies"' with the power to take action and to seek 
injunctions to prevent suppliers continuing to use "unfair terms". This second approach 
provides a level of regulatory control, previously unseen in England and Wales, capable 
of having an effect on the continued use of unfair terms in general, rather than being 
restricted in impact to the confines of a specific case` 
The role of the DGFT and other qualifying bodies is a significant one in the 
promotion of consumer trust and confidence in general and will be particularly important 
for the development of consumer confidence in the electronic environment. 
I S. I. 1999/2083. 
2 Regulation 8. 
3 Listed in Schedule 1 Parts land 2. 
4 For example, a term declared ineffective in a case brought under the Unfair Contract Terms Act only 
prevents reliance on the term in that specific case. The term in question may remain in use as a dissuasive 
devise utilised by an unscrupulous upplier to deter claims and it will only cease to do so when another 
case is taken to court. Under the Regulations the use of an unfair term may of itself attract the attention of 
the DGFT and result in the threat of action. 
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If the DGFT or other qualifying body (after notifying the DGFT) believes that a 
party is using, or recommending the use of, an unfair term drawn up for general use in 
contracts concluded with consumers, then he or they can apply for an injunction (or 
interim injunction) to prevent the continued use of that terms In practice, these ̀powers' 
have been little used, with the DGFT preferring a more conciliatory approach employing 
a combination of negotiation and persuasion to obtain a consensus with the seller or 
supplier. This approach will usually involve the issuing of a warning with advice on the 
action required, followed by a request for an informal undertaking that the seller or 
supplier will take the agreed action to delete or amend the offending term. There is 
considerable activity, as a glance at any of the OFI''s Bulletins on Unfair Terms will 
indicate. ' 
By initiating a decline in the practice of employing unfair terms this broader 
regulatory control may become an influential factor in the facilitation of electronic 
contracting. In turn, this should provide an environment of greater confidence for 
consumers entering contracts in the electronic market. However, the existence of 
regulation does not of itself create confidence; a lack of knowledge of the rights and 
protection available is capable of rendering even the most extensive consumer protection 
provision impotent. This factor is recognised as particularly important in cross border 
transactions and was identified in the preamble to the Directive responsible for the initial 
introduction of the Regulations. ' 
"Whereas, generally speaking, consumers do not know the rules of law which, in 
Member States other than their own, govern contracts for the sale of goods or 
services; whereas this lack of awareness may deter them from direct transactions 
for the purchase of goods or services in another Member State... "8 
The need and desire to disseminate information to consumers is reflected in the 
Regulations in the hope of creating greater public awareness of the existence of the 
provisions and of the work being done by the Office of Fair Trading! The publication 
of case studies and descriptions of terms considered ̀unfair' provides sellers and 
suppliers with guidance in relation to contract terms and good business practice. This 
5 Regulation 12. 
6 http: //www. oft. gov. uk. 
7 Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC. O j. L95/29 (21.4.93). 
9 Ibid Recitals 5 and 6. 
9 Regulation 15. 
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not only encourages suppliers to comply with the Regulations to avoid adverse publicity 
but it also empowers consumers with information about their rights and increases 
consumer confidence by demonstrating that there are bodies actively protecting their 
interests. This may go some way to addressing consumer issues identified by the 
National Consumer Council in their report "E-Commerce and Consumer Protection": 
"When pressed, consumers expressed doubts about using sites in other European 
States mostly because of an anticipated language barrier. Awareness of EU 
consumer protection and harmonisation was low, which is hardly surprising given 
the paucity of knowledge about consumer protection and enforcement 
generally. "" 
The scope of the Regulations, or more specifically the scope of the Directive on 
which the Regulations are based, fulfils another important factor in the promotion of 
electronic contracting. The Directive, as a Community measure, required 
implementation by all of the Member States of the European Community. This factor 
gives the substantive elements of the Regulations an intrinsic cross border dimension. 
The objective and effect of the Directive should, ideally, provide a level of uniformity 
across the European Union which in turn should provide increased consumer confidence 
in cross-border transactions. " Confidence in contracting outside the home jurisdiction is 
one of the key areas identified as restricting the development of electronic consumer 
commerce. 12 
The following discussion will consider whether the Regulations can be readily 
applied to electronic contracts and whether their application will fulfil the objectives of 
providing legal certainty and promoting trust and confidence in electronic contracting. 
The literature produced by the Office of Fair Trading also provides an opportunity to 
exam the Regulations ̀ in action' as it were and in particular the effects the Regulations 
are having in the electronic environment. 
10 "E-commerce and consumer protection. " A report by the National Consumer Council. Ref. 
PD39/2000, August 2000. p. 2 para. 6. 
11 The implementation of the Directive is left to the Member States in relation to resultant effect. 
However this is always subject o the principle that any National Regulation should be interpreted in the 
light of the Directive. 
12 qt cit fn 9. However, as is discussed below their findings were not promising; 
"Few of the people in the focus groups had bought online from abroad, and few had felt the need 
or desire to do so. In the omnibus survey one in five of those with Internet access aid they 
would never buy online from abroad" (at page 2 para. 3). 
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12.1 Background 
The Regulations are based on the European Council Directive on Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts. " The Directive was introduced under the legislative provisions 
of Article 100a of the EC Treaty, an article concerned primarily with the establishment of 
the internal market. " The purpose of the Directive is clearly stated in Article 1: 
"The purpose of this Directive is to approximate the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States relating to unfair terms in 
contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer. " 
By ensuring that unfair terms were not enforceable against individual consumers 
and preventing the continued use of unfair terms the Directive would create a 
Community wide minimum basic level of consumer protection and increase consumer 
confidence in cross border transactions. " 
The Regulations on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 1994 were the first 
attempt to implement the Directive in England and Wales. " On their introduction the 
Regulations attracted a degree of criticism. In fact the criticism was such that the 
Consumers Association applied for a judicial review of the interpretation of the Directive 
in the Regulations. 
The initial criticisms arose because of the delay in introducing the Regulations: 
they were introduced on the ltt July 1995,5 months after the implementation date 
specified in the Directive. "
In addition to being overdue, the implementing Regulations were inappropriately 
worded and introduced an added layer of confusion to the control of unfair terms 
instead of taking the opportunity to clarify the overall control of unfair terms in England 
and Wales. " The Regulations were essentially a transposition of the English version of 
the Directive; however, in certain key places the text of the Regulations differed from 
that in the Directive. For example, in implementing Article 7 of the Directive, the 
13 93/13/EEC. O j. No. L95,21.4.93, p. 29. 
14 Now found in Article 95 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (OJ C340, 
(10.11.1997), pp. 173-308. 
15 Recital 6. 
16 S. I. 1994/3159. 
17 313E December 1994 Article 10(1). In itself not an unknown occurrence in relation to Community 
measures. 
18 It was argued at the time that the opportunity should be taken to review UCTA and combine it with the 
new Regulations. See Reynolds, F. M. B. "Unfair Contract Terms" (1994) 110 LQR 1. As was indicated 
above, the suggestion has finally reached the Law Commission. 
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Regulations restricted the ability to take action against the continued use of unfair terms 
to the Director General of Fair Trading, " whereas the Directive extended the power to 
those with a "legitimate interest under national law in protecting consumers". " The 
Regulations also restricted the definition of seller and supplier, to parties who "sell 
goods" or "supply goods or services" 21 As a consequence, the 1994 Regulations were 
revoked and replaced by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 199922 
which were intended to "reflect more closely the wording of the Directive" 21 
The key changes to the Regulations include the expansion of the power enjoyed 
by the Director General of Fair Trading, to take action against suppliers using "unfair 
terms", to certain "qualifying bodies" 24 The new Regulations also introduce the power 
to require traders to produce copies of their standard contracts and information about 
their use. This provision will hopefully facilitate investigations into the practices of 
sellers and suppliers and the terms they employ in their standard contracts. The 
definitions of "seller" and "supplier" are also amended to clarify their scope. 25 
12.2 Definitions and Scope. 
The Regulations apply a test of fairness to terms, which have not been 
"individually negotiated", 26 in contracts concluded between a "consumer" and a "seller or 
supplier"! " The Director General of Fair Trading or any qualifying body may apply for 
an injunction against any person appearing to be using or recommending the use of an 
unfair term drawn up for general use in contracts concluded with consumers 28 
The Regulations only apply to contracts with "consumers", as defined in 
regulation 3. 
19 Regulation 8. 
20 Article 7(2). This led to the Consumer Associations application for a judicial review of their exclusion 
from the general regulatory powers of the Regulations 
21 Regulation 2. This restriction could have excluded certain consumer transactions to which the 
Regulations were clearly intended to apply. In particular the sale and transfer of computer software an 
increasingly common subject matter in electronic contracting. 
22 S. I. 1999/2083. 
23 Explanatory Note at para. 2. S. I. 1999/2083. 
24 Listed in the new Schedule 1. 
25 The removal of the reference to a 'seller of goods' and a ̀ supplier of services', see 13.2. below. 
26 Regulation 5. 
27 Regulation 4(1). 
28 Regulation 12. 
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12.2.1 The Definition of "Consumer" 
A "consumer" is defined, for the purpose of the Regulations, as 
"any natural person who, in contracts covered by these Regulations, is acting for 
purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession; 29 
The use of the words, "natural person" in the definition of consumer 
automatically excludes corporate or governmental bodies from the scope of the 
Regulations. " This can be contrasted with the Unfair Contract Terms Act, which, by 
virtue of the definition of "in the course of a business" adopted in R &B Customs Brokers, 
retains the possibility of corporate bodies "dealing as consumer"? ' Partnerships however, 
do not enjoy a legal personality in England and Wales and could technically qualify for 
protection if they satisfy the second part of the definition'' 
In addition to being a "natural person" the party must also enter the transaction 
for "purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession". What constitutes a 
purpose `outside' of a trade, business or profession is open to interpretation. A 
restrictive interpretation would require the activity to be completely unrelated to the 
individual's trade, business or profession. The difficulty with this interpretation is that it 
could include transactions entered into by an individual, in a private capacity, but which 
may have characteristics related to his trade, business or profession" Alternatively, the 
phrase could be interpreted as ̀ outside' the `normal activities' of his trade, business or 
profession" The DTI in its guidance notes to the Regulations refer to "business-related 
purposes" as falling outside the protection of the Directive, " which would suggest hat a 
more restrictive approach is preferred. This approach is supported by the Court of 
Justice which has expressed the opinion that it will not take into account the fact that the 
activities of a trader are unusual or seldom occurring. In PatriceDi Pnto, case C-361/89,36 
the Court of justice felt that it could not draw a distinction between the "normal acts" of 
a business and those which were "exceptional in nature". 
29 Regulation 3. 
30 There is an exception to the 'natural person' restriction in the Regulations where arbitration clauses are 
the subject of scrutiny. This is discussed further below at 12.4.11. 
31 Discussed above in chapter 11.5. 
32 In contrast with Scotland where they have legal personality. 
33 For example, a computer software buyer, who purchases apiece of software from a retail outlet as a 
present for his son. The purchase surely relates to the individuals trade business or profession. 
34 For example, once acting outside his capacity as a tradesman, businessman or professional, activities are 
no longer for the purpose of his trade, business or profession. 
35 August 2000, in the discussion of 'consumer'at para 4.4. 
36 [1991] ECR 1-1189 at para 15 of the judgment. 
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12.2.2 Seller or Supplier 
For the Regulations to apply, the other party to the transaction must be a "seller 
or supplier". A "seller or supplier" is defined in regulation 3 as 
"any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by these Regulations, is 
acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly 
owned or privately owned. " 
The inclusion of natural or legal persons in this definition gives it a broad scope. 
It covers all parties whatever their legal status if they enter into contracts with consumers 
for purposes which relate to their trade, business or profession. The phrase "acting for 
purposes relating to" would appear to encompass a wide range of activities, indicating 
that the `purpose' of the contract does not need to have a strong connection with the 
business itself. In the broadest sense "relating to" could encompass a computer engineer 
selling his home computer, i. e anything that relates to that profession or business per se. 
This is arguably a rather too wide interpretation bringing certain transactions 
inappropriately within the scope of the Regulations. However, the terminology of the 
regulation would appear to require a less restrictive approach to that adopted under the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act. The phrase "in the course of a business", used to 
distinguish consumers and non-consumers, has been given a narrow interpretation, 
requiring that the transaction be either integral to the business or occurring with a 
sufficient degree of regularity. " In the context of the Regulations an appropriate 
interpretation would require that the specific activity must relate to the trade business or 
profession rather than the nature or subject matter of that activity. 
In the 1994 Regulations the definition referred to 'a seller of goods' and a 
`supplier of goods or services'. This definition had the potential to restrict the scope of 
the Regulations by excluding transactions involving items which do not fit easily into 
these categories. A key example would be computer software, often the subject of 
electronic transactions, but not clearly categorised as ̀ goods' or 'services'. " 
37R &B Customs Brokenv UrritalL4nýias Trust [1988] 1 All ER 847. Discussed in chapter 11.5. 
39 See St Alters City and District Camcil u Intematiazal Grasputers Ltd [1997] F. S. R. 251. See the discussion 
below in chapter 13.2. 
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12.2.3 Terms Subject to the Regulations 
The Regulations are not restricted to particular ̀ types' of term in the same way 
that UCTA is restricted to exemption clauses. However, only terms which have "not 
been individually negotiated" are subject to the test of fairness. " Clauses are not 
individually negotiated if they have been drafted in advance and the customer has not 
been able to influence the substance of the terns ° This phrase clearly encompasses the 
vast majority of consumer contracts and would also cover the situation where a seller or 
supplier offers a choice of two or more contracts. "' A typical example of this approach 
would be the situation found in photographic stores for developing and printing services, 
where the consumer may choose between a standard and a deluxe service. Under the 
deluxe service a higher price is paid but in the terms and conditions the service provider 
accepts greater liability. Equally, simply offering a customer various levels of after sales 
service such as on-site service or on-line helpdesk does not mean that the term is 
individually negotiated. " The negotiation of a number of terms in what is otherwise a 
pre-formulated contract will not take the contract beyond the scope of the Regulation. " 
It is for the seller or supplier to show that a term has been individually negotiated with 
the consumer. ' 
12.2.4 Excluded Terms 
The most important exclusion from the scope of the Regulations is the exclusion 
of `core' terms of the contract. "' However, the Regulations do not apply to contractual 
terms reflecting mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions applicable in the United 
Kingdom or provisions or principles of international conventions to which the UK or 
EC are party. 
The 1994 Regulations contained a list of certain excluded types of contract, including 
contracts relating to employment and succession rights, rights under family law or the 
incorporation and organisation of companies or partnerships. "' These exclusions were 
removed from the 1999 Regulations although they were a clear reflection of the 
39 Regulation 5(1). 
1° Regulation 5(2). 
41 See, Bragg, R. "Implementation of the E. C. Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts: the 
Department of Trade and Industry Consultation Document. " [1994]2(2) Consm L 29-38. 
42 However, these factors may be relevant to any assessment of the fairness of a particular term in the 
contract. 
43 Regulation 5(3). 
44 Regulation 5(4). 
45 See below at 12.2.5. 
46 Found in Schedule 1 of the 1994 Regulations. 
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approach envisaged by the Directive. " However, the nature of the contracts subject o 
the exclusion found in the 1994 Regulations may indicate that such contracts are not 
between a consumer and a seller or supplier. Contracts relating to land or property are 
not excluded from the Regulations and it would appear that the courts are willing to 
accept that a contract between a landlord and a tenant could constitute a contract 
between a seller or supplier and a consumer. `' 
12.2.5 The `Core' Term Exclusion. 
Terms relating to the definition of the main subject mater of the contract or to 
the adequacy of the price or remuneration will not be subject to the assessment of 
fairness under the Regulations so long as they are in "plain intelligible language" 49 
The "core exclusion" maintains a level of freedom of contract, preventing 
interference with the central elements of the parties bargain. However, difficulties in 
determining what will constitute a `core term', or the `main subject matter of the 
contract' leaves room for uncertainty. The House of Lords considered this exemption 
from the scope of the Regulations in Diiutor General of Fair Trading v. First National Bank 
P1c. 5° Lord Steyn felt that the term in question was a "subsidiary" one and not defining 
the main subject matter of the contract. " Lord Bingham indicated that terms which 
"express the substance of the bargain" should be distinguished from those "incidental" 
terms which surround them. The former would fall within the exemption whereas the 
latter would not 52 The court felt that in general a narrow interpretation of the `core 
exemption' was important to the ability of the Regulations to fulfil their objectives' 
Nevertheless, a term "expressing the substance of the bargain" has to be in `plain 
intelligible language' to be excluded from the scope of the Regulations. 
12.2.5.1 "plain intelligible language" 
The use of inaccessible language has been identified as a problem by the courts 
for some time and the Regulations have been seen as an opportunity to rid, consumer 
contracts at least, of complex legal terminology and ̀ small print'. In The Zbmid 4 the 
" See recital 11. 
48 See Margaret Peters v. Fairdmgh Hazes Lvnitd [2002] WL 31961996 (Ch D) at para 58. 
49 Regulation 6(2). 
50 DireCtor tea( of Fair Trad . zg u 
Firn Nati) a1 &mk Pk [2002] 1 A. C. 481. 
51 At p 499. 
52Atp491. 
53 Per Bingham L. J. at 491. 
54 Stag Line Ltd u Tyne Shipiepair Group Ltd and Othe s, (The Znmia9 [1984] 2 Lloyds Rep 211. 
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judge observed that he was tempted to hold an exclusion clause in a commercial contract 
"unreasonable" because it was so complicated and prolix that one almost needed a law 
degree to understand it. " The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) took the opportunity to 
express an opinion at an early stage. In their second Bulletin on unfair contract terms 
they stated that; 
"The use of small print and obscure language (so often found together) is fatal - 
if not counter productive - and should be jettisoned. "" 
The impact of the phrase "plain intelligible language" on the fairness test is 
considered further below. " For the purposes of the `core exemption', failure to use plain 
intelligible language renders what would be an excluded ̀core term' subject to the fairness 
test in the Regulations. The interpretation of "plain intelligible language" is less than 
clear. The OFT have indicated that the terms must be plain and intelligible to "the 
ordinary consumer without legal advice" and that the legal `jargon' found in normal 
commercial contracts would be wholly inappropriate for use in contracts with 
consumers. " This would appear to suggest that an objective approach should be taken, 
ascertaining whether the language used in the term would be plain and intelligible to the 
average person 59 
The provisions of the Regulations cannot be evaded by a choice of law clause 
stipulating the law of a non-EU state. Regulation 9 reads: 
"These Regulations shall apply notwithstanding any contract term which applies 
or purports to apply the law of a non-Member State, if the contract has a close 
connection with the territory of the Member States. " 
5 Aid at p 222. 
56 OFT Unfair Terms Bulletin 2. 
57 At 12.2.5.1. 
58 Ihid Where legal terminology is necessary the OFT suggested the inclusion of explanations. 
59 Such an approach would allow scope for a consideration of the nature of the contract and whether it was 
the type of contract where legal advice would usually be obtained. 
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12.3 The Assessment of Unfair Terms 
An unfair term is not binding on the consumer, but the contract will continue to 
exist if practicable. " The test applied to determine whether a contract term is unfair is 
found in regulation 5: 
"A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded 
as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the 
detriment of the consumer. " 
In assessing the fairness of a term, the nature of the subject matter of the contract, all of 
the other terms of the contract, and all of the circumstances attending the conclusion of 
the contract will be taken into consideration. " This assessment will include a 
consideration of the `core terms' of the contract and whether the language used in the 
contract was ̀ plain and intelligible'. " An indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms 
which may be regarded as unfair can be found in Schedule 2 of the Regulation. " 
The key elements of the test are the significant imbalance in the parties' rights 
and obligations, to the detriment of the consumer, and that the imbalance is contrary to 
the requirement of good faith. In First National &mk, Lord Steyn explained that while 
there are three elements to this test, the element of detriment to the consumer "may not 
add much" serving primarily to indicate that the Directive was aimed at protecting the 
consumer against an imbalance rather than the seller or supplierb' He continued by 
asserting that the "twin requirements of good faith and significant imbalance will in 
practice be determinative". " 
60 Regulation 8. 
61 Regulation 6(1). 
62 Regulation 7(1) requires the seller or supplier to ensure that ̀ any written term of a contract is expressed 
in plain intelligible language" and any doubt as to interpretation will be determined in favour of the 
consumer. It is not expressly stated that failure to fulfil this requirement will be a consideration in the 
fairness test, but it the courts may see it as contrary to the requirement of `good faith'. 
63 Regulation 5(5). The Schedule is also known as the ̀ grey list'. 
64 ý aor Grwd of Fair Trading u First National Bank Plc [2002] 1 A. C. 481. at p 500 pars 36. 
65 Iba 
267 
77r Uniair Te ms in Q» oner Contracts Regu&tions 1999 
12.3.1 "Significant imbalance" 
In Din ar General of Fair Trading v. First Natianal Bank PIG" the House of Lords 
stated that the requirement of significant imbalance will be met if a term is "so weighted 
in favour of the supplier as to tilt the parties' rights and obligations under the contract 
significantly in his favour. "67 The imbalance should be assessed in the light of 
circumstances at the time of the contract to establish whether it is significant. Whether 
there is an imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of the 
consumer is assessed against he potential for creating an imbalance. " 
The OFT has indicated that the assessment may be approached by considering 
whether rights conferred on the seller are balanced by corresponding rights for the 
consumer. However, there are some terms which cannot be balanced by a mirroring 
term. In addition, attempting to weigh up the rights and obligations of the parties may 
be time consuming and not particularly productive. A low price may be the consequence 
of a particularly harsh term but that should not automatically make the term fair. '' 
Ultimately the assessment of whether there is a significant imbalance will be a factual 
determination based upon the circumstances and context within which the term is being, 
or intended to be, used. 
12.3.2 The Requirement of "Good Faith". 
The OFT has stated that the requirement of good faith does not equate to an 
absence of subjective "bad faith" in the sense of dishonesty but rather requires the 
supplier to behave fairly and equitably! ' The 1994 Regulations contained a Schedule 
providing guidance on the requirement of good faith based upon recital 16 of the 
Directive. " The guidance does not feature in the 1999 Regulations but the factors in 
recital 16 may be given consideration in appropriate circumstances. The first three 
factors contained in recital 16 are familiar to lawyers in the United Kingdom because 
they closely resemble factors relevant to the requirement of reasonableness in UCTA: 
"whereas, in making an assessment of good faith, particular egard shall be had to 
the strength of the bargaining positions of the parties, whether the consumer had 
66 Jbid 
67 Ibid at 494. 
68 OFT Bulletin I para. 1.2. 
69 Beale, H. "Unfair Contracts in Britain and Europe. " [1989] 42 CL. P. 197. 
70 OFT Bulletin no 2. 
71 Schedule 2. 
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an inducement to agree to the term and whether the goods or services were sold 
or supplied to the special order of the consumer. " 
The recital continues that the requirement of good faith may be seen as satisfied where 
the seller or supplier deals "fairly and equitably with the other party whose legitimate 
interests he has to take into account". In the 1994 Regulations the reference to the 
taking account of the legitimate interests of the consumer was omitted and it has been 
suggested that this element is essential to the adoption of a suitably high standard of 
`good faith. "' 
In First National Bank Lord Bingham considered the ̀ good faith' element of the 
fairness test as requiring fair and open dealing with no taking advantage of the 
consumers' weaker position, whether deliberately or unconsciously. The terms of the 
contract should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly containing no concealed pitfalls or 
traps for the consumer. " On a more general note he stated that the requirement of good 
faith "looks to good standards of commercial morality and practice". " 
The judgment in First National Bank is not without criticism, but it does provide 
some practical guidance to the application of the fairness test under the Regulations. " 
12.4 The Indicative or "Grey" List 
The indicative list of terms which may be regarded as unfair provides some 
guidance but as the OFT has emphasised, clauses of this nature will still be assessed 
against the test of fairness and are by no means blacklisted. The OFT has nevertheless 
stated that "if a term appears in the list then it is under substantial suspicion". 76 In First 
National Bank Lord Steyn described the list as a "check list of terms which must be 
regarded as potentially vulnerable" to a finding that they are unfair. " 
The list refers not to specific terms or their form but rather to the object or 
effect of the term in a broad way. Nevertheless, there are some familiar ̀types' of term 
72 Macdonald, E. "Scope and Fairness of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations: Dir for 
General of Fair Tradmgv First National Bank. " [2002] 65 M. LP, 763 at 769. 
73 Op cit fn 63 per Bingham L j. at 494. Lord Steyn reiterated the "the notion of open and fair dealing" at p 
500. 
74 Ibid 
75 It has been suggested that in not requesting a preliminary ruling on the meaning of `unfair' from the 
ECJ, the court infringed the interpretative monopoly of the Eq in the area of Community law. See Dean, 
M. "Defining Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts - Crystal Ball Gazing? " [2002] 65 M. L. R. 773. 
76 OFT Bulletin 4 at p 22. 
77 Opcitfn63 above atp500, pars36. 
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contained in Schedule 2. For example; paragraphs (a), (b) and (q) can be broadly 
categorised as exemption clauses; ` paragraphs (d) and (e) encompass terms which would 
fall within the common law rules on penalty clauses and related issues; " and paragraphs 
(j), (k) and (1) relate to the conferment of a discretion on the seller or supplier in relation 
to his performance under the contract which could fall within s 3(2)(b) of UCTA. 
Certain terms contained within the list may be particularly relevant to electronic 
contracts. These terms will now be highlighted. 80 
12.4.1 Excluding or limiting consumer's rights on suppliers breach of contract - 
including the right of set-off. 
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-a-vis 
the seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non- 
performance or inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the 
contractual obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the 
seller or supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against him. 
This paragraph has a broad applicability to exemption clauses or general disclaimers 
relating to liability for breach of contract. " For example, clauses stating that a supplier 
"will not accept any responsibility whatsoever in the event that adverse side-effects are 
caused by using our product" are prima facie unfair. " Such clauses are particularly 
common in electronic contracts for downloading media and software from service 
providers because of risks of viruses or bugs in software which could result in harm to 
the consumers system. Likewise, contract terms seeking to exclude or restrict liability for 
unsatisfactory goods or workmanship, or delay in performance are likely to be treated as 
prima facie unfair. 83 
In May 2002 the well known travel and leisure website `lastminute. com' was 
investigated by the OFT and found to be using no less than eight terms falling within this 
78 See, Macdonald, E. Exonpt n Uzaa acrd Unfair Tens (Butterworths: London, 1999) at p 202 et sm 
79 On penalty clauses generally See Koffman, L. and Macdonald, E. 71x Law of Conzrad 4th ed. (Tolley, 
2001) at chapter 10. 
80 It must be remembered that the OFT only gives guidance on terms that are likely to be unfair, only the 
courts can decide what is unfair on basis of fairness test. (Bulletin 3, p. 50) 
81 And to that extent is similar to s. 3 of UCTA. 
82 See "GP Care Supplies" case study in Bulletin 3 at p 51. 
83 Ibid at p. 53 - 57. There is considerable overlap here with s. 6 of UCTA. 
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category, including one for negligently providing inaccurate information to consumers, 
amongst sixteen amendments or deletions recommended by the OFI'. 84 
12.4.2 Agreements which bind the consumer but not the seller. 
(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services 
by the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realisation depends on his 
own will alone. 
Terms which make an agreement binding on the consumer but not on the seller until a 
condition, which the seller controls, is fulfilled will also be prvna fade unfair. For 
example, a seller will control the point at which goods are despatched from his 
warehouse. A term that states that the seller is not bound until the goods are despatched, 
but that a consumer may be irrevocably bound before that point may fall within this 
paragraph. In attempting to retain complete control over the contractual process many 
website operators are using terms to this effect and are, in the process, creating an 
imbalance in rights and obligations against the consumer. " 
12.4.3 Retention of deposits 
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where 
the latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for 
the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller 
or supplier where the latter is the party cancelling the contract. 
A term allowing a seller or supplier to retain a deposit paid by a consumer if the 
consumer cancels the contract is likely to be treated as unfair unless the sum retained 
reflects actual losses or costs incurred by a supplier and the consumer has an equivalent 
claim should the supplier cancel the contract. In 2002 the OFT encountered terms of 
this nature on the "easycar. com" website and recommended the revision or deletion of 
twenty five terms 86 
941n recent years British Telecom's Internet service, Tesco Stores Ltd and the Toys R' Us website have all 
been found to contain exemption clauses falling within para 1(b) by the OFT and OFTEL. 
as http: //www. oft. gov. uk. 
86 Bulletin 20 p. 11. 
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12.4.4 Unequal termination rights 
(f) authorising the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary 
basis where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the 
seller or supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him 
where it is the seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract. 
Many clauses of this nature are found in contracts for the provision of Internet 
and mobile phone services. They are popular because they provide the supplier with 
complete discretion as to when, where and how he provides the service, allowing him to 
adapt to changes in the market. However, the consumer is placed at a considerable 
disadvantage with no equivalent discretion in his contract. 
The Britannia Rescue Services Ltd case stud? ' provides a useful indication of the 
OFT's approach to this type of clause. As a result of intervention by the OFT a term 
allowing Britannia to cancel contracts on a discretionary basis, and thus to get out of a 
bad bargain and also permitting Britannia to retain money paid for a service which had 
not yet been provided, was amended. 
12.4.5 Termination without notice 
(g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate 
duration without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for 
doing so. 
This type of clause is also popular with service providers in the electronic environment 
for similar reasons to the preceding paragraph. In September 2001, One. Tel, an Internet 
Service Provider, had clauses allowing them to terminate service contracts without notice 
amongst sixteen potentially unfair terms 88 
12.4.6 Extension of contracts 
(h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does 
not indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express his 
desire not to extend the contract is unreasonably early. 
87 Bulletin 3, p. 26. 
88 Bulletin 18 p. 52. 
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The use of `rolling contracts' which continue and renew unless the consumer takes steps 
to cancel the agreement have been problematic for some time. " The OFT have 
indicated that such terms may be deemed unfair particularly where the consumer may 
not know of or understand the effect of the clause 90 
12.4.7 Binding the consumer 
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real 
opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract. 
In chapter 9 the incorporation of terms into contracts by `reasonably sufficient notice' 
was considered. This paragraph indicates that a term may still be challenged as unfair 
even if it is incorporated at common law, because the consumer has had no real 
opportunity to become acquainted with it. It would appear to require that the supplier 
do more than is required at common law to ensure that the consumer has the 
opportunity to be fully aware of the implications of the contract he is signing. In the 
Country Holidays case study91 the small print and language used in the term in question 
led the OFT to conclude that the consumer had no real opportunity to become 
acquainted with the terms effect 92 The lack of an opportunity to become acquainted 
with the term, rather than the content of the term itself, creates the unfairness. 
12.4.8 Unilateral alteration of products or services 
(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any 
characteristics of the product or service to be provided. 
Clauses of this nature are common in electronic and traditional contracts, and arguably 
they are an important element of any contract entered at a distance enabling a supplier to 
adapt to product developments and changes. This would appear to provide a `valid 
reason' for altering the product delivered. " Nevertheless, a clause to this effect will 
89 This form of `inertia selling' is outside of the scope of the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971. 
90 See the 'Bradleys Estate Agents Ltd' case study in Bulletin 3, at p. 25. 
91 Bulletin 3, p. 28. 
92 In addition the term fell foul of the requirement that terms must be written in plain and intelligible 
language. 
93 See the OFT case study ̀GP Care Supplies' - clause had potential for unfairness ince it enabled the 
company to change the characteristics of what was supplied. This right has now been limited and the 
consumer now has the right to withdraw if fundamental changes are made to the goods (Bulletin 3, p. 33). 
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usually also allow consumers to reject the substitute if he desires and under the Distance 
Selling Regulations94 this is now a statutory requirement in distance contracts 95 In May 
2000 the ISP `Total Web Solutions Ltd' were investigated by the OFT and as a 
consequence an ̀ entire agreement clause' was removed. 96 
12.4.9 Commitments undertaken by agents - Entire agreement clauses 
(n) limiting the seller's or supplier's obligation to respect commitments 
undertaken by his agents or making his commitments ubject o compliance with 
a particular formality. 
This paragraph could be of particular importance to website traders, the majority of 
whom attempt to disclaim any liability for statements or commitments made on his 
website. An interactive website can act as advertising, shop-floor and sales assistant and 
as such acts as the ̀ agent' of the supplier. 9' Terms, particular entire agreement clauses, 
which attempt to exclude any commitments made in statements made on a website, may 
have the potential to create unfairness. In the Vodacall Ltd case study an entire 
agreement clause which excluded representations made by Vodacall's agents on which 
the consumer could have relied, and substituted terms which the consumer had probably 
not read or understood was deemed potentially unfair by the OFT and as a result 
deleted. " Where statements are made on websites with the intention that consumers will 
rely on the information contained within those statements, any term seeking to limit the 
seller's liability for the lack of truth in those statements will potentially be unfair. 49 
12.4.10 Transfer of rights and obligations under the contract 
(p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and 
obligations under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for 
the consumer, without the latter 's agreement. 
94 The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (S. I. 2000 No. 2334). 
95Ibidregulation 19(7). 
96 Bulletin 12 at p. 31. 
97 For a general discussion of this issue see chapter 3.2 above. 
98 Bulletin 3 at 49. See also the ̀ Chromearch Ltd / Nationwide Driveways' case study at p. 27 in the same 
Bulletin. 
99 Terms excluding or limiting such liability may also be challenged under s. 3 of the Misrepresentation Act 
1967 (as amended by UCTA). 
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In the volatile commercial climate of the Internet and information technology in general, 
this occurrence, and terms allowing for this occurrence, are common place. For 
example, over the past few years many Domain Name Services (DNS) have ceased 
trading or sold their business interests and the contracts have been passed on to other 
service providers. The consumer is often only aware of this when he receives an e-mail 
from the new service provider and as such he is not given the opportunity to go 
elsewhere for the services. Terms allowing for this occurrence clearly place consumers at 
a significant disadvantage, particularly when they have no knowledge of the 
assignment. 10° 
12.4.11 Restrictions on legal remedies. 
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action or exercise 
any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes 
exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the 
evidence available to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, 
according to the applicable law, should he with another party to the contract. 
Alternative methods of dispute resolution are particularly important for electronic 
commerce, to provide speedy and efficient solutions to disputes without excessive cost. 
However, it is equally important that consumers should not be forced to take this route 
to uphold their rights under a contract. A contract term intended to inhibit the 
consumer's right to take legal action by for example, requiring disputes to be taken to 
compulsory arbitration, would be prima facie unfair. "' 
12.4.11.1 Arbitration clauses 
It is appropriate to comment at this point on the involvement of UTCCR in the 
control and use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Compulsory arbitration 
clauses in consumer contracts were previously considered undesirable because they may 
be used to deter consumers from pursuing valid claims by requiring binding and 
sometimes expensive arbitration. Hence, before 1996 such terms were not binding on 
the consumer if they were entered into before a dispute arose, by virtue of the Consumer 
loo See the case study of 'Orange Personal Communications Services', in Bulletin 17 at p. 44. 
101 See the case study of Town & Country Driveways Plc' in Bulletin 3 at p. 44. 
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Arbitration Agreements Act 1988.102 In effect such clauses were wholly ineffective in 
law. 
A general reform of English Law on arbitration was undertaken in the 1990's 
resulting in the repeal of the 1988 Act on the introduction of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
The provisions relating to consumer arbitration agreements can now be found in section 
89 - 91 of the 1996 Act. A term which constitutes an arbitration agreement103 will now 
be subject to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, and the test of 
fairness. There are however, two elements of this provision which are of particular 
interest. 
The first is an apparent digression form the basic premise that to be a ̀ consumer' 
under the Regulations a party must be a `natural person'. Section 90 of the Arbitration 
Act states that: 
"The Regulations apply where the consumer is a legal person as they apply where 
the consumer is a natural person. " 
Businesses, including limited companies may now advance an argument that an 
arbitration clause is unfair under the Regulations. 
Secondly, section 91 the Act appears to create a ̀ black list' to add to the ̀ grey list' 
in the Regulations: 
"A term which constitutes an arbitration agreement is unfair for the purposes of 
the Regulations so far as it relates to a claim for a pecuniary remedy which does 
not exceed the amount specified by order for the purposes of this section. "104 
Hence, arbitration agreements, where the dispute relates to a sum, at present not 
exceeding £3000, will be conclusively presumed to be unfair. Sums below this amount 
are not considered appropriate for reference to, a potentially expensive, arbitration 
process. 
102 Section 1. 
103 Section 89: "For this purpose "arbitration agreement' means an agreement to submit to arbitration 
present or future disputes or differences (whether or not contractual). " 
IN Emphasis added. 
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12.5 Conclusion 
The Regulations have had a significant impact on the terms used in consumer 
contracts in the traditional environment and there is no reason why they should not have 
the same impact on the contents of electronic consumer contracts. The majority of 
credit for that impact must go to the role provided to the OFT and other bodies by the 
Regulations. The examples and case studies included in the discussion do however 
indicate that the general use of unfair terms in the electronic environment is common. It 
is submitted that as the use of electronic commerce and electronic contracting increases, 
more sites will be found to be using potentially unfair terms and become the subject of 
the OFT scrutiny. The difficulty will be keeping pace with the rapidly changing 
electronic environment and the increasing number of sellers and suppliers entering 
contracts with consumers. Since the introduction of the 1999 amendments the OFT is 
now helped with the workload by other bodies such as regulatory bodies like OFTEL 
and the Consumers Association. 
The Regulations, or more correctly the Directive, has the added advantage of 
having cross-border influence. By providing a minimum level of consumer protection 
throughout the European Union the provisions will help develop consumer confidence 
in entering cross-border electronic contracts. 
The role of adverse publicity due to the publication of OFT investigations should 
not be underestimated. Publicity of this nature not only informs consumers about errant 
suppliers but also instils confidence because consumers can see that their interests are 
being protected. Perhaps most importantly the risk of bad publicity can act as a 
deterrent to sellers and suppliers to using unfair terms against consumers. The only 
criticism of the approach adopted at present would be the limited distribution of the 
information in the bulletins when a higher profile dissemination would probably result in 
greater changes in contractual terms. The information in the OFI' Bulletins would 
indicate that even well known names are using contractual terms, either naively or 
intentionally, which are potentially unfair under the Regulations. It must be questioned 
whether suppliers are continuing to use unfair terms until they are politely asked to 
amend them by the OFT, or whether the approach adopted under the Regulations is 
really winning the battle against the use of unfair terms. "' For electronic commerce the 
removal of potentially unfair terms from electronic consumer contracts is essential if the 
desired trust and confidence is to be obtained. 





A contract, be it formed and performed in the electronic environment or in a 
more traditional manner, may be subject to the implication of terms not stated or 
perhaps even contemplated by the parties themselves. This may occur by virtue of a 
statutory provision or by the courts implying a term at common law. The terms implied 
may have a significant effect on a party's obligations and liabilities and therefore, a degree 
of certainty in relation to the implication of terms is desirable. In this chapter the 
implication of terms at common law and by statute are considered and the potential 
uncertainties for parties entering electronic contracts highlighted. 
13.1 Terms Implied at Common Law 
At common law the implication of terms is often subdivided for convenience 
into those implied in fact, in law or by custom. The intention of the parties has a 
variable impact on the implication of a term. Terms that would appear obvious or that 
are necessary "to give such business efficacy to the transaction as must have been 
intended"' by the parties are implied on the basis of the contracting parties"intention' (in 
fact)? The basis for this form of implication is strict as can be seen from the words of 
Lord Pearson, in Tro&l e& Cogs Ltd v. N. W. Mebvpelium Regional Hospital Boar? ' 
"An unexpressed term can be implied if and only if the court finds that the 
parties must have intended that term to form part of their contract; it is not 
enough for the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the 
parties as reasonable men if it had been suggested to them; it must have been a 
term that went without saying, a term which, though tacit, formed part of the 
contract which the parties made for themselves. " 
i Moorcock fl (1889) 14 PD 64, per Bowen Lj at p 68. 
2 Shirla vv SoutJ in Foiouäies Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206. The 'officious bystander'test. 
3 [1973] 1 W. L. R. 601 at 609. 
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The emphasis in the judgment is on a clear indication that the courts are not re-writing 
the parties' bargain. 
Terms are also implied on the basis that they are ̀ necessary" in the particular 
`type's of contract in question and not based on the intention of the parties (in law). 
Such terms have been described as "... incidents attached to standardised contractual 
relationships"6 operating as "default rules". ' It has been indicated that terms implied on 
this basis may have a particularly important role to play in relation to certain common 
`types' of electronic contracts! 
Where certain terms are customary in a particular trade, profession or locality the 
courts are willing to imply that the contract is subject to that term. ' However, there must 
be "evidence of a universal and acknowledged practice of the market". " In the modern, 
and relatively ̀ new', electronic market one might suggest there has been insufficient time 
to establish such a custom or practice; however, this does not prevent a term, customary 
to a particular profession from being implied into an electronic contract. 
As a general rule terms will not be implied into a contract at common law in the 
face of an express contrary term, " or even in the face of very detailed, although not 
contradictory, express terms. " 
13.2 Terms Implied by Statute 
The most significant statutory implied terms for the purposes of this discussion 
also relate to contracts of a particular `type'. Such terms are usually the result of 
legislative intervention into a contractual relationship within which there is an imbalance 
of bargaining power. The statutory implied terms found in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
4 LkrTool CL vlrwzn [1976] 2 All ER 39. 
5 See El Au" v Bank of C3alit and C»arrne Inteniatiorral SA [1989] 1 All ER 242 at p 253. 
67 he Society of Lloyds v Clam [1995] CLC 117, per Steyn LJ at p 131. 
7 Malik v &mk of Cm it and Cara rce Intemat nal [ 1997] 3 All E. R. 1, per Steyn LJ at p 15. 
8 See the discussion below at 13.2; the possibility of terms equivalent o the Sale of Goods Act being 
implied at common law. 
9 See Hutton v Wanm (1836) 1M&W 466, and Nadazd &mk of C» rvF os Sinpprng Co [1990] 1 All ER 
78. 
10 Bakerv Black Sea Insw oxe [1998] 2 All ER 833 at p 842 the House of Lords supporting the words of 
Millett U. In the Court of Appeal 01996] LRLR 353 at 362). 
>> Johnstui vBloonzs1uiyHA [1991] 2 All ER 39. However, in this case the court indicated that the express 
term may be classed as an exclusion lause and subject to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (discussed 
above in chapter 12). See Macdonald, E, "Exclusion clauses: the ambit of s 13 (1) of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act" (1992) 12 LS 277. 
12 Tiudope & Colts Ltd u N. W. Metmpolit m Regiaurl Hospital Board (1973) 1 W. L. R. 601. 
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(SGA) 13 and the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (SGSA)" will be relevant to 
many electronic contracts. The terms implied by the Sale of Goods Act require that 
goods sold ̀ in the course of a business' match their description (s 13), or a sample(s 15), 
are of satisfactory quality (s 14(2)) and reasonably fit for the buyer's purpose (s 14(3)). 
When dealing with a consumer, the implied terms are classed as conditions and therefore 
any breach would entitle the consumer to repudiate the contract (s 14 (6)). When dealing 
with parties who are not consumers, the terms are also classed as conditions save for the 
situation where the 'breach is so slight that it would be unreasonable for him [the 
purchaser] to reject them' (s 15A); instead the terms are treated as warranties. " 
There is no need to demonstrate that the breach is due to negligence on the part 
of the supplier and hence the terms are often labelled as ̀ strict liability. " The terms 
relating to the quality and fitness of goods provide significant opportunities for redress 
should the goods be defective in some way. By contrast, the implied terms found in the 
Supply of Goods and Services Act require that contracts for the supply of a service are 
carried out with reasonable care and skill (s 13). ' Clearly the standards required of goods 
passing under a contract of sale are stricter than those implied in a contract for the 
supply of a service. There is also a greater burden of proof under the SGSA with the 
need to demonstrate the reasonable care and skill has not been taken. 
Hence, establishing whether a contract is for the sale of goods or the supply of a 
service is fundamental to identifying the potential liabilities of the supplier and 
corresponding rights of the customer. The existing common law and legislative 
definitions and their application to electronic contracts must be considered. 
In the electronic environment, whilst many contracts are entered into for 
`traditional tangible products', many concern the supply of material which can be 
accessed from, or downloaded directly to, a customer's PC or other device, with no 
`tangible' items passing. In such circumstances, will the customer benefit from the 
stricter requirements as to quality and fitness found in the SGA or is the supplier only 
13 Sections 13 - 15 imply terms into contracts for the sale of goods, sold 'in the course of a business', that 
they must match their description (s 13), or a sample(s 15) and that the goods should be of satisfactory 
quality(s 14(2)) and reasonably fit for the buyer's purpose (s 14(3)). 
14 Sections 8- 10 relate to the hire of goods implying similar terms to those found in SGA and s 13 implies 
a term requiring services to be carried out with reasonable care and skill. 
15 A breach of which entitles the injured party to claim damages but not to repudiate the contract and reject 
the goods. 
16 Atiyah, P. S. et al 71x Sale of Goad 10th ed. (Longman: Pearson Education, 2001), chapter 6. 
17 "In a contract for the supply of a service where the supplier is acting in the course of a business, there is 
an implied term that the supplier will carry out the service with reasonable care and skill. " Goods passing 
incidentally under a contract for services attract equivalent terms to those found in the SGA (SGSA s2 - 
s4). 
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obliged to provide the material and facilitate the download with reasonable care and skill? 
Alternatively, the possibility that the transaction cannot be categorised in the traditional 
way must be considered. " The statutory regimes contained within SGA and SGSA will 
not apply to the contract which would appear to leave customers, and of particular 
concern consumers, without the protection of any implied terms as to the quality of the 
item or the standard of performance of the supplier. Such a conclusion would arguably 
be unacceptable because the `thing' being contracted for is identical, only the carrier 
medium has changed. Allowing the carrier medium to dictate the rights and liabilities of 
the parties is surely inappropriate and it is submitted that this occurrence would not be 
tolerated by the courts. But what principles will the courts apply to avoid such a 
dichotomy? 
To a limited extent the courts have grappled with this dilemma in relation to 
computer software and this will be returned to below. " First, the principles which have 
been adopted by the courts to distinguish contracts for the ̀ sale of goods' from contracts 
for the ̀ supply of services' must be considered. 
13.2.1 Distinguishing Contracts for the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services at 
Common Law 
At common law, the distinction between a contract for the sale of goods and a 
contract for the supply of services, or work and materials, has been the subject of some 
debate, particularly in relation to books, " body parts or fluids, Z" and computer software! ' 
In Lee v. Gr ' the subject matter of the contract was a set of false teeth. In concluding 
that the contract was for the sale of goods Blackburn J felt that in order to correctly 
classify the contract the court had to decide whether the result of the contract could be 
the subject matter of a sale. If it could, then the contract was for the sale of goods; if it 
could not, then the contract would be for work and labour done! ' In Robbisc v. Grams 
the Court of Appeal indicated that to correctly decide the issue, the ̀ substance' of the 
contract had to be established. If the ̀ dominant element' of the contract was the skill 
18 Perhaps placed in a class of its own, sui generis, for example. (Discussed further below). 
19 A popular subject matter of contracts concluded in the electronic environment. 
20 See Lloyd, I. "A Rose By Any Other Name" (1993) Jan J. B. L 48-54. 
21 See Perfnn+tterv Beth Darid Hospita1123 NE 2d 792 (1955). Cf. D dd v Wilson [1946] 2 All E. R. 691, which 
is difficult to distinguish on grounds of legal principle. 
u See the discussion below at 13.2.2.3. 
23 (1861) 1B&S272. 
24 This judgment has been doubted in later cases, see Robinain u Grazes below. Atiyah suggests that the 
decision may be "indicative of the regard in which dentists were held in the mid-nineteenth century! " op cit 
fn 16 at p. 28n93. 
25 [1935] 1 KB 579. The dicta of Blackburn J. was doubted in this judgment. 
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and expertise of a party, then the contract was one for the supply of a service and any 
goods passing were incidental to that contract 26 The case before the court concerned 
the commissioning of an artist to paint a portrait. The contract was held to be one for 
work and materials, the substance of which was the skill of the artist, with the canvass 
and paint being materials passing incidentally under that contract. 
More recently in . 
%s Ashley v. Sutton London Bon igh 27 Scott Baker j expressed 
the view that; 
"... what one has to do, it seems to me, is to look at the essential nature of the 
transaction and see what in reality it was, that was being provided to the 
customer. " 
Hence, it would appear that if the substance or dominant element of the contract is the 
supplier's skill and labour a contract for services exists; if on the other hand the 
substance or dominant element of the contract is the end result, then the contract is one 
for the sale of goods. Although in principle this distinction is quite clear, its application 
to the particular facts of an individual case can prove problematic. 
In Ca7rn-ll Laird & Co Ltd v Marsges se Bronze and Brass Co Ltd' a contract for the 
construction of two ships propellers was held by the House of Lords to be 
`unquestionably' a contract for the sale of goods, even though a great deal of skill and 
labour had gone into their manufacture. 29 Likewise, in Lockett vA&M Charles Ltd°a 
contract for the supply of a meal in a restaurant was considered a contract for the sale of 
goods. It is at least arguable that although the end product, the meal, was important, the 
contract is comparable to the one in Robinson v. Grazas, in that the `dominant element' of 
the contract is the skill, expertise and labour of the chef. 
The House of Lords took an arguably more realistic approach to contracts of this 
nature in Hypo dai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Papadojoulos. 3' Here a contract for the 
manufacture of a ship was considered a sale of goods but not necessarily a pure contract 
of sale. The contract contained two parts: 1) the contract for the supplier to make the 
ship was a contract for services and, 2) a contract under which the supplier agreed to sell 
26 The goods passing incidentally would, nevertheless, have to satisfy the implied terms as to quality and 
fitness. 
27 Ashkyv Sutton London Bon gh [1995]14 Tr Law 350, The Times 8 December 1994,139 SJ LB 1. 
28 [1934] AC 402. 
29 This can be seen as similar to the set of false teeth in Leeu Griffez 




the completed ship which was, in effect, a contract for the sale of goods. The court 
recognised that the transaction was complex and could not be simply classified as a 
contract for the sale of goods or the supply of services. 
The principles discussed in the preceding cases can be applied to subject matter 
common to electronic contracts. With downloaded material such as a film, music or 
proprietary software the `end result' is the dominant element of the contract. Even 
though skill and labour went into the initial production of the work, the copies 
downloaded are for distribution to a mass market. Alternatively if the material is a 
`personalised' composition, or bespoke or customised software the skill and labour 
would appear to be the dominant element of the contract and more akin to the provision 
of a service. " 
However, even if the `dominant element' or `substance' of the contract is the 
movie, the album or the piece of software, it is debateable whether such ̀intangible' items 
can be correctly defined as ̀goods'. This potential difficulty will now be considered. 
13.2.2 The Definition of ̀ Goods' 
The natural starting point would appear to be the relevant statutory definition of 
`goods' in the Sale of Goods Act. Section 61 states that; 
" `goods' includes all personal chattels other than things in action or money. " 
Atiyah points out that the definition, although it appears ̀virtually all-embracing' clearly 
excludes non-physical items such as company shares, which are ̀ things in action' and also 
items of `intellectual property. " Equally clearly, goods can exist which contain or 
embody work that is the subject of intellectual property rights. 
Books, music, movies and computer software are all very popular online 
purchases. However, each of these items can be delivered in a number of forms - on 
paper, magnetic tape, CD or DVD, or electronically downloaded to the hard drive on a 
PC or other electronic communications equipment. When a customer purchases a `hard 
copy' of a book, tape, CD or DVD in a shop, few would argue that he is not purchasing 
`goods' from the retailer. " When items are downloaded directly to a customer's 
computer, the transaction includes no `tangible' items. For the purpose of the statutory 
32 Although there may be a transfer of the final product which may, in effect, be a sale of goods. 
33Opcitfn16atp. 66. 
34 Including the retailer himself! 
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implied terms it must be considered whether these transactions are a sale of goods, a 
supply of services, or ̀ none of the above'? Ultimately, the crucial question is whether the 
method of delivery of the material should dictate the liabilities of the supplier and the 
rights of the customer? The logical answer would be a simple no: 
"The basic argument that the rights of the parties should not depend upon the 
medium of supply must be right. But the point has to be made that there is the 
possibility that any original copyright work can, at the present stage of 
technological development, be delivered either on a physical medium or on-line. 
Does the fact that the contents of a book can be delivered on-line, or the image 
of a painting, mean that sales of books and paintings must now be treated as sui 
generis and thus outwith the Sale of Goods Act? Surely not:.. "" 
However, as the debate surrounding computer software indicates the solution 
may not be quite so straightforward. To date much of the discussion about the issue of 
`intangible' products has related to computer software, as have the few cases wherein the 
issue has been discussed, albeit obiter. However, it is submitted that many of the 
arguments discussed in relation to computer software can be applied to other 
`intangibles' purchased in the electronic environment36 
13.2.2.3 Computer Software - Goods? Services? Or Sui gazeris? " 
Although the actual cases where this issue has been discussed are few, and the 
comments obiter, the issue has been hotly debated and as a consequence the limited 
judicial comments have been analysed with some rigour. The relevant arguments in 
relation to computer software and the potential consequences of adopting those 
arguments in the wider context of electronic contracts as a whole will now be considered. 
The predominant arguments against computer software being classified as 
`goods' are: that it is ̀ intangible' and by its nature ̀mere information' and therefore not a 
`personal chattel' or personal property. The second argument is that software is 
35Opciüfn16atp. 68. 
36 Although some of the submissions have as their basis the differences between computer software and 
other media. These will be discussed in due course but it should be noted at the outset that these 
arguments have been developed to attempt to `fit' computer software into the `goods' category by 
distinguishing it from 'mere information'. Although this distinction is clearly valid it is respectfully 
submitted that it is an unnecessary and somewhat artificial solution to the problem. 
37 The classification of the software and other electronic media may also have an impact on protection 
afforded and liabilities incurred under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 and the Trade Description Act 
1968. 
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`intellectual propery and hence a `thing in action' and therefore specifically excluded by 
the definition in s 61 SGA. JB 
13.2.2.4 The Arguments: 
`Softzeme is Merely Infonnatiaz' 
Scott" puts forward the argument that as software is simply coded information'' 
it is "altogether different in nature to personal property". 41 The English authorities, 
culminating in the House of Lords decision in Boa inm v Phipps` suggest that 
information "is not property in any normal sense"" and is therefore incapable of being 
personal property or a personal chattel. In Oxford v Moss" it was held that an 
undergraduate student could not be convicted of theft of confidential information, under 
the Theft Act 1968, because such information did not fall within the definition of 
property under s 4. The `value' of information is recognised in law but in general the 
rights over information relate to the control over its use and are not, as such, based upon 
any notion that it constitutes personal property. Scott concludes that "Information, and 
therefore software, cannot be considered ̀goods' under s 61" of the SGA. ̀s 
This is an accurate technological analysis and if this analysis is accepted then it is 
submitted that all digitally and magnetically recorded media is simply coded 
information. 46 Therefore, the content contained on DVD's, CD's and magnetic tape 
cannot be considered goods, but the tangible transfer medium can be. This analysis has 
the rather unfortunate and arguably unacceptable consequence that only the `carrier', the 
piece of plastic or magnetic tape, is subject to the strict standards of the implied terms of 
the SGA. This analysis places too great an emphasis on the method of transferring the 
material in question in the determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties. 
However, in general the law is not, and arguably should not, be based upon 
detailed and microscopic technological analysis. If it is, then there is an equally 
38 A 'chose in action' is a proprietary right in personam, in contrast with a'chose in possession'. 
39 Scott, A. P. "Software as'goods': Nulluni Simile est idem. " (1987) 3(4) CL. & P. 133-136. 
40 As indeed a movie or music album may be when downloaded. 
41 Op cit fn 39 at p 135. 
42 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
43 Ibid per Lord Upjohn at p. 128. 
44 [1978] 68 Cr App R 183. 
45 Op cit fn 39 at p. 136. 
46 DVD's and CD's essentially contain a series of bumps interpreted by the reader as binary 1's and 0's. 
This information is simply translated into its recognisable form by the technology or software in the 
computer, DVD or CD player. On a magnetic tape or disc the arrangement of the magnetic particles is 
interpreted by the player/reader. 
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microscopic and technological analysis available to counter the argument that software is 
simply ̀ information'. 
? he physical or metaplysical igrarxv - nwwcr pic analysis. 
Macdonald" argues that in relation to computer software, when it is contained on 
a physical medium, the contention that it is simply information can be met from to 
perspectives, a physical one and a functional one. While the physical argument can be 
extended to movies, music and other material the functional argument does not transfer 
as readily. 
The physical argument relates to the fact that when embodied on a physical 
medium, the software takes a `physical form', albeit only at the microscopic level. For 
example, the variation in reflective and non-reflective pits on a CD or the altered 
orientation of the magnetic particles on a magnetic disc by the presence of the 
'information'. " In the context of the Criminal Damage Act 197149 Lord Lane LCJ 
concluded that the data or information stored on a disk, and the consequent orientation 
of the magnetic particles, could constitute ̀ property of a tangible nature' for the purpose 
of a charge of criminal damage. S° By analogy the eff t that the computer program has on 
the storage medium is tangibles' Unfortunately this analysis does not address the 
situation whereby no tangible storage medium is involved, which may result in a contract 
for the same subject matter being treated differently due to the method of transfer. 
Once again the transfer medium would have a potentially disproportionate and 
inappropriate impact upon the rights and liabilities of the parties. 
The `functional' argument relates to the fact that as the software "interacts 
directly, with the hardware",  it is not mere information because it has a direct effect on 
its surroundings, the hardware. Reference has been made to the US case i inter vGP 
Puttnam" in which the judge felt that whilst the information contained within an 
instruction manual could not be a ̀ product' for the purpose of product liability laws, he 
47 In Rowland, D& Macdonald, E, I, neat cn Tahnakg Law 2nd Ed. (Cavendish: London, 2000) at p 175. 
48 This follows the line adopted by Sir Iain Glidewell in his obiter comments in St Albans City and District 
Cawxi1 u Internat ial Canpaen Ltd [1997] F. S. R. 251 at 265. 
49 To this point now amended by the introduction of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
50 R. v Nitd y (Niddas ALm) (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 25 at p 28. 
51 Equally, a movie, music or text would have a tangible effect upon the storage medium. 
52 Atiyah, P. S. op cit fn. 16 at p. 178. 
53 938 F 2d 1033 (9th Cir 1991). 
286 
b*iei Terns 
felt that software could be a product because it was more than 'just information'. Here, a 
distinction was made between the analysis of the sale of a book and the sale of computer 
software. Atiyah explains this distinction by reference to the difference in the et that 
books and computer software may have upon their physical environment. The software 
may be capable of causing damage or harm to the system it enters, whereas all but the 
most woodworm infested book is unlikely to have an effect upon its surroundings 54 A 
further distinction can be identified due to the fact that the effect of the software on the 
hardware may be automatic, giving the user no opportunity to exercise his own 
judgement to identify any defects or unwanted results. 
The analogy with certain types of books has been used in relation to the supply 
of computer software and hardware together. Although the `physical' argument 
discussed above could be of equal application. Where computer software is sold in a 
package with the hardware" it has been suggested that the sale is analogous to many 
other contracts falling within the SGA because the software is akin to `instructions' 
telling the hardware what to do. In the Australian case Toby Canstnuzrouas Pnxktc v 
Gi xrter Bar Sales Pty L d'a computer system comprising of software and hardware was 
described thus: 
"By itself hardware can do nothing. The really important part of the system is 
the software. Programs are the instructions or commands that tell the hardware 
what to do. "" 
By employing this description it is possible to draw an analogy with decided cases falling 
within the SGA where misleading ̀instructions' included with goods led to a finding of a 
breach of the implied terms as to quality or fitness for purpose 58 However, this line of 
reasoning only equates to a breach of implied terms in relation to the hardware (clearly 
`goods' rather than supporting an argument that the software or `instructions' are goods, 
in their own right. 
54 Opcitfn. 16 at p. 68. 
ss As is becoming increasingly common with Microsoft's domination of the software market. 
56 [1983] 2 NSWIR 48. 
57 Ibid at p 51. This description was adopted in the St Albs case by Scott Baker J. 
58 s 14. Wonnen v RHM Ag *ultrae Ltd [1986] 1 All ER 769, a decision reversed by the Court of Appeal 
[1987] 3 All ER 75, but on the ground that the instructions were not misleading. The Court did not 
suggest that misleading instructions could not amount to a breach. 
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Atiyah believes that the analysis in the Wornrll case is far from satisfactory, 
especially when applied to computer software 59 He explains that software being 
described as a ̀ set of instructions to a computeri6° is a false analogy because 
"A computer cannot ̀understand' in any epistemological sense: it is a machine, 
and simply follows instructions. It would be a very stupid person who followed 
an instruction in a raid for a fish dish to `cook under the gill', but a computer 
would do exactly that. This would argue for a more ̀ mechanical' finding of 
liability in the case of defective software. "" 
There has been some debate regarding books and their content distinguishing the liability 
associated with the book's manufacture (the pages and printing etc) and the words 
contained within the pages. The predominant position in relation to books is that whilst 
the pages, binding and printing should be subject to the stricter standards of the implied 
terms in the SGA as to quality and fitness for purpose, the content or information 
printed on those pages should only be subject to the standards of due care and skill 
under the SGSA. 62 
"A book would certainly be regarded as goods but information or advice therein 
would be subjected to a due care standard"" 
Whilst this is an entirely logical analysis when considering works of fiction or those 
containing the author's opinions and commentary, there is an equally logical argument 
that the content of instruction manuals and `do-it-yourself books should be subject to 
the stricter standards implied by the SGA. Lloyd makes a convincing case for this 
suggestion 64 He concludes that a work that is intended to be functional and instructional 
in nature is providing information in the sense that it is `a material representation of 
some objectively verifiable fact', and should therefore be open to a claim that it is unfit 
for its intended purpose if it contains errors. An analogous argument can be made for 
s9 Op cit fn 16, at p. 69, n 18. 
60 Citing Macdonald [1995] MLR 585 at 590. 
61Op ntfn 54. 
62 In a transaction for the purchase of a book from a shop a distinction is made between the liabilities of 
the shop or publisher and the author. The former being liable under the SGA for missing pages or poor 
manufacture but not liable in respect of erroneous information contained within the book. See Bridge, M. 
G. The Sale of Goals (Oxford University Press, 1998) at p. 31. 
63 IM 
64 See Lloyd, I. "A Rose By Any Other Name" (1993) Jan J. B. L 48-54. 
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computer software to the extent that the software as a' work' is intended to be functional 
and instructional and therefore should be subject o the requirement that it is fit for its 
purpose. 
Intellatrdal propemy 
Where computer software is involved there has been a tendency to focus upon 
the intellectual property embodied in the software. Intellectual property rights are ̀ things 
in actionis and as such are excluded from s 61 SGA. However, intellectual property 
rights themselves, in particular copyright, are not usually the subject of the common 
transactions under discussion here. The transaction will usually be for a copy of the 
protected work, with a licence, express or implied, to use or get the enjoyment and 
benefit from that copy. The software, movie, text or music are not in themselves 
`copyright'; they are proated by copyright in that the copying, distribution of the work 
and certain other activities are prohibited without the permission of the rights owner 66 
One of the prohibited activities is of course the copying of the material - an act generally 
necessary to enable the use of a piece of software on a purchaser's system, in contrast to 
other works protected by copyright, such as movies, music or books where no copying is 
necessary to obtain the benefit from the purchase. Arguably this distinguishing feature 
of computer software led Lord Penrose to classify a contract for the supply of 
proprietary software as sui gneris in Beta Ganp1ters (Eun ) Ltd v Ado1 Systems (Europe) 
Ltd. " However, the fact that a computer program, a movie, a pop album or a book may 
be protected by intellectual property rights should not preclude it from being ̀ goods'. In 
the US this point was recognised by Weiss J in Ad xnt Systems Ltd v Unisys Corp. " 
"That a computer program may be copyrightable as intellectual property does not 
alter the fact that once in the form of a floppy disk or other medium, the 
program is tangible, moveable and available in the marketplace. " 
This statement however returns to the observation that, at a microscopic level, when 
stored on a medium such as a magnetic disk, the software takes on a perceptible physical 
65 Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 K. B. at p 430. " `chose in action' is a known legal expression used to describe 
all personal rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by taking physical 
possession. " 
66 In the computer software context this was recognised by Steyn J in Eur nics Systems v General 
Autonation Ltd (1988) unreported 6th September LEXIS. 
67 Beta Euters (Europe) Ltd vAdobe Systems (Europe) Ltd [1996] FSR 387 at p 396. 
68 925 F 2d 670 (1991). 
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or tangible form. The definition in the SGA excludes transactions for the transfer of the 
ownership in `things in action'. In the normal course of events the ownership rights in 
proprietary software are not transferred, merely licensed. 
Nevertheless, the problem remains that without examining the substance of the 
transaction at the microscopic level, when the subject matter of the contract is a ̀ data 
product', no `tangible' items pass. Even if the argument hat the contract is for the 
supply of `mere information' can be defeated, it is at least uncertain whether data 
products can be defined as ̀goods' within s 61. For this reason some members of the 
judiciary and academic ommentators have adopted a pragmatic approach to the analysis. 
Prag natzspn 
Bridge suggests that software should be treated in the same way as books, with 
the "seller being strictly liable only for the physical materials on which the programme is 
written". " However, Napier argues that such a conclusion, in relation to software, would 
offend common sense and defeat a purchaser's expectations. 7° In St Albans Scott Baker j 
adopted a pragmatic approach to the question of whether a computer program supplied 
on a physical medium could be classified as goods. Concluding that software probably 
was goods within the Act, he stated. 
"If the supply of software is not a supply of goods, it is difficult to see what it can 
be other than something to which no statutory rules apply, thus leaving the 
recipient unprotected in the absence of express agreement. "" 
Napier explains that as "structured and coded information" computer software in 
isolation cannot be goods for the purpose of s 61 SGA and continues: 
"... when software is captured on a physical medium do we have, by spx iauio, 
creation of a new thing, capable of constituting a ̀ good' ... ? If the answer 
is 
`yes', as some have suggested then it might be objected that we have allowed the 
physical medium to dictate the legal message. But if we say ̀no' we face a much 
greater evil... "72 
69 Bridge, M. G. The Sale of Gorxis (Oxford University press, 1998) at p. 21. 
70 Napier, B. "The Future of Information Technology Law. " [1992151 (1) CLJ46. 
71 St Al 's Qty mud District Gstaad! u Intem Q nputers Lvnitd [1995] F. S. R. 686 at 699. 
72 Op cztfn 69 at p. 48. 
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That greater evil being the exclusion of the ̀ software', in a package, from the implied 
terms of the SGA, whilst at the same time making the physical discs and documentation 
subject o the requirements as to quality and fitness. 
Although the comments of Scott-Baker J are commendable on the grounds that 
they emphasise the need to protect purchasers, his reasoning ignores two issues. First, 
his approach only extends to situations whereby the software is embodied on a disc or 
some other medium, ignoring the possibilities of transfer via a non-tangible medium. " 
Second, the statement is not necessarily correct, in that the protection afforded by statute 
may be provided by equivalent terms being implied at common law. 74 
Fitting computer software and other intangible items into an existing legal 
category does have the advantage of being convenient and creating some certainty. 
Although computer programs do not fit easily into the traditional definition of goods, it 
would be appropriate for them to be covered by the same statutory regime. Common 
transactions by which they are acquired are undoubtedly of the type, and involve the 
parties, that the legislation was designed to encompass. While it is true that computer 
software is different to other `goods', it would not be the first time that computer 
software was perhaps labelled inappropriately because an existing statutory regime is 
considered appropriate to accommodate it. Computer software was initially protected ̀ as 
a literary work' for the purposes of copyright protection, even though it was considerably 
different to existing literary works. However, the long term effect of such an approach 
may be undesirable, leading to over-complex technical argument and further uncertainty. 
Macdonald suggests that although, to an extent, computer software is akin to books, 
music CD's and videos, the `functional' nature of computer software (see above) makes it 
sufficiently different from those types of goods not to be included in the same category. 
In addition, the categorisation is too linked to the medium used to transfer the software, 
`inappropriately divorcing' programs transferred on a physical medium from those which 
are not75 The same could be said of music, films or electronic books. This line of 
reasoning follows the approach adopted by Lord Penrose in Beta v Adoh,. 76 In his obiter 
comments he felt that the reasoning that software was goods was unattractive because 
73 Direct down loading from the Internet for example. 
74 See St Alhms City wd District Cardu Intemat ial Gmpwers Ltd [1997] F. S. R. 251 at 265. 
75 0p cit fn 16 at p. 185. 
76 Op cit fn. 67. 
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"It appears to emphasise the role of the physical medium, and to relate the 
transaction in the medium to sale or hire of goods. It would have the somewhat 
odd result that the dominant characteristic of the complex product, in terms of 
value or of the significant interests of parties, would be subordinated to the 
medium by which it was transmitted to the user in analysing the true nature and 
effect of the contract. " 
He continued to criticise the view that where software is supplied on a physical medium 
it should be regarded as physical property like a book or a record, " and the views 
expressed by Steyn J in Ewz4n nnics Systans ply v General Autcrnnation Ltd' that the transfer 
of software is a transfer of a product. However, it is submitted that although different in 
nature, a computer software package is sufficiently similar to other goods to be so 
classified. 
Cam m sense / masonaUe ezpat wis. 
If computer software and other intangibles purchased via electronic contracts do 
not fit comfortably into existing categories, and it is submitted that in many cases they 
will not, perhaps they should not be `shoe-horned' inappropriately into an existing 
category for convenience. This was certainly the opinion of Lord Penrose in Beta v 
Adotr. 7' 
"... the supply of proprietary software for a price is a contract sui generis which may 
involve elements of nominate contracts such as sale, but would be inadequately 
understood if expressed wholly in terms of any of the nominate contracts. "" 
Although this conclusion is convenient, to the extent that it avoids the difficult issues 
raised by, as Lord Penrose put it, inappropriately forcing computer software into an 
existing category, it does raise difficulties of its own. In St. Albans City and District Caindi 
u International Canputers Ltd' Scott Baker j felt that if computer software fell outside the 
definition of goods the purchaser would fand himself, "unprotected by any statutory 
regime. " On the same basis Brian Napier concluded that if computer software is not 
n Ibid p, 608 - 609. See also, Reed, C. & Angel, J. Ccvn rter Law. 4th ed. (Blackstone Press Limited. 
London, 2000) at p. 44. 
78 6th September 1988 (unreported) LEXIS. 
79 Beta Canputas (Europe) Ltd u AchI Systems (Europe) Ltd [1996] FSR 367. 
80 Aid 
81 [1995] FSR 686. 
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categorised as goods then the `legal analysis' would defeat purchasers ̀common sense 
expectations. " In addition to these fears it can be argued that by treating software as sui 
gaieris the law lacks certainty and allows for too much flexibility in judicial decisions. 
However, some of the criticisms of this approach can be answered, and a level of 
`protection' found, by looking at other statutory provisions in force and the possible 
common law implication of terms of quality and fitness. 
The first relevant statute to consider is the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.83 
Sections 2 and 3 of the Act remain relevant and subject any contractual terms excluding 
or limiting liability for negligence or breach of contract in general, to the test of 
reasonableness. Where the contract is between a supplier and a consumer, the 
Regulations on Unfair Terms in Consumer ContractsS4 would also remain relevant. 
There would, however, appear to be no statutory implied terms relating to the quality of 
goods, or standards of service, that a purchaser could expect from a supplier. Hence, it 
would appear that to this extent, the purchaser is indeed ̀ unprotected'. 
It has been suggested that there would be no reason why a court could not imply 
equivalent terms, to those found in the SGA, into the parties' contract at common law. " 
Previously, where a transaction was not included in a statute, the judiciary have 
demonstrated a willingness to imply equivalent terms to those found in the relevant 
statute, where appropriate. In Dodd v. Wilsornb the contract concerned did not fall within 
the Sale of Goods Act 1893, nevertheless an equivalent term was implied at common 
law. The implication of a term can be based on the intentions of the parties, (in fact), or 
alternatively as a matter of law because of the type of contract being entered into. 
Further support for this suggestion can be found in the obiter dicta of Sir Iain Glidewell 
in St Albans City and District C. ooauzl v. Intemat ial Contjzrt7s Ltd, 87 in the Court of Appeal; 
"In the present case if, contrary to my view, the matter were not covered by 
express terms of the contract, I would hold that the contact was subject to an 
implied term that [the software] was reasonably fit for, that is, reasonably capable 
of achieving, the purpose specified. " 88 
82 Napier, B. "The Future of Information Technology Law. " [1992] 51(1) CLJ46. 
83 See chapter 11. 
84 See chapter 12. 
95 See Macdonald, E& Rowland, D. Infrnrrwt on Talmab& Law. 2nd ed. (Cavendish: London, 2000) chapter 4. 
86 [1946] 2 All ER 691. 
87 The Times 14 August 1996. (Heard 26 July 1996, by Nourse LJ, Hirst LJ and Sir Iain Glidewell). 
88 Ijjj 
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Although these comments were obiter they clearly state the approach adopted by the 
courts when faced with questions of liability and the implication of terms. It would 
appear that if a contract for the supply of computer software were to be treated suigeneris, 
the purchaser is perhaps not as ̀unprotected' as originally perceived by Scott Baker J. 
13.3 Conclusion 
The approach adopted at common law to the implication of terms produces no 
specific problems for electronic contracts. In fact terms implied by the courts at 
common law may have a particularly important role to play in some electronic contracts 
because of the difficulties associated with classifying contracts for intangible items. 
The statutory implied terms of the Sale of Goods Act and the Supply of Goods 
and Services Act are stalwart examples of Parliamentary policy towards certain types of 
business transactions, and transactions with consumers in particular. " They are as 
important to electronic contracts as they are to any other. Unfortunately there are two 
issues which are capable of creating uncertainty as to their application in the electronic 
environment and the rights and obligations of the parties to certain types of electronic 
contracts. 
The first issue is of general importance rather than being unique to electronic 
contracts; the classification of a contract as one for the sale of goods or alternatively for 
work and materials, or services. This classification will determine whether the stricter 
terms implied by the SGA are applicable to the contract. The case law demonstrates that 
there is a discernable level of flexibility in the tests adopted by the judiciary. However, 
the focus on the `dominant element' or `substance' of the contract appears logical and in 
Hjrcrrrdai Heavy Industries the House of Lords appeared to take a pragmatic approach to the 
analysis of a complex contract, recognising the practical realities of the situation. The 
case also highlights the important point that contracts do not have to be `either/or' but 
can be a combination as the facts of the case dictate. 
The approach adopted at common law can be readily applied to electronic 
contracts and their subject matter. For example, in a contract for the download of a 
movie or a piece of mass produced software the dominant element, or substance, of the 
contract is the finished product, the movie or the computer program. A transaction for a 
bespoke piece of software and service contract is more likely to be treated as a contract 
89 See the judgment of Potter L. J. in Ste=son mid Anotlaeru Rogers [1999] 1 All E. R. 613, [1999] 2 W. L. R. 
1064, [1999] Q. B. 1028. 
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for work and materials or a combined contract encompassing the sale of goods and the 
provision of services. The difficult question appears to be whether intangible items like a 
downloaded movie or software can be properly called ̀goods'. 
There are a number of arguments, supported by some judicial comment, that an 
intangible item such as computer software or a computer program and by analogy other 
intangible products, cannot be classified as goods. These arguments are capable of being 
met with sustainable counter arguments however, it is submitted that such arguments are 
unnecessary. 
The suggestion that computer software is intellectual property9° and therefore 
outside the definition of `goods' in s. 61 SGA does not recognise the nature of the 
majority of transactions entered into for software and media. The contracts will usually 
be for a copy of a work protected by intellectual property rights and rarely for the 
transfer of the intellectual property rights themselves. 
To describe computer programs and electronic media as merely information is 
arguably an accurate description, but it does not recognise the interactivity of computer 
software with its environment or the fact that when such ̀information' is placed on a disc 
or other carrier medium the contract is considered asale of goods. 
The technical argument that computer programs and by analogy downloaded 
media have no `physical presence' and can therefore not be called ̀goods' can be met 
with the equally technical counter argument hat a ̀ physical presence' does exist, albeit at 
a microscopic level. 
However, in analysing the transaction in this way it is easy to become consumed 
with arguably unnecessary technical debate and lose sight of the reality and true nature of 
the transaction and the purpose of the relevant legislation. As Professor Atiyah suggests: 
"... it is less important to worry about how we should slot software into existing 
legal categories, than what we think the respective liabilities of the software house 
or of any intermediary supplier to the purchaser should be. Once the latter is 
decided, other questions are relatively straightforward"91 
Once the transaction is approached in this way it becomes easier to analyse transactions 
for digital products or `dematerialised goods. A service provider supplying a movie, pop 
album or digital publication should not be liable for the abstract ̀quality' or `fitness for 
90 An argument, which could be extended to forms of downloaded media. 
91 Op cd fn 16 at p. 67. 
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purpose' of the material, in the same way that a retailer in the traditional sense should not 
be subject to a claim that, for example, a comedy movie was not fit for its purpose 
because it was not particularly funny or a pop CD is not of satisfactory quality because 
the music and lyrics are dreadful. The liabilities should relate to the functioning of the 
item. Can the movie be viewed or the music listened to without distortion or gaps? Is 
the publication complete without `pages' or words missing? These liabilities relate to 
quality, but they are the liabilities for which a traditional retailer would expect to be 
responsible and it is submitted that they are the liabilities for which a service provider of 
digitally downloaded items should be responsible. Faults of this nature do not always 
relate to a problem with the physical transfer medium and it would be inappropriate to 
confine the application of the implied terms of the SGA solely to these tangible items. 
This approach avoids any metaphysical debate and focuses on the expectations of the 
parties and allocation of liability. 
However, if the courts do not accept the proposition that intangible items can be 
categorised as goods, then the possibility exists for the supplier of an item such as a 
feature film to have different levels of liability depending on the means used to deliver 
the film to the customer. To this end it is submitted that the courts would imply 
equivalent terms at common law necessary to create parity and consistency between 
identical items, albeit supplied via different media. Any alternative conclusion would 
surely lead to an unacceptable dichotomy in the implied terms applicable to what are 
essentially identical transactions. 
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Conclusion 
In this section the ability and extent to which parties can dictate their rights and 
obligations in electronic contracts or exclude or restrict their liability under a contract 
have been examined. While it is important for sellers and suppliers to control their risks 
and potential liabilities by the use of contractual terms it is equally important to protect 
weaker parties against unfair or unreasonable t rms. In the electronic environment hese 
often competing needs are emphasised because parties are entering new and different 
contractual relationships. The potential effects of the common law rules on the 
incorporation of terms and overriding legislation such as UCTA and UTCCR must be 
predictable sufficiently certain to create confidence in the use of electronic contracts. 
The common law rules of incorporation provide the courts with the opportunity 
to declare contractual terms ineffective because they have not become part of the 
contract. As is the case with the common law rules on contract formation, although the 
principles are flexible enough to be applied to electronic contracts the uncertainty created 
by having to speculate as to how the courts may apply principles to the electronic 
environment does not provide the predictability required to promote confidence. 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act has the ability to protect both business parties 
and consumers against the use of exemption clauses. The greater protection afforded to 
those who `deal as consumer' under the Act is extended to business parties and 
companies entering contracts which are not part of their usual business activity. ' This 
added protection may be particularly important for smaller businesses looking to take 
advantage of the electronic environment by entering electronic contracts with more 
dominant trading partners. 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations have become an 
important weapon against the general use of unfair terms against consumers. The 
consumer confidence created by the publicised and pro-active discouragement of unfair 
terms by the OFT and other bodies is vitally important to the development of consumer 
trust in entering electronic contracts. In the more recent reports the investigation of 
sellers and suppliers using the electronic environment is becoming more evident. This 
will ultimately benefit the sellers and suppliers as much as the consumer because the 
i. e. Integral to or incidental to, but occurring with sufficient regularity. 
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increased consumer confidence can only lead to greater involvement in electronic 
commerce. 
The proposed amendment or amalgamation of these instruments would be 
welcomed if it codified and clarified the provisions without removing any of the 
protection afforded the business party under UCTA. One of the options mooted by the 
consultation to-date is the extension of UTCCR provisions to business-to-business 
transactions. It is submitted that although this suggestion may attract criticism for 
introducing further `red tape' to interfere with business transactions it would ultimately 
create a fairer and more stable legal environment for business and for electronic 
commerce in particular. 
The implied terms as to quality and fitness for purpose under the SGA and the 
reasonable care and skill required of service providers by the SGSA are vitally important 
elements of contracts falling within the scope of those pieces of legislation. This is 
demonstrated by their specific inclusion in measures found in UCLA and the recent 
discussions of computer software in the Court of Appeal. It is submitted that their 
extension to `dematerialised goods' and ̀ intangibles' or `data-products' is not only vital to 
promote confidence in, what will become the largest single subject matter of electronic 
contracts, but also to maintain legal consistency. The legal status of an item should not 






This thesis has set out to demonstrate that the legal environment applicable to 
electronic contracts lacks the certainty, consistency and predictability required to 
promote their use. 
The approach adopted in this thesis has been to analyse the key legal provisions 
applicable to electronic contracts. Common law and regulatory principles have been 
examined to assess their potential impact on electronic contracts and more generally 
electronic commerce. Areas of legal uncertainty, inconsistency and unpredictability have 
been highlighted to illustrate the potential difficulties encountered when applying existing 
principles to electronic contracts. 
In the introduction three key elements were identified as required for the creation 
of a stable and predictable legal environment for electronic contracts: 
1) The removal of legal ̀barriers' to the use of electronic contracts; 
2) A non-discriminatory or medium neutral approach to contracts formed and 
performed by electronic means; and 
3) The creation of legal certainty in the principles and legislation applicable to 
contractual relationships created in the electronic environment. 
It was also emphasised that in addition to these elements the cross-border 
potential of electronic commerce and hence electronic contracts must be taken into 
account. 
These criteria have been employed in the body of this work to identify the legal 
principles capable of having a detrimental impact on the use of electronic contracts. It is 
logical therefore that they should be considered first. 
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Legal barriers to electronic contracts may take a variety of forms and as the 
discussion in chapter 7 indicates, may come from a variety of sources. 
Traditional requirements of form, such as ̀ writing' and ̀ signature', have been 
considered the main potential barriers to electronic contracts because of doubts as to 
whether electronic forms of communication can satisfy those requirements. Formal 
requirements in the legislation of England and Wales are unlikely to cause significant 
problems for electronic contracts for a number of reasons. First, few requirements of 
form that exist apply to contracts in general and as such are unlikely to inhibit the use of 
electronic contracts. Secondly, if the courts adopt a purposive approach to the 
interpretation of the requirements then in the majority of situations the electronic forms 
of communication will probably be accepted as satisfying the requirement. However, the 
main problem for electronic contracts is created by the uncertainty surrounding whether 
electronic communications can satisfy formal requirements, rather than by the 
requirements themselves. 
In recognition of the uncertainty created by formal requirements the European 
Commission introduced measures to combat the problem at Community level. Article 5 
of the Electronic Signatures Directive was intended to create legal certainty in relation to 
electronic signatures and Article 9 of the Electronic Commerce Directive had the object 
of requiring Member State governments to remove potential legal barriers to electronic 
contracts. As Directives, the method of implementation of these measures is left to the 
discretion of the Member States. Arguably, the approach adopted in the United 
Kingdom does not go far enough to create legal certainty sufficiently quickly. The 
piecemeal nature of the approach in section 8 of the Electronic Communications Act is 
slow and the lack of statutory recognition of advanced electronic signatures as 
functionally equivalent to their traditional counterparts leaves legal uncertainty as to their 
standing. 
Potential barriers to the use of certain forms of electronic communication have 
also been introduced in legislation intended specifically for electronic commerce. They 
can also be found in legislation addressing related issues, such as distance selling. In a 
number of situations additional requirements can be justified because of the need to 
maintain safeguards for parties entering contracts in the electronic environment. For 
example, information requirements introduced to address the problem of identification 
in the electronic environment. However, even where new requirements are justified it is 
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submitted that sufficient consideration has not been given to the nature of the electronic 
environment and electronic contracts. For example the introduction of requirements 
which may be difficult to fulfil or ambiguous to interpret such as the requirement hat 
information be provided in a `durable form' or be `permanently accessible'. These 
requirements have the potential to lead to disputes about their interpretation and 
application to various technologies, resulting in uncertainty and a lack of confidence in 
the use of electronic contracts. 
A nail-disa-irninatrny orndii'n neutral appmuuh to mntracts fomx&and perfn»rnl by ekc icn1e4ms 
Naturally, formal requirements which create barriers to the use of electronic 
contracts may also be considered discriminatory measures and their removal can provide 
a medium neutral approach. There are also a number of measures of a discriminatory 
nature which have been introduced in legislation relevant o electronic communications. 
The measures are discriminatory because they require higher standards of electronic 
communications than their paper-based counterparts. For example; the levels of 
reliability and security expected of electronic signatures go beyond anything expected of 
traditional signatures; the requirement hat contract terms are provided in a manner 
allowing for their storage and reproduction is not something usually required of 
traditional contracts. Higher standards may be justified because of the nature of the 
electronic environment, but if they are, they need to be explicitly clear and the higher 
standards hould be reflected in the legal status of the communication. 
An area of particular concern in relation to discriminatory treatment of electronic 
contracts was identified in chapter 13 in relation to statutory implied terms. Traditional 
definitions of `goods' and `services' have the potential to discriminate against 
dematerialised goods or data products, denying them the benefit of the statutory implied 
terms. It was suggested that the courts may imply equivalent terms at common law to 
prevent purchasers from being ̀ unprotected'. However, even if they are there may still 
be discrimination because specific measures such as section 6 of UCTA will not apply. 
The aaztiGi of legal c w=vy m the principles and kgislatran applicable to wntracwd relatiars&ips 
cmataiii Ael icazvav vit 
A lack of legal certainty has been identified by this thesis as the most common 
and potentially damaging deterrent to the use of electronic contracts. Although a lack of 
legal certainty may be found in many areas of the law it is particularly detrimental in an 
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area new to the majority of individuals and businesses. Areas of legal uncertainty have 
been found in the common law and legislation. 
C, arrrxrz law sown s of imc, 7ainry 
The application of common law principles is never an exact science because the 
principles developed by the courts are intended to be flexible and transferable. It is due 
to this flexibility that those principles transfer readily to the electronic contracts. 
However, predicting the courts' interpretation and application of those principles in the 
electronic environment is somewhat more problematic. Two vitally important steps of 
the contractual process, formation and the incorporation of terms, which remain the 
domain of the common law have elements which require statutory attention if legal 
uncertainty is to be removed. 
In the formation process the point of contract formation, in particular the point 
of effective acceptance of the offer, is a major source of uncertainty. However, it is not 
the question of whether the postal rule should apply or not that is the source of the 
uncertainty but rather the question of when an electronic communication of acceptance 
is received. Regulatory attempts to address this issue, in the form of the draft Electronic 
Commerce Directive, resulted in a rather confused and unhelpful Article which was 
ultimately discarded. Unfortunately the issue will now produce an equally confused 
debate in the courts at a point in the near future. The UNC1TRAL Model Law probably 
provides the clearest set of rules on the matter, but Parliament was not persuaded to 
move the issue away from the courts. 
It could be argued that a regulatory measure has already addressed the issue tis a- 
vis regulation 9(1) of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, wherein 
it is stated that service providers shall clearly inform customers of "the different technical 
steps to follow to conclude the contract". However, this approach has been adopted by 
many suppliers for some years because of the uncertainty surrounding the application of 
the principles of contract formation to electronic contracts. It is submitted that this 
approach has demonstrably led to attempts by suppliers, in their `terms of website use' to 
distort the contract formation process significantly in their favour to the detriment of the 
consumer. For example: 
"No contract will subsist between you and [.. ] for the sale by it to you of any 
product unless and until [.. ] accepts your order by e-mail confirming that it has 
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dispatched your product. That acceptance will be deemed complete and will be 
deemed for all purposes to have been effectively communicated to you at the 
time [.. ] sends the e-mail to you (whether or not you receive that e-mail). "' 
It is submitted that rather than aiding clarity this approach in reality harms the consumer. 
The common law rules on incorporation, particularly by `reasonably sufficient 
notice' are a cause of uncertainty primarily because of the multitude of ways in which 
customers can be given notice of terms in the electronic environment. However, it is 
conceded that the position is no less certain for electronic contracts than it is for more 
traditional ones. Suppliers are aware that the notice they give of their terms must give 
the customer the opportunity to acquaint himself with the terms and it is submitted that 
the technology available to the supplier may play a role in any adjudication. For example, 
a simple hypertext reference at the bottom of a webpage may not be considered 
reasonably sufficient when a pop-up scroll box could be used without any detriment to 
the use-ability of the site. 
In the light of recent judicial comments and the increased risk of identity fraud in 
the electronic environment here is an undeniable need for the much maligned doctrine 
of mistaken identity at common law to be unravelled by Parliament. As a matter of 
policy there must be a system of justly allocating loss in the event of fraud. If losses were 
distributed in accordance with fault then a useful caveat will also be created for sellers to 
take steps to ensure the identity of their contracting partner. 
Whilst the common law is flexible and therefore capable of adapting to 
technological and societal change, the speed of that change is inadequate to meet the 
immediate need for legal certainty in electronic contracts. As a consequence the legal 
uncertainty created has the potential to at least result in costly precautionary steps to be 
taken by those entering electronic contracts and at worst deter parties from using 
electronic contracts stifling the development of electronic commerce. The fact that 
common law can accommodate the technological changes does not necessarily mean that 
it should. 
Sou ws of tract? in y in lc islatkn 
This thesis has identified two key sources of uncertainty in legislative measures 
applicable to electronic contracts; the first is the application of existing principles which 
uk. I 'Amazon'terms and conditions of sale, available at: httl2: //www. amazon. co. 
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are inappropriate for the electronic environment and the second is the introduction of 
regulatory measures which do not take sufficient account of the nature of the electronic 
environment and electronic contracts. 
There is no better demonstration of both of these problems than the rules on 
jurisdiction. 
Many of the difficulties highlighted with the Brussels Convention are caused by 
the reliance on the search for some form of `physical' presence in many of the 
provisions, which is an inappropriate base in the electronic environment. For example, 
the `place of performance of the obligation in question' is potentially difficult to assess 
online; the need for a consumer to `take steps necessary for the conclusion of the 
contract' in his home state creates a potential problem with mobile technology; and from 
the case law, the existence of a secondary establishment has implications of a physical 
presence. While a physical presence has traditionally been an important factor in 
jurisdiction issues, the concept may need some re-consideration in the light of electronic 
communications and the Internet in particular. The consumer protection measures in 
the Convention are an additional source of uncertainty because of the debate 
surrounding `advertising' and whether websites could constitute advertising targeting a 
consumer's jurisdiction for the purpose of the Convention. 
The new Regulation was introduced with the expressed objective of clarifying a 
number of these uncertainties, but it is submitted that insufficient account was taken of 
the nature of the electronic environment in the development of the new measures. 
While the retention of the basic need for a physical presence is understandable, it is 
unfortunate that this need was not qualified in the context of an electronic or `virtual' 
presence. For example, the clarification of `place of performance' only deals with the 
supply of goods or provision of services, which would appear to leave uncertainty in the 
case of `data products'. The `clarification' introduced for the provision of services does 
not account for the fact that the services may be `provided' on a remote device which 
could be located anywhere. The use of a virtual presence such as a website as a 
secondary establishment was not considered, although the potential impact of such a 
presence in a particular jurisdiction is identical to that of a physical ̀ branch, agency or 
other establishment'. Perhaps the most concerning omission in the new Regulation is an 
explanation of the replacement of `advertising' in the consumer protection provision 
with `directing or pursuing... activities'. The clear intention behind the provision was to 
extend consumer protection to cases where interactive websites are in use, and the 
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provision is capable of being interpreted in that manner. However, the lack of any 
clarification in the final instrument means that this potentially vital issue for the 
development of consumer trust and confidence in cross-border electronic contracts is 
left uncertain and for interpretation by the Member State courts. 
Legislation such as UCTA and UTCCR is extremely important for the promotion 
of confidence in electronic contracts and electronic commerce. There are a number of 
references in UCTA to formal requirements which could raise questions in the electronic 
environment, however, it is submitted that the courts will adopt a purposive approach to 
the interpretation of those requirements. With the amendment and possible 
combination of these instruments on the horizon, there would appear to be an ideal 
opportunity to remove any unnecessary references to writing and clarify certain 
provisions. However, for the promotion of small business use of electronic commerce it 
is hoped that the valuable protection provided by UCTA is not eroded but clarified and 
expanded in the revised provisions. 
To-date, where `new' measures have been introduced with the objective of 
accommodating new methods of communication and electronic contracts, insufficient 
consideration has been given to the nature of the electronic environment to produce 
regulation which is sufficiently clear to provide the legal certainty and favourable legal 
environment desired. 
Electronic contracts are just contracts formed and often performed by modern 
means of communication. If the message creating an electronic contract, or indeed the 
subject matter of that contract, is the same as a traditional contract then its legal 
significance should not be affected by the medium through which it is sent. However, 
electronic contracts are sufficiently different in nature, to challenge the application of 
existing legal principles. At present, this challenge is not being met by the law and the 
stable, predictable and consistent legal environment required to promote the use of 
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